Constellation Lessons

Christopher Cavas has a maritime podcast and recently offered a ‘lessons learned’ episode about the Constellation.[1]  In it, he speaks with former Under and Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly and retired Rear Admiral and former Fincantieri executive Chuck Goddard about lessons from the Constellation disaster.  Both Modly and Goddard were intimately involved with the Constellation.  Modly’s contribution was the usual worthless civilian nonsense.  Goddard’s thoughts are what we’ll focus on.  The podcast is interesting and worth listening to but not for the right reasons.
 
As you listen to the podcast, understand that both men were involved with the Constellation and, given the magnitude of the program failure, clearly neither man was part of the solution which means they were part – a very large part! - of the problem.  The entire interview, then, is the problem explaining what went wrong without being aware enough to even recognize that they were what went wrong!  The problem was trying to explain what the problem was!  The resulting discussion was exactly what you’d expect:  a mishmash of delusion and obvliviousness.
 
Before we go any further, it is important to understand Goddard’s background.
 

• Senior Vice President responsible for the FFG 62 Program for Fincantieri Marinette Marine (FMM)
• Capture Executive for the $5.5 billion FFG(X) program at Fincantieri Marine Group
• CEO, President and GM of FMM from Jun 2011 – Jul 2014
• Lockheed Martin director of Aegis Program Integration and Capture Manager for the Aegis Combat Systems Engineering Agent (CSEA) competition
• During his thirty-year career with the Navy, he led a variety of complex ship programs from destroyers to sealift ships, culminating in his role as the Navy Program Executive Officer, Ships
• Vice Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
• Chairman SUBSAFE Program review
• DDG 1000 Major Program Manager during design and development
• New Construction Officer at Supervisor of Shipbuilding, San Diego, CA overseeing AOE-10, Sealift Conversion and Sealift New Construction programs

 
He has been involved in a lot of failures and had an entire career to effect positive changes and completely failed to do so.  Almost every group he was with has been heavily criticized on this blog.  He has been part of, and known nothing but, failure his entire career.
 
As a general observation, Goddard utterly fails to grasp any actual lessons learned beyond the superficial and nearly irrelevant level which is typical of managerial incompetence.  Such managers simply can’t see or grasp the real lessons.  If they could, they would have changed things while they were in a position to do so.
 
For example, one of the major (perhaps the main) lessons from the Constellation was something we’ve harped on relentlessly:  the failure to generate a comprehensive Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  The Constellation never had a sharply defined mission/function.  It was a mini-Burke which is to say that it was all things to all people.  Goddard himself offers an observation that simultaneously demonstrates this and illustrates his complete failure to grasp what it means.  He noted that the Constellation eventually sank under the weight of the never-ending flood of change orders emanating from NAVSEA’s attempt to spec and build the frigate as a destroyer because they had no experience designing and building a frigate so they fell back on what they knew:  the Burke!  They designed and spec’ed the Constellation as if it were a Burke.  This demonstrates the lack of a CONOPS that would have filtered out any destroyer-like, non-frigate changes.  Absent a sharply defined CONOPS, there was no basis to reject any change order since each change, in isolation, seemed justifiable.  
 
While he fails to understand the true relevance of his observation, Goddard nevertheless identifies a key failing of the Navy:  they only know how to make one type of surface combatant, the Burke.  All their expectations, requirements, specifications, etc. are from the Burke.  I’ve repeatedly talked about the folly of continuing to build the Burke class (see, “Burkes – TheAnchor Around the Navy’s Neck”) and the folly of building large, multi-function ships, in general.  We should be building many types of single function ships and this is yet another reason why.  We need a Navy/NAVSEA that is comfortable with multiple ship types and understands why they exist, what their roles are, how they differ, and how to spec and build them.  The Chinese have extensive classes of missile boats, corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and destroyer/cruisers.  We have Burkes and that’s it.  We are a one-trick pony surface fleet and one-trick NAVSEA.  We know nothing else but Burkes.
 
Goddard’s comment about NAVSEA attempting to spec the Constellation as a Burke finalizes and confirms the observation that the Constellation was a mini-Burke rather than an ASW frigate or convoy escort or whatever else some observers wished it was.  Again, Goddard recognizes the change orders as a problem but fails to see that the mini-Burke mindset was a problem stemming from the lack of a CONOPS and that NAVSEA should have been “educated” and squashed from day one.
 
