US Submarine Losses in the Pacific

I generally avoid simply repeating information from other sources but I occasionally make an exception for truly amazing works.  One such is this link[1] to a brief summary of the numbers and causes of US submarine losses in WWII.  The Navy lost 52 submarines, almost all of them in the Pacific.  Amazingly, only one was lost in the open ocean of the central Pacific.  The rest were lost near land.

 

Below is a map showing the location of each loss.

 

Please follow the link and check out the site.  You’ll find it fascinating and informative.

 

 

Here’s a few open questions you might want to ponder or comment on:

 

• What does this suggest about future submarine actions against the Chinese?  
• What does this suggest about likely operating areas in future actions?
• What does this suggest about mid-ocean enemy submarine threats?
• What does this suggest about submarine support and basing requirements?
• What does this suggest about where our ASW resources should go in a war with China and how will we support and protect those resources?
• What does this suggest about the number of submarines we’ll need to prosecute a war relative to the number of submarines we have or are capable of building (2 per year)?

 

 

 

______________________________

 

[1]http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/SubLosses/SS_losses-Intro.html

Merry Christmas

 Merry Christmas to you and yours from ComNavOps !

Santa is modernizing his deliver system.

Christmas Gifts for the Navy

As ComNavOps sits in his parlor, waiting and hoping that Santa brings him a 16” triple gun mount, he can’t help but imagine what gifts he’d like Santa to bring the Navy.  Here’s a few thoughts:

• A new design, smaller, focused destroyer so that the Navy can finally stop building obsolete Burkes
• A dedicated, long range fighter aircraft
• A CNO with an ounce of integrity, courage, and intelligence
• A dozen new dry docks

 
What do you hope Santa brings the Navy?

US Commercial Ship Delivery Data

Here’s just a bit of data about commercial ship deliveries. 

 

For the six year period 2015-2020, inclusive, US shipbuilding delivered 30 large ships ranging from 26,410 to 53,400 DWT.[1]  Contract costs ranged from $125M - $255M.  The builders were:

 

• Keppel AmFELS, Brownsville, TX
• NASSCO, San Diego, CA
• Philly Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA
• VT Halter Marine, Pascagoula, Mississippi.
• Bay Shipbuilding, Sturgeon Bay, WI

 

 

Ship Deliveries 2015-2020
Container/RORO	10
Dry Bulk	1
Offshore Rig	1
Product/Chemical Carriers	18

 

NASSCO Orca Class Ro-Ro

 

 

I was slightly surprised to learn that some thirty to forty smaller craft, such as tugs, tows, barges, and the like are delivered each year from a multitude of shipyards.

 

 

 

________________________________

 

[1]http://shipbuildinghistory.com/statistics/currentcommercial.htm

Impact of Overhead on Shipbuilding Cost

Shipbuilding costs have skyrocketed, generally exceeding the rate of inflation, exceeding all reasonable expectations, and blowing away all historical precedents.  The reasons for this cost explosion are many and not always obvious.  Unfortunately, the lack of obvious reasons leads to simplistic, sensationalistic explanations among naval observers and, disappointingly, they are largely wrong. 

 

One of the most common complaints/explanations is that the shipbuilding industry, in cahoots with government and corrupt admirals, is rife with fraud and if we could just eliminate the fraud, shipbuilding costs would drop precipitously.  While this explanation makes for a compelling and, in a sense, satisfying (because we have an identifiable ‘villain’) story, it is unsupported by any significant body of evidence and fails to stand up to analysis.  This is not to say that a degree of corruption and fraud does not exist but it is not responsible for the magnitude of the cost increases we see on every new shipbuilding project.

 

A far more significant explanation for runaway costs is simple overhead.  We’ve previously covered this in depth (see, “Shipbuilding Costs – Impact of Low Volume”) but it warrants some follow up.  For those who may not be familiar with the basics of accounting and cost allocation, the following is a brief and grossly simplified explanation of overhead.

