Hypersonic Intercept … Well, Not Really

ComNavOps never ceases to be amazed at the deceptive spin (I’ll refrain from using the word fraud, in this case) put out by manufacturers, the Navy, and complicit ‘news’ sources.  As you know, the ability of defensive systems to intercept hypersonic attacking missiles is questionable.  Well here’s a headline from a Naval News website article that sounds like a piece of great news:
 
Aegis Combat System Demonstrates System’s Capability to Counter Hypersonic Threats[1]
 
A Burke class destroyer, USS Pinckney (DDG-91) conducted a successful intercept of a hypersonic missile.  Well, that certainly sounds like good news.  Aegis performed a successful intercept of a hypersonic missile.  Great!
 
However, as we read a bit further into the article, we note the following: 

The USS Pinckney (DDG 91) successfully completed Flight Test Other 40 (FTX-40), also known as Stellar Banshee, using Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Combat System to detect, track and perform an engagement against a live advanced hypersonic Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) target using a simulated SM-6 Block IAU.[1][emphasis added]

Wait, what now?  The intercept used a simulated SM-6 defensive missile????  So, in reality, all the destroyer’s Aegis system did was track the hypersonic target.  It didn’t engage.  No actual intercept occurred.
 
Well, that changes the tone of the article and essentially refutes the headline, doesn’t it?
 
So, what did the test actually accomplish?  I don’t know the test objectives but it certainly didn’t demonstrate a successful intercept.  At best, it demonstrated the ability to track a hypersonic target which we already knew we could do.  At worst, it was a purely theoretical, software exercise that proved nothing.
 
The main thing all of this demonstrates is the need for us to be very careful and diligent in our reading of articles.  Take nothing for granted.  Assume whatever you’re reading is deceptive and make sure you really understand what you’re reading.
 
Congratulations Lockheed and Navy.  You theoretically shot down a target drone with a theoretical missile.  Theoretically … good job.
 
Congratulations Naval News website.  You managed to parrot a Lockheed press release without adding any analysis or value whatsoever.  You’re a credit to news reporters everywhere.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Aegis Combat System Demonstrates System’s Capability to Counter Hypersonic Threats”, Carter Johnston, 25-Mar-2025, Lockheed Martin Press Release
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/u-s-navy-downs-maneuvering-hypersonic-missile-in-sm-6-block-iau-test/

Network Lessons for Future Warfare

The Navy (and, to be fair, the entire military) has gone all-in on networking as the basis of our future combat capability.  We’re attempting to create vast regional (or worldwide!) networks of distributed sensors and weapons all tied together in a completely interchangeable, any-to-any linkage.  The Navy claims this will deliver omniscient awareness that will place us inside the enemy’s decision/action loop (OODA, for those of you who recall Col. Boyd’s work) and allow us to wreak havoc and destruction against a hapless, helpless, confused enemy.  While we aren’t at the end point with fully functioning network systems, yet, we do have more than enough existing pieces to get an accurate assessment of the viability of the concept.
 
To ever so briefly review, ComNavOps has mocked the concept as being utterly unrealistic and pure fantasy.
 
To ever so briefly review, history and real world events have mocked the concept as being utterly unrealistic with example after example of the failure of networks, sensors, and weapons.
 
Now, we have yet another real world example of the failure of networking and distributed sensing to examine.  You recall the recent friendly fire shootdown by the Navy of a F-18F Super Hornet on 22-Dec-2024 by the USS Gettysburg (CG-64)?  Reader ‘G2mil’ brought an interview to my attention that examines the incident and offers insight into the networking and sensor failures that led to the shootdown.[1]  The interview is available on YouTube and features retired Navy Capt. Kevin Eyer, a former Aegis cruiser captain, discussing the friendly fire incident with retired former Navy Commander and F-14 RIO, Ward Carroll.
 
Caution:  The interviewee, Capt. Eyer is not on active duty and made no claim to have inside authoritative information.  He did, however, imply that he has access to unofficial, inside information.  The Navy has not yet issued a formal report.  You can make your own assessment of the credibility of the Captain’s information.
 
 
Continuing …  I’ve extracted salient points from the interview and summarized them below.
 

• The IFF interrogation of the aircraft initially succeeded and the aircraft was identified as friendly.  However, the Gettysburg was in the act of recovering a helo of its own and during the recovery had to shut down all emissions.  Upon re-establishing sensor coverage, the aircraft was again queried but this time the IFF failed and the aircraft was not tagged as friendly.
• An electronic warfare (EW) operator identified the aircraft’s emissions as friendly and designated the aircraft as such.  However, the designation failed to register in the system due to a software bug that has been known since 2023.
• The EW operator followed up with a verbal designation of ‘friendly’ on the CIC communication net but, in the din, confusion, and stress of the CIC environment, the verbal statement failed to register with the TAO or anyone who might have intervened.  Verbal communications in stress situations always fail.
• The area wide Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network did correctly have the aircraft identified as friendly however the Gettysburg’s CEC was either down or failed to register the designation from the network.  Networks always fail.

 
 
Here’s a couple of interesting, related notes:
 

• USS Gettysburg ‘failed’ its pre-deployment workups with the ship and crew’s performance being notably short of meeting standards.  Despite this, the ship was allowed to proceed on deployment due to a lack of potential replacement ships.  You’ll recall that we’ve talked about the widespread use of waivers that inevitably lead to tragedy and are at the heart of nearly every incident.  We’ve also noted the Navy’s refusal to hold anyone or anything to established standards.  This ship should never have been allowed to deploy.  The entire point of pre-deployment workups is to certify that the ship/crew are proficient enough to deploy.  Gettysburg was not but deployed anyway.
• NavSea knew about the software bugs but pushed the Aegis software out into the fleet anyway.  This is literally criminal negligence and, in the civilian world, is the basis for criminal and civil trials and lawsuits all the time. 
  

 
 
Discussion
 
As with almost every incident, it was due to a number of supposedly unlikely factors all occurring together.  However, upon examination we see that some of the factors were well known and, thus, the incident was less of a freak confluence of unlikely factors and more of a known problem waiting to happen.  It was just a matter of time.
 
In this incident, we see that despite multiple ships and aircraft tracking the F-18, area wide networks sharing their data, an aircraft that was talking and squawking its identification, and the most advanced surveillance and fire control software in the world, we still managed to lose situational awareness and shoot down a friendly aircraft.  If we can’t keep track of a friendly aircraft with IFF flying a known safe flight path and with no enemy cyber or electronic hindrance, what hope does a regional (or worldwide!) network have in combat?
 
