Don’t Say Nothin’ At All

We were all taught the old saying,

 

“If you can’t say something nice about someone, don’t say anything at all.”

 

Well, given the military’s abysmal record when it comes to acquisition programs, program management, weapon performance, and audits, the Department of Defense has taken that age old saying to heart but modified it to,

 

“If someone can’t say something nice about us, we won’t let them say anything at all.”

 

To that end, the Defense Department has now restricted DOT&E reports, the only source of unbiased testing and reporting due to the endless series of negative findings, year after year.

 

The Department of War restricted public access to 25 years of unclassified weapons testing reports on July 30, moving them to a secure network reserved for personnel with military-issued access credentials.[1]

 

The reports, issued annually by the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), have detailed unclassified effectiveness and maintenance shortcomings in major weapons programs … [1]

Unsatisfied with merely restricting access to the reports, SecDef Hegseth has moved to hugely reduce the DOT&E capabilities and responsibilities.

 

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has cut the test office's staffing to 30 employees from 126 and removed 90 programs from its oversight list this year, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).[1]

 

There is one problem with this and that is that the military’s move appears to be illegal.[2]

 

Williams [Greg Williams, defense policy director with the Project on Government Oversight ] said the 1983 law creating the test office required unclassified annual reports, and a 2011 law directs that such reports be posted online for public access.[1]

 

DOT&E’s own website confirms this [2] and the exact wording of the relevant law appears in the references below.[2]

 

 

Discussion

 

DOT&E has been the only organization forcing the military to test weapon systems and inform the public about the results in an unclassified report.  Without the efforts of DOT&E, the military would skip even more testing than they already do.  For example, the Navy attempted to indefinitely defer shock testing of the USS Ford.  DOT&E worked through Congress to pressure the Navy into performing the tests.

 

The annual DOT&E reports have been the only publicly available source of honest weapon system test result reports for the taxpayer to understand how effectively their money was being spent.

 

DOT&E’s downfall began with the retirement of Dir. Gilmore, who ComNavOps considers one of, if not the, most important and influential men in the military field in the last fifty plus years.  When he left, DOT&E’s new director began watering down the reports into uninformative, pointless pap.  Now, even that is being restricted and unavailable to the public. 

 

DOT&E no longer serves any useful purpose.

 

The military has been embarrassed and humiliated time and again by their own failures and they have finally found a way to prevent that.

 

“If someone can’t say something nice about us, we won’t let them say anything at all.”

 

 

 

_______________________________

 

[1]Newsmax website, “Pentagon Restricts Access to Weapons Test Reports”, Jim Mishler, 5-Aug-2026,

https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/war-department-weapons-reports-restrict/2026/08/05/id/1265159/

 

[2]https://www.dote.osd.mil/

From the DOT&E website,

 

In 1983, Congress established the position of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The Director, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, is the principal official and adviser to the Secretary of War on all DoW matters related to operational (OT&E) and live fire test and evaluation (LFT&E) of DoW systems and services acquired via the Warfighting Acquisition System.

 

Pursuant to Sections 139, 4171, 4172, and 4231 of Title 10, U.S.C., Section 223 of Public Law 117-81, DoDD 5141.02, and DoDI 5000.98, the DOT&E:

• Develops and updates policies and guidance for OT&E and LFT&E.
• Designates select DoW programs for OT&E and LFT&E oversight and publishes and manages the T&E Oversight List.
• Oversees, reviews, and independently reports on all OT&E and LFT&E activities and resources for programs on the T&E Oversight List.
• Assesses the adequacy of and approves OT&E and LFT&E strategies and plans in support of all acquisition decisions. This includes the alternative LFT&E strategies required in support of waivers from full-up system-level (FUSL) testing.
• Approves the adequacy of the multi-domain operational environment, threats, and targets used in LFT&E and OT&E.
• Observes OT&E and LFT&E to evaluate compliance with approved strategies and plans.
• Conducts an independent analysis of test data from across the acquisition life cycle and M&S results and in support of acquisition decisions; submits, as applicable, reports on the adequacy of LFT&E and OT&E and evaluations of operational effectiveness, suitability, survivability, and lethality to the: OSW, Joint Staff, DoW Components, and Congressional defense committees.
• Submits a publicly releasable Annual Report to Congress summarizing key OT&E and LFT&E activities planned, executed, or reported on within the fiscal year, and related challenges.
• In coordination with the DoW Component heads, defines strategic initiatives needed to update policy and meet future OT&E and LFT&E requirements.

 

Following is an exact recording of the relevant law:

 

10 U.S. Code § 139, Section (h)

 

(1)The Director shall prepare an annual report summarizing the operational test and evaluation activities (including live fire testing activities) of the Department of Defense during the preceding fiscal year.