 

A product’s cost is the sum of two components:  direct costs and overhead costs.

 

cost = direct + overhead

 

Overhead is the cost of business not specifically and directly related to producing a product. 

 

For example, regulatory compliance costs (diversity, gender, environmental, maternity leave, etc.) are necessary costs (are they really?) but they are not directly related to the cost of production.  A department of lawyers or accountants provide no direct contribution to production but their cost is indirectly included.  Taxes must be paid on land and facilities but they have no direct relation to production.  And so on.

 

Direct costs, on the other hand, include raw materials, cranes, assembly facilities, and labor.

 

So, again, a product’s cost is the sum of direct costs plus overhead. 

 

cost = direct + overhead

 

Seems simple enough, right?

 

The thing is, direct costs are fixed whereas overhead is variable.  I know, you think overhead is also fixed but we’re going to demonstrate that it’s not and we’re going to demonstrate how/why that variation impacts shipbuilding cost.

 

As an illustrative example, let’s pretend there’s an item that has $100 of direct costs to produce, regardless of the time required.  Let’s further assume that the overhead costs are $100/yr.

 

If that item takes us one year to produce then the total cost is

 

cost = direct + overhead

cost = $100 + ($100 * 1 yr)

cost = $100 + $100

cost = $200

 

Now, let’s suppose that item takes us two years to produce.  The total cost becomes

 

Cost = direct + overhead

Cost = $100 + ($100 * 2 yr)

Cost = $100 + $200

Cost = $300

 

Now, let’s suppose that item takes us five years to produce.  The total cost becomes

 

Cost = direct + overhead

Cost = $100 + ($100 * 5 yr)

Cost = $100 + $500

Cost = $600

 

Wait a minute, how can the costs vary widely if it’s the exact same item with the exact same direct cost?  It’s the overhead, of course.  More specifically, it’s the time required to complete the item;  the longer the time, the more overhead that has to be applied to the item’s final cost.

 

Now, suppose that the item is a US Navy aircraft carrier that has $10B of direct cost to produce and the shipyard has an additional $1B of overhead per year.

 

If the yard could build the carrier in one year, the total cost would be

 

Cost = direct + overhead

Cost = $10B + ($1B * 1 yr)

Cost = $10B + $1B

Cost = $11B

 

In reality, we have historically produced a carrier in four to five years (we’ll call it five) which makes the total cost

 

Cost = direct + overhead

Cost = $10B + ($1B * 5 yr)

Cost = $10B + $5B

Cost = $15B

 

However, the Navy sometimes stretches out the build times to around seven years which makes the total cost

 

Cost = direct + overhead

Cost = $10B + ($1B * 7 yr)

Cost = $10B + $7B

Cost = $17B

 

We see, then, that the carrier could cost anywhere from $13B (3 yr build time) to $17B (7 yr build time), depending on the build time and the number of years of overhead that have to be applied.

 

Why does overhead have to be applied?  A company does not produce products for free.  It has to pass on all its costs to the buyer.  Therefore, the overhead accumulates, year after year, for every year that it takes to build the carrier and, at the end, the total accumulated overhead gets dumped on the carrier and the Navy/taxpayer pays the cost.

 

Now, let’s take a look at the actual build times for Navy aircraft carriers, as shown in the table below. 

 

 

Carrier Build Time, yrs Laid to Commissioning
CV-63 Kitty Hawk	5
CV-64 Constellation	4
CVN-65 Enterprise	3
CV-66 America	4
CV-67 Kennedy	4
CVN-68 Nimitz	7
CVN-69 Eisenhower	7
CVN-70 Vinson	7
CVN-71 Roosevelt	5
CVN-72 Lincoln	5
CVN-73 Washington	6
CVN-74 Stennis	4
CVN-75 Truman	5
CVN-76 Reagan	5
CVN-77 Bush	6
CVN-78 Ford	8

 

 

We see that build times went from 3-5 years, pre-Nimitz, to 5-8 years.  That means that recent carriers are being hit with 2-5 years of added shipyard overhead.  Of course the total cost is going to increase and increase substantially! 

