MQ-8 Fire Scout Status

Remember when the Navy was claiming that the unmanned helicopter, the MQ-8 Fire Scout, was going to revolutionize naval warfare, providing area wide surveillance, total situational awareness, target detection and tracking, fire control for remote weapons, anti-surface capability, mine countermeasures, and … well … total battlefield dominance?  Let’s check in and see how that’s coming along.
 

The Future of Naval Warfare ... bye, bye

For starters, the Navy has all but abandoned the Fire Scout.

 

The current inventory is 36 aircraft with no additional procurement planned.[1]
 
President’s Budget 2023 included a significant divestment within the MQ-8 program, resulting in the removal of all MQ-8B AVs [ed. AV = Air Vehicle] from inventory and reduction of the MQ-8C AV active operational inventory. Currently there are 11 aircraft dedicated to operational employment with 3 allocated to test and training, an increase of 1 from last year’s Annual Report. Projections for FY24 will increase the operational employment number to 15. The remainder are in a preservation status and are planned to be used for maintenance parts as necessary to support the pool of operational aircraft.[1]

Budget documents from 2024 indicate that the Fire Scout is being phased out completely.
 

Operational employment of the MQ-8C will end in Q4 FY2024 and sundown will be completed by Q4 FY2026.[2]

Instead of having hundreds of Fire Scouts roaming the battlefield and dominating our enemies, as promised, the Navy is down to around a dozen, which are being phased out, and appears to have lost interest in the platform.
 
With the near abandonment of the Fire Scout as context, there are, nominally, three variations (increments, as the Navy terms it) of Fire Scout in the works:
 

• Endurance Baseline Increment – imaging EO/IR sensor and laser range finder and designator
• SUW Increment – maritime search radar
• Mine Countermeasure Increment – COBRA near shore mine detection

 
How is testing coming along?  DOT&E states,
 

The Navy has yet to complete land-based testing necessary to characterize radar performance against maritime targets.[1]

Conclusion
 
It seems that the Navy has all but abandoned the Fire Scout, presumably having realized that it has no effective use case in combat.  Of course, ComNavOps has been saying this since the first MQ-8 appeared.  Nice of the Navy to finally catch up.
 
Like the LCS, Zumwalt, and others, the Fire Scout platform has gone from being the future of naval warfare to an afterthought in a remarkably short period of time.
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2023 Annual Report, Jan 2024,
 
[2]Flight Global website, “US Navy’s MQ-8C Fire Scouts fly into retirement just two years after entering operational service”, Jan Tegler, 29-May-2024,
https://www.flightglobal.com/helicopters/us-navys-mq-8c-fire-scouts-fly-into-retirement-just-two-years-after-entering-operational-service/158500.article

Fire Scout ASW - Promise and Challenges

Northrop Grumman (NG) recently conducted an internal test of an ASW (anti-submarine warfare) configured Fire Scout MQ-8C UAV (actually, a modified Bell 407 simulator of the Fire Scout) in Oct 2020.  The test was declared a success (it could have crashed on takeoff and it would have been declared a success – that’s the way these staged tests work) but the real point is that after years of commentator speculation about the benefits of UAV ASW, someone finally made an actual effort, regardless of the real degree of success or failure.  Yes, I’m aware of the 2017 MQ-9A sonobuoy tests but that was sonobuoy integration testing, not ASW testing. 

 

Moving on, let’s take a closer look at both the promise and challenges of UAV ASW.

 

A NG spokesman claimed that the Fire Scout could operate 100 miles from the host ship and with up to 12 hours endurance.(1)  Concept art and verbal descriptions depict a Fire Scout with two sonobuoy dispensers holding a total of 40-48 miniature sonobuoys although testing was apparently conducted with a single, smaller, sonobuoy dispenser.

 

Artist's Concept of ASW Fire Scout

 

Some advantages of an unmanned ASW platform include:

 

Extended Range/Endurance – The MQ-8C can, under the right conditions, extend the ASW range from the host ship and, again under the right circumstances, the endurance of the ASW effort.  The Navy/manufacturer claim 100 miles and 12 hours endurance, however, those are predicated on minimal loads and minimal sonobuoy usage – hence, the ‘right conditions’ and ‘right circumstances’. 