(2)Each such report shall be submitted concurrently to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Secretaries of the military departments, and the Congress not later than January 31 of each year.

(3)If the Director submits the report to Congress in a classified or controlled unclassified form, the Director shall concurrently submit to Congress a version of the report that is unclassified and does not require safeguarding or dissemination controls.

DOT&E Reductions and a New Director

As you know, ComNavOps is not yet an enthusiastic supporter of SecDef Hegseth.  He says the right things but his actions, thus far, have been lacking and only sporadically beneficial.  He hasn’t done anything horribly wrong but he’s also not implemented the kind of wholesale changes needed.  Changes around the periphery are not going to improve the Department of Defense.
 
We now get notice of what is possibly his first blatant mistake:  cutting the Director, Operation Test & Evaluation (DOT&E).  If you’ve followed the blog for any length of time, you know that ComNavOps has been a big fan of DOT&E’s work, believing that they are the only force keeping the Navy (and military, in general) from committing wholesale, blatant fraud when it comes to weapon system testing.  Indeed, the Navy (and military, in general) has been highly critical of DOT&E which tells me that DOT&E is on the right path.
 
Now, SecDef Hegseth is proposing cuts to DOT&E.
 

In a bid to save what he estimated as $300 million per year, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has laid out a plan to reshape the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation by eliminating positions and layoff contractors supporting the team.[1]

Is saving $300M per year – and almost free sum of money by Pentagon standards – really worth possibly impeding the only Pentagon related organization that seems to function well?
 
A memo from Hegseth stated,
 

“A comprehensive internal review has identified redundant, non-essential, non-statutory functions within ODOT&E that do not support operational agility or resource efficiency, affecting our ability to rapidly and effectively deploy the best systems to the warfighter.”[1]

This sounds suspiciously like buzzword bingo, the affliction of the Pentagon.  I hope this is not happening to SecDef Hegseth.
 
In a fairly major change included with the manning cuts announcement, SecDef is also assigning a new acting Director.
 

Hegseth said he has appointed Carroll Quade to perform the duties of the Director of DOT&E. Quade is currently serving as the Navy’s deputy for Test and Evaluation for the Navy.[1]

I have no problem with this as the last few Directors were significant steps back from Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, who set the standard for DOT&E.  Recent Directors have virtually eliminated public oversight and information under the excuse of secrecy.  While truly classified information should not be made public, if you expect public support – in the form of taxes – you must provide some degree of feedback and information to the public.
 
To be fair, I have no knowledge about the inner workings of DOT&E.  Perhaps the group had become bureaucratically bloated and needs trimming.  However, note that the group only has 94 people (82 civilians, 12 military members).  SecDef proposes reducing that staffing to 30 civilians, 15 military personnel, and one senior leader.  Given that the group is responsible for testing every US military weapon, sensor, and system, this seems like a foolhardy reduction.
 
I fear that SecDef Hegseth is in over his head and is making changes almost randomly.  Time will tell.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Hegseth reshaping Pentagon’s weapons testing oversight office, cutting staff positions”, Ashley Roque, 28-May-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/hegseth-reshaping-pentagons-weapons-testing-oversight-office-cutting-staff-positions/

2023 DOT&E Quick Hits

Following are some quick hits from the 2023 (released 2024) DOT&E annual report.  Again, I cannot stress the near-uselessness of the DOT&E reports since Dr. Gilmore left.  Nevertheless, consider these items:
 
 
CH-53K
 
The DOT&E report assess the CH-53K as not operationally suitable.
 

In the December 2022 IOT&E report, DOT&E determined that the CH-53K is not operationally suitable. The aircraft demonstrated acceptable results for all reliability and maintainability metrics.
 
However, the demonstrated low aircraft availability does not support sustained operations.  Additionally, the low probability of success of the automatic blade fold system will result in mission aborts and extended deck cycles that could hamper amphibious operations. The aircraft demonstrated its sortie generation rate requirement.  Unexpected main and tail rotor blade erosion damage was observed on aircraft operating in the desert environment during IOT&E. Extended time was needed to repair blade erosion damage because of the lack of a structural repair manual. Battle damage assessment and repair also requires a structural repair manual that has yet to be delivered.[1, p.161]

CMV-22B COD
 

As reported in the combined FOT&E and LFT&E report of June 2022, DOT&E found that CMV-22B was not operationally suitable due to failures of many subsystems … [1, p.164]

The miraculous V-22 is less than miraculous?
 
 
F-18 Software
 

The Navy stopped SCS [Software Configuration Set] H16 operational testing during 4QFY22 due to severe software deficiencies, but still fielded the system to the operational fleet in FY23 without completing the DOT&E-approved FOT&E test plan.[1, p.195]

So, severe deficiencies identified in testing but the Navy fielded the system anyway?  I don’t see any way that can go wrong.
 