 

Someone with too much time on their hands is going to point out that the shipyard likely has other work and 100% of the yard’s overhead isn’t dumped on a single carrier.  That is true, of course, however, for our simplified discussion, the concept is valid and substantially correct.

 

While it may be satisfying and cathartic to blame all our shipbuilding cost problems on fraud and corruption, the reality is that those are minor factors.  Overhead is a much larger factor and may well be the main culprit.  Of course, without an itemized breakdown of the production costs, I can’t say for sure.

Battleships - Naval Massing

One of the foundational principles of combat, throughout history, is local massing of firepower.  Let’s examine that principle through the historical lens of battleship operations.  If ever there was a ship that could successfully operate alone, it would be the battleship, one would think.  However, in WWII, battleships always operated in groups, when possible, in accordance with the principle of massing of firepower.  Thus, despite their individually impressive firepower and armor, naval commanders of the time understood that massing was the proper way to employ battleships.

 

For the US, earlier in the war, battleships sometimes operated as single units – though still as part of larger groups such as a carrier group – due to inadequate numbers.  Later in the war, as numbers became available, battleships operated in groups, as discrete battleship task forces.

 

One of the earlier examples of US massing of battleship firepower was the pairing of the Washington and South Dakota to form Battleship Division 6 at Guadalcanal, culminating in the famous engagement and sinking of the Japanese battleship, Kirishima.

 

Oldendorf’s Task Force 77.2 consisted of the old battleships USS Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, Maryland, and West Virginia at Leyte Gulf.

 

The never-formed Task Force 34 at Leyte Gulf would have consisted of the battleships Washington, Alabama, New Jersey, and Iowa along with escorting cruisers and destroyers.

 

Task Force 58/38 included the battleships Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin although, of course, the individual ships rotated in and out of the Task Force as operational needs and availability dictated.

 

The British Home Fleet included 2^nd Battle Squadron with the battleships HMS Royal Oak, HMS Royal Sovereign, HMS Ramilies, HMS Nelson, and HMS Rodney although, again, the ships rotated in and out as needs and availability dictated.

 

When the principle of naval massing in combat was violated, it usually didn’t turn out well:

 

• Bismarck operated alone and was sunk after inflicting only insignificant damage on Allied shipping.
• Tirpitz operated alone and was sunk having accomplished little.
• Kirishima was the only Japanese battleship at the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal and was sunk in the famous battleship duel with Washington.
• Graf Spee, a so-called pocket battleship, operated alone and was trapped and scuttled for little return.
• Yamato and escorts faced the firepower of several of Task Force 58’s carriers and was sunk.
• Yamashiro, of the Japanese southern force at Leyte Gulf (Fuso having been sunk earlier), was sunk after facing a US force of several cruisers and six battleships.

 

 

Of course, merely assembling multiple battleships doesn’t guarantee success.  For example, the British Force Z battleship, Prince of Wales, and battlecruiser Repulse operated together but insufficient escorts, lack of air cover, and an operationally untenable position doomed the group regardless of their massing because their cumulative mass of firepower was less than the enemy’s.  In other words, the enemy achieved greater local mass of firepower despite the pairing of the two ships. 

 

This leads to the pointed reminder that massing refers to firepower, not numbers.  One could assemble six battleships but if the enemy can assemble eight, it is the enemy that has achieved superior local massing of firepower.  Similarly, assembling multiple battleships is pointless if the enemy can assemble superior firepower in the form of aircraft.

 

The need to achieve local massing of firepower seems obvious, now, right?  So why are we belaboring it?

