AUKUS Program

There has recently been speculation that the AUKUS submarine project may be cancelled.  The speculation is likely fueled by the fact that the current administration is reviewing the program, as it’s doing with all major defense programs.  At the moment, the project is not cancelled and, I suspect, is unlikely to be though it may well be altered.
 
Let’s take this opportunity to review and reassess the program.
 
To review, the program calls for Australia to receive eight nuclear powered submarines (SSN).  Construction would be in the UK and Australia although plans have varied with time so this is probably not locked in yet.  The first delivery would not be until at least 2040.  The US has committed to providing Australia with up to five Virginia class subs as interim replacements.
 
My take is that the deal makes no strategic or operational sense, whatsoever.  Here are a few issues:
 
Strategic Situation - A few more submarines in Australia won't appreciably change the strategic situation.  The US already has enough submarines to cover monitoring the E/S China Seas and trail any Chinese subs that enter the open ocean.  Of course, this assumes that the US can get their subs to sea instead of sitting for years pierside waiting for maintenance.
 
The delivery date of 2040 or beyond also renders any discussion of near to moderate term strategic relevance nearly moot.  If Australia could, magically, operate a fleet of SSNs today, that would potentially benefit the US as we grapple with our own (long recognized and yet ignored!) submarine shortfall.  Of course, that can’t happen and by 2040+, the US plans (hopes!) to have its submarine numbers on the upswing again which makes a few more AUKUS subs much less impactful. 
 
Support - I assume Australia will have a very difficult time maintaining and crewing the subs given their well documented difficulties with the Collins class submarines.  As of November of last year, only one of the six Collins class subs was operational.[1]  Manning and maintaining nuclear subs will be even more challenging.
 
Australia will also come to find out that establishing and maintaining a nuclear industry to support the subs will be costly beyond their imagining and prove highly unpopular with the citizenry.  Establishing a nuclear technology base will be much harder than simply sending a few officers to a US/UK training course.  Nuclear technology, technicians, scientists, and support staff are not conjured out of thin air.  It would take decades to establish.
 
As has happened in the US, the Australian government will likely pass comprehensive and onerous nuclear regulations that will create significant costs.
 

Collins Class Submarine - It will only get harder with SSNs

Nuclear Storage – Disposal and storage of spent nuclear materials and reactors is an issue.  Whether Australia would attempt to take that on or whether the US would do it is unknown.  Either way, someone will have to foot the costs.  Similarly, nuclear fuel storage is an issue as would be the handling and storage of contaminated nuclear equipment that needed to be changed out as part of maintenance.
 
Basing – One of the claimed major benefits for the US is basing in Australia with access to full nuclear submarine support capabilities.  Referring back to the support issue, it seems very unlikely that there will be any significant nuclear submarine support capability in any useful time frame.  Complicating matters is that basing for nuclear vessels has far more stringent security issues than for conventional ships.  Again, this is a significant added cost for Australia that I have not heard anyone discussing, yet.
 
 
 
Alternative
 
A better approach would be to assist Australia in building a significant SSK force for use in the China/Pacific region, something the US totally lacks. These submarines could be used to monitor and control shallow water chokepoints along the first island chain, a task better suited to smaller SSKs than the larger US SSNs.  That would actually be a strategic and operational benefit for the US and Australia and the support industry already exists in Australia. Crewing and maintenance remain ongoing challenges, of course.
 
 
 
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[1]The National Interest website, “Australia Has Only 1 Collins-Class Submarine ‘In Service’”, Peter Suciu, 4-Nov-2024,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/australia-has-only-1-collins-class-submarine-service-213563

Reserve Fleet – Nuclear versus Conventional Power

In times past, we kept conventional ships in reserve after they concluded their active service but we never kept nuclear ships, as best I can determine.  This makes sense, I suppose.  I assume that leaving nuclear reactors unattended for years on end, as a reserve ship, is not safe or feasible.  This leads to an obvious question:  is this an additional argument against nuclear ships and for conventional ones?
 
Admittedly, the argument is moot as we no longer maintain a reserve fleet (see, “What Reserve Fleet?”) but, still, it’s an interesting question.
 
As an isolated example, the conventionally powered carrier USS Kitty Hawk stayed in various ‘reserve’ status from her retirement in 2009 to 2017 when she was stricken from the Naval Vessel Register.  In contrast, the nuclear powered Enterprise (CVN-65) began defueling and scrapping almost immediately upon retirement and never spent time in any reserve status.
 

USS Kitty Hawk

We’re beginning to reach the retirement age of the Nimitz class.  With the rising threat of China, wouldn’t it be wonderful to have a reserve fleet of supercarriers?  Unfortunately, even ignoring the Navy’s policy of no reserve fleet, it would appear that nuclear ships can’t be held in reserve status.
 
