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| MQ-8C Fire Scout |
It seems that the Navy has assessed the MQ-8C as a failure,
at least for the moment.
Although
there are marked improvements in endurance over the MQ-8B, the Navy and
DOT&E assessed the MQ-8C system as not operationally effective, not
operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable. (1)
Well that was a touch damning. Why the negative assessment?
Primary
degraders that led to this assessment included the overall air vehicle
reliability, image quality and system performance of the BRITE Star II EO/IR
system, and the poor
reliability and inconsistency of the Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL). The TCDL
is the conduit for payload video and control. Excessive operator workload
coupled with an immature supply support system also contributed to the
assessment of not operationally suitable. (1)
So, essentially, the Fire Scout can’t see, hear, or talk but
at least it’s slow and not stealthy!
This reminds me of the common assessment of my favorite cellar dwelling
hockey team: they may be small but they’re
slow.
So, there you have the DOT&E testing assessment. Despite the results and the Navy’s own
negative assessment, the Navy declared that the Fire Scout achieved Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) in Jun 2019 .
The
Navy declared its MQ-8C Fire Scout unmanned helicopter mission capable and
ready to deploy aboard Littoral Combat Ships. (2)
Let me understand this.
The Navy believes that the Fire Scout is not operationally effective,
not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable and that constitutes a
declaration of IOC????? Well, doesn’t
that just sum up the state of the Navy today?
Many people believed that the Fire Scout would also be used
to defeat swarm boat attacks but the Navy has dropped that idea.
A
little more than a year ago, the Navy was still testing how Fire Scouts could
be used to repel swarm attacks of small attack craft. By this spring, the Navy
scrapped those plans in favor of loading the aircraft with sensors to provide
an LCS with superior over-the-horizon targeting capabilities. (2)
Why did the Navy opt to drop the idea of arming the
FireScout?
The
decision to focus on targeting missions comes after the Navy experienced some
space constraints associated with arming the Fire Scout aboard an LCS. The Navy
intended the Fire Scout to carry BAE System’s advanced precision kill weapon
system (APKWS), which are modified 70mm Hydra rockets fitted with a guidance
system.
While
a smaller MQ-8B Fire Scout was able to successfully demonstrate its ability to
operate the weapon aboard an LCS in 2018, it became clear the LCS ships
themselves do not have a lot of magazine space, explained Capt. Jeff Dodge, the
Navy’s Fire Scout program manager … (2)
The Navy has bought, or is planning to buy, 38 MQ-8C Fire
Scouts.
The MQ-8C first flight occurred in 2013. Now, seven years later, this is where we’re
at. The -8C should have been about the
easiest development program possible. It
used existing airframes and technology.
There was nothing particularly novel about it and, yet, the Navy can’t
seem to make it work. I think the lesson
herein is that technology is always oversold.
It always suffers from performance problems despite glowing manufacturer’s
claims. It’s always more difficult to
implement than anticipated. Observers
who marvel at the latest claims are just deluding themselves. The more technology you put into something,
the more problems you’ll have (Ford, LCS, Zumwalt, F-35, etc.). There is a very good argument for simpler,
more basic equipment that has a much higher chance of actually working.
There you have the current status of the Fire Scout. It will not be armed and will be tasked with
surveillance and targeting despite being assessed by the Navy and DOT&E as not
operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable. Sounds like the basis for an effective distributed lethality concept, right?
The new DOT&E category of cyber survivability is an
interesting one. This suggests that the
possibility exists that an enemy could take control of a Fire Scout during
flight via cyber attack or, at least, render it a mission kill.
With all that in mind, keep going Navy! Against all reason, you’ve declared IOC so
keep going!