 

One reason is the persistent tendency by so many people to make the one-versus-the-entire-enemy argument for why –fill in the blank- weapon system or ship can’t succeed in naval combat.  The reality, as revealed by WWII naval combat, is that it’s never one-versus-the enemy but a group-versus-the enemy.  We should be evaluating systems and ships as groups because that’s how they’ll fight.  How many times have I heard the argument that a battleship is as good as sunk against the enemy’s missiles, aircraft, submarines, and mines?  As if a single battleship is ever going to attempt to take on the entire enemy war machine single-handed!  The real question is whether, say, four battleships operating as a group with escorts and properly supported by air power, reconnaissance, and submarines has value for the kind of operations we envision (assuming we had a naval strategy … which we don’t).

 

Task Force Entering Ulithi

I don’t want to turn this post into a battleship debate because that’s not the point.  I’m using battleships just to illustrate the point about massing firepower.  It’s not the firepower of a single battleship that matters.  It’s the firepower of a group of battleships, relative to our operational plans and the resources of the enemy, that is the proper basis for evaluations.

 

Another reason to hammer on the principle of local massing of firepower is the Navy’s ill-conceived distributed lethality concept which envisions ships operating alone – the opposite of massing of firepower.  Why is the Navy insistent on pursuing distributed lethality using the LCS which is the polar opposite of a battleship?  If battleships have been shown to be unable to successfully operate alone, why do we think an LCS is going to sail blithely around in enemy territory?

 

Finally, we’ve thoroughly discussed the massing of carriers but we have not explored additional forms of massing of naval firepower.  We should be exploring tactics for massing the firepower we have which, for the surface navy, is Burke class destroyers.  Can a group of Burkes accomplish anything useful?  How many ships would constitute a useful and effective force?  How would they operate?  What tactics would they use?  What support do they need?  What constraints should they operate under?  Of course, not only are we not doing this but I haven’t heard anyone in the Navy even broach the subject of examining a Burke surface group.  The idea may have merit or it may not but it should, at least, be examined.

 

One might be tempted to claim that a group of Burkes is never going to be used as a massed firepower unit but the same might have been said of Oldendorf’s group of obsolete, resurrected battleships and yet they wound up facing a Japanese battleship at Suriago Strait.  One never knows what circumstances might arise and it’s best to be prepared and have thought/exercised through the possibilities before they happen.

Hiding in Plain Sight Nonsense

I keep getting calls from commenters for ‘warships’ to be disguised as civilian ships and hide in plain sight, lost among the throngs of commercial shipping.  These unidentifiable ships will rain destruction on the enemy who will have no clue where and what the disguised ships are.  Hey, does this sound a lot like the Marine’s idiotic notion of small, hidden, missile-shooting units raining destruction on the hapless enemy who cannot find them?  But, I digress …

 

I didn’t want to do this post because, frankly, the concept is so obviously bereft of intelligence as to be a worthless exercise. Unfortunately, this ridiculous notion has gotten so prevalent that I’m forced to do a post and lay this idiotic idea to rest, once and for all.

 

Let’s start with the obvious.  In a war, there won’t be any commercial shipping anywhere near a war zone.  Commercial ships will avoid war zones like the plague because they know they’ll be sunk on sight.  Both sides will assume that any unidentified ship belongs to, or is aiding, the enemy and they’ll sink it without a second thought.

 

I mean, think about it.  If you’re the owner of a commercial ship are you going to sail your ship through the middle of a war zone infested with mines, submarines, trigger happy missile-shooters, etc.?  Of course not!

 

So, since there won’t be any commercial traffic anywhere near a war zone, what’s the point of trying to disguise a warship as a commercial ship?  If it stayed in commercial shipping lanes, it wouldn’t be anywhere near a war zone where it could do any good and, if it did venture into a war zone, it would be conspicuous for being the only supposed commercial vessel in the area and would be automatically assumed to be a disguised enemy ship and sunk on sight.

 

All right, let’s talk about the fabled Q-ships so many people are enamored with.  As a reminder, Q-ships were designed to combat submarines which, at that time, generally came to the surface, at some point, during attacks.  Today, submarines never surface during an attack so Q-ships are useless in that role.