The entire NAVSEA attempt to spec the Constellation as a Burke also offers the larger issue of how to appropriately “downgrade” a ship from a high end destroyer to a low level frigate.  What degree of reduced structural strength is appropriate?  What level of reduced survivability?  How much redundancy?  What degree of separation of key components? And so on.  A frigate must be “less” than a destroyer or else it is a destroyer.  Navy/NAVSEA have clearly not come to terms with the appropriate level of downgrading for a frigate.
 
Goddard and Modly go on to offer other, multiple, supposed lessons learned but fail to accept even the slightest blame for their own involvement and failings.  For example, Goddard notes that the Constellation, still only partially complete, had already gained 1000 ton on what was intended to be a 7000 ton ship.  That’s more than a 14% growth even before the ship was half complete!  Despite that stunning failure, no one made any attempt to figure out why the weight gain was occurring and what to do about it.
 
The podcast is interesting but ultimately worthless in terms of any actual lessons learned and illustrates that the people running the Navy are so completely incompetent that they are inherently incapable of recognizing and learning any actual lessons.
 
 
 
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[1] Defense & Aerospace Report CAVASSHIPS Podcast [Dec 04, ’25] Ep: 220 Tom Modly & Chuck Goddard on Constellation Lessons Learned, 4-Dec-2025,
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/defense-aerospace-report-cavasships-podcast-dec-04/id1573063059?i=1000739767674

Navy SUPSHIP and Waivers

Congress has recently been exercising their mandated oversight responsibilities over the military.  This is all for the good and I commend them, as a group, while noting that they should be much more vigorous, rigorous, and punitive in their actions.  Still, it’s an improvement. 

 

Congress requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) review the Navy’s Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) organization which functions under NAVSEA (which I have previously stated should be eliminated as a completely worthless organization).  To that end, GAO has released a report examining the role of SUPSHIP.  As the report notes, SUPSHIP

 

… serve as the Navy’s on-site technical, contractual, and business authority for the construction of Navy vessels at major private shipyards.[1]

 

These are the people who should be ensuring that ships are built properly and to specification.  The reality, however, is that ships are routinely delivered significantly incomplete, non-functional, and, in some cases, damaged.  Clearly, SUPSHIP is failing and failing badly.  For example, GAO

 

… found in 2018 that the lead ships for six Navy programs experienced delays in providing the ships to the fleet, ranging from 6 months to 6 years, and cost growth as high as 154 percent.[1]

 

As the report states,

 

Collectively, these results have raised questions about the Navy’s ability to effectively oversee shipbuilder performance throughout the construction of new ships.[1]

 

GAO was commissioned to find out why.

 

Think about the concept embodied in SUPSHIP. 

 

While prime contractors are responsible for controlling the quality of their work, the Navy relies on the SUPSHIPs, as the government’s primary on-site representatives, to perform quality assurance oversight during ship construction at private shipyards.[1]

 

These are supposed experts in ship construction and they are emplaced in the shipyards that the Navy contracts with.  They see the ships being built on a daily basis.  There should be no surprises, no quality issues, no incomplete ships, and no construction failures  …  and yet there are.  In fact, failure is the norm.  How can that be?  Well, peruse the following quotes from the report that point at various SUPSHIP issues. 

 

Note, in the following quotes, ‘we’ refers to GAO.

 

… we found in 2013 that, while the number of significant deficiencies generally had dropped, the Navy continued to accept the delivery of ships with open deficiencies that lingered after ship delivery.

 

We recommended in 2013, among other things, that the Navy clarify in its policy when contractor-responsible deficiencies should be fully corrected during the acquisition process for shipbuilding programs and ensure the policy is followed. In response, DOD indicated that it would monitor whether additional guidance was necessary but took no further action to implement our recommendation. [emphasis added]

 

In July 2017, we found that problems with quality, completeness, and reliability persisted when ships were turned over to the Navy’s fleet.  Although a certain number of deficiencies can be expected for something as complex as a Navy ship, we found that the Navy’s routine acceptance of ships with significant unresolved deficiencies and reliability problems consumed limited resources, diminished ship performance, and added to sailors’ workloads.

 

… we recommended that the Secretary of the Navy revise the service’s ship delivery policy to clarify what types of Supervisors of Shipbuilding deficiencies need to be corrected and what mission capability must be achieved at acceptance of ship delivery from the shipbuilder and when the ship is provided to the fleet. DOD did not agree with this 2017 recommendation and has yet to take action to implement it. [emphasis added]

 

We found that the Navy infrequently uses specific quality incentives in contracts, and that, when used, they have minimal effect on the SUPSHIPs’ quality assurance activities …

 

… SUPSHIPs traditionally perform limited or no on-site quality assurance of the ship systems and components developed and produced away from the shipyards.