If we ever returned to maintaining a reserve fleet, the inability to include nuclear powered ships – carriers, obviously – might suggest that conventional power would pay an additional benefit upon termination of a ship’s active status and that future carriers should be conventionally powered.  What do you think?

Mobile Nuclear Reactor Stupidity Continues

We talked about the military’s idea of mobile nuclear reactors and ridiculed it as one of the dumbest ideas ever (see, “Mobile Nuclear Reactors – The Dumbest Idea Ever”) but now, it seems, the military is going ahead with it.

 

The Pentagon today announced that Idaho National Labs will build and initially operate a type of mobile “nuclear microreactor” … [1]

 

… designed to deliver one to five megawatts of electrical power for a minimum of three years … [1]

 

The reactor fuel will be high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fabricated into tristructural isotropic (TRISO) reactor fuel[2] … whatever that means.  I’m not a nuclear fuel expert.  See ref.[4] for a discussion of the vulnerabilities of the fuel.

 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has picked BWX Technologies’ (BWXT’s) microreactor design for its “Project Pele” full-scale transportable prototype.

 

Lynchburg, Virginia-based BWXT will now manufacture and deliver the prototype microreactor to Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for testing by 2024. “The prototype will be built under a cost-type contract valued at approximately $300 million … [2]

 

Three hundred million dollars?  For one?  You can buy a lot of conventional energy for that amount!

 

Why are we doing this?

 

“A safe, small, transportable nuclear reactor would address this growing [energy] demand with a resilient, carbon-free energy source that would not add to the DoD’s fuel needs … [1]

 

Let’s be thorough and note that this will add to DoD’s fuel needs.  The graphics shown in the photos below note that the transportation fuel requirements are substantial and then the operating site will require heavy earth moving and construction equipment to set up.  That heavy equipment will require its own transportation and operating fuel. 

 

The descriptions depict this as a zero-impact energy source.  What about the disposal impact?  What will happen when we have to dispose of dozens of these units?  Ominously, disposal does not appear to have been examined as part of the project.  Disposal planning is offered only as a possible future add-on study.  As we know, possible future add-ons almost never happen.

 

INL could also potentially conduct mobile microreactor and spent nuclear fuel post-irradiation examination and disposition.[2][emphasis added]

 

Radioactive material disposal is already an unsolvable and growing problem and we’re looking to add to the magnitude of the problem for a minor (1-5 megawatts) gain in convenience?  Is that really a positive in the overall picture?

 

Where will we use this reactor?

 

.. supporting mission-critical operations in remote and austere environments.[1]

 

Note the size of the transport vehicle in the photos above.  How are we going to get that vehicle to ‘remote and austere environments’ and, once there, how will that vehicle traverse areas that, because they are ‘remote and austere’, likely have no roads suitable for such a vehicle? 

 

Its transportable design “consists of multiple modules that contain the microreactor’s components in 20-foot long, ISO-compliant CONEX shipping containers.[2]

 

The reactor assembly is spec’ed to weigh up to 40 tons.[4]  That’s not light and not easily transported across ‘remote and austere’ terrain.

 

What about safety, both operational and combat damage related?  According to Jeff Waksman, program manager,

 

… an inherently safe by design mobile microreactor can be constructed … [1]

 

Inherently safe nuclear equipment?  Whew, that’s a load off my mind!  Unfortunately, Mr. Waksman then immediately contradicts himself,

 

It’s not that they’re no risk, but it is just a different era.[1]

 

Uh … so there is risk but the risk is in a different era?????  Huh?  Is risk in a different era somehow better?

 

We have the ability to build reactors that, even in worst case scenarios, have very minor radiological imprints.[1]

 

So, there is a radiation risk but it’s minor?  I’m guessing the exposed soldiers and surrounding civilian people and villages won’t consider it minor.

 

The Drive website notes,

 

There are concerns, of course, associated with deploying mobile nuclear reactors to bases or the battlefield. Meltdowns, waste products, and other malfunctions are always a concern with nuclear energy technologies, and if a reactor in a contested area is destroyed by adversary forces, for example, the risk of environmental contamination is high. That, in turn, could create a political disaster for the DOD and United States. Deploying any nuclear systems abroad also incurs the risk of proliferation if those technologies should fall into the wrong hands due to a forward-operating base or convoy being overrun by hostile forces.[3]

 

That seems like a lot of risk for a minor (1-5 megawatts) gain in energy.

 

We’ve seen that the nuclear power plant in Ukraine has come under fire from Russia.  What happens when these mobile reactors are shelled and blown up?

