One of the worst characteristics a military individual or
organization can exhibit is timidity.
Before we go any further, let’s define timidity. For our discussion, timidity is the failure
to act at an opportune moment due to doubt and uncertainty. Timidity eliminates the possibility of bold
success – and devastating failure. The
timid commander will experience neither and, as a result, accomplish nothing.
Let’s consider a few historical examples and then we can discuss
the phenomenon.
First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal – 13-Nov-1942
The Japanese, in a major attempt to reinforce Guadalcanal,
committed a large task force of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers,
commanded by Adm. Abe, to shell Henderson Field and prepare the way for
transports carrying troop reinforcements.
After a confusing, point blank night battle, the defending US force was
almost wiped out while Abe retained the bulk of his force intact and relatively
undamaged. The way was clear for Abe to
continue on and completely eliminate the US naval presence, destroy Henderson
Field, and assure the safe landing of the Japanese reinforcements. Inexplicably, Abe broke off the engagement
and retired. His timidity likely cost
the Japanese possession of Guadalcanal.
Battle off Samar – 25-Oct-1944
Japan’s Center Force, led by Kurita, was still very
powerful, consisting of four battleships (including the Yamato), six heavy cruisers, two light
cruisers and eleven destroyers.
The group encountered the US escort carriers
and escorting destroyers (Taffy 3). Despite incessant US air attacks by improperly
armed aircraft which were generally ineffective and the destroyer’s heroic
actions, Kurita’s force sank three destroyers and the escort carrier Gambier
Bay. At that point, the way to the
amphibious shipping at Leyte Gulf was wide open. Inexplicably, Kurita broke off the attack,
turned away, and retired to the north.
German Surface Fleet in WWII
The Germans exhibited repeated, institutional timidity in
the use of their surface fleet. This
resulted in the withholding of powerful ships (Tirpitz) from action and the
piecemeal expenditure of other ships for little gain.
US Submarine Commanders – 1942
US submarine commanders in the first year of WWII exhibited
the inbred, institutional timidity that their peacetime training had instilled
in them. They were cautious and timid in
the extreme. It wasn’t until more
aggressive commanders took their places that the US submarine effort became
effective. Of course, the faulty torpedo
issue didn’t help!
General George McClellan – US Civil War
Gen. McClellan’s repeated timidity was demonstrated by his
refusal to press his advantage during the Peninsula campaign and the Battle of
Antietam which could have dealt a decisive blow to the Confederacy. Thus, the war dragged on and President Lincoln
eventually replaced McClellan.
Military history is replete with examples of timidity that
forfeited the opportunity for decisive victory.. History is also full of examples of the
opposite, which is calculated boldness and aggressiveness. For example,
Battle of Mobile Bay – 5-Aug-1864
During the American Civil War, a Union fleet led by Adm.
David Farragut attacked a Confederate fleet and three forts guarding Mobile
Bay. During the battle, when confronted
with a minefield that could have stymied the Union attack, Adm. Farragut issued
his oft paraphrased order, “Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead”. The Union fleet passed through the minefield
and went on to defeat the Confederate fleet, seize the forts, and capture
Mobile Bay.
I won’t belabor the point with endless illustrations of
timidity and boldness.
Today, US commanders are the very epitome of timidity. They spend their command tours in a state of
near-paralysis, praying that no one in their command makes a mistake that could
result in the dreaded ‘loss of confidence’ and removal from command. US naval timidity derives directly from the
zero-defect mentality that has taken hold of the Navy. When mistakes are not allowed and no second
chances are given, timidity quickly manifests and becomes the ruling culture.
While the formal antidote to timidity is intel,
comprehensive intel is often unavailable at the opportune moment. At that point, there is no substitute for an
inherent sense of boldness and aggressiveness backed, of course, by tactical
competence and experience. Boldness
requires self-confidence whereas timidity results from the complete absence of self-confidence.
It should be noted that timidity is not simply an artifact
of hindsight where poor decisions or poor results are ascribed to
timidity. Someone can make bad decisions
without being timid. An aggressive plan
can go badly wrong without having timidity to blame (Operation Market Garden in
WWII, for example).
This leads us to note that there is a fine line between
timidity and prudence. Prudence can be
thought of as the opposite of a calculated risk – it is a calculated caution. Adm. Spruance’s decision at Midway to retire
after having achieved a significant measure of success was a calculated caution
that avoided a possible night battle with Japanese battleships – a battle he
could not have won. His prudence
preserved the American success.
So, how do we avoid instilling a habit of timidity in our
military leaders? It starts with
abandoning the zero-defect mentality and practice. In fact, we need to practice the opposite. We need to encourage officers to make mistakes
that they can learn from. We need to
foster an attitude and environment of calculated risk taking coupled with
forgiveness.
Encouraging mistakes is good but we have to provide a
‘sandbox’ where officers can exercise their risk taking. That sandbox is wargames and fleet
exercises. No amount of policy papers
encouraging mistakes will accomplish anything.
We need to turn officers loose in realistic exercises to try things and
succeed or fail and to do so with no penalties for failing. We need to be running ten times as many
exercises as we do now and they need to be free form and realistic.
We bred timidity into our Navy and we can breed it out. We just need to make it a priority.