 

… for key complex systems that must be integrated into the ships, the SUPSHIPs’ lack of involvement prior to the [Government Furnished Equipment’s] arrival at the shipyard reduces opportunities to leverage their expertise to address known problems.

 

We found that the Navy largely limits the SUPSHIPs’ involvement in key decision-making activities for shipbuilding programs prior to contract awards.

 

 

 

Waivers

 

As regular readers know, ComNavOps is death on waivers, believing they are unjustified, regardless of circumstances, during peacetime.  Indeed, the report repeatedly addresses the use of waivers as a detriment to successful ship construction and delivery as evidenced by the following quotes.

 

Prior to the [Ford] acceptance trials, the CNO also approved a waiver for the advanced arresting gear that excluded the system from inspection during the trials.

 

We found that five of 12 case study ships used deficiency waivers approved by the CNO—50 waivers in total—to proceed with acceptance trials.  Additionally, the Navy’s subsequent acceptance of ship deliveries for five of the ships was supported by 59 waivers for starred card deficiencies identified by INSURV during the trials.

 

… we found that the Navy has received standing waivers for some deficiencies with Virginia class submarines that will never meet Navy specifications or cannot be completed prior to acceptance trials due to time restrictions.

 

… waiving incomplete or deficient equipment through trials and delivery reduces the SUPSHIPs’ ability to hold the shipbuilder accountable for timely correction of deficiencies by allowing shipbuilders to deliver ships that have yet to meet requirements.

 

The Navy’s use of waivers and the corresponding limits to the SUPSHIPs’ shareable knowledge of the condition of waived systems also have the potential to mask construction problems with longer-term quality and performance consequences.

 

 

 

 

Here’s a table showing a couple examples of the use of waivers in Acceptance Trials and Delivery (table adapted from report [1]).

 

	Acceptance Trial Waivers	Delivery Waivers
CVN-78	15	36
DDG-1001	29	18

 

 

Waivers are tossed around like confetti.  Is it any wonder that ships are delivered incomplete, non-functional, and damaged?  All waivers must be personally approved by the CNO.  That makes this entire mess solely and personally his fault.  Congress needs to immediately fire SecNav and CNO.  Of course, if either had an ounce of integrity, they’d resign in shame.

 

NAVSEA and SUPSHIP need to be eliminated since neither perform an effective, useful function.

 

 

 

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[1]Government Accountability Office, “Navy Shipbuilding, Increasing Supervisors of Shipbuilding Responsibility Could Help Improve Program Outcomes”, April 2022

Ford Trials and Propulsion Problems

The new carrier Ford has suffered more than its share of problems due to normal shakedown issues plus the stupidity of concurrency.  Well known problems include,

• Weapon elevators
• EMALS
• Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG)
• Nuclear propulsion / main turbines
• Dual Band Radar

Most of the problems have been well documented and thoroughly discussed but the propulsion problems are far less understood and far less public so let’s take a closer look at the propulsion problems.

Ford is currently undergoing Post Shakedown Availability (PSA) to correct the various problems identified in trials and sea periods.  However, the PSA completion date has been repeatedly extended due in large part to the elevators and propulsion problems.

Problems with the propulsion system are less understood publicly. The problem isn’t resident in the two nuclear reactors aboard but rather the ship’s main turbines generators that are driven by the steam the reactors produce.

… two [of four] of the main turbine generators needed unanticipated and extensive overhauls. As Geurts [Navy acquisition chief James Geurts] told Congress, the ship’s company discovered the problem during sea trials. (1)

The turbine generator repairs are likely related to earlier propulsion issues related to a recent design change which forced the ship to return to port in May 2018. (2)

Here’s a brief timeline of the propulsion problems and the various trials that the ship has undergone.

Jun 2016  Major turbine problems discovered

Apr 2017  Builder’s Trials

May 2017 Acceptance Trials

May 2017 Delivery

Jan 2019  Propulsion problem discovered

May 2019 Propulsion problem forced return to port

Note the ineffectiveness and pointlessness of the trials.  The Navy knew about the major turbine issues and yet accepted the ship anyway.  Subsequent trials failed to discover the additional propulsion problems.  I have one question: What’s the point of trials if we’re going to accept damaged ships anyway and if the trials don’t reveal problems that routine operating does?  Trials have become a joke.  Since they accomplish nothing, why not just do away with trials and save some money?