(1)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), FY
2019 Annual Report, 20-Dec-2019, p. 151-2
(2)USNI News website, “Navy Declares Unmanned MQ-8C Fire
Scout Helicopter Mission Capable”, Ben Werner, 9-Jul-2019,
https://news.usni.org/2019/07/09/navy-declares-unmanned-mq-8c-fire-scout-helicopter-mission-capable
To me the crazy part about all these unmanned systems are especially the ones that just reuse a manned system. This is what a Bell Ranger? So it's well understood and manned which makes it "meh" at best BUT suddenly remove the pilot, increase the endurance and it's the best thing since man discovered fire!!! It's still just freaking Bell Ranger with some endurance. Really, removing the pilot is that special? Seems like pilots still need to be around to look at screens and make decisions....how much money was wasted on removing the pilot compared to just buying a stock Bell?
ReplyDeleteThe sensors are a significant size, and when you are some thousands of feet higher than the radar mast of the ship deployed from the data can be sent make to the ship to provide a much wider radar horizon.
DeleteEvery wespons system has setbacks both inherent from the wepon and operationally. I forget how many shells of the thousands fired at Jutland were hits , but it was pretty small, hadnt improved much by WW2. Same goes for anti -aircraft fire in WW2 or how many bombs dropped on a target - other than area bombing- came even close.
The advantages however meant that low probability of hits from opposing weapons systems still meant you had to take a different approach . Same goes with say a LCS/Frigate with a small drone helicopter the enemy has to take account of their presence.
"LCS/Frigate with a small drone helicopter the enemy has to take account of their presence."
DeleteOf course, the helo with its active radar will be seen by the enemy from much farther away than the helo can see the enemy. That's the fundamental flaw with any active sensor scheme and it's the flaw that the Navy, with their distributed lethality scheme, has failed to explain how it will succeed. Perhaps you'd care to take a shot at explaining it, if you think it's a viable scheme?
Any radar will tell an opponent where you are, with the ship in 'radar silence' the drone can do the looking or vice versa. I dont know that complete stealth for surface vessels is possible , submarines maybe . Anyway presence is one thing precise location is a different story. Surface ships already have helicopters ( mostly) a drone is just an option to increase capability for listening or scanning without reducing the manned capability.
DeleteFWIW think the earlier MQ-8B is to be terminated along with sleping/life extension the old Burke's, first four LCS's etc as part of Modly's plan to save $40 billion over the next 5 years. A reflection on lack of any useful capabilities?
ReplyDelete"A reflection on lack of any useful capabilities?"
DeleteI suspect it's less an objective analysis of capabilities and more an issue of just cost savings. The Navy has no idea what a future war will actually be like and, therefore, no idea what will or won't be useful. For example, by any reasonable analysis, the Zumwalts are of limited usefulness and yet they seem not to be among the cuts. As with most Navy decisions, there is little rationality.
Reading the article again, is it common for a ship to only have one weapons magazine? I always figured there would be 2 magazines but apparently LCS only has 1 small one....with not a lot of spare space to boot.
ReplyDeleteUnderstood it was LCS max weapons payload limit of only 105 tonnes, the MCM mission module had to be split into mini mission modules as too heavy.
DeleteNavy plans to continue testing its full MCM suite on a ~70,000t ESB in 2020 :)
"Understood it was LCS max weapons payload limit of only 105 tonnes"
DeleteI think you might be confusing two different concepts. The LCS had a mission module weight allowance designed in and it was something on the order of 100-200 tons (I don't have the specs in front of me). I could be wrong but I think the magazine weight allowance is a separate seaframe (hull) allowance. The 57 mm gun, for example, was not part of any module but presumably makes up the bulk of the weight/volume of the magazine.
Thus, the MCM module (or any module) weight issues are a separate concern from the ship's magazine. Where they overlap is in the available space (volume) in the magazine and the space is, apparently, severely limited.
Again, I'm not 100% positive about this but that's my understanding.
Googled, GAO-14-749, " Mission packages (regardless of which type) are required to consume no more than 180 metric tons when installed aboard a seaframe. Of this 180-metric-ton allocation, 105 metric tons are allotted to the actual mission package equipment, whereas 75 metric tons are reserved for fuel to power that equipment" Fuel for helo/uav.
