Amphibious Assault - Strategic Level

We’ve devoted much discussion to amphibious assaults in this blog and we should given that it’s both a traditional US military capability and the foundation of an entire branch of the military – namely the Marine Corps.  We’ve talked about specifics like connectors, naval gun support, LST’s, logistics, etc.  Let’s back off a bit and look at the larger picture – the strategic level, as opposed to the operational level.

The first, and only, question is whether amphibious assaults are even needed from a strategic level.  I’ve repeatedly addressed this in comments and, obliquely, in posts and it’s time to formally address this.

From a geopolitical strategy perspective we have five foreseeable “enemies” that we can identify that will be concerns for the next twenty years.  The enemies are,

• China
• Russia
• Iran
• North Korea
• Third World / Non-State

Let’s take a hard look at each enemy and consider the likelihood of needing to conduct an amphibious assault against each.

China.  Unless we are insane, we are never going to want to land troops on mainland China.  There is no geopolitical need to do that.  The land, itself, has nothing we need and comes with many problems (extensive land borders, cultural and ethnic issues, population problems, etc.) that make forcible entry into, and occupation of, China undesirable.  That only leaves the artificial islands that China has constructed and militarized or similar small, natural, militarized islands.  However, those islands will never be subject to amphibious assault if for no other reason than they are too small to hold any troops!  They’ll be destroyed with cruise missiles and forgotten – somewhat akin to the island hopping strategy of WWII.  The only conceivable use for an amphibious assault would be to reclaim a foreign country that China has seized, such as Taiwan, Philippines, or Vietnam. 

From a geopolitical perspective, the only one of those that would realistically justify an assault is Taiwan.  We simply don’t care enough about Vietnam to fight for it.  China has already begun the annexation of the Philippines but will conclude that “peacefully” as they’ve done with the South China Sea.  China will conduct political maneuvers aimed at ousting US influence and enhancing Chinese influence, as they’ve already started to do.  They’ll flood the country with state sponsored immigration (already underway) until the balance of population shifts to Chinese and then simply and slowly absorb the economy and government and the “Philippines” will align with China and become a Chinese state in all but name.  At that point, the US will have no internationally recognizable rationale for an invasion. 

Within the context of a Chinese Philippines (Chilippines?), seizing the Philippines as part of a larger war effort might be a possibility.  However, we are likely looking at a Chinese fortified Philippines scenario as being 20+ years down the road and, therefore, beyond the time frame of this post subject.

Taiwan remains the one possible amphibious assault scenario.  In any war scenario, Taiwan will be seized by China as the first order of business for two reasons:  one, China has always stated that Taiwan belongs to them and the opportunity of a war simply makes the seizure inevitable and, two, China cannot afford to leave Taiwan as a possible base of operations for the US so deep in its territory and so close to its mainland.  The seizure will occur quickly – far quicker than the US could possibly respond.  The US will be faced with a fait accompli.  If the US wants to retake Taiwan, it will have to be after a massive amphibious force buildup.  Given the proximity of Taiwan to mainland China, an amphibious assault to reclaim the island would be conducted under the very near umbrella of mainland China’s air power, missile power, naval power, and with a close and ready resupply of an almost unlimited amount of manpower.  This is the farthest possible scenario from a “quick” Marine Corps assault using existing forces.  Such an assault would require years of build up.  Is the US likely to do that?  I think not.  A Taiwan seizure will, unfortunately, be a one-way affair.  China will seize it and it will not come back.

Thus, there is very little need for amphibious assaults in a China war scenario.

Russia.  There is very little usable or useful Russian shoreline to assault!  That’s one of the geopolitical problems that Russia faces and is probably one of the reasons they seized Crimea.  A war with Russia will be a land war conducted through Europe.  The Cold War plans still largely apply.  There is a very remote possibility that an assault against the far eastern regions could occur which would be intended to seize military bases along the Sea of Ohkotsk.  Far more likely, though, is that those bases would be neutralized with cruise missiles and relegated to unimportance.  There is just no reason to attempt to seize the bases or the region.  There is nothing there that the US would want.

Further, there is no foreseeable scenario in which US troops would attempt to enter mainland Russia.  Combat would occur around the periphery of the Russian borders and would be aimed at restoring the pre-war boundaries.