With these repeated demonstrations of ineffectiveness and unreliability, why are we basing our entire future warfare plans on this kind of network/software approach?  This network/data/software approach to warfare requires perfect performance to even begin to be useful in combat and when does perfection ever occur in combat?
 
We shoot down our own aircraft, collide with hulking merchant ships, are unable to verify attacks on us (USS Mason affair), and yet we choose to ignore those real world experiences in favor of fantasy level imaginings of future warfare.  How stupid are we?  The answer is … admiralty stupid!
 
 
 
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[1]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bo34Zwbte6c

New Threat Upgrade and Aegis

From a certain perspective, the Aegis combat system was one of the worst developments in the history of the Navy.  It directly led to the [literal] sinking of an entire class of the best ASW destroyer ever built and has resulted in expensive ships with permanently degraded radar systems.  Worse, there was an alternative to Aegis which was the New Threat Upgrade (NTU) program which would have modernized the existing conventional radars and combat systems, providing much the same capabilities.  Let’s take a closer look at NTU and Aegis.
 
 
Background
 
It became apparent to the Navy that the existing aerial (meaning, mostly, missiles) threat of the time would only grow more lethal and that this would happen sooner rather than later.  Prior to this, incoming targets had been engaged one at a time in an almost leisurely manner.  Now, however, the Navy could foresee sea-skimming, saturations attacks and they recognized that a much more flexible, rapid defense was needed with the ability to engage multiple targets simultaneously or nearly so.  The situation was made worse by the fact that each defensive missile needed a dedicated illuminator radar for guidance and each ship had only two or three such illuminators.
 
The solution that the Navy envisioned was to develop a system that would allow multiple defensive missiles to be guided against multiple targets simultaneously.  Thus was born the concept that eventually led to Aegis. 
 
However, Aegis was not the only solution.  An alternative method using conventional radars was also devised, the New Threat Upgrade.
 
 
NTU
 
As the shortcomings of the initial Standard SM-1 missile and its guidance system became apparent, a series of upgrades were developed culminating in the SM-2 which would be paired with NTU along with two new radars, the SPS-49 and SPS-48 which would have replaced the common SPS-40 and SPS-55 sets then in use.  In fact, the SPS-48/49 combination is still in use on big deck amphibious ships such as the Wasp and America classes and the SPS-48 is standard on the San Antonio class.
 

SPS-48, -49 on Wasp Class

Other new NTU-related equipment included [2]:
 

• SPS-64 navigation radar
• SLQ-34 electronic warfare
• SRQ-4 data link for SH-60 helicopters
• SYS-2 Integrated Automatic Detection and Tracking (IADT) system
• SYR-1 telemetry receivers (missile in-flight position data)

 
All of these new pieces of equipment were to feed directly to the NTDS (Naval Tactical Data System) combat system, the combat management system equivalent to Aegis.
 
The main improvement offered by NTU was the ability to time-share the few SPG-51 illuminators so that multiple missiles could be controlled by a single illuminator.  In addition, the NTU ships Kidd and Scott demonstrated cooperative engagement capability (CEC) during tests in 1989 using Link 11.
 

SPG-51 Illuminator

As it happened, the NTU upgrades were applied to the 4-ship Kidd variant of the Spruance class, USS Mahon, and the Leahy class.  Elements of NTU were applied to USS Long Beach but it is unclear whether the entire, formal NTU upgrade was applied.  USS Texas, CGN-39, was retired in the midst of its NTU upgrade.  NTU would have made the Virginia class cruisers quite formidable. 
 
NTU, when it first came out, was generally considered superior to Aegis which would spend quite some time working out its bugs, as documented in ref[1].  See the side note at the end of this post for a more detailed description of Aegis’ early problems. 
 
In the event, the Cold War ended shortly after NTU came to fruition and the resulting budget restrictions led to fierce competition between NTU and Aegis for funding.  Recognizing the teething problems of Aegis and the fact that many believed NTU to be a viable (superior, at the time) and hugely cheaper alternative, the Navy decided to, literally, sink the entire Spruance class to eliminate the possibility of a Spruance-NTU fleet threatening Aegis funding.
 
 
NTU Alternate History
 
Where would NTU have gone in its subsequent development?  It is fascinating to contemplate the course of US naval history had NTU been the winner of the combat system ‘war’.
 
One can only imagine the altered path of ship development if the Virginia-NTU and Spruance-NTU had come to pass.  It is likely that the compromised Ticonderoga class (10 lbs of ship in a 5 lb can) would never have come about and the Burkes might have, initially, been designed as the pure AAW ships they always should have been.  This could have given us two focused ship classes: the ASW Spruances and the AAW Burkes instead of trying to make the Burkes a do-everything design.  One could imagine that, having specialized ASW and AAW destroyer classes, a true cruiser class, with an emphasis on offensive firepower, might have replaced the Virginia class instead of the badly compromised Ticonderogas.
 
As for NTU, itself, it is likely that, as radar development progressed, the conventional lattice radars would have given way to something akin to the TRS-3D/4D, rotating panels.  This would have been a hugely significant development in that it would have resulted in reduced size, reduced complexity, no alignment issues, reduced weight, reduced top-heaviness (stability) issues, and less utility demands in all subsequent ship designs.  Arguably, it would have produced more resilient radar setups by allowing multiple units, each providing 360 degree, and taking up far less external space and internal volume than Aegis flat panel arrays.  In short, the follow on ship classes would have been cheaper, simpler, and more combat resilient than what the Navy actually developed.
 
The one drawback would have been reduced maximum range, however, given the close range encounters that I believe most likely to occur in modern combat, much of Aegis’ performance claims are have been rendered moot.  Remember that Aegis was developed to counter high altitude, massed bomber and missile attacks.  For that, maximum radar range was required and, thus, the development of Aegis was understandable.  However, that requirement was fairly quickly abandoned in favor of low level attacks and NTU would have been equal or superior in that case.  Further, as it turns out, current advances in radar technology have seen small, rotating flat panel radars with claims of range equaling or exceeding the Aegis SPY claims.  Whether any of those claims are accurate is, of course, unknown.
 
In short, Aegis imposed all manner of severe penalties on the Navy and subsequent ship designs.  NTU might well have avoided most/all of those.
 