The first several LPD-17 ships were accepted with many thousands of hours of incomplete work.  The early LCS’es were accepted with incomplete compartments.  Zumwalt was accepted with none of its combat systems installed.  Ford was accepted with major systems inoperable and compartments incomplete (see, “PartialDelivery – Total Obfuscation” and “Navy To Accept And Commission Damaged Ship”).

Here’s a bit more background on some of the propulsion problems.

A transformer/voltage regulator problem caused main turbine generator failures in Jun 2016.

A serious voltage regulator problem on the carrier's four main turbine generators (MTGs) has prevented engineers from running the motors up to full power, and only now has the problem been identified and a fix decided upon.

The MTGs are a significant element in the ship's power generation system – an all-new layout supporting a plant developing at least three times the electrical power of previous carriers.

The problem manifested itself June 12 when a small electrical explosion took place on the No. 2 MTG during testing. Navy sources disagree whether the term "explosion" is appropriate, but two sources familiar with the situation used the reference, one noting that "it was enough of an explosion that debris got into the turbine." (5)

May 2019 propulsion system problem was found.

This second propulsion issue is unrelated to a previous one identified earlier this year. According to Navy Times, the current issues are related to mechanical failures which prevent steam produced in the ship’s nuclear plant from adequately spinning the ship’s 30-ton propellers. (3)

A propulsion system problem was found during a Jan 2019 at-sea period.  The problem may have been a bad bearing.

“During at-sea testing in January, the crew identified one component in the propulsion train was operating outside of design specifications and took action to place the propulsion train in a safe condition,” Bill Couch spokesman for Naval Sea System told Navy Times. (4)

As we’ve seen with the waivers of certifications in the Pacific fleet and the complete lack of enforcement of construction standards, the Navy has totally abandoned any pretense of standards.  This is simply unacceptable.  Navy leadership should be fired en masse.  As they’re so fond of declaring, I have lost confidence in their ability to command.

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(1)USNI News website, “USS Gerald Ford Delivery Delayed Due to Extensive Nuclear Propulsion, Weapons Elevator Repairs; Carrier Won’t be Ready Until October”, Sam LaGrone, 26-Mar-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/03/26/uss-gerald-ford-delivery-delayed-due-extensive-nuclear-propulsion-weapons-elevator-repairs-carrier-wont-ready-October

(2)Navaltoday website, “Nuclear propulsion system repairs delay USS Gerald R. Ford’s return to fleet”,

https://navaltoday.com/2019/03/27/nuclear-propulsion-system-repairs-delay-uss-gerald-r-fords-return-to-fleet/

(3)Navaltoday website, “USS Gerald R Ford returns to port with propulsion issues”,

https://navaltoday.com/2018/05/23/uss-gerald-r-ford-returns-to-port-with-propulsion-issues/

(4)Navy Times website, “Why the Navy’s newest aircraft carrier was forced back into port”, Mark Faram, 22-May-2018,

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2018/05/23/why-the-navys-newest-aircraft-carrier-was-forced-back-into-port/

(5)Defense News website, “Carrier Ford Has Serious Power Problem”, Christopher Cavas, 18-Sep-2016,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2016/09/18/carrier-ford-has-serious-power-problem/

Ship Service Life Extensions

In their latest act of delusional fantasy, the Navy is looking at arbitrarily extending the service life of ship classes.  Of course, followers of this blog are well aware that very few Navy ships even make it to their current service life endpoints before being retired.  The Los Angeles class submarines, for example, are being retired, on average, several years prior to their service life endpoints.

Here are some of the current and proposed service life endpoints as documented in a 25-Apr-2018 NAVSEA memo.

Class      Current, yrs   Proposed, yrs

CG  52-73     35             42-52

DDG 51-78     35             45

DDG 79-       40             46-50

LHD 1-8       40             46-53

LHA 6-8       40             47-49

LSD 41-52     40             45-52

LPD 17-28     40             47-53

LCS 1-26      25             32-35

How can the Navy seriously propose extending service lives when they can’t even reach the current endpoints? 

Some of these service lives are already delusional.  For example, the DDG 79 has already been arbitrarily extended from 35 to 40 years with no physical or maintenance changes that would rationalize the extension.  It was just an arbitrary extension to make things look better when devising 30 year shipbuilding and fleet size plans.  Does anyone think we’re going to take a Burke class that was designed for a 35 year life span and, without doing anything to actually improve that span, suddenly make it to 50 years just because of a memo?

There are two main reasons for premature retirement of ships.

1. Physical abuse due to insufficient and chronically deferred maintenance.  This is self-inflicted neglect and is an ingrained aspect of the Navy’s failure to properly maintain the ships they have.