Thus, there is no need for amphibious assaults in a Russian war scenario.

Iran.  Most combat forces would enter Iran through Iraq.  While there is a possibility of wanting to land troops somewhere along Iran’s coastline, this would not be an amphibious assault but just an unopposed unloading of troops and supplies through an already seized port or across an uncontested beach.  Iran simply does not have the capability to oppose a landing. 

Thus, there is no need for amphibious assaults in a Iranian war scenario.

North Korea.  There is some small possibility of the need for an amphibious assault along the northern shoreline.  This would be a diversionary assault or raid rather than a major, sustained assault.  The bulk of combat will be land based and troops and supplies will enter through South Korea via secured ports and airbases. 

NKorea possesses a vast inventory of mines which will be used to protect the northern shoreline.  Coupled with our almost complete lack of mine countermeasures, there is probably little likelihood of attempting even a small scale diversionary assault.

Thus, there is no need for amphibious assaults in a NKorean war scenario.

Third World / Non-State.  This is the case that is most likely to require amphibious assaults.  Assaults into Middle East locations or Africa to deal with terrorist threats or, less likely, South America to stabilize collapsing countries are conceivable.  However, given the nature of the threats, any amphibious assault would be limited in size and scope and the assault itself would likely be unopposed and revert to a simple unloading.  A single MEU/ARG would be the likely force size required, at the high end.

Thus, there is a conceivable need for amphibious assault of a limited and, likely, unopposed nature.

As a general observation, unless someone miraculously takes over the entire Pacific, as Japan did, we’re never going to need to island hop our way across an ocean again.  That recognition, alone, eliminates a huge chunk of the need for amphibious assaults.  Similarly, unless someone miraculously seizes all of Europe, we’re never going to need to conduct another Normandy invasion.  That recognition eliminates most of the remaining chunk of need for amphibious assaults.

We see, then, that there is no compelling geopolitical need for major amphibious assaults and no resulting military strategy requiring major amphibious assaults to support the geopolitical needs.  There remains a possibility of small assaults that would be more akin to unopposed unloadings than opposed assaults.

So, what does this tell us about our amphibious fleet force structure?

The obvious conclusion is that we don’t need 33 large deck amphibious ships!  A single MEU/ARG consisting of three ships is sufficient.  If we want to play it safe and call it six ships to allow for reinforcement and overhaul unavailabilities, that’s fine.  So, six amphibious ships should be sufficient.

In fact, since we just concluded that amphibious assaults are so unlikely, we now have to ask, why do we have forward deployed MEU/ARG’s?  And, if we don’t need forward deployed MEU/ARG’s, we don’t need the traditional 3-ships-to-support-one-forward-deployed.  Instead, we can take our six amphibious ships and keep them home ported until needed and provide proper maintenance along with occasional training stints.

The one valid argument for forward deployed, amphibious Marines is crisis response:  embassy protection, evacuation, terrorist response, short term stability operations, etc.  There is a valid and ongoing need for this capability but this leads to the next question which is, is an Amphibious Ready Group the best way to provide this kind of response?  Is keeping several major warships and an entire Marine Epeditionary Unit afloat for months at a time the best way to meet the need?  Alternatively, could the Army’s rapid response, aviation transported units better meet the needs?  There is a valid argument to be made that keeping crisis response troops home-based with aviation transport available on short notice is a more economical and more effective method of providing crisis response.  A MEU can only be in one area at a time and can only respond within that specific area.  An aviation transportable Army unit, however, can respond anywhere. 

The problem that any crisis response force faces is escalation – the threat rapidly escalates beyond the original level and reinforcements are needed very quickly – Mogadishu, for example.  That specific issue – excalation/reinforcement – is, however, a topic for another time.

We should also note that crisis response forces have historically been small and very light compared to a full MEU.  Again, this argues against the need for a forward deployed MEU/ARG.

All of this suggests that we should reevaluate our amphibious doctrine.  Rather than prepare for major amphibious operations that are extremely unlikely, perhaps we should be preparing for small, uncontested landings/unloadings and, perhaps, the Marine’s aviation-centric shift is not without merit.