 
Aegis Cost
 
One of the main disadvantages of Aegis was that it was hideously expensive for the time (still is!).  The CIMSEC report makes note of the high cost of Aegis development and fielding. 

… [Aegis] critics noted the cost of fielding Aegis was consuming much of the Navy’s budget for engineering development. At the same time, ADM Zumwalt was committed to replacing the Navy’s World War II-era surface escorts which were still in service. To make this escort replacement program affordable, ADM Zumwalt planned to asked Congress to fund a “high-low” mix of ships, which featured low capability, less expensive escorts for convoy protection and high capability, higher speed escorts for work with carriers. The projected high cost of Aegis made ADM Zumwalt’s task of obtaining funds for large numbers of both “high” and “low” capability ships just that much more difficult.
 
At that stage ADM Zumwalt considered cancelling the whole project. He was angry because there was no AAW development plan to integrate the various ongoing AAW projects, and he correctly anticipated that Congress would resist funding sufficient numbers of an expensive, nuclear-powered Aegis ship.[1]

USS Long Beach was considered for an AEGIS conversion but the $800M (then year dollars) cost was prohibitive.[1]
 
NTU, in comparison, used modifications of existing radars and required no great redesign of ships in order to accommodate it and certainly did not require that a new class of ship be built just to ‘hold’ it.
 
 
History’s Judgment
 
Some might argue that even if Aegis was not all it was claimed to be, initially (what is?), it has now developed into the most advanced radar-combat system in the world.  However, this is simply not true.  As mentioned, Aegis is degraded fleet wide and this is, apparently, a permanent condition.  The degree of degradation is unknown as is the actual capability of the system since it has never been tested under realistic conditions.[3]
 
Recent events have also demonstrated that Aegis’ claims far exceed its actual capabilities as the entire USS Mason incident demonstrated (see, “Yemen Missile Attacks”).  The Navy has claimed to have shot down some drones and missiles recently, related to the Israeli-Hamas conflict, but, again, no details have emerged.
 
History also notes that conventional, rotating radars have become quite advanced with manufacturers claiming performance equal to or exceeding Aegis.  Of course, manufacturer claims are invariably greatly exaggerated.  Still, to those who would suggest that all the pain and cost of Aegis at least led us to a point we could not have otherwise reached, I would point out that current hybrid, rotating panel radars prove we could have reached this same point without going the Aegis route.
 
 
Conclusion
 
This post is emphatically not a debate about which system, NTU or Aegis, was or would become the better system.  As it turns out, Aegis has never lived up to its full hype.  The system is so complex that it is perpetually degraded, fleet wide, as stated by the Navy.  Whether that degraded state is superior to what would have been a modernized NTU system is, as I stated, unknown and not the point of the post.  The point of the post is that Aegis imposed heavy costs and penalties on the Navy by eliminating an entire class of the best ASW destroyer the world has ever seen just to ensure that Aegis had no funding competition.  In addition, Aegis permanently altered the course of Navy ship design and force structure for the worse.  That is the true cost of Aegis.
 
Aegis also ushered in the continuing era of unworkably complex technology which now infests our ships.  Far too many ship systems are beyond the ability of Navy technicians to maintain and repair.  In short, the systems are not combat-resilient.  On paper – or when they have been exquisitely tweaked by Ph.D. manufacturer tech reps – the capabilities are impressive but in real life they fall well short.  For example, in the early years of Aegis, the systems were supported by on-board crews of manufacturer’s tech reps but, as time went by, the tech reps left and Aegis fell into a degraded state as documented in a past Proceedings article by an Aegis ship captain.
 
Even if one were to stipulate that Aegis would have been theoretically superior to NTU, the question has to be asked whether it is better to have a theoretically superior Aegis that is perpetually degraded and impossible to repair at sea or a theoretically lesser NTU that routinely works at 100% efficiency and effectiveness?
 
It is also important to note that the strengths of Aegis were long range, high resolution sensing which was a desirable characteristic when facing large, high flying Soviet bombers but today’s threats are sea-skimming missiles in short range (horizon) engagements for which NTU would have been well suited.
 
All things considered, it appears that NTU may well have been the better path.  Of course, hindsight is 20/20!
 
 
 
_________________________________
 
As a related side note, Aegis performed poorly in its early years.  For those interested in the early trials and tribulations, here is an excerpt from a CIMSEC report.[1] 

In 1983, the newspaper headline war heated up again. CG-47 was put through qualifications trials that April. That summer, Representative Denny Smith (R-Oregon), a frequent critic of high-cost military procurement programs, alleged that CG-47’s Aegis combat system had failed operational evaluation. His criticisms were echoed in the Senate by Gary Hart of Colorado, a candidate for the Democratic Party’s nomination for President. As Senator Hart told The Wall Street Journal, “Do we have a testing and reporting system that is fundamentally dishonest?” To head off speculation, the CNO acknowledged that there had indeed been software system failures in the April trials and he pledged further tests in September.
 
After the September 1983 tests, both Watkins and Secretary Lehman wrote to Representative Smith, assuring him (as Lehman did on 11 October) that “Aegis is the most carefully tested combat system ever built.” But Smith did not stop his criticism of Aegis. That winter, he found an ally in Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In February 1984, Grassley grilled Secretary Lehman and CNO Watkins on CG-47’s performance. The Navy Secretary accused Grassley of “grandstanding” and said that CG-47 was performing splendidly off the Lebanese coast in her first tour overseas. One week later, unnamed Pentagon and Congressional sources told The Washington Post that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering had informed the Secretary of Defense that Aegis had serious design problems, and the Secretary of the Navy admitted to reporters that “actual missile kills … have not been that impressive.” At the same time, Secretary Lehman officially (and privately) directed PMS-400 to supervise “a fully challenging test series,” which it did with CG-47, April 23-29, 1984, near Puerto Rico.
 