2. Technological obsolescence.  This is the excuse trotted out whenever the Navy wants new toys but can’t otherwise justify them.  Of course, this utterly ignores the ease and cost effectiveness of upgrades.

Do you recall the Perry class?  They were standing in the way of the LCS but the Navy couldn’t come up with a good reason to retire them so they removed their weapons and then claimed that they had to be retired because they were underarmed and couldn’t be upgraded.  Of course, the Australians and others promptly went and upgraded them, putting the lie to the Navy’s claims.

Does anyone believe that when the next new ship toy comes along that the Navy wants, they’re going to stop and say, “Wait, we can’t get our new toy yet because we still have service life remaining on the current class.”?  Of course not!  They’ll early retire the current ships just as they do now.

To be fair, NAVSEA points out that in order to meet these proposed service life endpoints, the Navy must adhere to the class maintenance plans – something the Navy has never done.

The memo might just as well call for extending the service lives to 100 years, or a thousand years, because they have an equally good chance of reaching those points as reaching these delusional points.  Heck, we could project a 1000 ship fleet if we simply make the service lives infinity!

Navy Accepts Incomplete and Damaged Ford

The Navy has accepted delivery of the aircraft carrier Ford.

“The Navy accepted delivery of the first-in-class aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) on May 31, following the completion of acceptance trials on May 26 …” (1)

This continues the Navy’s practice of accepting substantially incomplete ships which began with the first LCS’s, continued with the LPD-17 class, included the Zumwalt, and now counts the Ford in this should-be criminal practice. 

The Navy issued a contract for the construction and delivery of a COMPLETE aircraft carrier.  The Navy is accepting delivery of a substantially INCOMPLETE aircraft carrier.  In fact, parts of the ship are not only incomplete but are actually damaged, as we’ve documented in previous posts.

Here’s a list of known incomplete or damaged items that the Navy just accepted.  I’m not going to document these in this post since I’ve extensively documented them in previous posts.

EMALS – cannot safely launch Hornets and Growlers with wing mounted external fuel tanks;  system cannot be electrically isolated for repairs; induces unsafe oscillations of the F-35 during launch; reliability is poor with Mean Cycles Between Critical Failure (MCBCF) – a cycle is one launch – of 340 versus the target of 4,166 – every 340 launches, you’re tossin’ a plane in the drink!

Main Turbine Generator - Ford has suffered major main turbine generator (MTG) failures (an explosion of the No. 2 MTG and a similar event with the No 1 MTG) which have crippled half the the ship’s main generators.  The No. 2 MTG is non-functional and will be repaired sometime after the ship is commissioned.

Advanced Arresting Gear – The Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) is essentially non-functional, having had to undergo recent fundamental redesigns due to equipment failures.  Further, the most recent reliability data indicates the AAG is non-functional.  The MCBCF requirement for the arresting gear is one every 16,500.  The actual MCBCF is 20.  That’s a critical failure every 20 recoveries!

Weapon Elevators – cited in 2016 DOT&E Annual Report

Berthing – insufficient berthing for the CVN-78 Service Lilfe Allowance

Dual Band Radar - testing has uncovered tracking, clutter/false

track, track continuity, and engagement support problems, according to the 2016 DOT&E Annual Report

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) – system has been indefinitely deferred for budgetary reasons

This is just a selection of the problems that have come to light.  There are, undoubtedly, many others.

What is the point of sea trials and inspections if you’re going to accept the ship no matter what condition it’s in?  They may as well just cancel trials and inspections and save some money. 

Not only will the Navy accept delivery of a badly damaged ship but it will also commission a badly damaged ship.  A commissioned ship is supposed to be combat ready.

This is just stupidity beyond belief.  The only justification for accepting a damaged ship is a feeble and fraudulent attempt to generate positive public relations.

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(1)USNI News website, “Carrier Ford Delivers To Navy After 15 Months of Delays”, Megan Eckstein, 1-Jun-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/06/01/25931

NAVSEA's Failure

Who provides the quality assurance for the Navy?  Who insures that that Navy gets what it pays for?  Who shepherds new ships through construction and into the fleet?  Who monitors readiness in the fleet? 

The answer, of course, is NAVSEA (Naval Sea Systems Command).

How are they doing?  Well, given the deplorable state of the fleet, one would suspect that they are not performing their duties very well.  Let’s take a closer look.