 
Constellation
 
From the DOT&E operational effectiveness assessment, 

Unclassified risks to operational effectiveness include that the FFG 62 design does not have a tracker illuminator system, which is typically installed on other Aegis platforms, and that the design crew size will be highly reliant on currently unproven system automation and human system interfaces. The Navy acknowledges the risk of the current crewing strategy for FFG 62 … [1, p.201]

Independence LCS-MCM
 
Here’s the operational suitability assessment of the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) that is the actual sweep portion of the MCM module as opposed to the one-at-a-time hunting systems.  Doesn’t look good. 

UISS is not operationally suitable, as documented in the UISS IOT&E report dated June 2022. UISS’s reliability and availability do not support sustained mine sweeping operations.[1, p.207]

MQ-25 Stingray Unmanned Tanker
 
How’s that tanker coming along? 

DOT&E has not approved any operational test plans for MQ-25.[1, p.217]

Not even testing, yet???

SEWIP 

…preliminary data indicate SEWIP Block 2 fails to meet its reliability and operational availability requirements.[1, p.242]

John Lewis Class Replenishment Oiler 

USNS John Lewis could not support scheduled test events on five occasions due to equipment failures.[1, p.245]

Discussion
 
A few common themes jump out from the DOT&E report.
 
While it is perfectly normal for every new project to encounter problems, many of the systems being reported on are far from being new and the degree of problems encountered is not acceptable.
 
The number of scheduled test events that were cancelled due to equipment failure – often not of the test item, itself! – is disappointing especially when one considers that the tests were scheduled and the equipment presumably underwent meticulous tweaking prior to the test period.  The failures paint a picture of a Navy that is physically failing and is incapable of performing rapid, on-site repairs.  This speaks worlds – and poorly - to the specter of battle damage and our ability to ‘stay in the fight’ when damaged.
 
As noted many times in the past, the Navy lacks suitable, enemy-representative, target drones for realistic testing.  To paraphrase, ‘millions for new construction, not a penny for testing!’  The Navy’s priorities are beyond badly screwed up.

EMALS and AAG Reliability Data

Here is the only data to appear in the entire 2022 DOT&E annual report:  It’s for the Ford EMALS and AAG.

 

EMALS

 

During testing from March through June 2022 (after the PIA), EMALS achieved a reliability of 614 mean cycles between operational mission failures (MCBOMF) during 1,841 catapult launches (where a cycle is the launch of one aircraft). While this reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF, EMALS showed slight improvement in reliability from FY21 (460 MCBOMF throughout 1,758 catapults). However, during the fi rst underway of IOT&E in September 2022, EMALS reliability appeared to regress …

 

Thus, the most recent reliability is only 15% of the requirement.

 

 

AAG

 

During testing from March through June 2022 (after the PIA), AAG achieved a reliability of 460 MCBOMF during 1,841 aircraft recoveries (where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft). While this reliability is well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF, AAG showed slight improvement in reliability from FY21 (115 MCBOMF throughout 1,758 catapults).  However, during the first underway of IOT&E in September 2022, AAG reliability appeared to regress …

 

Thus, the most recent reliability is only 3% of the requirement.

2022 DOT&E Report

After a woefully misguided decision by DOT&E to not publish a ‘civilian’ version of their annual weapons assessment report last year (well, to be fair, they did publish a ‘civilian’ version but there was nothing in it of any use, whatsoever), DOT&E was instructed by Congress to drop the restricted Congressional version and just issue a single ‘civilian’ report this year.  Thus, it was with great anticipation that I read through the just-released 2022 annual report.

 

I can say with certainty that, far and away, the biggest positive from the report was the fact that it was an electronic version which saved a large number of trees from being cut down to make paper.  Beyond that, there was absolutely no information of any use in the report.  The only exception was two reliability data points for the Ford’s EMALS and AAG (both still abysmally poor despite the Navy’s glowing public statements).

 

I could not be more disappointed in the report.  There was nothing there.  There may be even less than the prior year, if that’s possible.

 

Clearly, DOT&E was angry about being rebuked by Congress, didn’t want to do a public report, and put this worthless pile of garbage out as a finger in the eye of Congress and the public.

 

Don’t waste your time looking at it.  I’m not even going to post a link to it.

Ford Reliability

The nearly worthless DOT&E annual report has been released and one of the very few sets of actual data is for the Ford EMALS, AAG, and elevator systems.  Let’s take a look at the data.

 

Note: Reference is made in the quotes to ‘ISE’ which is an abbreviation for Independent Steaming Event which is part of a series of at sea, post-delivery tests and trials.  It’s basically one of a sequence of test periods at sea.  The number indicates which test/event it is in the sequence.  So, for example, ISE 12 would be the twelfth at sea test period.