ADM Watkins praised the results of the trials at a public press conference, and the May 1985 Naval Institute Proceedings carried a glowing description of the Aegis system and also praised the performance of CG-47 during the ship’s tour of duty off of the Lebanese coast the previous fall. A later issue of the same journal, however, carried a long letter from an officer who claimed that the ability of CG-47’s radar to monitor contacts against the backdrop of the Lebanese coast had been exaggerated. The ship had been approached by a light plane while patrolling near Beirut’s harbor, and, by his account, CG-47 never detected it. The question of Aegis’ operational performance was therefore left somewhat unresolved.[1]

 
________________________________

 
[1]CIMSEC, “The Politics of Developing The AEGIS Combat System, PT. 2”, Thomas C. Hone, Douglas V. Smith, and Roger C. Easton, Jr., 2-May-2023,
https://cimsec.org/the-politics-of-developing-the-aegis-combat-system-pt-2/
 
[2]Capt. Michael C. Potter, USNR, Electronic Greyhounds, The Spruance-Class Destroyers, Naval Institute Press, 1995, ISBN 1-55750-682-5, p.172-4
 
[3]Note that there were tests in Aegis’ very early development (after serious real world problems were revealed) that claimed to be extensive and realistic but the conditions of the tests are unknown and the Navy has a well earned reputation for lying about such matters.  Further, the tests were against very early missiles now multiple generations removed from today’s threats.  The testing has not been repeated against today’s threats.

I’m Blind … Or Lying

The Navy is attempting to retire large numbers of ships in a misguided effort to increase funding for unmanned vessels and other nonsensical items.  In particular, the Navy has been trying for many years to retire the Aegis cruisers, the world’s most capable and powerful warships.  After being repeatedly rebuffed by Congress, the Navy settled on the ploy of allowing the ships to sit pier side and, literally, rust away and then claim that it would cost too much to upgrade them.  Now, the Navy is going a step further and outright lying to Congress.  CNO Gilday had this to say to the House Armed Services Committee about the Aegis cruiser retirement requests:

 

 “The older SPY radars can’t see the threat. If they can’t see it, they can’t shoot it down.”[1]

 

So, according to the admiral, Aegis/SPY-1 ‘can’t see the threat’.  Really?  Aegis originated the motto,

 

‘If it flies, it dies’.

 

Was that a lie? 

 

The threats haven’t changed all that much since Aegis/SPY was first introduced.  The threat was missiles back then and today the threat is … ah … missiles.  Yes, stealth has come along but that affects all radars not just Aegis/SPY radars.

 

Ah … here’s a thought … don’t the Burkes use the same SPY-1 radar, albeit a slightly different version (-D versus –A/B).  Is the version difference so great that Burkes are front line warships capable of seeing every threat and yet Ticonderogas are blind barges, unfit for even harbor patrol?  Or, is Gilday lying to get what he wants which is to retire the cruisers?

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Breaking Defense website, “Decommissioned ship funds would go towards buying missiles, Navy says”, Aaron Mehta, 11-May-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/decommissioned-ship-funds-would-go-towards-buying-missiles-navy-says/

Stand And Fight

There is an old adage that governs the ultimate rationale for naval forces: 

The seat of purpose is on the land.

Sooner or later, a naval force must engage land forces.  That engagement can take the form of direct strikes from missiles or carrier aircraft or can be amphibious assaults to get land forces ashore.  Either way, it means that a naval force must, eventually, approach land.  This is where the Navy/Marine’s idiotic doctrine of conducting an amphibious assault from 25-100+ miles at sea falls apart.  If you won’t approach land, you can’t influence events on land which is where ultimate purpose resides.

Yes, there are other ways to influence events on land.  A blockade, for example, can influence events on land.  For countries that have an alternate, land-only means of engaging an enemy, the naval forces can get by with just playing a minor, supporting role like a blockade.  The Union Navy did this during the American Civil War by imposing a blockade on the South.  However, for a country that has no direct land contact with an enemy, there is only one way to get troops to the enemy and that is by sea.  Yes, air transport can move a few troops but only sealift can move the massive quantities of men, weapons, ammunition, and supplies that are needed for sustained combat.

Acknowledging, then, the necessity to eventually approach an enemy’s land, the naval force structure planner must ask what forces, weapons, and tactics will allow a reasonable chance of survival while conducting near-land operations.  Assessing survival equipment needs starts by identifying the major threats.

The biggest threats to naval forces wishing to operate near land are,

• Mines
• Submarines
• Anti-ship missiles (ASM)

Ironic and troubling, isn’t it, that the US Navy has no effective combat mine countermeasures capability, no effective, dedicated surface ship anti-submarine (ASW) vessels, and limited and non-survivable aerial ASW capability?  The Navy is ill-prepared to deal with two of the three major near-land threats.  At least the anti-ship missile threat is manageable with our large fleet of Aegis equipped Burke class ships.

It’s further ironic and baffling that the Navy’s stated reason for doctrinally refusing to approach land is the threat of land based ASM’s, the one threat for which we are prepared!  Let’s set aside the mine and submarine threats and examine the ASM threat a bit closer.

The Navy has spent billions of dollars on its Aegis capability.  The system was designed and intended to counter saturation swarms of Soviet anti-ship cruise missiles launched from entire regiments of long range bombers.  Aegis is designed to handle large numbers of targets simultaneously and can do so in a completely automatic mode – and, in fact, is more efficient and effective in that mode.

With all that capability in mind, one has to wonder why the threat of a relatively few isolated, land based cruise missiles so terrifies the US Navy?  Either they know that Aegis is an utter failure or they’ve become so risk averse that they can’t imagine actually standing and fighting and possibly losing a ship.  I tend to believe it’s the latter.  I’ve seen nothing to indicate that Aegis is a failure but, to be fair, there is little actual data to indicate that Aegis is a success!  Still, I’ll assume it’s capable until I see data indicating otherwise.

So, if Aegis is capable of handling the ASM threat, then the Navy is just too scared and too risk averse to stand in harm’s way and execute their function.

Let’s look at the arithmetic of the situation.  For a high subsonic cruise missile, like the Chinese C-802, the missile speed is around 680 mile per hour and it cruises at an altitude of 10-20 m which decreases to 3-5 m in the terminal phase.  The Navy is scared to stand near shore and, apparently, feels that the extra 25-50 miles will enable them to more effectively engage such an anti-ship cruise missile.  Will it, though?

Here’s the raw reaction times for various distances.

10 miles = 0.9 minutes

25 miles = 2.2 minutes

50 miles = 4.4 minutes

Unless an ASM is sited nearly on the beach – in which case it would, presumably, have been spotted, targeted, and destroyed as part of the assault preparations – the launch site will likely be 10-100+ miles away from the assault location.

