"Existing Design With Only Minor Modification" Trap

More and more, the Western naval ship acquisition world is reverting to ‘existing designs with only minor modifications’ instead of new ship designs.  This is due to fear rather than combat requirements: fear of runaway costs, fear of schedule delays, fear of bad publicity and criticism, fear of innovation, etc.  Fear.  The Western naval world is acquiring ships as a reaction to fear of their own ineptitude. 
 
Instead of honestly and objectively assessing the reasons for acquisition failures and fixing the problems, Western navies have opted for the perceived path of safety over that of combat effectiveness.
 
The latest victim is Germany which has cancelled its F126 frigate acquisition program. 
 

The German Ministry of Defense has decided to discontinue the construction of six F126-class frigates …[1]
 
According to the BMVg, Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS), the company initially contracted as the prime contractor, was unable to meet the agreed-upon time and budget constraints.[1]

The program began around 2015, depending on what one considers the starting point, and the first production contract was issued in 2020.  Lead ship delivery had been delayed until 2032 and costs were ballooning.
 
Burned by the failure and afraid of a repeat, Germany has opted to proceed with an existing design, the MEKO A-200 frigate.
 

Instead of planning a new ship, the decision was made to use a readily available, off-the-shelf vessel with only minor modifications.[1]

On a side note, this is yet another bit of evidence that the widespread belief among American naval observers that other countries can produce quality ships, on time, on or under budget, and cheaper than US shipbuilders is false.  But, I digress …
 
So, what is the problem with using an existing design with only minor modifications?
 
There are multiple problems:
 
The “minor modifications” never happens.  The existing design gets heavily modified, commonality disappears, and the costs balloon while the schedule slips.  The US Constellation program was a prime example of this.
 
Far more serious, though, is the trap that existing designs present.  If one never builds new designs, how do ships ever get better?  At some point, you have to move to a new design in order to incorporate new technology.  There’s a reason we’re not still building sailing ships.  Yes, you can upgrade individual pieces of equipment (though limited by ship’s utilities capacity, internal volume, weight margins, etc.) but you can’t improve or change the basic ship.  No amount of equipment upgrades could turn a Burke into a Visby-level stealth ship.  If you want a Visby-level stealth warship – and you do! – it’s got to be a new design.
 
Given the several year (or decade+)  build time for a modern naval vessel, even if the parent design was adequate when the program began, it will be obsolete by the time it enters service.  Of course, existing designs are not adequate.  Consider the MEKO A-200 that Germany now intends to acquire.  The original MEKO 200 design dates back to 1987 and even the MEKO A-200 dates back to 2001, making it already a 25 year old design which will be 30+ years old by the time the ships enter service.  Is a 30+ yr old design really what you want for your most modern, front line surface warship?
 
Take a look at the MEKO A-200.  It’s not particularly stealthy which is the major survival requirement for the modern battlefield.  Its electrical capacity for the perpetually ‘just around the corner’ lasers and rail guns is inadequate.  And so on.
 
Consider the US National Security Cutter (NSC) which is to be the basis for the next iteration of the Navy’s attempt at procuring a frigate.  The design dates back to the late 1990’s and is not even built to combat standards.  Assuming the project isn’t cancelled, the Navy is going to accept frigates whose base design is going to be around 40 years old by the time they enter service!  The NSC meets none of the requirements for success on the modern naval battlefield and yet the Navy has turned to them out of desperation and fear – fear of yet another ship acquisition fiasco.  We’re not designing for combat;  we’re designing for programmatic and career safety and public relations.
 
We cannot successfully build new designs until we objectively and honestly figure out why we keep failing.  Just to save Western navies decades of study, I’ll tell you why we keep failing:
 

• CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS
• Change Orders

 
There you have it, Western navies.  I’ve done your job for you.  Now, go build a new ship that actually belongs on the modern battlefield.
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Germany is cancelling the F126 frigate project and procuring eight MEKO frigates”, Staff, 24-Jun-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/06/germany-is-cancelling-the-f126-frigate-project-and-procuring-eight-meko-frigates/

NSC Frigate Commonality

Do you remember the main selling point of the Constellation, as originally stated?  It was to use an existing (parent) ship design with absolutely minimal modifications so that commonality would be high, thereby keeping costs low and schedules short.  Instead, the Navy heaped on so many changes that commonality dropped from 85% to 15% at the time of cancellation.  We saw what happened to cost and schedule, as a result.
 
For the National Security Cutter (NSC) frigate, the Navy’s main goal is to get AMERICAN hulls in the water as quickly as possible without worrying about lethality or combat effectiveness.  Setting aside the absurdity of the lack of lethality and combat effectiveness, the only way hulls can hit the water quickly and cheaply is to maintain maximum commonality with the parent NSC design.  Of course, the greater the commonality, the less the firepower and lethality … but, I digress.
 
Unfortunately, we’ve already seen many changes to the parent design.  The forward superstructure is being modified, stern platforms added, weapons changed, electronic warfare added, sensors added, presumably a new combat software system, etc. and those are only the changes we know about and only the external, visible changes.  Each of the listed changes requires modifications to the internal structure, ducting, cabling, bulkheads, layout, runs, utilities, etc.  Changes have a cascading effect far beyond the main change.  Further, the NSC is not built to Navy standards so, presumably, like the Constellation, the Navy will make significant internal structural changes for increased survivability just as was done to Constellation.  My slightly educated guess is that the commonality is already down to around 50% and it’s only going to get worse as the design progresses.  The Navy will continue to make changes.  They can’t help themselves.  It’s who they are and what they do.
 