 

 

EMALS

 

DOT&E reports this data for the Ford EMALS,

 

During the 8,157 catapult launches conducted through ISE 18, EMALS achieved a reliability of 272 mean cycles between operational mission failures (MCBOMF), where a cycle is the launch of one aircraft.  This reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF. [1, p.144]

 

Compare this to the preceding year’s report,

 

During the 3,975 catapult launches conducted post PSA through ISE 11, EMALS demonstrated an achieved reliability of 181 mean cycles between operational mission failure (MCBOMF), where a cycle is the launch of one [2, p.137]

 

What is not clear is whether the phrase ‘through ISE 18’ refers to the total since the beginning of the program up through ISE 18 or whether it refers to the incremental change since the last DOT&E report (2020) which was ISE 11.  If it refers to the cumulative lifetime total then the results are skewed by the initial higher failure rate.  If it refers to the incremental number since the previous report then we can get a good feel for the current performance.

 

My interpretation is that the numbers are cumulative.  This means we can, therefore, take the difference between the current (2021) figure of 8,157 launches and the 2020 figure of 3,975 launches, do some simple arithmetic and get the performance for the last year (ISE 13 through ISE 18) which, presumably, should show substantial improvement over the initial performance and give us a good look at the current status.

 

Simple arithmetic gives us the actual number of failures and allows us to assemble the following table of data.[3]  Calculated data is indicated as such.  Remaining data is from the DOT&E report.

 

 

Launches	Failures	Actual MCBOMF	Required MCBOMF
8,157 (through ISE 18)	30 (calculated)	272	4,166
3,975 (through ISE 11)	22 (calculated)	181	4,166
4,182 (calculated - 2021)	8 (calculated)	522 (calculated)	4,166

 

 

We see, then, that the performance for last year (2021) showed substantial improvement from the initial failure rate of 181 to 522, however, it is still woefully short of the required 4,166.

 

Okay, it’s still very bad but if it keeps getting better we’ll be okay, right?

 

Unfortunately, no.  As with any developmental effort, progress and improvement is rapid in the initial stages and then slows quickly as the easy improvements are made and progress becomes increasingly more difficult.  Even if progress were to continue in a linear fashion at the current rate – say, improving from 181 to 522 each year – it would take just over 12 years to get from a failure rate of 522 to 4,166 … but, as I just explained,  that’s not how it works.  Barring a developmental breakthrough, I just don’t see EMALS ever being able to meet the failure rate (MCBOMF) or even come close.

 

 

Advanced Arresting Gear

 

For the AAG system, the current DOT&E report gives,

 

During 8,157 recoveries, AAG achieved a reliability of 41 MCBOMF, where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft. This reliability estimate falls well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF. [1, p.144]

 

And, from the previous year’s DOT&E report,

 

Through the first 3,975 recoveries, AAG demonstrated an achieved reliability of 48 MCBOMF, where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft. This reliability estimate falls

well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF. [2, p.137]

 

Treating the data as was done for EMALS,

 

 

Traps	Failures	Actual MCBOMF	Required MCBOMF
8,157 (through ISE 18)	199 (calculated)	41	16,500
3,975 (through ISE 11)	83 (calculated)	48	16,500
4,182 (calculated - 2021)	116 (calculated)	36 (calculated)	16,500

 

 

The data shows that we can only recover around 40 aircraft before experiencing an operational failure.  So, if we were to launch a full air wing strike, only half the aircraft could recover!

 

There are two things that are absolutely stunning about this data:

 

1.     The failure rate has barely changed from the initial data.  For practical purposes, there has been no improvement from the start until now!  In fact, the previous year’s failure rate is actually slightly worse than the initial rates!

2.     The difference between the actual MCBOMF of around 40 and the requirement of 16,500 is staggering.  No amount of further development is going to eliminate that gap and, as with EMALS, the easy improvements have already taken place and progress from now on will be slower.  Yikes!

 

 

Elevators

 

For the Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE), we have only one set of data.  From the DOT&E report,

 

Therefore, only preliminary reliability estimates are available to compare to the requirement of 932 hours between operational mission failure. Through the first 14,842 elevator cycles, 68 operational mission failures were reported. [1, p.145]

 

Again, simple arithmetic gives us the following:

 

cycles = 14,842

failures = 68

failure rate = 218 versus that target of 932

 

While this tells us that the performance is still well short of the requirement, it is at least numerically conceivable that the gap can be closed with further development.  On the other hand, with the amount of effort and man-hours that have already gone into this, it is hard to imagine that there is much more improvement left to be had.