 

Just out of curiosity, what happens when enemies and terrorists capture these things?  We’ve had drones, ships, and aircraft captured by various enemy countries.  Why would we think a mobile nuclear reactor would not be seized?  Again, I’m not a nuclear expert but I suspect that a clever and resourceful enemy could come up with many ways to use these reactors to our detriment.  Do we really want to give an enemy or a terrorist the ability to cause major panic by threatening radioactive catastrophe?  Look at our over-the-top reaction to Monkeypox.  It doesn’t require a real threat to generate a real panic.

 

 

 

 

I previously called this one of the dumbest ideas ever and I’m not seeing anything to change my mind.

 

 

 

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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Idaho National Labs to build Pentagon’s mobile ‘nuclear microreactor’”, Jaspreet Gill, 13-Apr-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/idaho-national-labs-to-build-pentagons-mobile-nuclear-microreactor/?_ga=2.166586301.2026423008.1649640840-1009727458.1647467636

 

[2]https://www.powermag.com/dod-picks-bwxt-to-manufacture-project-pele-prototype-nuclear-microreactor/

 

[3]https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40914/the-militarys-mobile-nuclear-reactor-prototype-is-set-to-begin-taking-shape

 

[4]https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/mobile-nuclear-power-reactors-wont-solve-the-armys-energy-problems/

Mobile Nuclear Reactors – The Dumbest Idea Ever

‘Spitballing’  is a time-honored method for generating ideas and spurring innovation.  If you’re not familiar with the practice, it’s basically a mental free-for-all where participants toss out ideas, no matter how wild or unconventional and nothing is ruled out.  There are no bad ideas at this stage.  The concept is that the flow of ideas either produces a good one or, more likely, triggers a new, good idea from the germ of one of the oddball ideas.  The second stage of the process is to filter the assembly of ideas and begin weeding out the ridiculous ones and focus in on the better ones. 

 

Well, it appears that the military has been engaging in spitballing but without the second step wherein the ridiculous ideas are weeded out.  A case in point is the concept of mobile nuclear reactors, as reported by an Army Times website article.(1)  According to the article,

 

The Army is seeking to develop and field a mobile nuclear reactor to power forward operating bases. (1)

 

The program, known as “Project Pele,” is prototyping the mobile advanced microreactor concept under the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office.

 

The purpose is “to provide deployable, reliable, resilient and safe operational power for a variety of DoD missions,” said Navy Cmdr. Josh Frey, a Defense Department spokesman.

 

“Project Pele offers a transformative capability to deliver resilient electrical power for years without refueling and in a size small enough to be transported by existing defense infrastructure,” Frey said. (1)

 

In a 148-page 2018 report commissioned by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-4, the authors claimed the benefits of such reactors would help reduce fuel logistics and storage problems, reduce infrastructure challenges for large-scale power, aid in power generation for areas lacking electrical grids and provide power to energy-intensive systems.

 

Congress approved funding for prototype reactors and the Army awarded $40 million in contracts to three nuclear reactor companies in March 2020 for Project Pele, according to the NPPP report. (1)

 

 

 

Here’s an accompanying illustration. 

 

 

What would the specific requirements be?

 

The original proposal, approved by the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office asked for industry solutions in January 2019 on providing a less than 40-ton small, mobile nuclear reactor design that could operate for three years or more and provide 1 to 10 megawatts of power.

 

Planners want the reactor to fit inside a C-17 cargo plane for air transport to theater. More recent moves have reduced the power output to 5 megawatts.

 

Other requirements include: the reactor must shut down safely without intervention in the event of an attack, rely on passive cooling and avoid significant release of radioactivity or health consequences to people nearby. (1)

 

 

Where would these reactors be used?  Among other places,

 

The 2018 G-4 report recommended the following locations where it saw potential use for the mobile reactors:

 

• Thule, Greenland
• Kwajalein Atoll
• Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
• Diego Garcia
• Guam (for both a naval and Air Force facilities on the island)
• Ascension Island
• Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico
• Camp Buehring, Kuwait
• Fort Greely, Alaska
• Lajes Field, Azores

 

Just out of curiosity, don’t all of those places already have power?

 

 

Not everyone agrees with the concept.

 

Alan J. Kuperman wrote the 21-page report titled, “Proposed U.S. Army Mobile Nuclear Reactors: Costs and Risks Outweigh Benefits,” in his role as coordinator of the University of Texas at Austin’s Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project. (1)

 

Kuperman makes some excellent and common sense points:

 

High cost – Kuperman said the Army’s claims that nuclear power can provide cheaper electricity for powering future forward bases is “based on unrealistic assumptions.” Those include that such a reactor would have low construction costs and operate for 18 hours a day over 40 years. The more likely scenario is a mobile reactor would run for half that time over about 10 years, meaning nuclear electricity could cost 16 times more than estimates and still seven times more than diesel-generated power.