 

Q-ships have been occasionally used against merchant ships but the overall record is almost utterly ineffective and any losses inflicted are utterly insignificant. 

 

Modern satellites and other surveillance and tracking will very quickly detect a Q-ship and modern, long range weapons will quickly sink it.  We have computerized tracking of all civilian shipping (and naval ships that opt to signal their location).  No Q-ship will stay hidden.  The Q-ship will be the one who turned off their transponder.  If they leave it on, they’ll be sunk.  If they turn it off, they’ll be sunk.  Same result, regardless.

 

I feel like I’m writing a post about the foolishness of trying to cross a crowded highway blindfolded.  Is it really necessary to construct an argument against it or is it just so incredibly obvious that it’s a bad idea that it’s a waste of time to even discuss it?

 

I don’t want to discuss this again. 

Tanker Stipends

As we’ve discussed (see, “Merchant Ship Conversions to Wartime Use”), the US needs to require that merchant ships be designed for rapid conversion to military use in the case of war.  A small step in that direction is taking place.  Congress has authorized the Tanker Security Program to provide stipends for private tanker ships in exchange for a commitment to allow the military to use the vessels, if needed.

  

“The rule published today kicks off the process of standing up a critical program necessary for our at-sea logistics and mobility enterprise for the Departments of Defense and Transportation” said [Joe] Courtney, chairman of the House Armed Services’ seapower and projection forces subcommittee. “The Seapower Subcommittee pushed for the authorization of the Tanker Security Program on a bipartisan basis to address alarming capacity gaps in our at-sea fueling logistics capabilities and our reliance on foreign-flagged vessels to deliver these resources.”

 

The program would provide stipends to the owners of privately-owned, militarily useful tanking ships and in exchange the ships’ owners agree to use their vessels to assist the federal government if called upon.[1]

 

 

Some more information from the Maritime Administration (MARAD), as published in the Federal Register,

 

Congress appropriated $60,000,000 for the TSP in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022, Public Law 117-269. Authorized payments to participating operators are limited to $6 million per ship, per fiscal year and are subject to annual appropriations. Participating operators will be required to make their commercial transportation resources available upon request by the Secretary of Defense for military purposes during times of war or national emergency.[2]

 

This is a good, if very small step in the right direction.  In addition to securing the right to use merchant vessels, we must ensure that new construction is militarily useful and designed for easy conversion. 

 

 

 

 

_______________________________________

 

[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy admiral touts sealift recap, stops short of saying 2025 problem is solved”, Justin Katz, 8-Dec-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/12/navy-admiral-touts-sealift-recap-stops-short-of-saying-2025-problem-is-solved/

 

[2]https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/12/07/2022-26358/tanker-security-program

Pearl Harbor

In recognition of the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, here’s a couple of related posts that might be of interest.

 

First is a discussion of one possible future Pearl Harbor scenario involving our biggest naval vulnerability, shipyards and cranes.

 

"The Next Pearl Harbor – Shipyards"

 

 

Second is an alternate history vision of what might have happened if the Japanese had opted to invade and occupy Pearl Harbor after the attack instead of withdrawing.

 

"Japanese Invasion of Pearl Harbor"

 

Merchant Ship Conversions to Wartime Use

It is no secret that the Navy has nowhere near enough amphibious and logistic support ships to prosecute a sustained war with China.  New construction of sufficient numbers and types of ships when war comes will be impossible given the state of US commercial shipbuilding.  An alternative to new construction is to acquire and convert commercial ships as was done routinely during WWII, especially at the start of the war.