 

 

Summary/Conclusion

 

The basic function of a carrier is to arm planes (weapon elevators), launch planes (EMALS), and recover planes (AAG).  The Ford is currently unable to perform those basic functions at anywhere near the required level of reliability which means the Ford is unable to perform its basic function.

 

How do we get from where we are to the requirement?  Disturbingly, for the reasons discussed, it likely can’t be done.  We’re well into the diminishing returns portion of the development curve.  In other words, we’re entering the flatter portion of the development curve and improvements will be fewer and less impactful. 

 

So, what’s the alternative?  What can be done?  Well, we could rip out the systems and install something proven like the Nimitz systems but that’s almost prohibitively expensive and difficult since the Fords are not designed for those systems.  Instead, I’m going to predict that the Navy will do what they always do when they can’t meet a specification … change the requirement!  I predict the Navy will accept the current performance and simply change the specification.  And just like that, they’ve met the spec!

 

As bad as all this is, the really scary part is that we’re in the process of building three more identical carriers with, presumably, the same problems.  We are building an entire class of carriers that can’t perform their basic function.

 

The only slight hope is that the engineers have learned from the Ford and significantly modified the equipment for the subsequent carriers so that they will be able to perform their basic function.  Unfortunately, this is yet another example of concurrent construction.  We’re building multiple ships before the first one is complete and working properly so the EMALS, AAG, and AWE for the subsequent carriers were ordered long ago, before there was time for the development feedback loop to function and, therefore, the equipment is almost certainly identical, for all practical purposes.  Same equipment … same problems.

 

Of course, given DOT&E’s new practice of concealing almost all data, it’s likely that we’ll never see any data for the other carriers so we’ll have only the Navy’s official statements to inform us … and those will be glowing, without a doubt, as the Navy’s official pronouncements about the Ford have been.  In fact, I’m quite surprised that DOT&E exposed even this data.

 

On the plus side, China has committed to EMALS for their carriers so they’ll likely have the same problems!

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, 2021 Annual Report, Jan 2022

 

[2]Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, 2020 Annual Report, Jan 2021

 

[3] Launches / failure rate = number of failures

8,157 / 272  = 30 fails

3,975 / 181  = 22 fails

 

Taking the difference between those two data sets

4,182 / 522  = 8 fails

DOT&E Disappointment

Well, the 2021 DOT&E weapon systems annual report is out and it’s everything I was afraid it would be:  watered down to the point of being nearly useless (see, “The Demise of DOT&E”).  I’ve read the entire Navy section and the only actual data was about the Ford EMALS, AAG, and elevator reliability.  Other than that, across all the remaining systems and programs, there was no data.  Beyond that, there was almost no qualitative information, either; no indications of what problems exist and why.  The most common phrase in the report – which appears verbatim in every individual section, generally multiple times, is, ‘Not enough data are currently available … ‘.

 

The report is not worth the time it took to write and is certainly not worth anyone’s time to read.

 

This is a major disappointment.  For many years, DOT&E was the sole voice of reality and sanity in the military development and testing world and now that voice has been silenced.  I don’t know why DOT&E decided to do this.  They proffered a vague excuse about security but, having read all the previous DOT&E reports, I can assure you there was never anything remotely classified in any report and there was nothing that would have given an enemy any insight or advantage.

 

What there was, was an honest, test-based assessment of our systems as opposed to the Navy’s outright lies.  We have lost that voice and the Navy has shaken off the last vestige of accountability.  Yes, DOT&E is issuing an informative report for Congress that has been deemed to be a ‘controlled unclassified information’ document but that will not be available to the public.

 

The country has lost the only reliable oversight reporting available about the military development efforts and this can only bode ill for informed oversight.  We, the people, will be the worse for this loss. 

 

Nickolas Guertin, Director Operational Test and Evaluation, has failed the country and his duty.

The Demise of DOT&E

The most valuable organization in the US military complex is the office of Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).  As documented countless times in this blog, DOT&E is the only thing preventing the military from engaging in wholesale fraud when it comes to weapons development testing.  For their part, the Navy has done everything they can to skirt, avoid, bypass, and ignore DOT&E test requirements and has been publicly slapped down multiple times for it.  A good example is the Navy’s attempt to avoid shock testing on the Ford which was thwarted by DOT&E.

 

Unfortunately, someone has gotten to DOT&E and appears to have neutered them.

 

But next year, the Pentagon’s office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation will issue two different versions of the 2021 report: An unclassified version that will be available to the public, and a version with “controlled unclassified information” (CUI) that will only be made available to lawmakers and those inside the department, according to Raymond O’Toole, acting head of the DOT&E office. [1]

 

 

As a reminder, DOT&E is required by law to release a public version of its annual report.

 

DOT&E is required by law to submit an unclassified version of the report every year. [1]

 

Why is the Director taking this action?