Among other duties, NAVSEA is responsible for the INSURV inspection program which is sort of a spot check intended to determine the readiness of ships.  Thus, if the pattern of INSURV inspections shows that the ships are generally ready, we can feel confident about the fleet as a whole.  With that in mind, the 2010 report from the Fleet Review Panel of Surface Forces Readiness, headed by VAdm. Philip Balisle (the famous Balisle report, as it’s referred to publicly) stated that of the then 14 Avenger class mine countermeasures (MCM) ships, only one could get underway and fully execute the mission.

Capt. Robin Rusell, speaking for NAVSEA’s Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare (SEA 21) was quoted,

“What we had was a naval sea systems organization that was … not as responsive as it could have been.”

NAVSEA should have been inspecting the ships and loudly proclaiming the fact that the MCM fleet, at least, was almost completely idled due to lack of maintenance.  Instead, the INSURV inspections gave no hint of the state of the MCM fleet.

As the fleet continued to deteriorate, many other ships failed INSURV exams.  Of course, a ship’s failure is not NAVSEA’s fault.  Their job is simply to inspect and evaluate the ships.  However, the INSURV failures became so frequent and embarrassing that the Navy resorted to classifying the results.  Further, the inspection was eventually changed from a pass/fail event to an advisory report with no failure attached.

More recently, NAVSEA has been providing “helper” exams to give ships such as the LCS and LPD a better chance to “pass”.  NAVSEA is totally missing the point that their mission is not to pass ships but to provide a realistic assessment of the condition of ships so that Navy leadership can address problems.

On a related note, cross-decking of crew and materials is a common pre-inspection practice.  Vital needs that a ship is lacking are borrowed from another ship for purposes of passing the inspection and then the materials are returned after the inspection.  Again, this completely misses the purpose of the inspection which should be a come-as-you-are event.  If you fail, you fail and that gives Navy leadership the opportunity to provide corrective assistance to the ship in question.  Cross-decking just covers up the problem.  It’s up to NAVSEA to minimize this practice so as to obtain a more realistic assessment.  Inspections should be unannounced.

NAVSEA is also responsible for conducting acceptance trials of new ships and determining whether the ships are complete and functional.  With the LPD-17 program, NAVSEA failed badly even at this most basic function.  As documented in a CRS report (1), the Navy accepted delivery of LPD-17 with 1.1 million man-hours of additional construction needed to complete the ship.  LPD-18 was accepted with 400,000 man-hours remaining and LPD-19 was accepted with 45,000 additional man-hours needed.  In fact, two years after LPD-17 was delivered, the report notes that 138 of 943 ship spaces remained unfinished – 15% of the ship was incomplete two years after acceptance.

The LCSs were accepted in similar unfinished states.

C’mon, now.  It doesn’t get any simpler than this.  Is the ship complete?  NAVSEA couldn’t even do that correctly.

Commenting on one of the many LPD-17 mechanical problems, a 20-May-10 memo from Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command had this to say related to NAVSEA’s performance.

“Inadequate Government [ed.: NAVSEA] oversight during the construction process failed to prevent or identify as a problem the lack of cleanliness and quality assurance that resulted in contamination of closed systems.”

The memo goes on to cite a long list of oversight, maintenance, and training failures for which NAVSEA was responsible.  The entire LPD program was a case study in failed acquisition, construction, acceptance, maintenance, and training.

You’ll recall that NAVSEA traces back to 1966 when BuShips was disbanded.  The loss of the Navy’s General Board - BuShips combination was an event that the Navy has never recovered from and many of today’s current problems can be directly attributed to this loss.  NAVSEA has been a disappointment, to say the least.  A cursory comparison of the DOT&E annual reports to NAVSEA’s responsibilities reveals just how poorly NAVSEA has performed.  The Navy needs to abolish NAVSEA and return to the General Board / BuShips model.

Before we leave this topic, let’s consider why NAVSEA has failed so badly.  The reason is that NAVSEA falls under the Navy’s chain of command.  Thus, NAVSEA marches to the orders of Navy leadership.  That’s hardly a situation that encourages reporting of the unvarnished truth.  Indeed, there is much evidence, direct and indirect, that Navy leadership has, indeed, exerted undue influence on NAVSEA. 

Contrast NAVSEA’s conflicted organizational arrangement with that of Director, Operation Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) which is responsible for performance testing of the military’s systems.  The stunningly critical, honest, and effective (by comparison, at least) DOT&E reports clearly demonstrate the advantages and benefits of having the quality assurance functions divorced from the organization being evaluated.

Abolish NAVSEA !