 

Consider the case of troop transports.  At the start of WWII, we had nowhere near enough Attack Transports which were the backbone of the entire Pacific campaign.  Instead, we converted commercial ships to troop transports until we were able to ramp up our wartime shipbuilding.  Here’s a few examples:

 

McCawley Class - The McCawley class consisted of two converted commercial ships built for the American shipping company, Grace Lines, by Furness Shipbuilding Company.  The ships were completed in 1928 as Santa Barbara and Santa Maria. They were bought by the Navy in 1940 and converted to troop transports as the USS McCawley (AP-10) and USS Barnett (AP-11).

 

USS Harry Lee (AP-17) - The Harry Lee was built as the passenger ship SS Exochorda by New York Shipbuilding Co. in 1931 before being acquired by the Navy in Oct-1940 and converted to the Harry Lee (AP-17) in Dec-1940.

 

USS John Penn (AP-51/APA-23) - The John Penn was built as Excambion in 1931 by the New York Shipbuilding Company as one of American Export Lines's original "Four Aces."  She was acquired by the Navy 8-Jan-1942 and converted to a troop transport in Apr-1942.

 

 

Even prior to WWI, the US recognized the need for vastly increased numbers of commercial ships that could be converted to wartime use.  With the 1916 Shipping Act, Congress established an organization to do just that – the United States Shipping Board which, in turn, founded a business, the Emergency Fleet Corporation whose mission was to acquire merchant ships for war needs.

 

Paraphrased from various Wikipedia entries,

 

The Shipping Board had been established while the United States was at peace, with the intent to restore the nation's Merchant Marine.

 

Ten days after declaration of war, on 16 April 1917, the Board created the Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) in the District of Columbia with a capital stock of $50,000,000.  The EFC’s purpose was to acquire, maintain, and operate merchant ships to meet national defense, foreign and domestic commerce during World War I.

 

When the United States declared war against Germany the purpose and policy of the Shipping Board and the Fleet Corporation changed from a body established to restore the American Merchant Marine to a military organization tasked with providing transport of war materials to Europe. 

 

The EFC was renamed the U.S. Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation in February 1927, then abolished entirely in October 1936. Its functions were transferred to the United States Maritime Commission.

 

The EFC operated together with some 80 shipyards throughout the country to design commercial ships suitable for conversion to war use.  For example, the Design 1029 ship (full name Emergency Fleet Corporation Design 1029) was a steel-hulled passenger/cargo ship designed to be converted in times of war to a troopship.

 

Today, China does something along these lines with their commercial ships being designed for rapid conversion to wartime vessels.

 

We see, then, that acquisition and conversion of merchant ships to wartime use has been a common practice throughout history.

 

Given our appalling shortage of transport and logistic ships, we will definitely need to acquire and convert merchant ships.  Unfortunately, the US flagged merchant fleet is lacking in numbers.  The U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, lists only 180 US flagged, privately owned, oceangoing ships of 1,000 tons or greater, as of 2021.[1]  The breakdown by type is shown in the table below.

 

 

Ship Type	Qty.
Containership	63
Dry Bulk	4
General Cargo	20
Ro-Ro	26
Vehicles Carrier	3
Tanker	64
Total	180

 

 

Of the 180 vessels, 157 were deemed militarily useful.[1]

 

We don’t need to attempt to build more amphibious or logistics ships but we do need to ‘change the landscape’, so to speak, with the following actions:

 

• Need to require merchant ships to include military conversion features in their design.
• Need to increase the number of US flagged merchant ships by modifying the applicable laws.
• Need to plan for acquisition and conversion of merchant ships.
• Need to have conversion plans for each individual ship in hand and ready to go.
• Need to assess shipyard capacity to accomplish conversions.

 

Most of all, we need some kind of organization tasked with the described acquisition and conversion.  It is unclear to me whether such an organization exists within the government/military.  The ‘s responsibilities have, over the decades, been diluted and distributed among various organizations such as the United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) but none seem to have the charter to produce/ensure that commercial ships are designed for easy and rapid conversion to wartime configurations.