 

“I thought it very important to provide Congress and the Secretary the test evaluation details that shouldn’t wind up in our adversaries’ hands, hence the new CUI version of the annual report,” he said at an event hosted Monday by the National Defense Industrial Association. [1]

 

No one wants to make sensitive information available to the enemy but the dual reports are not necessary.  DOT&E already routinely issues classified sub-reports, as warranted.

 

The problem is that the negative information will, undoubtedly, be deleted from the public version and pushed to the ‘controlled’ version where we will not be able to see it.

 

Mandy Smithberger, director of defense information for the Project On Government Oversight, raised concerns that most technical details could be pushed to the CUI version, leaving the unclassified version a shell with little relevant insight. [1]

 

“DOT&E already has the ability to include classified reporting, and I worry that this will end up [resulting] in a watered down version of the report that makes it more difficult for the press and the public to make sure that we are buying weapon systems that are effective and safe,” she said in an email to Breaking Defense. [1]

 

More frightening is that, under this new system, the military gets to decide what is ‘controlled’ and what is not.

 

O’Toole also stated that the decision about what constitutes “controlled unclassified information” ultimately rests with the services, not DOT&E itself. [1]

 

Do you really think the military is going to allow negative results to appear in the public version?  I think we can anticipate, with 100% certainty, that the services will use a very broad definition of ‘controlled’ to keep unflattering information from going public.

 

Someone has gotten to the Director and applied pressure to coerce him into hiding weapon failures.  There is no other explanation.  As someone who has read every DOT&E report issued, I can assure you that the information in the DOT&E reports contains nothing that could remotely be considered classified or sensitive.  The reports contain almost no actual data and only vague descriptions of the issues that arise during testing.

 

Beyond that, our enemies have active and robust cyber espionage programs and know far more about our weapon programs than what appears in the DOT&E reports.

 

The pubic exposés of the various program failures are the only means the tax-paying public has to evaluate whether their tax dollars are being well spent.

 

DOT&E reports are often the only negative reports ever seen as the Navy/military trots out an endless string of spokesmen to sing the praises of the various programs.  According to Navy spokesmen, there has never been a weapon system or test that did not far exceed our wildest hopes … and yet we have the LCS, Ford, Zumwalt, and so many other abject failures.  Well, you didn’t hear about those failures from the Navy.  Only DOT&E gave you the straight truth.

 

The Director has been co-opted by the Pentagon and is doing a disservice to the American public by watering down the public version of the annual report.  This is only going to make an already badly broken weapon development, testing, and acquisition process even worse … if that’s even imaginable.

You'll recall that INSURV reports got classified when they were demonstrating too many negative results, and now this.

DOT&E was the shining light in military systems development and testing and now that light has gone out.

 

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

[1]Breaking Defense, “Pentagon tester to restrict info on weapons programs, raising transparency concerns ”, Valerie Insinna, 6-Dec-2021,

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/pentagon-tester-to-restrict-info-on-weapons-programs-raising-transparency-concerns/

MQ-8C Fire Scout Status

Many commentators have described the near magical benefits of the MQ-8C Fire Scout in the surveillance and targeting role especially as it relates to the Navy’s distributed lethality concept.  ComNavOps is not one of those.  But, I digress …

MQ-8C Fire Scout

It seems that the Navy has assessed the MQ-8C as a failure, at least for the moment.

Although there are marked improvements in endurance over the MQ-8B, the Navy and DOT&E assessed the MQ-8C system as not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable. (1)

Well that was a touch damning.  Why the negative assessment?

Primary degraders that led to this assessment included the overall air vehicle reliability, image quality and system performance of the BRITE Star II EO/IR system, and the poor reliability and inconsistency of the Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL). The TCDL is the conduit for payload video and control. Excessive operator workload coupled with an immature supply support system also contributed to the assessment of not operationally suitable. (1)

So, essentially, the Fire Scout can’t see, hear, or talk but at least it’s slow and not stealthy!  This reminds me of the common assessment of my favorite cellar dwelling hockey team:  they may be small but they’re slow.

So, there you have the DOT&E testing assessment.  Despite the results and the Navy’s own negative assessment, the Navy declared that the Fire Scout achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in Jun 2019 .

The Navy declared its MQ-8C Fire Scout unmanned helicopter mission capable and ready to deploy aboard Littoral Combat Ships. (2)

Let me understand this.  The Navy believes that the Fire Scout is not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable and that constitutes a declaration of IOC?????  Well, doesn’t that just sum up the state of the Navy today?

Many people believed that the Fire Scout would also be used to defeat swarm boat attacks but the Navy has dropped that idea.