DeleteYou are correct, loose wording on my part, the 105t is max is for the mission module hardware, not total weapons payload as it excludes the Base Weapons, 57mm, RAM or SeaRAM and 4x .50 mg's. The 2x Mk46 30 mm cannons are part of the surface warfare MM and so weight in theory would have to be deducted from the max 105t for the MCM MM and ASW MM which includes weight of helo/uav, as will the weight of SSMM 45x Hellfires if fitted (always thought the low weight of the Kongsberg NSM one of the main Navy drivers for its selection for SUW MM as the LCS payload is so weight limited)
Navy spec for both LCS classes only called for a minimal 50t SLA, service life allowance, built in for future weight growth over its 20/25 life, GAO mentions that SLA weight had already been eaten into by 2014 for the requirement for increased crew numbers, accommodation/food/water etc and larger RHIB, expect also used for the 2x Mk46 30 mm cannons and SSMM, so now LCS already at near max displacement which not good this early in its life as all ships put on weight over the years and why the seaframe max magazine weight strictly limited to the original specs as has no margin to take weight of additional weapons eg APKWS).
PS The Navy SLA standard for new surface combatants or new variants was 10%, LCS 50t would be equivalent to ~1.5% eg Burke Flight I 10%, new Flight III hits 8% only after excluding the HED, HED upgrade since cancelled for Flight IIA, the new FFG(X) only spec'd at 5%.
I addressed LCS SLA in a previous post that you might find interesting. It has some individual LCS ship weight data. See, "LCS SLA"
DeleteThe last few ship classes the Navy has been designing have had far lower weight and stability margins than traditionally required for new ship designs. I suspect this is a cost savings attempt but, if so, is a severely short-sighted move.
Thanks for your ref to "LCS SLA" as always your input said it all.
DeleteThere is a silver lining of sorts here. By pairing the Fire Scouts with the LCS's it allows the navy to buy their useless toys without actually degrading the effectiveness of useful weapon systems.
ReplyDeleteSurely the obvious fix to the magazine problem is to operate the Fire Scout from a larger platform and see if the programme can be useful in principle, even if not on the LCS. Unmanned programmes have to be pushed forward and the technology developed for a number of reasons - one of those that has not been discussed widely is the possibility that this Coronavirus outbreak is a deliberate rehearsal by the Chinese and not just poor lab security. [Cue separate post on how resilient the navy is to biological warfare].
ReplyDelete"Unmanned programmes have to be pushed forward"
ReplyDeleteWhy? All I ever hear is vague generalities. It simply appears to have become an article of faith - it must be done because it must be done.
There are a few noteworthy possible applications for unmanned such as mine clearing. Deep penetration strike is another good candidate but we already have a fully functioning, unmanned, deep penetration strike platform - it's called a cruise or ballistic missile.
So, tell me why we have to push unmanned forward?
"Coronavirus outbreak is a deliberate rehearsal by the Chinese"
That's a rumor, not a fact, at this point. That aside, the counter to biological warfare is nuclear warfare in the MAD concept.
Unmanned programmes need to be pushed forward for a number of reasons in my view :
Delete- Western democracies have a political disadvantage in that their populations can't handle casualties whilst our likely enemies can.
- Recruitment is an issue for many countries and conscription is much more difficult.
- We are militarily outnumbered and have to rely of a steadily-decreasing technology gap and need to maintain the advantage.
That said, I agree that there must be a targetted application with a valid goal and that you shouldn't just approve something that has the word 'unmanned' in it.
Firstly, you misquoted me - I said it is a possibility that it's a Chinese test, I didn't say it was a fact.
I don't agree that the response to a biological warfare is a nuclear strike - it may be the official theory but I just don't see the opposition putting us in a position where a President would have the political cover to do that. This may well be a test to see how the US reacts - no talk of nuclear warfare by anyone so far.