 

Vulnerability to missile attacks – The report points to the 2020 missile attack on forces at al-Asad air base in Iraq. Even with warnings hours ahead of time, more than 100 U.S. personnel suffered traumatic brain injury from the 11 strikes that hit the facility. And the missiles were 10 times more accurate than the Army has predicted in its report on the vulnerability of reactors to precision strikes. The service admits that a direct hit on a reactor would destroy the device. Kuperman notes that even the Army’s plans to protect the reactors, by burying them underground, could inadvertently cause meltdowns by impeding air cooling and causing overheating. A similar strike on an similar such future base with a reactor could cause far more devastating consequences.

 

Captured reactors – Should a U.S. base housing a mobile reactor be overrun or abandoned, the radioactive waste from the reactor could be used in “dirty bomb” terror attacks.

 

No mission for reactors – One of the chief purposes of pursing such reactor programs was to reduce casualties from diesel transport to remote bases. But Defense Department data shows a dramatic drop in casualties of five per 1 million gallons of fuel delivered in 2005 to nearly zero by 2013.

 

High-energy weapons don’t need reactors – Kuperman states that the justification that future high-energy or laser weapons that the Army hopes to have protecting bases don’t require a reactor to power. “A high energy weapon would have to be fired millions of times to justify a reactor,” Kuperman said. “In reality such a weapon would be fired perhaps hundreds of times in its lifetime.”

 

Transport problems – The Army wants to air deliver these reactors to combat posts. Kuperman questions the “regulatory nightmare” that would create. The program calls for initial tests flying the reactors domestically to run then returning them, and their radioactive waste, to another domestic location. Foreign transport would require approval of countries airspace traversed and the approval of a host nation where the reactor would be placed, he said. Other Army recommendations include truck or rail transport domestically and either ship or over-the-ocean flights to friendly ports to then move the reactors again via truck or rail.

 

 

 

Is there any relevant experience with small reactors that we can look at?

 

The military did have a small reactor program during the Cold War. The Army Nuclear Power Program, which ran from 1954 to 1977, developed eight small nuclear reactors. Those reactors ranged in power production from 1 to 10 megawatts.

 

How five of the eight reactors were used:

 

The PM-1 reactor was used in Sundance, Wyoming, from 1962 to 1968.

The PM-2A was used at Camp Century, Greenland, from 1961 to 1964.

The PM-3A was used at McMurdo Base, Antarctica, from 1962 to 1972.

The ML-1 was used in developmental testing from 1962 to 1966.

The MH-1A was used in the Panama Canal Zone from 1965 to 1977.

 

Lyman [Union of Concerned Scientists and its then-director of the Nuclear Safety Project, Edwin Lyman] notes a major failure with one of the original eight designs in 1961 when a core meltdown and explosion of the SL-1 reactor in Idaho killed three operators.

 

The three deployed to Antarctica, Greenland and Alaska proved “unreliable and expensive to operate,” Lyman wrote in his response to the Army’s 2018 report on the mobile reactor program.

 

Lyman told Army Times on Thursday that a number of those old reactors required decades of decommissioning and one used at Fort Belvoir, Va., near Washington D.C. is finally scheduled for decommissioning in late 2021. (1)

 

 

 

Let me summarize this as briefly as I can:  this is one of those ideas that doesn’t even require ten seconds thought to see that the idiotic aspects outweigh the benefits by a wide margin.  Does the military have no one with the courage to stand up and say, this is stupid?  There are so many things we desperately need to be doing and yet we continue to waste time on things like this.  So sad.

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

(1)Army Times, “Mobile nuclear reactors? Scathing report slams ‘disturbing’ military program”, Todd South, 1-May-2021,

https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2021/04/30/mobile-nuclear-reactors-scathing-report-slams-disturbing-military-program/

Australian Nuclear Submarine

USNI News had an article about Australia acquiring asymmetric military capabilities to help deter China.  Unfortunately, the article was just a useless collection of vague babbling by John Lee (former national security advisor to Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, 2016-18) who clearly has no idea what asymmetric means.  For example, he cited ‘unmanned and undersea technologies’ as examples of asymmetric capabilities, apparently unaware that unmanned equipment is pretty much standard by now and hardly constitutes ‘asymmetric’.  I have no idea what he meant by ‘undersea technologies’;  presumably unmanned undersea vehicles which, again, are now commonplace.

 

There was, however, one good thought in the article which appeared to reference Australia’s nuclear submarine acquisition desire:

 

“Leasing has to be an option” to fill the timeline gap in undersea readiness, but the submarine does not necessarily have to be an American Virginia-class boat. “We need to learn how to operate them” and maintain them, he said. [1]

 

Now, I’m not sure what, exactly, the leasing reference was to …  perhaps SSKs? perhaps a nuclear sub from some country?  perhaps training simulators or facilities?  Regardless, this raises the intriguing possibility of Australia acquiring an early-retired Los Angeles class submarine … of which we have many.