A little more than a year ago, the Navy was still testing how Fire Scouts could be used to repel swarm attacks of small attack craft. By this spring, the Navy scrapped those plans in favor of loading the aircraft with sensors to provide an LCS with superior over-the-horizon targeting capabilities. (2)

Why did the Navy opt to drop the idea of arming the FireScout?

The decision to focus on targeting missions comes after the Navy experienced some space constraints associated with arming the Fire Scout aboard an LCS. The Navy intended the Fire Scout to carry BAE System’s advanced precision kill weapon system (APKWS), which are modified 70mm Hydra rockets fitted with a guidance system.

While a smaller MQ-8B Fire Scout was able to successfully demonstrate its ability to operate the weapon aboard an LCS in 2018, it became clear the LCS ships themselves do not have a lot of magazine space, explained Capt. Jeff Dodge, the Navy’s Fire Scout program manager … (2)

The Navy has bought, or is planning to buy, 38 MQ-8C Fire Scouts.

The MQ-8C first flight occurred in 2013.  Now, seven years later, this is where we’re at.  The -8C should have been about the easiest development program possible.  It used existing airframes and technology.  There was nothing particularly novel about it and, yet, the Navy can’t seem to make it work.  I think the lesson herein is that technology is always oversold.  It always suffers from performance problems despite glowing manufacturer’s claims.  It’s always more difficult to implement than anticipated.  Observers who marvel at the latest claims are just deluding themselves.  The more technology you put into something, the more problems you’ll have (Ford, LCS, Zumwalt, F-35, etc.).  There is a very good argument for simpler, more basic equipment that has a much higher chance of actually working.

There you have the current status of the Fire Scout.  It will not be armed and will be tasked with surveillance and targeting despite being assessed by the Navy and DOT&E as not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not cyber survivable.  Sounds like the basis for an effective distributed lethality concept, right?

The new DOT&E category of cyber survivability is an interesting one.  This suggests that the possibility exists that an enemy could take control of a Fire Scout during flight via cyber attack or, at least, render it a mission kill.

With all that in mind, keep going Navy!  Against all reason, you’ve declared IOC so keep going!

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(1)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), FY 2019 Annual Report, 20-Dec-2019, p. 151-2

(2)USNI News website, “Navy Declares Unmanned MQ-8C Fire Scout Helicopter Mission Capable”, Ben Werner, 9-Jul-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/07/09/navy-declares-unmanned-mq-8c-fire-scout-helicopter-mission-capable

Zumwalt Self-Defense System Problems

We all know the story of the Zumwalt debacle in which the Navy built a ship with a main weapon that, despite using an Army/NATO/world standard 155 mm caliber gun, was completely incompatible with any other artillery system and, when the unique munition for the Zumwalt gun failed in performance and demonstrated runaway costs, left the Zumwalt with no functional main weapon.  Well, it now appears that the Zumwalt’s firepower problems extend to its self-defense capability, as well.

According to the 2019 DOT&E Annual Report (1), the Zumwalt is experiencing severe problems with the ship’s self-defense system – severe enough to render the system nearly useless. 

The Navy has discovered severe problems during the DDG 1000 SDTS [ed. Self Defense Test Ship] events that will adversely affect the operational effectiveness of the combat system if not corrected.  Consequently, the Navy has put the test program on hold and is currently working to identify the root cause of these problems. (1)

The report does not identify the specific problem(s), presumably for security reasons.  However, the magnitude of the problems can be gleaned from the status of the self-defense testing program,

The Navy conducted 4 of the 10 DDG 1000 tests planned for the Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) (3 of 6 planned developmental tests, and 1 of 4 planned integrated developmental and operational tests). The Navy canceled one integrated test event and one developmental test event because of unacceptably low performance predictions. (1)

The fact that testing could not proceed even by the Navy’s demonstrably lax standards is incredibly damning.  We also know that Navy performance predictions are always excessively exaggerated so if their own predictions were too low to justify continued testing, they must have been truly horrible.  We’ve seen the Navy routinely push poor performing systems along in order to avoid jeopardizing funding so, again, the fact that the Navy would cancel tests suggests staggeringly bad performance and very serious problems.

As I said, the report does not specify the problems so we are left to speculate.  Just for fun, let’s try to reason out the problem, shall we?

As the report describes, the system consists of several components (1):

• Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) – The command and control architecture unique to Zumwalt.
• Multi-Function Radar (SPY-3) – The new X-band radar going on DDG 1000-class guided-missile destroyers and the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78).
• Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) – The tracker and sensor data fusion and distribution system.
• Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 (SLQ-32B(V)6) – The passive electronic sensor used to detect and identify hostile radars.
• Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 1 with Joint Universal Weapon Link (JUWL) – The short-range missile interceptor used to defeat air threats at close-in ranges, and the system used for radar-missile communication and support.  Within the U.S. Navy, only the DDG 1000-class ships and the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) use ESSM with JUWL.
• Standard Missile 2 (SM-2 Block IIIAZ) with JUWL – The unique Zumwalt variant of SM-2 used to defeat air threats at longer ranges.
• MK 57 Vertical Launch System (VLS) - The DDG 1000-only vertical missile launcher variant.