At the low end of that range, 10 miles, and assuming the defending ship is beached so that there is no extra range added, 10 miles provides around 0.9 minutes of reaction/defense time.  In the world of computers and a fully automatic Aegis system, 0.9 minutes is an eternity!  Longer distances simply provide even longer reaction/defense times.

Stand and Fight!

In any realistic scenario, say with the Navy ships about 5 miles offshore and the enemy anti-ship missile launchers around 10-100+ miles away, the reaction time is more than adequate.

There’s no question that longer distance translates to more time to defend.  However, a couple of minutes is more than enough time.  If you can’t shoot down an incoming missile in a couple of minutes of engagement time, a few more minutes isn’t likely to produce a positive result.

Ultimately, the risk of standing in close and fighting must be balanced against the accomplishment of the mission.  It does no good to remain safe, far out at sea, but unable to accomplish the mission.  If the mission is worthwhile, then the risk is acceptable.  The Navy’s defensive systems were built for this.  Trust them to do their job.  Stand and fight.

Ship Magazines - Do The Math

One of the recurring fears among some naval observers is the inability to reload VLS systems at sea.  We’ve just recently debunked the concern but the fear lingers (see, "War Deployments").  Well, here’s yet another perspective on the issue that proves reload capability is not needed:  the math!

A carrier group, for example, will consist of 3-4 carriers (4 is ComNavOps preferred number) and 20+ escorts (25-30 being ComNavOps preferred number) (see, "Carrier Task Force").  Let’s assume that each escort is a Burke with 96 VLS cells and that 50 are Standard missiles, 30 are quad packed ESSM, and the remainder are Tomahawks and VL-ASROC, neither of which are relevant to this discussion.

So, let’s do the anti-air warfare (AAW) math.

Standard Missiles:  20x ships X 50 Standards per ship = 1,000 Standard missiles

ESSM Missiles:  20x ships X 30 cells X 4 ESSM/cell = 2,400 ESSM missiles

Total = 3,400 AAW missiles

This ignores any SeaRAM point defense missiles the group might have.

So, in order for reloads to even be required, the group would have to fire off well over three thousand missiles!  Given that the enemy’s anti-ship missile inventory is limited just like ours, does anyone really believe a single battle will see the enemy bring over three thousand anti-ship missiles to bear on a single carrier group????

Let’s do some more math.  The average modern warship carries somewhere around 8 anti-ship missiles and possibly up to a dozen or two.  For sake of discussion, let’s use the higher number of 24.  How many ships would be needed to launch three thousand missiles?  Well, 3000 missiles / 24 missiles per ship = 125 ships.

The enemy would need to assemble a force of 125 ships to launch 3000 anti-ship missiles!  No navy in the world can do that and even if an enemy had that many ships it couldn’t assemble that many in range in time.  A reasonable assembly of enemy ships opposing a carrier group might be 12-24 which would give an anti-ship missile inventory of 96 – 576.

Well, you say, the enemy can also launch anti-ship missiles from aircraft.  Yes, yes they can!  Let’s assume, say, 4 anti-ship missiles per aircraft – I know, there are some aircraft that can theoretically carry more but the impact on aircraft range and endurance is significant and that load would be uncommon.  So, 4 missiles per aircraft is a reasonable average.  Thus, the number of aircraft needed to launch over 3000 anti-ship missiles is, 3000 missiles / 4 missiles per aircraft = 750. 

The enemy would need to assemble, in short order, a force of 750 aircraft (of the right type!) to deplete our carrier group’s defensive missile inventory!  Not possible.

Of course, this analysis is simplistic.  Defending missiles aren’t launched one-for-one at attacking missiles.  A ratio of 2:1 is more realistic.  That means that the defending force in our example can only engage 1,700 attacking missiles.  Go ahead and rerun the math.  That’s still way, way beyond the attack capacity of any actual enemy.

A more realistic scenario is a single engagement with, perhaps, a dozen surface ships and/or a few flights of 10 or 20 attack aircraft.  Of course, the attackers would have to get past the carrier’s defensive aircraft before missiles even come into play but we’ll ignore that aspect.  We see, then, that a realistic scenario likely involves only a few to several dozen attacking missiles versus the defensive inventory of over 3000 missiles.  Depletion of the ship’s missile inventory is simply not conceivable and, therefore, reloading at sea is not a requirement.

Recall the old Soviet attack plan against US carrier groups?  Regiments of bombers would launch a couple of anti-ship missiles each for a total of 70+ attacking missiles.  Again, not even remotely near depleting the ship’s defensive missile inventory.

Here are the salient points to keep in mind regarding ship’s missile inventories.

• The enemy’s inventory of attack missiles is just as limited as a ship’s inventory of defensive missiles.

• Assuming even a small amount of surprise, the enemy has to assemble their attacking forces with little notice and can only bring a small fraction to bear in time.  This assures that attacking missile numbers will be small and manageable.

• Ship’s don’t just stand in one spot and slug it out.  They appear, execute a mission, and retire.  Typical missions (the combat portion) last hours or a few days.

• Ships don’t fight individually, they fight as groups and it’s the group’s missile inventory that matters.

Missile depletion is simply not a concern and, therefore, at-sea reloading is not a requirement.

Yemen Missile Attacks

It’s coming up on two years since the series of reported attacks on US Navy ships off the coast of Yemen.  It’s worth taking a look back at the events and see what lessons can be learned.  As a reminder, here’s the timeline and description of events.  Note that the descriptions are pieced together from many reports.  As such, I’ve not included any specific references because the reports, at the time, were fragmentary, sometimes contradictory, and far from definitive.

Sunday, 9-Oct-2016

USS Mason (DDG-87), a Burke class destroyer, operating near the Bab-el-Mandeb strait off Yemen’s southern coast, in concert with the USS Ponce (AFSB-15), was reportedly targeted by two missiles fired from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. Both missiles fell short and impacted the water.

Some reports state that the missiles were detected over a 60 minute period, suggesting two separate launches of one missile each.

Initial reports indicated that Mason employed countermeasures but did not launch its own missiles.  Later reports indicated that Mason fired two SM-2 Standard missiles and one RIM-162 ESSM missile as well as deploying its Nulka decoys.

Official statements say that it is not clear whether the attacking missiles were shot down or crashed on their own.

One report indicated that one of the missiles traveled more than two dozen nautical miles before crashing into the water.  Two dozen miles would be an incredibly short distance for an anti-ship missile.  This report seems highly questionable.

