Problem
Amphibious assaults?
A moot concept since we have no landing craft.
Wait, what? Of course
we have landing craft! We have the LCAC,
LCU, and LCM. Well, yes, we have those
craft but none of them are initial wave assault craft. They’re follow on craft for sustainment after
the assault site has been secured.
The only initial wave landing craft we have is the Marine’s
AAV/ACV which is not really a landing craft in the traditional sense of a small
boat that can delivery troops to the beach and return to the host ship to get
more troops for subsequent waves. The
AAV/ACV is a one-way, amphibious, light armored personnel carrier (APC).
Let’s do the math. An
AAV/ACV can carry around 15 combat equipped troops and a MEU (we’ll discuss a
MEU but this scales up to whatever size and, yes, we recognize that a MEU, on
its own, is not capable of conducting an opposed landing) has around a dozen
AAV/ACV so that represents a landing capacity of around 180 troops that can be
delivered to the beach. The remainder of
the MEU’s 2200 troops have to find some other way to get ashore. That’s an initial assault capacity of around
8% of the MEU.
A MEU has around 16 transport helos/MV-22s, each of which
can carry 15-20 combat loaded troops but, again, these are not initial assault
assets. Helos are not survivable over a
battlefield. They’re follow on
transports.
Are 180 troops per MEU really enough to conduct an opposed
landing? Of course not! Thus, we have a problem.
Solution
So, what’s the solution?
I’ve heard many people recommend foreign “landing craft” such as the
CB90, Jehu (Finnish), Raptor (Russian), etc be used as landing craft. Claimed benefits include a [very small]
degree of stealth, speed, armament, and the ability to fit six or so craft in
the well deck of an amphibious ship.
 |
| CB90 |
 |
Jehu - Note the narrow, restricted exit ramp and imagine fifteen or so combat laden troops trying to rapidly debark, one at a time, under fire. |
Analysis
Let’s take a closer, analytical look at this type of boat in
the landing craft role.
Troop Capacity – This size boat claims to be able to
carry 15-20 or so troops, likely less when the troops are combat equipped. Let’s be generous and use a figure of
20. For 6 boats, that’s 120 troops per
assault wave. Is that an assault or a
school board meeting? By comparison, a
WWII attack transport carried around 24 landing craft, each of which could
carry around 30 troops for a wave of 720 troops.
Cargo Capacity – None. These types of craft have no cargo
capacity. That’s all there is to say
about that. The troops would land with
whatever they can carry on their person.
Debarkation – One of the constant characteristics
across these types of boats are the requirement for the troops to debark via
narrow passageways, single file, slowly.
While some claim to have restricted, emergency egress, it is, again, an
exceedingly slow and cumbersome process.
Under fire, these boats are death traps for the troops. Arguably, the most important characteristic
of an effective landing craft is the ability to rapidly discharge the troops while under fire. The WWII Higgins boat allowed the troops to
egress, line abreast, several at a time, simultaneously, across the bow
ramp. In an emergency, dozens of troops
could simultaneously egress over the open sides.
Cost - This
type of craft costs several million dollars apiece, or more, which is way too
expensive for a niche craft that is likely to suffer high rates of attrition
and needs to be procured in large numbers.
Conclusion
It is patently clear that these types of craft are not
suitable for amphibious assaults. They
are suited (and this may even be overly optimistic) for the kind of tiny raid
operations or patrol duties they were designed for. We need to stop looking for foreign landing
craft because there are none that are suited for the purpose. If we want a landing craft, we need to go
back to the drawing board and design a dirt-simple, modern, Higgins boat and be
done with it.
Of course, such a landing craft would require a radically
re-designed amphibious ship to make use of it … you know, something like a WWII
Attack Transport (APA) but that’s a separate, though intimately related, topic.
Given that ComNavOps sees very little strategic need for
future amphibious assaults and given that the Marines have publicly stated that
they are out of the assault business, this entire discussion is probably moot
but at least we now know what won’t work and can stop bringing up these types
of boats.