Your comments about populations, casualties, and recruitment seem to suggest that you hold the common misbelief that unmanned equates to less manning and that is simply not the case. In fact, the Air Force has publicly noted that unmanned systems require greater manning levels!
DeleteThe point that I think you're making about casualties - that they're unacceptable to Western societies - has an element of truth to it, DURING PEACETIME. In an all out war, being properly waged (meaning clear causes and objectives), we will accept casualties as we have always done.
"Firstly, you misquoted me - I said it is a possibility that it's a Chinese test, I didn't say it was a fact."
I noted that and did not believe you were stating it as a fact. My apologies that I did not make that clear.
"I don't agree that the response to a biological warfare is a nuclear strike"
It's not a matter of agreement. The US policy is that the use of WMD begets the use of WMD (nuclear, since we don't have chemical or bio weapons). This is the MAD doctrine. This is not my opinion that I'm stating, it's the US policy.
"no talk of nuclear warfare by anyone so far."
Of course not, since no one believes (yet) that the virus was a weapon or an attack.
Your suggestion about a test seems unlikely to me but bears consideration and investigation and I would assume the US govt is looking closely at the possibility.
What's very concerning and hopefully US Military is thinking this through but the mention of a test or something similar made me wonder: has anyone else noticed the problems raised here by Covid? Forget politics, let's just stick to military: supply chains of F35 being disrupted, civilian supply chain disrupted, global supply chain disrupted, shortage of basic commodities could affect military?, if many civilians get sick, how much support does military get, how many jobs that used to be done by military are now civilian? What happens if a big depot-maintance plant gets shut down? Boeing had to close to clean plant when a worker got sick. What happens if rail transportation gets slowed from lack of conductors and you need to mobilize? Can military get their trains moving? I mean, sure we could load them but if you have no conductor....not going anywhere. I mean, you could affect US military severely with just spreading the common cold, forget super sophisticated viruses!!! This is revealing some serious weaknesses and maybe we need to rethink our reserves, mobilization and how we execute with little to no civilian support or difficulties. I doubt an enemy would do this BUT as I said, who needs Covid, a well directed common cold could take out enough to slow us down considerably and how would anyone really know? Maybe after a while and notice only specific important people to US military deployment are sick but how long would it take for somebody to detect, it would creep up slowly why these people are sick....just before an attack and you need them. It's far fetched but I think some lessons are going to be learned here, at least we should into it....
DeleteAlso, can somebody please wake up to the fact China controls rare earth minerals and medication fabrication wayyyyy too much????
Bio warfare is not used and is not likely to be used for two reasons:
Delete1. It's far too difficult to control and would, almost certainly, boomerang and bite the attacker given the global interconnections of today's world.
2. Bio is a WMD and the US policy is to respond with WMD to a WMD attack. Given that the only US WMD is nuclear, a bio attack would elicit a nuclear response. Most enemies would prefer to avoid that.
As far as a non-weapon bio incident, such as we are currently experiencing, it may well disrupt our infrastructure but it will also do the same to any enemies, again given the interconnected nature of the world.
Regarding rare earths, Trump has initiated studies of the situation and is working on remedies. I don't have the details but I've read the very brief summaries. The main problem in the US is not that we lack rare earths but that we've legislatively prohibited the mining/refining. If we would loosen/rewrite the regulations we could, apparently, supply our own rare earths in needed quantities. Protesters, however, would be dead set against mining/refining so it becomes a political question rather than a purely military one. Hence, the reason why we were previously willing to allow China to produce the rare earths. We now see that as a strategic mistake and Trump is working to correct that. Obviously, it won't happen overnight.
You can like Trump or not but you have to give him credit for shining a light on some of these strategic issues. Whether he can correct them remains to be seen.