 

If the payload increases (carrying torpedoes, for example), the range and endurance drop dramatically.  NAVAIR lists endurance as 12 hours with a 300 lb payload (2) although this is somewhat misleading since transit time has to be accounted for (an hour out and an hour back, for example, at the 115kt cruising speed(2)).  Throw in reserve fuel/time and the endurance is further reduced.  Add heavier payloads – like a 600 lb Mk 54 torpedo – and endurance will drop drastically.  Still, several hours of loiter time is potentially useful and impressive.

 

Far more importantly, if the sonobuoy usage is heavy, the endurance becomes meaningless.  Once the sonobuoys are gone, the helo has little else to do but return to the host ship.  Yes, it can hang around and listen for a while but with no active contact, that would be largely pointless.  If sonobuoys are dropped in strings of, say, 5, a Fire Scout with 40 sonobuoys would be able to lay only 8 strings.  In a combat scenario, where every slight sonar twitch demands investigation, 8 strings would be used very quickly.  One might recall that S-3 Vikings, acting in the extended hunting role, tended to deploy sonobuoys in chevrons resulting in heavy sonobuoy expenditure.  Assuming a Fire Scout would behave similarly, sonobuoy depletion is an issue.  Thus, endurance is probably a misleading and meaningless claim. 

 

 

There are also some potential challenges to unmanned ASW which include:

 

 

Weapons – Currently, there are no plans to put weapons on an ASW Fire Scout.  This makes the Fire Scout only partially effective and requires two platforms (a second, weapon carrying platform) to perform the function of a single manned helo or P-8.  The lack of weapons also means that the Fire Scout will have to maintain contact until another platform can arrive which is no easy feat.

 

Communications – Operating at a range out to 100 miles puts the Fire Scout well beyond line of sight communications.  It will either have to climb to higher altitude to maintain communications or depend on some kind of satellite communications or other methods which are less likely to be available in combat.  This also raises the issue of the communications broadcasting the helo’s location.  The communications requirement to transmit the kind of data intensive packages involved in ASW detection and tracking – and from multiple sonobuoys! – is enormous, I would assume (not being a combat communications expert).  Add in the requirement that the data be near real time and the comm load is immense and continuous.  This just screams out detection of the Fire Scout.

 

Not to be ignored is the control communications link.  UAVs have a disturbing tendency to lose command link and wander off, never to be seen again.  There will be a certain degree of attrition attributed to command link loss.

 

Off-board Processing.  The communications discussion leads directly to the issue of off-board data processing.  Unlike the old S-3 Viking, SH-60 type helos, or P-8s which have sonar analysts aboard the aircraft, the Fire Scout will, of course, be unmanned and data processing will have to occur aboard the host ship.  This causes the communication issue just described and introduces a degree of lag between the Fire Scout and the host ship.  Of course, ASW is, generally, a pretty slow affair so this will likely not be a severe problem.

 

Payload – Fire Scout is a small helo and payload capacity is uncertain but limited.  I’ve seen widely varying claims but NAVAIR lists the payload as 700 lbs (2).  By comparison, a Mk 54 lightweight torpedo is around 600 lbs.  NG demonstrated a very small, very lightweight, 220 lb torpedo drop from a Bell 407 in 2016.(3)  Of course, it’s highly questionable whether such a small torpedo would be effective against a submarine given that our largest, Mk48 torpedoes, were deemed to be of questionable lethality against Soviet Union submarines.  Smaller diesel subs, less stoutly constructed, might be hindered by such a small torpedo but that, too, is questionable.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

We see, then, that unmanned ASW potentially offers benefits for range and endurance but those benefits exist only under certain conditions and are potentially offset by the challenges such as limited payload, communications, lack of weapons, and off-board data processing.  The ability to potentially push the ASW outer layer further away from the host ship is useful and, to a limited extent, makes up for some of the capability we lost when the S-3 Viking was retired without replacement.