Confirming the uncertainty, USNI News reported that the crew of the Mason was uncertain if the suspected cruise missile was taken out by an SM-2 or went into the water on its own. The Pentagon claimed that an investigation was ongoing.

Some reports suggested that the missiles coming from Yemen might have been intended to strike Ponce.

Wednesday, 12-Oct-2016

On Wednesday, 12 October 2016 Mason was again targeted by missiles fired from Yemeni territory while operating in the Bab el-Mandeb strait.  Mason was not hit by the two missiles, which were fired from near the city of Al Hudaydah.   While the Navy is not certain whether the first incoming missile was intercepted or it just fell into the sea, officials claim Mason successfully intercepted the second missile at a distance of about 8 miles (13 km).

Thursday, 13-Oct-2016

On Thursday, 13 October 2016, US ships attacked three radar sites in Houthi-held territory which the Navy claims had been involved in the earlier anti-ship missile attacks against U.S. ships.  Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched from USS Nitze. The Pentagon assessed that all three sites were destroyed.

The areas in Yemen where the radars were located was near Ras Isa, north of Mukha and near Khoka.

Saturday, 15-Oct-2016

USS Mason was targeted in a third attack by five anti-ship cruise missiles while operating in the Red Sea north of the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Reports claim that Mason launched radar decoys, an infrared decoy, and several SM-2 Standard missiles in response, either neutralizing or intercepting four of the five incoming missiles. The Navy claims the fifth incoming missile was neutralized by a radar decoy launched from USS Nitze, after Mason alerted her to the threat.  Thus, the Mason was the only ship to have seen the claimed attack.

One report puts it this way:  one of the U.S. ships saw on radar what sailors believed to be missiles being fired on it out of Yemen at night.  Well, was it or wasn’t it attacking missiles?

Here’s a quote from CNO Richardson which indicates the general uncertainty and inability to even determine whether an attack even occurred.

“The latest is there has been recent activity today with the Mason once again. It appears to have come under attack in the Red Sea again from coastal defense cruise missiles fired from the coast of Yemen.” (1) [emphasis added]

So, according to the CNO, the Mason “appears” to have come under attack.  Put another way, no one can say for sure if an attack actually occurred.

Conclusions

To the best of my knowledge, no Navy report has ever been publicly issued about the purported attacks and I have not seen any results from the subsequent official investigation.

It is obvious that the Navy has no definitive idea whether any missiles were actually launched against any Navy ships.  If they were, they would likely have offered much more public proof because such attacks are potential windfalls for the Navy in terms of going to Congress and asking for money.

It is further obvious that the Navy has no evidence that any of the defensive missiles hit any attacking missiles if such even existed.  If they had, they would have plastered the news all over the media since successful combat operations would bolster recruiting efforts, justify increased budgets, “prove” the validity of Navy weapon systems, and help make a case for more ships – the thing the Navy wants more than anything else.

We see, then, that despite the most advanced suite of shipboard sensors ever constructed, despite the combined sensor systems of multiple ships, despite the use of networked naval data sharing which make up the foundation of the Third Offset Strategy, despite the oversight of satellite coverage, the Navy appears to have no credible evidence that actual attacks occurred and no credible evidence that any attacking missiles were shot down if there were actual attacks.

Regarding the question of whether the Saturday attacks were real, it is telling that there was no retaliatory attack as there was after the Sunday and Wednesday attacks.  The US Navy didn’t hesitate to respond to those attacks and yet a supposedly larger attack involving several missiles prompted no response.  The conclusion seems obvious that the Saturday “attack” did not actually occur.

This strongly suggests that the crew that reported the attack was seeing what they were conditioned to see.  It is noteworthy that despite the presence of several US ships in the immediate area as well as additional regional sensors, only one ship, the Mason, ever reported attacks and it was that ship that reported all three separate attacks.

USS Mason - Scenario Fulfillment?

Finally, if the attacks were real and the Mason actually shot down one to several attacking missiles, the Navy would, without a doubt, have showered medals on the Captain and crew.  You’ll recall that the Navy gave a medal to the crew member of the seized riverine boats who tried and failed to send a radio request for help.  If they would give a medal for a trivial, failed action they most certainly would have showered medals all around for the first successful combat action in quite some time – not only a successful combat action but hugely successful if they actually shot down four of five attacking missiles!  The conclusion is, again, obvious – there were no actual attacks.

It appears highly likely that the crew of the Mason behaved as the crew of the Vincennes did many years prior.  They saw a scenario that they “wanted” or were conditioned to see.  That the fog of war lead an overeager crew to see missiles where none existed is mildly interesting but hardly shocking.  This is nothing more than a common human tendency of scenario fulfillment demonstrated ad nauseum throughout history.  No, the more important aspect is that all of our vaunted technology utterly failed to tell us what was (or, was not) actually happening.  Despite this blatant failure of technology, we remain firmly committed to placing our entire combat welfare in the hands of technology and basing our entire military future in the hands of the Third Offset Strategy which is based entirely on sensor technology – technology that has been demonstrated repeatedly to be unreliable in application.

I know that my analysis completely contradicts the official Navy story but, lacking any documentation from the Navy, the logic is compelling and inescapable.

_____________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “CNO Richardson: USS Mason ‘Appears to Have Come Under Attack’”, Sam LaGrone, 15-Oct-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/10/15/cno-richardson-uss-mason-attacked-cruise-missiles-off-yemen

Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Characteristics - Follow Up

You undoubtedly recall the recent discussion about anti-ship cruise missile characteristics and how they impacted likely defensive engagement scenarios (see, "Cruise Missile Characteristics Related To Detection And Engagement Range")?  The conclusion was that intercept engagements were likely to occur much closer to the ship (radar horizon) than the Navy believes and that what is needed is an optimized medium/short range radar paired with ESSM.  Some people struggled to understand how demanding the engagement scenario would be due to the short engagement window, the need to immediately flood the skies with ESSM missiles, and the resultant need to be able to deal with the immense amount of targets, both incoming, outgoing, and engagement debris.  Well, here’s some bits of information from the recent DOT&E 2017 Annual Report that illustrate and support the conclusions from the post.

“Investigate means to mitigate the chances of an ESSM pre-detonating on debris before approaching its intended target.” (p. 213)

This is exactly what I described.  With a very short engagement window, we won’t be able to leisurely fire off one or two ESSM and then wait for the radar picture to clear to see what the result was.  We’re going to have to launch many missiles and the radars are going to have to be able to function in a debris-filled sky.