(1) Congressional Research Services, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, Ronald O'Rourke, March 16, 2011

LCS Waiver Trials

GAO has a fascinating report out about the Navy’s acceptance of the first two LCSs despite significant uncompleted construction work (1).  ComNavOps has reported on this before but this report contains the entire ugly story.  The report describes the contract terms as they affect delivery of the ships and their acceptance by the Navy.  It also identifies the responsible parties within the Navy at the various stages.  For instance,

 “During builder’s trials, inspectors from the Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) are generally responsible for observing and identifying deficiencies.”

“During acceptance trials, the responsibility for identifying deficiencies falls upon the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV), an independent organization whose inspectors evaluate the newly constructed ship and report on its material condition to Congress and Navy leadership.”

INSURV conducts two inspections:  one for preliminary acceptance and another following post-delivery outfitting and availability periods to determine final acceptance.  Serious deficiencies are referred to as “starred” and must be corrected by the builder or waived by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Here’s the summary of results from the acceptance trials for LCS-1/2.

LCS-1 Acceptance Trial Part One

Newfound Starred Deficiencies = 21

Uninspected Systems = 63

Incomplete Certifications = 19

Incomplete Compartments = 2%

LCS-1 Acceptance Trial Part Two

Newfound Starred Deficiencies = 31

Uninspected Systems = Not Assessed

Incomplete Certifications = Not Assessed

Incomplete Compartments = Not Assessed

LCS-2 Acceptance Trial Part One

Newfound Starred Deficiencies = 39

Uninspected Systems = 83

Incomplete Certifications = 12

Incomplete Compartments = 31%

You’re probably thinking, this can’t be true.  It must be another humor piece.  No construction program could be this bad.  Sadly, it’s not.  This is real.  Keep reading. 

Both LCS-1 and LCS-2 were delivered and accepted by the Navy with major shortfalls in completeness and adherence to contract specifications.  LCS-2 had 31% of its compartments not even finished!!!  The report notes,

“We found that LCS 1 and LCS 2 were delivered with a large number of open deficiencies, the majority of which were determined to be attributable to the contractors. Our analysis found that over half of these deficiencies were closed after the ships were delivered to the Navy and were being outfitted, but other deficiencies continued to be unresolved one year after delivery—a point at which the Navy had taken final acceptance of LCS 1 and LCS 2.”

Somewhere around half the deficiencies remained unresolved a year after delivery?  How could that happen?  Here’s the explanation.

“Under the cost-reimbursement contracts, the LCS 1 and LCS 2 prime contractors were only required to give their best efforts to complete quality-related activities—along with the other work specified in the contracts—up to each contract’s estimated cost. These efforts resulted in LCS 1 and LCS 2 not completing final contract trials, and LCS 2 not finishing its acceptance trials—resulting in increased knowledge gaps related to ship performance and deficiencies. In addition, the Navy did not achieve the quality standards on LCS 1 and LCS 2 that are outlined in its own ship acceptance policy, although the policy also contains several notable flexibilities to these standards. In particular, the policy recognizes situations where the Navy may defer work until after delivery and final acceptances and affords the Chief of Naval Operations the power to waive certain quality standards outlined in the policy. The Navy relied extensively on these waivers to facilitate its trials and acceptance processes for LCS 1 and LCS 2.”

The report points out that to this day, almost five years after delivery, LCS-2 has not competed acceptance trials!!!  Clearly, the Navy has no intention of ever doing so.

The report points out that the Navy complied with all relevant rules and laws in accepting the significantly incomplete ships through the extensive use of waivers.  Technical compliance does not, however, excuse horrific program management.  None of us would pay full price for an incomplete car and yet that’s exactly what the Navy did multiple times.  By the way, the Navy did the exact same thing with the entire production run of the LPD-17 class.  No lessons learned by this Navy!

The Navy didn't conduct acceptance trials on the LCS, they conducted waiver trials.

Read the report.  It paints an absolutely stunning portrait of incompetence and mismanagement by Navy leadership.

(1) Government Accountability Office, “LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP - Navy Complied with Regulations in Accepting Two Lead Ships, but Quality Problems Persisted after Delivery”, September 2014, GAO-14-827

General Board and BuShips

Once upon a time (hey, that’s how any good fairy tale starts), the Navy designed ships in-house.  They debated needs and requirements, collected opinions from the fleet, settled on specifications, and drew up designs.  The designs were then offered to industry to bid on the actual construction.  Along the way, the Navy’s in-house experts monitored the progress of construction, compared the product to the specifications, and eventually passed judgment on whether the product quality was acceptable.  Because of the in-house knowledge and expertise, the Navy knew exactly how the ship should be built, what materials were appropriate, and how the ship would perform.  There were two groups largely responsible for this approach to ship procurement:  the General Board and BuShips.