 

Of course, converted merchant ships won’t be perfect fits for wartime uses since they are, after all, merchant ships at heart.  For example, we can easily convert a merchant ship to a troop transport, like we did in WWII, but we can’t convert it to a big deck, aviation ship of the type the Navy currently procures.  However, this fits well with the blog’s overall ship design philosophy of single function, cheaper, smaller ships.  The Navy needs to institutionally come to grips with this reality – and desirability!  We then need to revise our doctrine and operations to include these types of ships instead of the big deck, aviation ships we have today.

 

One final consideration is the cost of naval amphibious or logistic ships – they’re expensive to buy and operate!  By having a fleet of merchant ships capable of being usefully converted to wartime work, the Navy largely avoids the cost of procuring and operating the ships while still having access to the numbers and capabilities the ships represent.  Thus, the cost of administering such a program would easily pay for itself.

 

 

_______________________________________ 

 

Related Note:  Following is an example of a commercial ship, the SS United States, designed for conversion to wartime needs.  The ship was designed and acquired under the direction of the United States Maritime Commission (MARCOM) which succeeded the United States Shipping Board.  From Wikipedia entries,

 

… the US government sponsored the construction of a large and fast merchant vessel that would be capable of transporting large numbers of soldiers. Designed by American naval architect and marine engineer William Francis Gibbs (1886–1967), the liner's construction was a joint effort by the United States Navy and United States Lines. The US government underwrote $50 million of the $78 million construction cost, with the ship's prospective operators, United States Lines, contributing the remaining $28 million. In exchange, the ship was designed to be easily converted in times of war to a troopship. The ship has a capacity of 15,000 troops, and could also be converted to a hospital ship.

 

The vessel was constructed from 1950 to 1952 at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in Newport News, Virginia. The hull was constructed in a dry dock. United States was built to exacting Navy specifications, which required that the ship be heavily compartmentalized, and have separate engine rooms to optimize wartime survival.[2]

 

SS United States

 

____________________________________

 

[1]https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/2021-04/DS_USFlag-Fleet_2021_0316_Bundle.pdf

 

[2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_United_States

Open Post

We haven't done one in a while so it's time for an open post.

What's on your mind?  

What do you want to discuss that we haven't covered?   

What topic would you suggest for a future post?

Any general feedback about the blog?  Things you like?  Things you don't like?

Sound off !

Test your knowledge.  Do you recognize this class with its number removed?

Naval Guns on Smaller Vessels

The Navy, today, seems to have a fascination with small guns – the smaller the better, it seems.  The Constellation FFG, for example, has an incredibly small gun given the size and role of the ship.  Following is a table of some smaller ships and the guns they carried.  The list is sorted by gun size.  It’s illuminating, to say the least.

 

Note that the Constellation FFG, despite being the largest ship listed by a significant margin has the smallest gun.  Also, note that the two most modern ships in the list are also the two lightest armed.

 

 

 

Ship Type	Ship Length, ft	Gun(s)	Gun Range, yds
Knox Class FFG	438	1x 5” (127mm)	25,000
Landing Craft LSM(R)	203	1x 5” (127mm)	17,500
Flower Class Corvette	205	1x 4” (102mm)	13,850
Perry Class FFG	453	1x 3” (76mm)	20,122
Harris Class APA	435	4x 3” (76mm)	14,600
Buckley Class DE	306	3x 3” (76mm)	14,600
Gato Class Submarine	311	1x 3” (76mm)	14,600
Pegasus Class PHM	133	1x 3” (76mm)	20,122
LCS - Freedom	378	1x 2” (57mm)	19,000
LCS - Independence	418	1x 2” (57mm)	19,000
Constellation FFG	496	1x 2” (57mm)	19,000

 

 

Naval guns are no longer considered main weapons but still …  this is embarrassing.  If this trend keeps up, it won’t be long before our main naval gun will be a guy with a pistol sitting in a lawn chair on the bow.  Or, maybe we’ll upgrade to a dual mount with two guys sitting side by side?