 

The LA class subs would provide valuable nuclear submarine and nuclear power plant operating experience.  While the subs may not have thirty more years of operational life left, that’s not a requirement for a country that first needs to simply learn how to operate the subs and their reactors. 

Los Angeles Class Submarine

 Of course, there are practical considerations to deal with:

 

• You don’t become a [safe] nuclear capable navy overnight.  Australia has no nuclear plant operating expertise that I’m aware of.  It would require years to build up that level of [safe] competency.  This is also not something that can be done on a part-time, occasional basis which leads directly to the next consideration …
• Nuclear subs require fairly substantial crews and long term, sustained expert manning.  This is not something that can be done using one-enlistment term sailors.  I’m thinking now about the difficulty Australia has had manning the few conventional subs that they have.[2]  Where are the needed long term, professional nuclear organizations and personnel going to come from?
• It’s not enough to train a crew to operate a nuclear sub.  It also requires a substantial shore-side nuclear support organization for specialized maintenance, inspection, repair, refueling, etc.  Again, given Australia’s manning challenges, where will the shore support people come from?
• Assuming an Australian nuclear submarine force would operate much closer to China than is currently the case for Australian submarines, this would require substantial open ocean and first island chain oceanography/mapping support.  Perhaps the US Navy would share their data but, if not, Australia would have to generate their own which requires a large investment and effort.
• Nuclear submarines are a major commitment.  I hope the Australian military/navy has carefully thought out the CONOPS for a [very?] small force of nuclear subs and thought through how these fit into, and support, the country’s overall geopolitical and military strategies.  If not, it will be a massive waste of resources and effort.  I hope this isn’t just a knee-jerk reaction to something … you know, the way the US Navy does things.  Given that the desire for nuclear subs seems to have appeared out of nowhere, this is a concern.
• Finally, operating nuclear powered ships does impact political interactions in the region.  New Zealand, for example, bans ships with nuclear weapons or power from their waters. 

 

 

Assuming Australia can successfully address the various concerns, acquiring an LA class sub(s) would provide a rapid (on a relative basis) route to nuclear submarine operations and is well worth pursuing.  However, this is not something to be entered into lightly.  It requires a massive commitment of people and resources and needs to be carefully thought out prior to acting.

 

 

Note:  I am not well versed on Australian naval matters so some of the preceding may be inaccurate and, if so, feel free to [politely!] offer corrections.

 

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “Australia Needs Asymmetric Capabilities to Counter China in Indo-Pacific, Former Australian Official Says”, John Grady, 26-Nov-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/11/26/australia-needs-asymmetric-capabilities-to-counter-china-in-indo-pacific-former-australian-official-says

 

[2]The Guardian website, “Crew shortage could leave Australia's new submarines high and dry – report”, Lisa Martin, 8-Oct-2018,

https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/oct/08/crew-shortage-could-leave-australias-new-submarines-high-and-dry-report

The Nuclear Power Debate

The nuclear power debate has raged since nuclear power became a viable propulsion method.  I have avoided doing a post on the choice of nuclear versus conventional power for two reasons:  one, I’m ambivalent about the issue and two, it’s impossible to reach any well founded conclusion with publicly available data.  Both sides fling numbers back and forth with little regard for the analytical rigor of the underlying figures.  Generalities abound, none supported by rigorous facts.

For example, one can compare the nuclear powered Ford at a construction cost of $15B (and counting!) to the conventional powered carrier, the Forrestal, at $2.1B (FY2019 dollars) (2) and conclude that nuclear power costs $13B more than conventional power.  While this may be arithmetically correct, it ignores all the other factors that go into carrier construction costs.  Thus, the figure is correct but the conclusion is not. 

Many studies have been conducted that purport to compare the costs of nuclear versus conventional power.  Most of the studies have been flawed, the majority badly so.  Surprisingly, relatively few studies have attempted to quantify the operational comparison of nuclear and conventional power.  In fact, the only such study I’m aware of is the 1998 GAO effort (1) which has, overall, some serious methodological problems and the resulting conclusions are suspect, at best.

Despite my reluctance to address this subject, it’s reached a point where I feel I have to.  Too many readers are making unsupported and incorrect statements about nuclear power, pro and con.  This blog is all about facts, data, and logic so I guess it’s about time to examine the issue.  That said, let’s look at the various aspects of nuclear and conventional power.