To sum up,

• We only need around 6 major amphibious ships.
• We should keep our amphibious ships home ported.
• We should investigate whether a MEU/ARG is the most economical and effective crisis response force.
• We should reevaluate the MEU force structure in light of the historical “light” nature of crisis responses.
• We should reevaluate Marine manning levels.

I love the Marines and desperately want to see them remain part and parcel of the US Armed Forces.  However, I just don’t see the need for major amphibious assaults in the next 20+ years.  That doesn’t mean that the Marines should be eliminated but it does mean that we should reexamine their missions and force structure.

Now, there is one other potentially useful function that the Marines can perform and which I see as far more likely than the classic amphibious assault and that is port/airfield seizure.  In any war, we are going to need access to ports for unloading the massive amounts of supplies required to keep any invasion going.  To a much lesser extent, the same applies to seizing airfields although it is simply not possible to keep an invasion going via airlifted supplies.  The tonnage and volume movement is just not there.

Port seizure is a completely different game than an amphibious assault.  The operations, tactics, and equipment are radically different.  Also, since most (all?) major ports are intimately and physically intertwined with cities, a port seizure becomes a specific case of urban warfare which brings its own set of challenges which are entirely different from the classic amphibious assault.

The likelihood of port seizures within the context of geopolitical and military strategies should be carefully evaluated.  Unfortunately, I’m simply not in a position to make that evaluation. 

All that said, my conclusions can and would change if we felt port seizure was a likely strategic need and made it a Marine mission.  Right now, however, port seizure is not a specific Marine mission in the sense that they have the equipment, doctrine, tactics, and training to accomplish it.  To the best of my knowledge, the Marines/Navy have never practiced a port seizure.  If you ask a Marine general whether port seizure is a mission, I’m sure they would say yes but it’s not really a mission if you aren’t equipped for it and have never trained for it.

I understand that most of you are going to disagree with the conclusion of this post.  That’s fine.  Feel free to tell me why.  However, do not engage in “what if”.  What if Russia takes over Europe and we need to conduct another Normandy invasion?  What if China suddenly launches an instantaneous seizure of the entire Pacific Ocean?  “What if” is not a viable or logical argument.  If you think we need to retain significant amphibious assault capability, tell me, specifically, where and under what circumstances it would be needed.  Nothing else is reasonable or logical.

Also, do not engage in “you never know” – we need to keep our current Marine force structure because you never know what will happen.  “You never know” is an argument that has no logical basis and can’t be countered.  It’s also an argument for unlimited capabilities because …  well …  you never know.  Using that argument, we should have 98 super carriers, a ten million man Marine Corps, and a thousand B-2 nuclear armed bombers in the air continuously because …  you never know.

The practicalities of budget, industry, and manpower preclude “you never know” force structures.  Therefore, “you never know” is not a valid argument.

Give me something specific or accept the conclusions of the post.

Aegis Cruiser Gets Lucky

You’ve probably already read that a South Korean fishing boat collided with the Aegis cruiser Lake Champlain.  Apparently, damage was minimal to both vessels. 

“Guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain (CG-57) and a South Korean fishing vessel collided in international waters east of the Korean Peninsula, the Navy said in a statement this morning. That fishing vessel lacked functioning radio or GPS and did not heed audio warnings, a defense official told USNI News.” (1)

How can a Navy Captain allow an unidentified and non-responsive boat to get close enough to collide?  Did we learn nothing from the Cole attack?  Do we not recall that North Korean forces have torpedoed a South Korean ship?  Have we forgotten that North Korean small boats and mini-subs have been found in South Korean waters?  While there may have been no overt reason to believe this was a suicide/attack attempt, there was also no reason to believe that it wasn’t given North Korea’s history and erratic and unpredictable behavior.  In fact, blowing up a US cruiser would have been something quite appealing to North Korea.

I repeat, how did a Navy Captain allow an unidentified and non-responsive boat to get close enough to collide?  That’s a huge risk of a multi-billion dollar ship.  That’s gross incompetence.  The Captain should be relieved and court-martialed. 