The rare earths supply problem could easily be solved with one policy change. All thorium produced via the extraction of rare earths will be accounted for by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at government expense and shall be considered the property of the US Government. Rare earths are usually in ore containing thorium and thorium is a Special Nuclear Material and must be accounted for (regulated at every step of production to prevent diversion). The cost of the regulations are born by the producer. After the extraction of the rare earths the producer has tails with thorium in them that are now considered special nuclear material and have to be disposed of as nuclear waste and cannot just be returned to the soil from which it was extracted. That's why there is minimal rare earth activity in the USA. China does have some ore bodies that have minimal thorium so they have an easier extraction process but the cost of the regulations are what really killed the USA producers.
Deletehttps://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/nuclear-mat-ctrl-acctng.html
Clarification thorium is not a Special Nuclear Material but can be made into one and must be accounted for because of that fact.
DeleteThorium is classified as a Source material. Still a lot a regulations and paperwork since it is radioactive and can be turned into a Special Nuclear Material (Atomic bomb material).
DeleteThe out sourcing of medicines and medicine components needs serious attention.
DeleteAn immediate zero percent income tax rate for drug/medical product companies producing products with 100% USA content along with a five hundred percent tariff on imports, phased in over 10 years, would solve the issue. Tariffs make importing drugs/medical products into the US economy more expensive and production would likely move back to the USA. No drug company shareholder wants their profits to be lost to tariffs if they can make more money producing the drug in the USA.
For really low volume drugs, some form of direct support would be needed to keep multiple production plants open. Some production quantities are so low that you could realistically produce the world's supply in your garage. A production tax credit of $2 to $25 million per drug at a specific supply level (one third of USA domestic demand with surge capacity of 1.5 times USA domestic demand) would likely assure production from multiple sources. The tax credit would be the profit center for the company, not the sale of the drug, so the drug could realistically be given away. Allow up to 4 production tax credits to be awarded for each drug and there will be no shortages of medicines in the USA and no worries about external influence by China over the healthcare system.
The production of medicines and medical components is usual industrial chemistry or industrial biologic culture and can be done with a small plant. Economy of scale is not present in medicine production like industrial chemicals PET, polypropylene, Ammonia, lysine etc, so feedstock materials do not control the cost of production, other factors influence the cost (capital, taxes, staff, regulations).
China supports its exporters and protects producers from imports. If your company wants to sell to the second/third largest economy you need to produce it in China and hand over the intellectual property.
The USA needs to make it more attractive to produce medicines in the USA than China if we want medicines produced in the USA.
China may raise a stink with the WTO but you could make a reasonable argument that these are critical industries to the survival of our population and not subject to WHO trade regulations. Additionally, We are only responding to the open threat of restraint of trade in medical products by China and they have no one to blame but themselves for our actions.
"The tax credit would be the profit center for the company, not the sale of the drug"
DeleteThat's a fascinating concept and seems plausible.
"The USA needs to make it more attractive to produce medicines in the USA than China"
Yes! This also applies to all goods manufactured in China. Until China drastically changes its behavior, we should endeavor to bring all manufacturing back to the US. We are at war with China and this would be a good tactic. Trump has begun doing some of this but we should be much more aggressive about it.
Really good comment!
"The rare earths supply problem"
DeleteGreat comment. Good background info. Thanks for that!
"we've legislatively prohibited the mining/refining."
DeleteThis is my comment and I probably should have more accurately said that our regulations have made it prohibitively expensive (economically non-viable) to produce rather than outright banning it, as far as I know.
It's not only a function of US legislation.
DeleteIt's also because China massively subsidises rare earth metal production.
A similar program could be enacted in the US and eould solve the problem.
Rare earth metals are a misnomer. They're aren't all that rare.
Another to remember is that two of America's closest allies in Canada and Australia are not too far behind China as sources of the metals.
So while it's certainly wise for the US to support the rare earth metals industry, it is a problem that could easily be addressed.