“Correct the SSDS scheduling function to preclude interference with the RAM infrared guidance stemming from prior intercepts and warhead detonations.”  (p. 213)

Again, this is the ability to distinguish valid targets from debris in a chaotic sky.

“Investigate and correct the combat system time synchronization problem that prevented the launch of a full salvo of ESSMs.”  (p. 213)

This acknowledges the need to be able to launch many missiles as nearly instantaneously as possible.

“Improve SSDS MK 2 integration with the MK 9 Track Illuminators to better support ESSM engagements.”  (p. 212)

This demonstrates that it’s not enough to just have a radar that is capable of the required resolution.  We need to be able to take that resolution and actually distinguish valid targets among large debris fields and outgoing missiles and do a much better job of integrating the radar with the combat fire control software.

As I stated in the post, an engagement that begins at the radar horizon will be over in 120 seconds for even a relatively slow 600 mph, high subsonic, incoming missile.  A 1200 mph, supersonic, incoming missile will have an engagement window of just 60 seconds.  Actually, that’s not true.  Those engagement windows are vastly overstated.  We can’t engage when the incoming missile is one second from impact.  The engagement window closes when the either the minimum safe arming distance of the defensive missile is reached or the defensive sequence can’t react in the flight time remaining for the incoming missile.  Thus, the engagement window is more likely from the radar horizon to about 10 miles (I’m purely speculating about these values).  Thus, the engagement window for ESSM against the 600 mph incoming missile is just 60 seconds and the 1200 mph engagement window is just 30 seconds.

Of course, the engagement windows assume that the threat is instantaneously identified and the defensive reaction also occurs instantaneously.  If there is any hesitation, like waiting for human command and control, the engagement window essentially is non-existent.  This mandates a purely automatic defensive mode.  This, in turn, raises some questions.

• Have we developed fleet doctrine to safely operate our ships and aircraft in the vicinity of ships whose defensive systems are in full auto mode?

• Can our full auto systems reliably distinguish incoming targets from our own decoys, flares, and countermeasures?  CIWS had this problem in the past.

• Can our systems operate in full auto mode without hazarding our own ships to friendly fire?  The corollary to this is, do we know how to position and operate our ships so as not to interfere with our own defensive fires?  With engagement windows of 60 seconds or less, there won’t be time to reposition ships.

• Do we know how to coordinate our countermeasures with our defensive sensors so as not to inadvertently confuse our own defensive fires?  Is it more effective to use countermeasures and risk disrupting our own active defenses or is it more effective to forego countermeasures in favor of a cleaner radar picture?

To summarize this post and its predecessor, there is every reason to expect that anti-ship cruise missile defensive engagements are generally going to start at the radar horizon (say, 20 miles or so) and will have a correspondingly very short window of opportunity.  The traditional shoot-shoot-look engagement sequence is not going to be feasible or effective.  We need to modify and upgrade our systems for the medium/short range, short time frame engagement scenario.  We need radars, both ship and missile, that can discriminate targets amid a debris filled sky and we need the ability to salvo lots of missiles in an incredibly short time frame.  To the best of my knowledge, we currently have little or none of this capability, as indicated by DOT&E test results and recommendations.  We also need a comprehensive set of operational and tactical procedures to enable full auto defensive modes.

Now is the time we should be testing and developing these capabilities, not when actual combat occurs.  We need to largely pull back from the many peacetime, worthless missions (partnership, show the flag, forward presence, deterrence, anti-piracy, etc.) and concentrate on bringing our ships and crews up to combat readiness and developing the capabilities we’ll need to fight the next war.

Aegis Battle Damage Resilience

While the circumstances were tragic, the Navy now has a wealth of damage control and battle toughness data available to consider related to the recent collisions of the two Burke class destroyers.

Consider the photo below.  There was not direct impact damage to the Aegis radar arrays but they were clearly affected.  You can see that the array to the right is partially unsupported and has a gentle curve or warp in it.  The array to the left seems largely undamaged although there is some involvement at the very bottom. 

Collision Damage Near Radar Arrays

The question is, were the arrays still functional immediately after the impact and, if so, to what degree?  One of the supposed benefits of arrays is resilience to damage given the modular nature of the elements that make up the array.  On the other hand, we’ve heard unconfirmed reports that the gentle grounding of the Port Royal threw the Aegis arrays out of alignment to the point that they could not be repaired.

Of course, the Navy is unlikely to release any information on this but, internally, the aftermath damage assessments should provide invaluable information about the resilience and battle toughness of the Aegis system.

The same kind of resilience and damage control information can be gleaned from the many other impacted systems and damage control practices.  There are a wealth of valuable lessons to be learned.  It would be fascinating to read an assessment, even a basic, unclassified one, of the battle worthiness of the Burkes. 

Navy Ignores SecDef

Here’s an item that speaks for itself, from the DOT&E 2017 Annual Report,

“The SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] directed in FY16 and reiterated in FY17 that the Navy fund long-lead items for an Aegis SDTS [Self Defense Test Ship] to be used for testing Aegis ACB-20, DDG 51 Flight III, the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR, a.k.a. AN/SPY-6), and Evolved Seasparrow Missile (ESSM) Block II; the Navy initially complied with the direction but subsequently removed all funding for the Aegis SDTS and the required aerial targets.”  [emphasis added]

The Navy, against “directions” from the Secretary of Defense, refused to fund an Aegis test ship.  Aegis - the main weapon system of the Navy and the Navy won't even fund a test ship for it.

There’s nothing I can add to that.  It speaks for itself.  CNO Richardson must be fired.

Cruise Missile Characteristics Related To Detection and Engagement Range

The US Navy is committed to an anti-air warfare path of long range intercepts using the Aegis and Standard systems.  The wisdom of this is debatable for a variety of reasons.

Long range intercepts depend on being able to detect the target at long ranges.  You can’t engage what you can’t see!  For targets that obligingly fly at high altitudes, this is a viable approach.  For targets that fly at low altitudes or are less detectable due to small size and/or stealth, this approach is not feasible.  Unfortunately, the trend in anti-ship missile (ASM) technology is towards stealth and sea-skimming altitudes.  Many missiles have options for an initial high altitude cruise phase followed by a sea-skimming attack phase.  The question is how far out from the target does the cruise phase terminate and the sea-skimming attack phase commence?  If the cruise phase terminates and converts to the low altitude attack phase beyond the effective range of defensive missiles then the ASM is, for all practical purposes, a purely sea-skimming missile.  This is what seems to be the typical case today.  Thus, it is quite likely that a defending ship will never see, or at least not have the opportunity to engage, the attacking missile until it enters the radar horizon (20 miles or so).