The General Board of the Navy was established as an advisory group in 1900 and disbanded in 1951 by order of then CNO Forrest Sherman.  The board consisted of senior admirals and others, often near the end of their careers or retired who had a wealth of experience, relatively little politicking left to do, and sufficient time to consider issues facing the Navy.  While they were tasked with contemplation of any issue brought before them, their greatest value lay in the guidance and direction they provided for the Navy’s shipbuilding programs.  Anyone who has read any of Norman Friedman’s series on the design history of the various classes of ships will be well familiar with the role the General Board played in evaluating the various ship design proposals and then establishing the final requirements.  It is worthwhile to note that the General Board was abolished by the office of the CNO which viewed the Board as a threat to the CNO’s power.



The General Board - The Navy's Best Hope?



The Navy’s Bureau of Ships (BuShips) was established by Congress in 1940 and consolidated the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering.  The Bureau was responsible for the design, construction, procurement, maintenance, and repair of ships as well as establishing relevant specifications for materials, fuel, etc.  BuShips was eliminated by order of the Dept. of Defense in 1966 as part of a general reorganization of the Navy and was replaced by what is now known as the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). 

Beginning somewhere around the time of the Spruance class procurement, the Navy decided to farm out its design responsibilities to industry.  The Spruance was the result of a general set of wishes provided to industry with industry allowed to design the ship.  On the plus side, the Navy hoped that this would lead to more unconventional designs and cost savings.  On the minus side, there was no guarantee that any of the industry designs would turn out to be acceptable.  As it happened with the Spruance, a fairly good design did result.  Also on the minus side was the loss of ship design expertise and familiarity with the specifics of the design.  Thus, the Navy no longer had in-house experts who could evaluate a design and recognize good from bad.  Further, the Navy had no person or group intimately familiar with the details of a given ship class’ design.  The Navy would have to depend on industry to understand the details – the Navy knowingly and willingly abandoned the concept of attention-to-detail.  This trend of farming out design responsibilities to industry has continued to this day and has given us the LCS, LPD, DDG-1000, and other notable failures.

Here’s a simple and minor example of what happens when no one inside the Navy is responsible for, and knowledgeable about, ship design.  The Navy just recently announced that it would retrofit bridge wings to the LCS-2’s that have already been built or are under construction.  Apparently, bridge wings are necessary for vision when maneuvering the ships in tight spaces.  Of course, every sailor since Columbus has known this and yet the Navy failed to include bridge wings in the LCS-2 design.

Not to pick on the LCS, but consider the corrosion problems due to galvanic corrosion, a phenomenon that has been well understood for centuries.  The lack of in-house naval engineers with responsibility for the design led to a fundamental oversight that shouldn’t have happened.

I could go on with example after example but you get the point.

The lack of in-house technical and engineering expertise is bad enough but there is another, equally serious, problem resulting from the absence of a dedicated design group.  The people who are nominally in charge of developing requirements and overseeing the ship designs don’t stick around long enough to see their work through and take responsibility for it.  Instead, they serve their short term assignment and move on.  The people supposedly responsible for the LCS are long gone.  There is no continuity or accountability and attention to detail suffers.  Wouldn’t we all like to ask the originators of the LCS design what they were thinking?  Compare that model of ship design to the BuShips approach.  With BuShips, the designers worked in the Bureau for years and were readily accountable for their designs.  Further, for naval engineers BuShips represented the pinnacle of their careers rather than a short term stop on the way to other career paths.

I mentioned NAVSEA which replaced BuShips.  Shouldn’t they be performing the same responsibilities?  Sadly, no.  NAVSEA does not design ships.  In fact, as I understand their function, they don’t even get involved with a ship design until it’s already built.  NAVSEA verifies that the newly constructed ships meet the contract specifications but by then it’s too late to improve the design.  Worse, NAVSEA doesn’t even do this properly.  The first few LPDs were accepted by NAVSEA despite the fact that the ships weren’t even remotely close to being completed – they required thousands of post-acceptance man-hours just to physically complete the construction.  Similarly, the LCSs have been accepted with entire compartments incomplete.  NAVSEA’s acceptance evaluations have become a joke and a political and public relations tool of a politicized Navy leadership.

The Navy urgently needs to reconstitute both the General Board and BuShips if it is to have any hope of living happily ever after.