It's not as though there aren't rare earth deposits within the US. They just aren't being exploited.
"A similar program could be enacted in the US and eould solve the problem."
DeleteYou're on the money! The US needs to understand what its strategic necessities and vulnerabilities are and start strengthening them. If that requires subsidies or modified regulations then that's what we need to do.
"Another to remember is that two of America's closest allies in Canada and Australia are not too far behind China as sources of the metals."
Now this is an interesting aspect. Allies are always an unreliable entity since they all act in their own best interests - as they should and as we also do - but that introduces a degree of uncertainty. If you're trading for a common commodity, that's no big deal. However, if we're looking for an ally to supply a strategic resource, that's a risk. Strategic resources should be wholly under our own control which means contained within our country, if at all possible.
The other aspect to using allies for supply is that supply can be disrupted in war. Just as we strangled Japan's resources with our submarines in WWII, China could, someday, be strong enough to cut off rare earth shipments from Australia to the US. Canada, with its intimate proximity, is less of a problem although the inherent unreliability question remains.
"Now this is an interesting aspect. Allies are always an unreliable entity since they all act in their own best interests - as they should and as we also do - but that introduces a degree of uncertainty. If you're trading for a common commodity, that's no big deal. However, if we're looking for an ally to supply a strategic resource, that's a risk. Strategic resources should be wholly under our own control which means contained within our country, if at all possible."
DeleteInterests align.
Australia, the US and Canada have broadly the same strategic interests. The US has never fought a major war in isolation, or without the support of her allies.
Future wars will be largely the same. It requires an amazing leap of logic to presume that Canada would stop exporting rare earth metals to the US in the midst of a war.
Regardless, the US should also, where possible, provide her own strategic reserve.
While in the long term that will require the US to begin greater exploitation of known reserves in places like the Mountain Pass mine in Calafornia or Bokan Mountain in Alaska, or even by sifting through the piles of tailings left over from various mining operations that have or are occurring across the continental US.
In the short term it should probably mean stockpiling reserves of REEs by acquiring those from current major exporters, Australia being by far the largest after China. Australia has vast reserves of REEs, and is one of very few. countries that has put an emphasis on extracting them.
"Interests align."
DeleteSometimes. Sometimes not. France, Spain, and Italy denied us basing and overflight during the 1986 Libya attack (Op El Dorado Canyon). Philippines was a solid ally and is now leaning pro-Chinese. Australia has been publicly supportive of better Chinese relations (sold the port of Darwin to China) which might lead to a situation of neutrality in a war (or might not - hence, the uncertainty). In May of 2019, a Spanish frigate abandoned a US carrier group when tensions with Iran spiked. NATO ally Turkey has all but abandoned the US and NATO. South Korea has recently begun significant improvements in their relations with China leading to the possibility of neutrality in a China-US war. France and Germany opposed the 2003 Iraqi Freedom conflict. And the list goes on.
Allies act in their own best interests which is perfectly understandable but it makes them unreliable. When it comes to a critical strategic resource, that's not something you want to gamble on. As you say, "the US should also, where possible, provide her own strategic reserve".
Canada and the US have engaged in vitriolic trade wars and it is no great leap of logic to imagine the possibility that Canada would not support some future US war. One would hope that wouldn't be the case but hope is not what we want to bet our strategic resources on.
To infer that because the state government of the Northern Territory leased a commercial port to a chinese owned company means Australia might be neutral in a war is so far from reality it's hard to know what to say in response. That just doesn't make any sense.
DeleteAustralia and Canada are members of the Five Eyes. The US doesn't have closer allies. Your suspicions are unfounded.
The idea that Australia wouldn't support the US in a war against China really displays a fundamental misunderstanding of Australian politics. Australia is more worried about China than the US is.