So, presumably the problem lies with one or more of the components on that list.  Let’s consider the likelihood of each component being the problem (or part of it).

Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) – This is just the ship’s internal network and it’s been installed on various ships/classes for some time and has functioned without notable problems.  This seems very unlikely to be the problem.

Multi-Function Radar (MFR/SPY-3) – The radar is untested.

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) – This has been around for many years and has been installed on many platforms.  It is very unlikely to be the problem.

Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 (SLQ-32B(V)6) – This has been a separate developmental effort and has been reported to have some typical developmental problems but nothing all that severe.  The system has been in development for some time and its issues are well known and would not likely trigger surprise cancellation of the Zumwalt self-defense program.  In addition, it is independent of the active defenses.  This is almost certainly not the problem.

Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 1 with Joint Universal Weapon Link (JUWL) – ESSM has been around for some time, has been extensively test, by Navy standards, and has reportedly performed well.  It is highly unlikely that the missile, itself, is the problem.  However, the guidance data link appears to be brand new and untested.

Standard Missile 2 (SM-2 Block IIIAZ) with JUWL – SM-2 variants have been around for some time and have been extensively tested, at least by Navy standards.  It is unlikely that the SM-2 is the problem.  However, the guidance data link appears to be brand new and untested.

MK 57 Vertical Launch System (VLS) - The VLS has not been extensively tested but, other than failure to launch, would be unlikely to cause severe problems and a systematic failure to launch issue would, undoubtedly, have been noted and reported before now since it would be too big and obvious a problem not to be publicly noted and reported.  Further, a launch failure does not fall into the category of predictable performance problems which the report refers to.  Therefore, this is not the problem.

So, what did that little analysis leave us with?  The only candidates for problems are the SPY-3 radar and the JUWL guidance link.  Either could be a likely source of predictable failure. 

As you may recall, the Zumwalt was originally supposed to have the Dual Band Radar (DBR) which consists of the SPY-4 (S band) volume search radar and the SPY-3 (X band) horizon search radar.  The SPY-4 was deleted from the Zumwalt design as a cost saving measure.  As a result, the SPY-3 was to be reprogrammed to selectively perform volume search or (and?) its intended horizon search function.  The functionality was to be operator selectable.

It seems quite plausible that the intended modifications to perform volume search have proven to be problematic.  The volume search was not intended, not designed into the SPY-3, and has had an extremely abbreviated development and testing schedule.  It is reasonable to believe that now that Zumwalt is undergoing actual combat system tests, the previously untested radar is demonstrating poor performance.

The other problem candidate, the Joint Universal Weapon Link, is also a plausible trouble source.  Again, it is unique and untested.  However, weapon guidance links are relatively straightforward communication technologies and relatively easy to correct, one would think.  So, this is certainly a possible problem point but seems much less likely than the SPY-3.

The other potentially problematic aspect to the JUWL is the mechanism of transmission.  Assuming the SPY-3 is being used to transmit the JUWL guidance commands, it is possible that the demands of the simultaneous dual guidance/tracking functions are not working together correctly.  If so, this again leads us back to a flawed SPY-3.

Therefore, the logical conclusion is that the Zumwalt is experiencing severe problems with the SPY-3 radar.

Ominously, the SPY-3 is also installed on the Ford which has not yet tested its combat systems.  More problems to come for the Ford?

Zumwalt SPY-3/4

If all of the above speculation is correct, there is even worse news.  The Navy has been testing the SPY-3 on the Self Defense Test Ship (SDTS) but is planning to remove the SPY-3.  From the DOT&E report,

The Navy plans to remove the SPY-3 radar and TSCE computer equipment on the SDTS at the end of 2QFY20. (1)

Whatever problems the SPY-3 has, the Navy’s best hope of solving them lies with exercising the SDTS with the SPY-3 installed.  Removing it may greatly hinder or totally prevent diagnosis and correction of the problem(s).  Removing the SPY-3 does not seem prudent or wise but when has the Navy ever been accused of wisdom?

The poor Zumwalt program can’t seem to catch a break, can it?  Aside from the complete failure of its main weapon system, it’s had problems with power generation/distribution (which was supposed to be a strength of the design), ship handling concerns in certain seas, and now its self-defense system is useless.  Think about it, though – is it really bad breaks or is it just a very bad design concept showing its inherent and utterly predictable problems and failures?

We’ll be keeping an eye on this one.

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(1)Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, “FY2019 Annual Report”, 20-Dec-2019, p.159-60