 

The major challenge seems to be the lack of weapons which means that any prosecution requires two aircraft to equal a single Seahawk or P-8.  The ability of an unmanned aircraft (or any platform, to be fair!) to hold contact on a submarine for an extended period until a weapon carrying platform can show up is highly suspect.

 

On balance, I’m not seeing sufficient justification for an unmanned ASW Fire Scout to replace a full size Seahawk helo.  Now, a very small, UAV carrier with a bunch of Fire Scouts might well be a useful addition to any naval group and this is the developmental direction I’d explore. 

 

 

_________________________________

 

(1)USNI News, “Northrop Grumman Pitching Fire Scout Helicopter Drone for ASW Missions”, Sam LaGrone, 16-Feb-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/02/16/northrop-grumman-pitching-fire-scout-helicopter-drone-for-asw-missions

 

(2)NAVAIR,

https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/mq-8c

 

(3)The Drive website, “Northrop Grumman Reveals New Mini Torpedo Aimed At Arming And Defending Navy Submarines”, Joseph Trevithick, 21-May-2020,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33606/northrop-grumman-reveals-new-mini-torpedo-aimed-at-arming-and-defending-navy-submarines

MQ-8C Fire Scout Status

Many commentators have described the near magical benefits of the MQ-8C Fire Scout in the surveillance and targeting role especially as it relates to the Navy’s distributed lethality concept.  ComNavOps is not one of those.  But, I digress …

MQ-8C Fire Scout

It seems that the Navy has assessed the MQ-8C as a failure, at least for the moment.

Although there are marked improvements in endurance over the MQ-8B, the Navy and DOT&E assessed the MQ-8C system as not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable. (1)

Well that was a touch damning.  Why the negative assessment?

Primary degraders that led to this assessment included the overall air vehicle reliability, image quality and system performance of the BRITE Star II EO/IR system, and the poor reliability and inconsistency of the Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL). The TCDL is the conduit for payload video and control. Excessive operator workload coupled with an immature supply support system also contributed to the assessment of not operationally suitable. (1)

So, essentially, the Fire Scout can’t see, hear, or talk but at least it’s slow and not stealthy!  This reminds me of the common assessment of my favorite cellar dwelling hockey team:  they may be small but they’re slow.

So, there you have the DOT&E testing assessment.  Despite the results and the Navy’s own negative assessment, the Navy declared that the Fire Scout achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in Jun 2019 .

The Navy declared its MQ-8C Fire Scout unmanned helicopter mission capable and ready to deploy aboard Littoral Combat Ships. (2)

Let me understand this.  The Navy believes that the Fire Scout is not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable and that constitutes a declaration of IOC?????  Well, doesn’t that just sum up the state of the Navy today?

Many people believed that the Fire Scout would also be used to defeat swarm boat attacks but the Navy has dropped that idea.

A little more than a year ago, the Navy was still testing how Fire Scouts could be used to repel swarm attacks of small attack craft. By this spring, the Navy scrapped those plans in favor of loading the aircraft with sensors to provide an LCS with superior over-the-horizon targeting capabilities. (2)

Why did the Navy opt to drop the idea of arming the FireScout?

The decision to focus on targeting missions comes after the Navy experienced some space constraints associated with arming the Fire Scout aboard an LCS. The Navy intended the Fire Scout to carry BAE System’s advanced precision kill weapon system (APKWS), which are modified 70mm Hydra rockets fitted with a guidance system.

While a smaller MQ-8B Fire Scout was able to successfully demonstrate its ability to operate the weapon aboard an LCS in 2018, it became clear the LCS ships themselves do not have a lot of magazine space, explained Capt. Jeff Dodge, the Navy’s Fire Scout program manager … (2)

The Navy has bought, or is planning to buy, 38 MQ-8C Fire Scouts.

The MQ-8C first flight occurred in 2013.  Now, seven years later, this is where we’re at.  The -8C should have been about the easiest development program possible.  It used existing airframes and technology.  There was nothing particularly novel about it and, yet, the Navy can’t seem to make it work.  I think the lesson herein is that technology is always oversold.  It always suffers from performance problems despite glowing manufacturer’s claims.  It’s always more difficult to implement than anticipated.  Observers who marvel at the latest claims are just deluding themselves.  The more technology you put into something, the more problems you’ll have (Ford, LCS, Zumwalt, F-35, etc.).  There is a very good argument for simpler, more basic equipment that has a much higher chance of actually working.