"To infer that because the state government of the Northern Territory leased a commercial port to a chinese owned company means Australia might be neutral"
DeleteHardly! One incident, no matter how egregious, is not the basis for my opinion. It is one example. I've seen several statements over the past several years from various Aus leaders about not needing to choose between China and the US and the desirability of balancing the influence and benefits of both and the need to cultivate good trade relations with China. I've noted Chinese investments in Australia as well as Chinese contributions to political campaigns. I've observed a lack of Australian military involvement in containing Chinese expansions. And so on. That body of 'evidence' can't help but generate at least a few doubts. To think otherwise is to be blind to reality.
I've also noted some harder stances toward China in the last couple of years. I would be encouraged if that trend continues but it will require some sustained evidence.
So, I would very much like to believe that Australia would side with the US but there is more than enough evidence to warrant at least some doubts. You seem to think that my doubts constitute a condemnation of Australia as a near-enemy. Nothing could be further from the truth. I merely note some concerns that prevent me from automatically and unquestioningly lumping Australia into the 100% guaranteed ally category. Instead, I put Australia into the likely but not guaranteed ally category and I continue to monitor and hope for the best.
No member of the government has suggested aligning with China or abandoning the US alliance.
DeleteAustralia's entire foreign policy and security framework for the last 80 years has been predicated on one fact - that we are 100% locked in to the US alliance.
To understand that, you need to see the world from Australia's position.
A massive country, with enormous resources and wealth, with a tiny population immediately south of Asia. Having barely survived the Japanese advance in WW2, with no real ability to stand alone in the region if another massive power (e.g. China) decided to exert control, Australia's entire history has been predicated on the political and military support of first Great Britain (1900-1942) and then the US (1942-today).
Australia needs the US far more than the US needs Australia. That's why we followed the US to Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, the Afghan War, the invasion of Iraq and why we have special forces deployed to support US interests throughout the Middle East and Africa to this day. It's why we sent ships and aircraft immediately in the most recent crisis with Iran. It's why we were the first country to pledge support after 9-11 by formally enacting the ANZUS treaty, before even NATO.
It's why every single PM since Curtin in 1942 has repeatedly pledged support for ANZUS and the US.
It's why every single one of our defence papers for the last 15 years has highlighted the danger of China and the need to prepare the Australian military for the potential of a conflict with China in support of the US. It's why there are thousands of Marines stationed in Darwin (at Australia's request). It's why we coined the concept of an Asian pivot when Obama was in power. It's why the Australian government will not criticise Trump, no matter how outrageously he behaves. It's why we have had hundreds of US intelligence personnel based at the massive and highly secretive Pine Gap facility in the middle of Australia for the last 70 years. It's why we are one of the members of the Five Eyes intelligence group.
Australia is just about the most reliable ally the US has.
If you don't regard Australia as a guaranteed ally, then you simply don't believe that any ally is reliable. If that's the case I'd simply ask you to look to history - the US has never gone it alone. Even when most countries have not supported the US, Australia always has.
I understand the need to develop a domestic REE industry. No doubt it's a good idea. It makes perfect sense and is eminently achievable.
But that's a different concept entirely than deciding that probably the US' most reliable ally in the last 80 years is suspect.
I'd suggest that maybe your familiarity with Australian politics vis a vi China is out of date.
Not sure if you've been following the subject in the news, but Australia and China are in the worst diplomatic crisis they've ever been in.
Not least because of our support for the US. Also because China has been caught meddling in Australian politics, attempting (and in one case succeeding) in bribing Senators.
Ironically, it's Australia that worries about American commitment in the region and to her.
Here's an example of the kind of thing that gives me pause. It's a quote from a Mar-2019 Bloomberg News article:
Delete"Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s government on Friday announced the formation of the National Foundation for Australia-China Relations, which will use the private sector, industry lobby groups, and non-government and cultural organizations to “turbo-charge our national effort in engaging China.”
Another example … Here's a bit from a recent ABC News article:
"Successive Australian governments have decided they don't have to choose between the United States and China, respectively the nation's primary security ally and economic partner.