_____________________________

(1)USNI News website, “UPDATED: Cruiser Lake Champlain Collides With South Korean Fishing Vessel That Lacked Radio, GPS”, Megan Eckstein, 9-May-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/05/09/cruiser

What War Is

One of ComNavOps’ recurring themes is that we’ve forgotten what war is.  The corollaries to this are that we’ve forgotten how to wage a true war and we’ve forgotten the cost, in lives and utter destruction, of war.  SNAFU blog brings the issue to the forefront with a simple sentence in a new post about Hezbollah acquiring the Yakhont anti-ship cruise missile (P-800 export version).  Here’s the quote,

“A mission to destroy/recover those missiles (assuming you aren't willing to risk massive civilian casualties by simply bombing the grid square they're located in) is gonna be rough.” [emphasis added]

This sums up and focuses the entire “what war is” issue in one sentence.

We’ve fought low end conflicts for so long and gotten so used to being able to pick and choose exquisitely precise attacks that we’ve forgotten what an indiscriminate affair true war is.  We’ve come to believe that we can conduct a war with no civilian casualties or collateral damage.  Arguably, avoidance of civilian casualties and collateral damage has been our main objective in many instances, as opposed to achievement of any actual military objective.

What is war?  For the purpose of this discussion, war is combat to eliminate a threat to national security.  If one’s national security is threatened then one should take any and all action necessary to eliminate the threat.  You don’t address national security threats on a limited, collateral damage avoiding basis.  You decisively, thoroughly, and permanently eliminate it.  If you can do so while avoiding civilian casualties and collateral damage, all the better but avoidance of casualties and damage cannot be the military objective.  If it is, then your national security isn’t really being threatened.

If a missile such as this (or any military asset, for that matter) constitutes a threat to national security then it must be eliminated.  The only question is how best to go about it.  Even here, the question is fairly easy to answer.  The “how” is the method that achieves the asset’s destruction with the least loss of American lives.  Avoidance of civilian casualties and collateral damage are secondary objectives that may serve to moderate the method but not dictate it.  For example, avoidance might suggest conventional bombs as opposed to nuclear weapons if conventional bombs would be equally effective and not unduly risk American lives.

To return to the specific example of a missile located amongst the general population, the option to eliminate it via bombing a grid square is likely the option that would provide the most effective accomplishment of the task while providing the least risk to US lives.  When faced with a national security threat, avoidance of civilian casualties and collateral damage must take a back seat to mission accomplishment.  We’ve forgotten that.

In WWII, when faced with snipers hiding in civilian buildings, we called in artillery, mortars, or bazookas, leveled the building, and moved on.  That was war.

The only “good” in war is ending it quickly, decisively, and victoriously.  Any other approach just prolongs the fighting and results in more casualties on both sides, both civilian and military.  Consider the US’ reluctance to engage ISIS when co-located with civilians.  By passing on engagement opportunities, the US repeatedly allows ISIS fighters to continue to slaughter more civilians.  On the one hand, tens of civilians may die in the engagement.  On the other hand, hundreds or thousands may die, and many more suffer deprivations, over the succeeding months and years at the hands of the ISIS terrorists that are allowed to live out of a desire to avoid civilian deaths or collateral damage.  Which is worse?  The answer is clear, if ugly, but that’s what war is and we’ve forgotten that and forgotten how to make the hard decisions.

This post runs the risk of putting words in the mouth of the SNAFU author that the author did not intend.  Thus, note that SNAFU did not suggest that the Yakhont missile constituted a national security threat requiring immediate action nor did SNAFU state how, exactly, the threat should be dealt with.  ComNavOps has simply taken one of SNAFU’s typically informative and thought provoking posts and extrapolated on one aspect of it.  If you have problems with the conclusions in this post, blame ComNavOps not SNAFU.

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(1)SNAFU website, “Hezbollah Terror Group now has P-800 Oniks Anti-Ship Missiles (Brahmos)????”, 23-Feb-2017,

http://www.snafu-solomon.com/2017/02/hezbollah-terror-group-now-has-p-800.html

Inside Our Loop

John Boyd introduced the military to modern air combat theories and resultant aircraft design theories.  His most famous contribution was the OODA loop which can be summed up, very simplistically, as consisting of the following circular steps:

• Observe
• Analyze
• Act

 Note: I present this with abject apologies to Boyd for this gross simplification and, he would undoubtedly claim, misrepresentation of his theory.  He actually had a fourth step and multiple side steps in his presentations.  As I said, this is a gross simplification to illustrate a point.