There you have the current status of the Fire Scout.  It will not be armed and will be tasked with surveillance and targeting despite being assessed by the Navy and DOT&E as not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable.  Sounds like the basis for an effective distributed lethality concept, right?

The new DOT&E category of cyber survivability is an interesting one.  This suggests that the possibility exists that an enemy could take control of a Fire Scout during flight via cyber attack or, at least, render it a mission kill.

With all that in mind, keep going Navy!  Against all reason, you’ve declared IOC so keep going!

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(1)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), FY 2019 Annual Report, 20-Dec-2019, p. 151-2

(2)USNI News website, “Navy Declares Unmanned MQ-8C Fire Scout Helicopter Mission Capable”, Ben Werner, 9-Jul-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/07/09/navy-declares-unmanned-mq-8c-fire-scout-helicopter-mission-capable

MQ-8C Fire Scout

The MQ-8C Fire Scout is a helicopter-type unmanned aircraft intended to act as a scout asset for the LCS.  The aircraft is based on the commercial Bell 407 helicopter.  The MQ-8C represents a substantial improvement over its predecessor, the MQ-8B, although the improvements come with drawbacks such as increased size which impacts stealth and survivability.  Let’s take a look at what the MQ-8C can do and how it might be used.

MQ-8C Fire Scout

MQ-8C Fire Scout Specifications (1)
Maximum Speed	135 kts
Cruise Speed	115 kts
Service Ceiling	16,000 ft
Std Day Max Endurance w/ 300 lb Payload	12 hrs
Hot Day Max Endurance w/ 300 lb Payload	10 hrs
Empty Weight	3200 lbs
Length	34.7 ft

Note: Wikipedia cites endurance of 15 hours, max speed of 140 kts, max ceiling of 20,000 ft, a range of 150 nmi (170 mi; 280 km), and a payload capacity of 701 lb.  These claims appear to be largely unsubstantiated and, more importantly, unrelated to each other.  For example, if the claim of 700 lbs payload capacity is true, it would significantly affect the speed and endurance as indicated in the table.  In short, the table values seem much more realistic than the Wiki values.

As of the 2018 GAO annual report, the Navy apparently plans to procure 55 operational units with a program unit cost (production and development) of $46.25M each. (2)  Contracts are being issued as fixed-price, incentive type contracts.  It should be noted that the commercial airframe is being provided to the primed contractor as Government Furnished Equipment and the cost for the airframe may not be included in the GAO unit cost estimate. (2) I’m unable to determine whether that is the case or not.

The somewhat limited procurement quantity impacts CONOPS in that it means that the MQ-8C cannot be considered expendable as there would be few or no replacements.  With 30 or so LCS, there are less than two aircraft per ship.  Thus, the inherent non-stealthy character of the aircraft combined with the need to actively broadcast, thus giving away its location, would seem to severely limit the aircraft’s use to very low threat scenarios.

The acquisition program has been run under an accelerated approach which has bypassed many of the normal risk reduction actions and reviews.  Further, the Navy is acquiring the aircraft totally under low rate initial production (LRIP) status which violates Department of Defense acquisition practices.  LRIP acquisition is limited to 10% of the total acquisition.  No surprise that the Navy is ignoring acquisition practices since they routinely do so.

… the program has yet to demonstrate that its critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control—an approach inconsistent with best practices. (2)

The MQ-8C is being equipped with Leonardo-Finmeccanica’s Osprey AESA radar in a 2-panel configuration which provides a 240 degree field of view.  The unit has a maritime surveillance, small target mode, among other modes.  The radar uses a Line of Sight (LOS) communications procedure and is, apparently, intended to operate at high altitudes to enable longer distance communications (longer LOS).