Installation Cost.  This is the obvious place to start and we immediately see all hope of analysis fall apart due to lack of data and lack of a consistent set of criteria.  For example, what is the installation cost of a nuclear reactor?  Well, that depends on what you choose to include or exclude as part of the installation.  The reactor container, itself, certainly is part of the cost but what about associated piping?  Do you include the reactor cooling system?  What about the cost of shielding around the compartments and equipment?  What about the systems and equipment required to convert the nuclear energy (heat) into electricity?  And the list goes on and on.

Similarly, what do you include in the cost of a conventional power plant?  Do you include the fuel storage tanks without which the power plant is an inert paperweight?  How about the fuel handling/pumping system?  What about the auxiliary diesel engines that are a common part of any conventional power system today?  How about the air intake and exhaust ducting and exhaust stacks?  What about the exhaust IR suppression systems that are required for a conventional power system?  What cost do you associate with the enormous ship’s volume that is consumed by the giant ducting runs?  And the list goes on and on.

The installation cost, then, will depend on what pieces you include and exclude.  If you favor conventional power, you’ll include every nuclear related item you can think of to drive up the nuclear cost and make your position look better and you’ll exclude all but the direct items for conventional power.  If you favor nuclear power, you’ll do the reverse.

In addition, while we can find some reasonably accurate costs for some of the isolated big ticket items like the GE LM2500 turbines, it’s very difficult or impossible to find accurate data for reactors or for any of the ancillary equipment, nuclear or conventional.  Worse, the costs that we can see, like the Navy’s SCN line item budget figures, are undefined.  For example, the 2020 Navy SCN budget document has a Virginia class line item that reads, “Nuclear Propulsion Plant Equipment” but no description of what is included in the cost figure.  For the Ford class, there is a line item that reads, “Propulsion Equipment” (it doesn’t even mention nuclear!), and has a cost of $2B but, again, no description of what is included/excluded in the figure.  It’s not even clear that the reactor itself is included in the SCN propulsion line items.  They could be Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) that isn’t accounted for in the SCN budget.  However, given the magnitude of the propulsion line items, it seems likely that the reactor is included.

On the conventional side, the SCN budget has no line item for propulsion.  There is a line item for HM&E (Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical) but the detailed breakdown of that line item shows no propulsion machinery.  Alternatively, propulsion may be included in the line item, “Basic Construction/Conversion”, but, again, there is not description of what is included in the line item.  There is a “Main Reduction Gear” line item but that seems extremely specific and the dollar figure is fairly small.

Conventional wisdom claims that nuclear power is more expensive to install but I can find no data to support or refute that claim.

So, we have no hope of determining even the seemingly straightforward installation cost. 

Manning.  Nuclear critics claim that it requires many more people to man and operate a nuclear propulsion plant than a conventional one.  Again, I can find no data to support or refute the claim.  We did just recently see that the USS Ford has two reactors which require <25 watchstanders (5) which suggests that there is no great manning penalty associated with modern nuclear plants and they may even require fewer personnel !

Operating Costs.  After the installation costs, there are daily operating costs.  Again, this all depends on what you include/exclude.  Nuclear proponents would claim that there are no daily operating costs (manning aside, which is a wash between nuclear and conventional) and that this is the major advantage of nuclear power.  However, what about the long term nuclear disposal and storage costs that ultimately become part of the overall operating costs of nuclear power and that continue for decades/centuries after the individual nuclear ship is long gone?

Conversely, what about the costs to operate an entire fleet of tankers to replenish conventional powered ships?  What about their crew costs?  What about the land based fuel tank farms that are required to support the tankers?  What about the drilling and refining operations to make fuel?  And on and on.

As we noted, the evaluation of this depends on what you include and exclude.  Without dipping into a quagmire of debates over what to include/exclude, and without attempting to put a specific dollar figure to it, it seems as if the operating costs of conventional power are far beyond those of nuclear given the requirement for a vast infrastructure of fuel processing, storage, transport, and tanker fleets to support conventional powered ships.

Operational Benefits.  This ought to be a major factor and yet almost no one factors it into their discussions.  If nuclear power conveys a significant tactical or operational benefit, that would compensate for, or outweigh, many disadvantages.  However, the only operational benefit is the reduced need for tanker support and even that is only a limited benefit since the carrier’s escorts all need tanker support.  Of course, eliminating the need for ship’s fuel frees up internal ship’s space for larger magazines, more jet fuel, more food and water stores, or whatever else the ship designer wishes to include.  Is this enough of a benefit to justify nuclear power?  I don’t think so.  The benefits are nice but not critical and do not enable any significant combat enhancements.