Thus, he suggested, the pilot that could more quickly (and correctly!) execute this repetitive loop would “get inside” the opponent’s loop and be able to anticipate better and act faster and, ultimately, win.  For example, in air to air combat if I can see that my opponent is beginning a maneuver (observe), analyze his maneuver so as to predict the outcome (analyze), and place myself in a position to take advantage of his final position (act), I’ll be in position to defeat him as a result of having operated inside his OODA loop.

Unfortunately, ISIS, and terrorists in general, are inside our OODA loop.  Consider this, from a Navy Times website article,

“The Navy is moving to place armed watch-standers at recruiting stations nationwide, a move that comes a year after shootings at a recruiting station and a reserve center in Chattanooga, Tennessee, claimed the lives of four Marines and a sailor.”

It’s taken us a year to decide to have armed personnel at recruiting stations.  A year!!!  How’s that for a snail-slow OODA loop?  No wonder we’re not making more progress in the war on terror.

“We are in the final stages of preparations for implementation” of the policy, said Cmdr. Dave Aliberti, policy branch head for Fleet Forces Command’s anti-terrorism, force protection directorate. 

A year, and we’re still not actually implementing it.  We’re just in the “final stages”.  That means we’ve got a ways to go, yet.

Now, what would you or I - logical, reasonable people - decide in about the first 2 minutes after the original incident?  We’d say, “Arm the recruiters.  After all, they’re highly trained in weapons handling and they could always be given additional training for using weapons in civilian settings, if need be.”  Of course, the military sees it differently.

“Some lawmakers called for service members, especially recruiters, to be allowed to carry their personal firearms to work so they could respond to an attack in progress. Aliberti said that was looked at in detail but it is not being considered.

“Because of the nature of their mission it’s something less than ideal to have every recruiter armed when their mission is engagement with the public,” he said. “While that would be one extreme, it’s not something that is being considered seriously at this time.”

Seriously????  We won’t consider allowing recruiters to be armed?  What does engagement with the public have to do with whether professional military personnel are armed.  Actually, isn’t that their job – to be armed and defend citizens against terrorists?  Is the military afraid that the public will find out that war involves guns?

Here’s a further extension of the stupidity.

“Navy leaders have also been less than enthusiastic about allowing sailors to bring their guns on bases. In an April interview with Navy Times and Defense News, the Navy’s top officer said the idea was on the table but that he was concerned about a situation where more guns are present during a shooting creating confusion for law enforcement.”

Think this one through …  If sailors were armed on base, there would be nothing for law enforcement to do after an incident except bag the terrorist’s body for removal.  More guns aren’t going to create confusion, they’re going to end the incident before it becomes a base-wide massacre. 

So, what’s the military’s approach, since they don’t seem to want to use simple, common sense?

“Militarywide, the Army Corps of Engineers is upgrading recruiting stations' security with visual identification features, as well as better access control mechanisms and ballistic shields, he said. The Army Corps is also making alterations to buildings that make them more secure, he said.”

There it is – the pervasive and misguided belief that technology is the preferred solution to any problem.  Armed sailors are the simple answer but the military would prefer to spend enormous sums of money on some idiotic technological solution that keeps budget money flowing.

Well, I’ve wandered off track, here.  The point of the post is that terrorists are inside our OODA loop.  If it takes us this long to implement simple, common sense solutions, how can we possibly fight a war and hope to win?  We have completely forgotten the lessons that Boyd taught us.  We need to be mentally nimble, quick and decisive in our decision making, and bold and timely in our actions.  We need to operate inside the terrorist’s loop instead of the other way around.

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(1)Navy Times website, “Navy to put armed sailors at recruiting stations”, David Larter, July 14, 2016,

http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/07/14/navy-put-armed-sailors-recruiting-stations/87099232/

The Navy And The War On Terror

As we contemplate the recent anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, let’s take a moment and consider the Navy’s role in the global war on terrorism.  Sure, the Navy has played its part in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts but there is much more that the Navy could be doing.