Operational Considerations

Communications.  The radar’s LOS communications requirement means that in order to achieve useful extended coverage range from the host ship the aircraft must fly high and thus be very visible to enemy detection (the MQ-8C being decidedly non-stealthy) and highly susceptible to destruction (having no speed, maneuverability, or countermeasures).  Alternatively, the aircraft can fly very low and decrease its chance of being detected but then the useful coverage range becomes not much more than the 15-20 mile horizon due to the LOS communications requirement.

How a large, slow, non-stealthy, high flying aircraft will survive long enough in high end combat to perform its function is a mystery that the Navy has not yet explained.  Such an aircraft seems very useful for no-threat scenarios but not viable for high end combat.

Detection.  If equipped with radar, the aircraft will be continuously broadcasting its presence.  Radar is like the flashlight analogy – you can see the flashlight much farther away than the flashlight can see you.  So too, with radar.  While there are claimed low probability of intercept radars, the low probability is accomplished by significantly reducing the radar’s power output.  Unfortunately, significantly reduced power output also means significantly reduced range and capability.  So, the radar user is faced with the choice of either broadcasting at full power to achieve significant range and announcing his presence/location or reducing power which reduces range and capability.

The other sensor option for the MQ-8C is EO/IR sensors.  Being passive, these sensors would allow the aircraft to remain as stealthy as its non-stealthy airframe allows by not broadcasting its location.  This offers some potentially useful tactical possibilities although the data communication back to the host ship still requires LOS which means high altitude or short range.

An alternative mode of operation would be the use of passive EO/IR sensors and low altitude with no data transmissions.  The data would be collected and stored onboard the aircraft for download upon its return to the host ship.  Of course, this would require a degree of autonomy from the MQ-8C in identifying and stealthily maneuvering around threats that does not currently exist.  It would also impose a significant lag in data analysis and would negate any chance of using the aircraft for real time targeting.  Still, it would allow the establishment of general situational awareness.

Risk.  As noted above, the limited acquisition quantities render the MQ-8C decidedly non-expendable.  Unfortunately, as also noted above, the aircraft is non-stealthy and non-survivable which means that to be effective the aircraft must be considered expendable and large numbers of replacement aircraft must be immediately available onboard the host ship.  There is an obvious conflict of requirements, here!

In a war, it is possible that production could be ramped up to the point that the aircraft could be considered expendable.  However, that only solves half the problem.  The more immediate problem would be the number of aircraft available onboard the host ship and the LCS simple doesn’t have the room to carry more than a couple.  Thus, the inexorable conclusion is that the MQ-8C must be considered non-expendable and must be operated under a risk-averse doctrine to avoid having the host ship become ‘blinded’.  This suggests that the Navy’s concept of using the MQ-8C as a long range scout using its radar is not viable.  This is why ComNavOps has repeatedly called for large numbers of much smaller UAVs to fill the scout/surveillance role.


Conclusion

The Navy views the MQ-8C as the key to enabling the LCS as a viable anti-ship threat and yet it is difficult to see how the aircraft can effectively and survivably perform the intended scout/targeting function.  The non-stealthy nature of the aircraft combined with the communications constraints simply preclude any effective tactical utilization. 

____________________________________

(1)Naval Drones website, “MQ-8C Fire Scout”, retrieved 2-Oct-2019,

http://www.navaldrones.com/MQ-8C-Fire-Scout.html

(2)Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Apr 2018, GAO-18-360SP

(3)https://www.leonardodrs.com/media/5350/osprey-mm_data-sheet.pdf

COBRA Description

We just recently saw that the Navy declared initial operating capability for the LCS' Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (DVS-1 COBRA) system.  We expressed severe doubt about that and wondered about the rationale behind the plan to order 30 of the systems despite only having 8 LCS MCM platforms (see, “COBRA Declared Operational”).  That aside, COBRA is a rarely discussed system and there is not a lot of information about it that is generally available so let’s take a brief look at what we do know.

COBRA is intended to detect and localize mines in the surf and beach zones as well as provide visual reconnaissance of the zones.  The system is carried on an unmanned MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV deployed from an LCS and consists of the sensor package and data collection station on the UAV plus a mission control and planning package on the host LCS (3).