Battle Damage.  This factor strikes me as potentially one of the more significant aspects of nuclear power.  While a reactor is protected, to a degree, within the ship, the possibility of battle damage resulting in nuclear contamination is real.  What is the likelihood?  I have no way of knowing but it would seem unlikely that the reactor has any inherent immunity to damage so the likelihood would seem as great as for any other area of the ship.  The problem is that the potential exists for relatively minor damage to produce a serious contamination issue which could result in the operational loss of the ship.  I don’t know the ins and outs of naval nuclear power plants but, conceptually, a damaged ancillary system (cooling, for example) might be the source of a radiation leak even though the reactor had no direct damage.  Depending on the location and spread of the leak the carrier might have to be abandoned or operations halted from a relatively small amount of physical damage.

As I say, I have no inside information about the likelihood of such a scenario but the potential for radiation related battle damage seems all too high.  This factor, alone, strongly sways me away from nuclear power.

Midlife Refueling.  We have seen in recent post discussions that the stated midlife refueling costs for carriers are mostly fraudulent in the sense that the Navy includes extensive overhaul costs with the nuclear refueling costs (see, "Nuclear Carrier Refueling Costs").  So, again, we’re left with no actual, verifiable, authoritative costs to look at.  It seems clear, however, that of the multi-billion dollar overhaul and refueling costs that the Navy cites, the vast majority of it is for non-nuclear work.

Summary

So, where does all this leave us?  Well, it leaves us right where we started which is clueless.  We have no actual comprehensive cost figures to examine and what partial cost figures we have seem to be a wash – depending on what is included/excluded.  Therefore, I see no definitive conclusion based on costs.

Manning is a non-issue with manning levels seeming to be comparable for modern nuclear plants.

Operational benefits of nuclear power are limited and not significant.

The only factor that seems significant is the issue of battle damage and, unfortunately, we have no reliable assessment of the likelihood or severity of such an occurrence.

Once upon a time, when we were dependent on foreign oil, one could make a compelling argument for nuclear power based on our strategic vulnerability to oil shortages during war.  Today, however, the US is essentially energy independent so that argument is invalid.  This does, however, highlight the benefits of ensuring that our strategic resources are under our control (I’m looking at you, rare earths!).  But, I digress …

In the end, we wind up arguing about nebulous numbers.  Is it any wonder I find myself ambivalent about the whole issue?  If I had to offer a conclusion, I’d lean towards conventional power on the basis of the battle damage issue but, lacking definitive information on the subject, my ‘lean’ is not very strong.

I can conclusively and definitively state that I am deeply and profoundly ambivalent about nuclear power.

___________________________________

(1)General Accounting Office, “NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, Cost-Effectiveness of Conventionally and

Nuclear-Powered Carriers”, Aug-1998, GAO/NSIAD 98-1

(2)Navy Matters, “Forrestal – Ford Comparison”, 21-Oct-2019,

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2019/10/forrestal-ford-comparison.html

(3)Navy Matters, “Nuclear Carrier Refueling Cost”, 20-Nov-2019,

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2019/11/nuclear-carrier-refueling-cost.html

(4)Navy Matters, “Carrier Costs”, 23-Sep-2019,

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2019/09/carrier-costs.html

(5)Navy Matters, “Ford Design Considerations”, 23-Mar-2020

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2020/03/ford-design-considerations.html

Virginia Class Cruisers

For no particular reason, ComNavOps has always had a fondness for the Virginia class nuclear powered cruisers, believing them to be one of the most attractive looking ships of the modern era.  For nostalgia sake, let’s take a closer look at them.  The class consisted of four ships, as shown below.  Note the very short service lives.  The class was the victim of the Cold War ‘peace dividend’ as their mid-life refueling was considered too costly for the time period given the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Ship	Service Life, years
Virginia, CGN-38	18
Texas, CGN-39	16
Mississippi, CGN-40	19
Arkansas, CGN-41	18

Virginia Class - As Built

The ships were 586 ft long (about 20 ft longer than the Ticonderoga class cruisers) with 11,666 tons full displacement and a crew of 579.  Wiki reports the construction cost as $675M (1990) which is $1.3B (2020) today.  Interestingly, these ships were initially classified as frigates/destroyer leaders before ultimately being labeled cruisers.

The class underwent refits in the 1980’s which resulted in the elimination of the helo and hangar in favor of Tomahawk armored box launchers.  Other additions included CIWS and Harpoon launchers.

The post-refit weapons fit was respectable for the time:

• 2 × Mk 26 missile launchers for 68 missiles (SM-1/2MR, ASROC)
• 8 × Tomahawk missile in 2 armored-box launchers
• 8 × RGM-84 Harpoon in 2 Mk-141 quad launchers
• 6 × Mk 32 triple torpedoe launchers
• 2 × Mk-45 5-inch/54 caliber rapid-fire gun
• 2 × 20 mm Phalanx CIWS
• 2 × 25 mm Mk 38 chain guns

Let’s take a closer look at some aspects of the class.