One of the challenges in fighting terrorism is that it is amorphous.  It can, and does, pop up anywhere that conditions and a lack of awareness on our part permit it.  Closely tied to this is the cross-border, or unbordered(?), nature of terrorism.  Terrorism respects no national boundaries which makes it difficult for countries that do respect national boundaries to combat it.  Finally, and closely related to the preceding, is that fighting terrorism requires, more than anything, intelligence.  We already have all the explosives we need.  We don’t need another carrier or aircraft or missile.  What we lack is intel.

What, then, can the Navy do to aid in this fight?

The Navy is in a unique position to provide worldwide, persistent intelligence collection.  Virtually any submarine or surface vessel can be provided a fairly comprehensive signals collection capability for little cost or impact on the host vessel.  Add to that the ability to operate UAVs from surface ships and the Navy is capable of performing very effective intelligence gathering without having to divert overworked national intelligence assets.  The ability of a ship to maintain a persistent presence offers the advantage of familiarization.  On-board analysts can acquire an intimate understanding of the local situation, norms, and deviations that may indicate actionable intelligence. 

This is especially useful in areas that are not currently considered high level threats and which are, therefore, only sporadically checked by national intelligence assets.  The entire continent of Africa is a good example of a lower level threat that still warrants enhanced attention.  South and Latin America are also examples.  Basically, the entire world ought to be monitored and the Navy is in a unique position to offer a great deal of this capability in an affordable way.

Now, intel alone is not enough.  Knowing that a terrorist camp is building in an African nation is good but pointless if we can’t or won’t act on it at an early stage.  Again, the Navy is in a unique position to take action early on.  This may range from Tomahawk strikes on known camps to inserting Special Ops forces.  If these kinds of actions are taken early, terrorist groups can, at least, be kept disorganized and reeling.  Of course, this requires the political will to violate the boundaries of other countries. 

Respect for the sovereignty of other countries is a cornerstone of our geopolitical relations.  Unfortunately, far too often, that simply provides terrorists a safe haven.  We need to re-evaluate our policy on this.  If we believe that terrorism is  a threat to our own national interests – and the “global” war on terrorism is an implicit recognition of exactly that – and that threat is found to manifest itself in a country that can’t or won’t take effective action then we need to act directly.  This type of action will benefit the subject country anyway unless they are active sponsors of terrorism in which case why should we care about their sovereignty?  Again, the Navy is in a unique position to do this.  The persistent nature of Naval vessels allows for the development of the type of in-depth local knowledge that is required for effective counter-terrorist actions.

It’s obvious, then, that the Navy could be far more active in the war on terrorism.  Unfortunately, the Navy’s emphasis on new construction of multi-billion dollar ships diverts attention and resources from the small and relatively simple types of assets needed for combating terrorism.  The Navy should be building more patrol vessels with small UAV capability and intelligence gathering capability.  In addition, trained analysts are needed at the local level.

There is no reason that a terrorist group in Africa can’t be identified, monitored, and destroyed before they kidnap 200 girls, for example.

Having laid out this vision for the Navy’s counter terrorism activities, we have to ask the obvious question – is the Navy already doing this and simply not broadcasting it?  Maybe they are.  I hope they are.  I suspect that they’re doing a bit of it but nowhere near the extent I’m suggesting.  For instance, we know that the Navy simply doesn’t have the sheer number of ships to do this.  We know they don’t have the number of UAVs.  We know they don’t have the necessary analysts.  And so on.  The Navy has been desperately searching for a mission and a statement of relevance since the end of the Cold War.  They’ve latched on to fictional ideas like littoral warfare in an effort to be relevant.  They’re now pushing the Pacific Pivot as a way to justify budget.  Well, the concept we’ve just discussed offers a real and highly useful function.  The only drawback from the Navy’s perspective is that it doesn’t require more carriers – just simple vessels and unglamorous intelligence collection – but, so what?  The Navy’s job is not to build carriers, it’s to protect America and this is one vital way to do that.

ISIS Strike Costs

Breaking Defense website reports that the costs of engaging ISIS are running an average of $7.5M per day and have totaled $573M since 16-Jun, according to Pentagon spokesman RAdm. John Kirby (1).  Kirby also confirmed that the Pentagon would not need money to supplement the 2014 budget.