The current Block 1 version can detect surface laid mines and obstacles in the beach zone and has a more limited capability to do the same in the surf zone.  It is limited to daytime use only due to the need for illumination for the imager, much as a regular camera needs a light source.  Data is collected and analyzed post-mission after recovery. 

A developmental Block 2 version is intended to enhance the surf zone capability and add a nighttime illuminator.  The developmental Block 2 illuminator is a new technology effort.  It is, essentially, a flashlight that is required to provide illumination for the COBRA camera.  The problem is that current electro-optical illuminators cover only a single wavelength band and cannot support the 6-band COBRA multi-spectral sensor (2).

COBRA uses a passive, multi-spectral sensor which covers 6 wavelength bands from near UV to near infrared. The sensor is capable of providing 4 frames per second (4 Hz) for the 6 bands with a 16M camera (4896x3264) yielding a Ground Sample Distance (GSD) of 2.4" which translates into 6.1 Gigabits per second (Gbps) of data (1).

Military and Aerospace website states that the COBRA payload includes stabilized step stare digital gimbal and high-resolution multispectral imaging digital camera with a spinning six-color filter wheel, a processing unit, and a solid-state data storage unit which collects six different color-band images across a large area using a step-stare pattern (4).

The system appears to be effective mainly in the beach zone with little water depth penetration in the surf zone – not surprising given that it is, essentially, just a camera with a wavelength expanded beyond just the visual.

COBRA Surf and Beach Zone Reconnaissance

One of the weaknesses of the system is that the data is not available in real time and requires post-mission analysis which means the UAV must survive in order for the data to be available.  Thus, a UAV could complete an entire reconnaissance mission only to be shot down at the end and all the data would be lost.

Another weakness is the operational concept.  A good sized, low, slow flying, non-stealthy, non-maneuvering (has to remain reasonably steady during its recon run) helo passing back and forth across the shore line just can't have much of a life expectancy.  This is the classic definition of a target drone!  In combat, we're going to go through these like candy!  As with so many of today's operational concepts, the success of the system depends on the enemy cooperating by not shooting down this sitting duck of a target and allowing us to recon the beach unimpeded.  Does that seem like a reasonable assumption to base a combat operational concept on?  Seriously, who comes up with these things?

The coverage area of the system depends on the sensor being raised above the beach/surf.  This is the same as a regular camera being able to “see” more of an image the further back it is held from the scene.  Thus, COBRA is not applicable to, for example, an unmanned surface vessel.  It could, presumably, be deployed from any aircraft large enough to carry the system.

COBRA is intended to complement the AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) which is operated from the MH-60 helo and provides laser detection of surface and near-surface mines past the surf zone.

As stated, I have severe doubts that the system is operational, reliable, and effective.  I’ll wait to see a DOT&E assessment before accepting the system as combat effective.

_______________________________

(1)http://www.navysbir.com/n16_1/N161-045.htm

(2)http://www.navysbir.com/n15_1/N151-053.htm

(3)http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=1237&ct=2

(4)http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2017/06/multispectral-uav-sensor-payloads-mines.html

COBRA Declared Operational

Apparently, the Navy quietly declared the LCS MCM Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) system operational during the summer as just reported in a USNI News website article (1).  COBRA is an aerial mine detection system that has been under development for many years.

Before we go any further, does anyone believe the Navy’s declaration of operational capability?  How many systems have we see declared operational and nothing short of magnificent only to find out the reality, as actually measured by DOT&E, falls far short?  To put it bluntly, I don’t believe the Navy and I don’t believe the COBRA system is operational.

Setting that aside, something else caught my eye in the article.  Apparently, the Navy plans to purchase a total of 30 COBRA systems. 

“… the Navy bought two systems in Fiscal Year 2017 and will continue to buy more as quickly as budgets allow.  … the plan is to buy 24 additional COBRAs, for a total of 30.” (1)

Now, you’ll recall that after the recent reorganization of the LCS fleet, there will be three functional squadrons of four ships each on each coast, one squadron for each type of module/function: ASW, MCM, and ASuW (see, “Navy Surrenders”). 