Mk26 Launcher.  The Virginias had 2x rapid fire Mk 26 twin arm missile launchers mounted fore and aft.  A pair of missiles (one on each arm) could be launched every 9 seconds.  Thus, the ship’s overall firing rate was 4 missiles every 9 seconds – a respectable rate and quite adequate for almost any scenario.  Given the Navy’s typical shoot-shoot-look engagement sequence, this rate of fire seems perfectly adequate.  Today’s VLS really offers little in the way of an effective enhanced firing rate.  What VLS offers is that every missile is available for use as opposed to having to be selected and loaded.

While the drawback of the twin arm launcher is that it has to point at the target and thus is limited to certain firing arcs, the benefit of the launcher is that it can point at the target and there is no delay as there is for a vertically launched missile to ‘tip over’ and acquire its target.  Thus, the twin arm launcher can put a missile at the target faster than a VLS, if the launcher is not masked by the ship’s superstructure.

It’s an article of faith, today, that VLS systems are vastly superior to twin armed launchers but the reality is that they’re not.  They have a few advantages but they also have drawbacks.

ASW.  The ships carried bow mounted SQS-53A sonars and, as originally constructed, a below deck hangar and elevator for one Kaman SH-2 Seasprite LAMPS helicopter.  The hangar proved problematic and the Navy was never able to achieve a watertight fit of the horizontal hatch covers.  The helo and hangar were eliminated in the 1980’s refits in favor of Tomahawk armored box launchers.  Hangar problems aside, the idea of fitting out major warships with ASW capability is highly suspect.  ASW is not the responsibility of a capital ship and no sane commander is going to risk such a ship playing tag with submarines.  In addition, the fact that the ship carried only a single helo meant that its ASW capability was not all that great to begin with.  Elimination of the helo/hangar was a good idea.  Interestingly, a proposal was made to install a vertical launch system for Tomahawks in the vacated hangar space, however, the idea was eventually dropped.

Armor.  The ships reportedly had 1 in (25 mm) Kevlar armor around the combat information center, magazines, and machinery spaces.  I don’t know the hull steel thickness and type.

Radar.  The ship’s main radars were the AN/SPS-48A 3-D air search radar and AN/SPS-40B 2-D air search radar which constituted a typical fit for the period.  These were mechanically steered, rotating units.  Given the maintenance and alignment problems with the Aegis SPY-x fixed planar arrays through the years, ComNavOps has often wondered if modernized versions of these units might not be combat-superior.  But, I digress …

Note Tomahawk Armored Box Launchers On Stern

Now, let’s do a bit of speculation, just for fun.

Nuclear Strike Group.  With the planned 11 ships of the class plus the two California class cruisers and the Truxtun, the Navy was on its way to assembling entire nuclear powered carrier strike groups.  This would have offered some significant operational and tactical advantages.  The group would have required no refueling support and could have operated at high speed for extended periods thereby allowing for rapid repositioning.  A highly mobile and self-sufficient task force would have been a significant benefit.

NTU.  The New Threat Upgrade would have made the Virginias quite formidable.  NTU, when it first came out, was superior to Aegis which would spend quite some time working out its bugs.  Of course, the Navy sank the entire Spruance class to avoid the Spruance-NTU fleet from threatening the Aegis funding.  A Virginia-NTU would have been the most capable AAW ship afloat.

One can only imagine the altered path of ship development if the Virginia-NTU and Spruance-NTU had come to pass.  It is likely that the compromised Ticonderoga class would never have come about and the Burkes might have, initially, been designed as stealth-NTU AAW ships to complement the Spruances instead of replace them.  This could have given us two focused ship classes: the ASW Spruances and the AAW Burkes instead of trying to make the Burkes a do-everything design.  The successor cruiser to the Virginias would probably have been a new design with more anti-surface capability than the Ticonderogas.

VLS Upgrade.  Had they continued to serve, the Virginias might have been upgraded to VLS at some point.  Given their size, it is likely they could have accommodated 128-160 VLS cells.  A truly powerful ship, indeed!

Note Harpoon Launchers In Front Of Superstructure

Summary

Aside from ComNavOps' personal affection for these ships, it is obvious that the Virginia class left a lot of untapped potential on the table when it was prematurely retired.  For all those naval observers and ship designers who constantly talk about extended ship service lives, this is yet another example of a prematurely retired ship class.  Premature retirement is the standard in the Navy, not the exception.  With this kind of history it is foolish to design for extended service lives.  As I’ve posted in the past, we should be designing for 15-20 year service lives because that’s all we typically get before we retire our ships.  All this planning for future growth is pure bilge droppings – it never happens!

The Virginias were wonderful ships and I wish they had been fully utilized by the Navy and had a longer service life for ComNavOps to enjoy and admire!