First, I don’t even remotely believe this and, second, I am nowhere near an expert on Pentagon budgets.  So, on what basis do I not believe this if I admit to not being intimately familiar with the budget or its workings?  The numbers were presented by a Pentagon and Navy expert.  How can I not believe them?  Well, common sense, I guess.  It just feels wrong.  Let me apply a tiny bit of common sense and see what that reveals.

If we decide to launch a hypothetical aerial strike on an enemy and we happen to have a carrier in the vicinity to do so, it stands to reason that the cost of the strike would be the extra fuel, maintenance, and munitions expended that would otherwise not have occurred, right?  So, in this example, it would be the cost of several planes worth of fuel (strike aircraft and, perhaps, some rescue aircraft standing by and maybe an electronic warfare aircraft), some extra maintenance for the additional flight hours, and the bombs that were dropped.  Well, several planes worth of fuel, some extra maintenance, and several bombs would add up to, what, $10K?  $50K?  Certainly not $7.5M.



Real Costs?



Yeah, but what about the cost of operating the carrier, itself?  And the crew?  And the carrier’s escorts?  And the resupply ship?  And the Pentagon intel support?  And the Joint Chiefs leadership time?  All of those were required for the strike to occur.  That’s got to easily add up to $7.5M for one day, right?

Well, here’s the thing.  If we hadn’t conducted the strike, the carrier would still have operated, the crew would still be paid, planes would still have been launched, maintenance would still have occurred, escort ships would still have sailed, resupply would still have occurred, intel would still have been collected, and the Joint Chiefs would still have met.  In other words, all those things would still have taken place and their costs would still have been incurred.  They just would have been carrying out some other task.  Suppose the other task had been to ID a fishing boat with a helo.  Would we assign a cost to ID’ing the boat of $7.5M?

As I stated, the only real, additional cost of the strike is the fuel, maintenance, and munitions that would otherwise not have been expended.  The rest was going to happen anyway and is paid out of the Navy’s general operations funding.  In fact, in our strike example, even the fuel and maintenance of the strike aircraft is debatable since some or all of the aircraft were probably going to fly that day, anyway, just on some other mission.

Now, if we surged an otherwise idled carrier group specifically to launch our strike then, yes, the entire cost of the carrier group’s operations would be a legitimate strike expense (well, not the entire amount because a carrier still costs money to operate even when it’s idled but we won’t quibble about that).

It sounds like attributing $7.5M per day to ISIS strikes is a case of dumping the entire carrier/Pentagon routine operating costs on the ISIS strikes when, in fact, the incremental costs of the strikes was minimal.  Thus, a common sense logic exercise suggest to me that the claimed costs are not even remotely accurate.

Having said all that, I repeat my caveat that I have nowhere near the level of knowledge to properly assess the budget and strike costs.  I may be completely wrong.

If I’m right, though, one has to ask why the Pentagon is misrepresenting the strike costs?  The answer to that is obvious enough that I won’t even waste the time to spell it out. 

The games that the Navy and Pentagon play when it comes to obfuscating costs are staggering and border on fraud (they don’t border, they are fraud but I’m being nice today).  Whether it’s ISIS strike costs (unless I’m wrong), JSF procurement costs, LCS costs, estimated SSBN replacement costs, or whatever, the Navy’s reported costs are absolutely worthless and lack of integrity and honesty inherent in them are very discouraging.

(1) Breaking Defense, Colin Clark, 29-Aug-2014,

http://breakingdefense.com/2014/08/isil-operation-costs-hit-563m-about-225m-a-month/

No Win Situation

You may recall an incident in July of last year in which a Navy oiler fired on an apparent fishing vessel approaching at high speed.  The fishermen were killed and the incident caused severe diplomatic problems.  Navy Times website has a writeup, here, that I encourage you to read.  This is a classic no win situation.  If the Navy ship doesn't shoot, it risks becoming the next USS Cole.  If it shoots, it risks becoming the next USS Vincennes which is exactly what happended, albeit on a smaller scale. 

I have no insight to offer other than the sad recognition of the conditions that terrorists have forced upon the world.