Thus, there will be a total of 8 MCM type LCS vessels.  Therefore, 30 COBRA systems is way beyond the minimum required.  For one system per ship, only 8 are needed.  Even with two, the maximum possible per ship, only 16 are needed.  Throw in a few for backups or maintenance unavailabilities and that still leaves a bunch extra.  Is the Navy planning for combat attrition?  That would be wise and very unlike the Navy.

MQ-8 Fire Scout

Recall that the COBRA system is intended to search for mines along the shore.  The host platform for the COBRA is the MQ-8B/C Fire Scout unmanned helo.  In an opposed scenario which, by definition, any mined shore would be, a large, slow, non-stealthy, hovering helo is going to have a very short life expectancy.  Additional COBRA systems will be required, for sure!  However, I’m unaware that the Navy is planning to procure additional UAVs so having extra COBRA systems would be pointless.

I’m a little puzzled by this.  Could the Navy be planning to mount the COBRA systems on some other platform in addition to the LCS/Fire Scout?  Alternatively, does the Navy already know that the reliability is such that 30 units will be required to keep 8 in service?

I’ll have to continue looking into this.

__________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Navy Declares COBRA Coastal Mine Detection System Operational After Successful Test”, Megan Eckstein, 10-Oct-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/10/10/navy-declares-cobra-coastal-mine-detection-system-operational-after-successful-test

Independence LCS Aviation

On a relative basis, the Independence variant LCS is a bit of an unknown.  In part this is because the class’ first operational deployment is only now being undertaken despite the class having been first commissioned in Jan-2010.  That’s six and half years without a deployment by a vessel of that variant!  So, we don’t have much operational data to look at.  Now, with the arrival of USS Coronado, LCS-4, in Singapore for a deployment, we’ll hopefully get some insight.

USS Coronado

One of the unknown aspects is the variant’s aviation capabilities.  Outside of brochures, there is little actual operational data.  It is being reported that the ship is operating two MQ-8B Fire Scout UAVs and one MH-60S Knighthawk/Seahawk helicopter on this deployment (1).  This is significant because multiple sources have reported to me that the Freedom variant’s flight deck, while large, is significantly understrength, structurally, thereby limiting the variant’s ability to operate numbers or weights of aircraft.  The structural strength was reduced early in development as a cost saving measure.  I have no reports as to the Independence variant’s flight deck structure so it’s interesting to note the simultaneous operation of two Fire Scouts and one Seahawk.  Of course, the Fire Scouts are the smaller “B” version rather than the larger “C”.  This is an arrangement and number that has not been operated on the Freedom variant, yet, as far as I know.  This may, possibly, indicate that the Independence variant’s flight deck strength and aviation capabilities are a bit more robust than the Freedom’s.

Fire Scout MQ-8B

Also of interest is the note that the Fire Scouts are equipped with the Telephonics Corporation AN/ZPY-4(V)1 radar.  Of course, radar performance data shows ranges on the order of 14 miles so this is not exactly AWACS type monitoring (2). 

We’ll keep an eye on this deployment – assuming no more engineering breakdowns! – and see what we can learn.

_________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Littoral Combat Ship USS Coronado Arrives in Singapore”, Mike Yeo, 18-Oct-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/10/18/littoral-combat-ship-uss-coronado-arrives-singapore

(2)http://www.islinc.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ISL_wbwf_p2_program_summary_v2_pr_for_website.pdf

Manned-Unmanned Helo Squadron

A Navy Times website article today (Julie Watson, 2-May-13) announces the establishment of a combined manned and unmanned helicopter squadron, HSL-35, which will operate 8 unspecified Seahawk type helos and 10 MQ-8B Fire Scouts from the LCS.  This is fine.  UAVs have a role to play.  However, the claims for UAVs far exceed any reasonable real world performance.  For example, the article states,

“… the Fire Scout can hover over an enemy target, maintaining contact …”

 

The Fire Scout, for any who may not be familiar with it, is simply an unmanned helo: not very stealthy and not very fast.  An enemy target is going to allow it to hover over its position?  Maybe if we’re fighting some third world idiots armed with BB guns.  An actual enemy with a real military would simply shoot down the Fire Scout in short order.

Again, I have no problem with UAVs but the abilities claimed for them are far too often simply ridiculous.