Another problem with the Navy’s long range intercept path is that it’s very expensive.  For example, the Standard SM-6 costs around $4M each and has a claimed range of 150-300 miles.  Launching volleys of $4M missiles quickly becomes prohibitively expensive.  Of course, the cost of a volley of $4M missiles is, arguably, a bargain if it prevents the destruction of a multi-billion dollar ship!  Still, the price tag of Standard missiles does impact the budget and the number of missiles procured. It’s not just the missiles that are expensive.  The Aegis system that enables the Standard missile costs hundreds of millions of dollars and the developmental costs for the ever-changing software are astronomical.

Before we go any further, let’s take a moment to look at some characteristics of common potential enemy anti-ship missiles as provided by readily available open source information.  Note the attack altitudes and relatively small sizes.  These missiles will be hard to detect and engagement windows will be very short.

C-801

Speed   Mach 0.75

Flight Altitude  <20 m

Attack Altitude  <20 m

Range  40 km

Length  5.8 m

C-802

Speed  Mach 0.9

Flight Altitude  7 m

Attack Altitude  5 m

Range  120 km

Length  6.4 m

Exocet

Speed  Mach 0.92

Flight Altitude  2 m

Range  72-180 km

Length  4.7 m

P-270 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn)

Speed  Mach 3.0

Flight Altitude  20 m

Attack Altitude  <7 m

Range  90-240 km, depending on version and flight profile

Length  9.7 m

P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)

Speed  Mach >1.6

Flight Altitude  high

Attack Altitude  <25 m

Range  625 km

Length  10.0 m

P-800 Oniks (SS-N-26 Strobile)

Speed  Mach 2.5

Flight Altitude  high

Attack Altitude  10 m

Range  370 miles

Length  8.9 m

Kh-59 MK (AS-13 Kingbolt)

Speed  Mach 0.8

Flight Altitude  7 m

Attack Altitude  ?

Range  285 km

Length  5.7 m

BrahMos

Speed  Mach 3.0

Flight Altitude  high

Attack Altitude  5 m

Range  280 miles

Length  8.4 m

Even if not designed as stealthy airframes, ASMs are small and have an inherently small radar cross section.  A small missile, in sea-skimming mode, down in the wave clutter, will not be readily detected.  First detection is likely to be inside the radar horizon.  Even the presence of an airborne radar plane will not greatly increase the detection range of an incoming sea-skimming missile. 

Also, detection and targeting are two separate issues.  An airborne radar may detect a missile further out but being able to maintain a steady lock sufficient to guide a defensive missile is another matter and likely will not be achievable until the attacking missile has gotten much closer to its target.

What is the overall point of this discussion?  It’s that I suspect that the actual targeting detection range of most ASM’s is going to be very short.  That being the case, one can’t help but ask whether the Navy’s focus on very long range Standard missiles is appropriate.  It would seem that the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (RIM-162 ESSM) would be a more likely and useful defensive system.  ESSM range is given as 27 nm which would seem to be an appropriate match to the expected detection range.

In fact, I have doubts that intercepts at ranges of hundreds of miles are even feasible given the cruise characteristics of enemy anti-ship missiles.  What enemy missile or aircraft is going to fly obligingly high, straight, and level for an extended period while we guide a Standard missile to it?  Ballistic anti-ship missiles do fly predictable paths and, for those, long range intercepts are both feasible and desirable – but that’s another topic.

If my conjecture is correct and the vast majority of anti-ship cruise missile engagements are going to occur at radar horizon ranges, shouldn’t the vast majority of our defensive systems also be optimized for those same ranges?  Wouldn’t it be better to emphasize ESSM defenses over Standard missiles?

Further, given engagement ranges of radar horizon and closer, shouldn’t we also greatly beef up our short range engagement capabilities such as RAM, SeaRAM, and CIWS?  Sure, debris from a successful short range intercept may still impact the ship and cause damage but it will be a lot less damage than having an intact, functioning anti-ship cruise missile hit the ship.  Consider that most Burkes have only a single CIWS for close in defense and, for a time, Burkes were built with none.  Burkes do not mount RAM/SeaRAM.  Our short range defenses are lacking, to put it mildly.

We need to do several things to beef up our medium range (out to 30 miles or so) AAW capability.

1. Install multiple RAM/SeaRAM launchers on every ship.
2. Provide at least 3 CIWS for every Burke.
3. Focus on electronic anti-missile defenses (soft kill).
4. Develop radars/sensors optimized for medium/short range use.
5. Develop methods to effectively launch and utilize high density volleys of ESSM and RAM.  This would include the ability to track the incoming target even in the presence of high clutter returns due to near miss defensive missile explosions.  Given the short engagement window, it is vital that we can continuously track and engage rather than have to wait for the radar picture to clear after a near miss.  The traditional engagement sequence of shoot-shoot-look is no longer viable.  The engagement sequence has to be shoot-shoot-shoot-keep shooting!  We also need to be able to track the incoming missile in the presence of many outgoing missiles.

The last point also suggests that Aegis is likely not the optimum AAW radar.  We don’t need bigger and longer range AMDR radars (well, we do for ballistic missile defense but, again, that’s a topic for another post); we need very high definition, very rapid response, enhanced capability medium/short range radars combined with much greater numbers of medium range ESSM and integrated fire control systems.  We need to greatly reduce our emphasis on Aegis/Standard and put far more emphasis on medium range engagement.

We also desperately need to improve our AAW electronic countermeasure (ECM) capability.  The venerable – and never all that effective, according to reports – SLQ-32 needs to be enhanced far beyond even the current SEWIP (Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program) block improvements.  We need massively more capable and powerful detection and active jamming/decoy systems (remember our discussion about an electronic warfare version of the Zumwalt?).

In summary, future naval AAW engagements are not going to be the long range intercepts that the Navy has designed for – they’re going to radar horizon, close range, short window, affairs that require an optimized radar fire control system capable of operating a continuous fire defensive system, backed up by extensive short range and ECM capabilities.