The strategy has been to try to straddle the growing gulf between the two superpowers by keeping a foot in both camps."
You can see how these kinds of things can inject at least a note of concern for the US. Again, I'm not saying that Australia is a China ally. I'm just saying that I could imagine a scenario where Australia might lean towards neutrality in a China-US conflict. I'd like to think not but it's at least conceivable to me. If you can read these kinds of statements and not recognize the existence of even a tiny doubt then you're ignoring the bits that don't fit your view.
As I said, I've also noted some harder stances and statements of late but hardly overwhelming anti-Chinese rhetoric.
For me, if/when Aus sends forces to 'confront' China (like FON exercises in the South China Sea, for example) then I'll conclude that Aus is seriously anti-China.
I'm clearly not going to influence your opinion so I'll leave it at that. Feel free to have the last word.
"2. Bio is a WMD and the US policy is to respond with WMD to a WMD attack. Given that the only US WMD is nuclear, a bio attack would elicit a nuclear response. Most enemies would prefer to avoid that."
DeleteExcept that it is almost impossible to tell where a biological attack originated from. Who are you going to nuke if you are not sure wether the attack originated from Russia, China, Iran or North Korea? All four of them just to be sure? That talk about responding to a bio-attack with nukes is just that: Talk! In reality this will be practically impossible.
"he point that I think you're making about casualties - that they're unacceptable to Western societies - has an element of truth to it, DURING PEACETIME. In an all out war, being properly waged (meaning clear causes and objectives), we will accept casualties as we have always done."
ReplyDeleteI'd argue that the numerous failures, blind reliance on tech like this, and the lack of the Navy to come up with a coherent battle plan that is workable instead of sound bites (Air Sea Battle! Distributed Lethality! Sounds like 80's video games) will end up costing us more casualties when it really counts.
Please Navy, don't tell me you're trying to make war more sanitary by acting like a 10 year old with a credit card in an electronics store.
I wonder aloud if the MQ-8 program suffers from the same mismanagement in general as the LCS program? I also wonder aloud if a fixed wing platform would have been better?
ReplyDeleteThe “Brodie system enabled WW2 LSTs with a 210-foot flight deck to launch L-4 observation aircraft. https://www.pipermuseum.com/SubmittedArticles/The%20saga%20of%20the%20seasick%20US%20Army%20Piper%20Cubs%20on%20the%20Navy.htm
This is all eerily similar to the DASH program, which was well conceived, but poorly implemented, and ill supported.
Ironically, the JMSDF got good use out of DASH, as did the U.S. Army.
GAB
"I also wonder aloud if a fixed wing platform would have been better?"
DeleteFor all our technological advancement, is a modern Fire Scout or Scan Eagle all that much of an improvement over a WWI (yes, WW One) Sopwith Camel? And, the Camel has the advantage that it can be completely maintained, repaired, and rebuilt aboard ship by crew with no more than a wrench!
As always, you cut to the heart of the matter!
It seems as though the C program erased undervalued benefits of the B program. The B's were cheaper,more expendable, and you could carry more of them.
ReplyDeleteOnce they made a C model that was almost as big as a manned asset and almost as pricey, it just makes more sense to carry the more capable manned asset.
Especially on a small ship like a frigate, where the choice would be 3-4 B-models vs 1 c-model, vs 1 manned helo.
"It seems as though the C program erased undervalued benefits of the B program."
DeleteAn astute observation. Here's a hypothetical question to ponder. For all our technological advancement, is a modern Fire Scout or Scan Eagle all that much of an improvement over a WWI (yes, WW One) Sopwith Camel? And, the Camel has the advantage that it can be completely maintained, repaired, and rebuilt aboard ship by crew with no more than a wrench!
"The Navy believes that the Fire Scout is not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable"
ReplyDeleteSounds like the perfect weapon for the LCS.