Affordable and fast production?  I think cheap has already left town and quick is buying a bus ticket out as we speak. 

Where’s the Lethality?

Having failed so many times, the Navy’s primary shipbuilding criteria is no longer lethality (if it ever was in modern times) but the [incorrectly] perceived need to get hulls – any hulls – in the water as quickly as possible to stop the criticisms and fend off Congressional anger.  As Naval News website notes about the new frigate program,
 

… speed [of production] is now the primary factor driving the program.[1]

Speed of production.  Not firepower, not stealth, not lethality, not operational usefulness or anything else one might think would be of importance … just the speed with which hulls can be put in the water.  Why not just buy combat canoes?  We can get them in the water quickly.
 
The new Frigate’s armament will consist of a 57mm main cannon and a RAM launcher with 21 Rolling Airframe Missiles.  A payload space will be constructed (so much for no changes to the parent design!) at the stern of the ship capable of carrying 16 Naval Strike Missiles, 48 Hellfires, or other containerized weapons or modules.[1]
 
50-65 ships will be built …  So, we’re committing to a large production run before the first design is even finalized.  Does sound identical to the LCS?
 
The horrifying concern is that this level of armament relegates this vessel to the level of a patrol boat (and not a particularly impressive one at that!) and yet it will make up something like a third of our combat fleet.  Absorb that for a moment.  A third of the combat fleet will be patrol boats.  Add in the Navy’s desire for all manner of unmanned vessels and we’re looking at half or more of the fleet being nearly devoid of serious combat capability. 
 
Sure, the Navy will talk about future upgrades but when has that ever actually happened?  Ask the LCS how those future module upgrades that we were promised are coming along.
 
If I were China, I’d bankroll this program for the United States just to ensure we field a fleet of non-lethal ships!
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “New U.S Navy Frigate: FF(X) Program Specs Revealed”, Ethan Gossrow, 16-Jan-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/01/new-u-s-navy-frigate-ffx-program-specs-revealed/

Parent Design

What’s the Navy’s latest fad in shipbuilding?  Yeah … parent designs. 
 
The concept is that an existing, well established, “parent” design is used in a new shipbuilding program to avoid all the problems associated with new designs.  Being already in existence and thoroughly “wrung out”, the new shipbuilding program will have no problems since it will just use the parent design.  Sounds good.  Sounds logical.  Right?
 
The concept was the foundation of the successful disastrous FREMM/Constellation frigate program.  Of course, the Navy instantly abandoned the parent design as soon as the program became official and, in a shock to no one except the Navy, costs ballooned and schedules crashed.
 
The concept has also been applied to the Burke class although not by name.  When the Navy wanted the next generation surface combatant they didn’t even consider any option other than modifying the Burke parent design.  This eventually became the Burke Flt III despite the severe limitations the parent design imposed on the desired radar equipment and capabilities, stealth signature, weight margins, and so forth.
 
The concept is now being applied to the Constellation’s replacement, the National Security Cutter frigate (NSC-FF).  The new frigate is going to be based on the NSC parent design.  Of course, as we’ve seen, the Navy has already begun implementing fairly significant changes and the parent design is beginning to fade into the rear view mirror even as the program works to become official.
 
So, yes, the Navy has butchered the parent design concept in execution but what if they didn’t?  For the sake of discussion, let’s pretend that the Navy could flawlessly execute the parent design concept, meaning, no change orders, predictable costs, and schedules that can be met thanks to the absence of continuous change orders.  Would that produce a useful product?  Would the parent design result in an affordable, timely, combat-effective ship?
 
At first glance, how could a successful parent design approach not produce a successful, useful product?  By definition, the parent design exists and was, presumably, successful and useful so the “child” design has to be, as well, right?
 
Let’s take a look at some of the issues with a parent design approach.
 
Obsolescence – By definition, a parent design is obsolete.  Consider the timelines for the Navy’s parent design attempts.  The FREMM design dates back to somewhere around 2005 making the design 20 years old.  Would any sane ship designer really want to begin a new program with a 20 yr old design?  The Burke design dates back to the mid 1970’s, making it now a 55 yr old design.  The NSC design dates back to around 2000, making it a 25 yr old design. 
 
Do we really want to be basing our newest ship designs on 2-5 decade old designs?
 
While some characteristics and features can be updated from the parent, such as weapons, software, and sensors, others cannot, such as stealth.  For example, the Burke hull/superstructure stealth is obsolete and no longer effective but there is nothing that can be done about it.  The stealth signature is largely fixed by the hull/superstructure design.  Survivability is also largely fixed by the original design.  The FREMM, for example, was inherently unable to meet Navy survivability and damage control requirements, necessitating a major redesign resulting in the Constellation having less than 15% commonality with the parent design.  The Navy had to abandon the parent design in order to meet survivability standards.  Similarly, acoustic signatures, infrared signatures, etc. that are determined by the hull/superstructure shape, materials, and construction cannot be significantly altered or improved.  They are what they are.
 
Changed Requirements – Every ship design is determined by the operational and tactical requirements of its time and those change over time, especially over several decades.  The design, however, once established, is fixed and cannot be changed without abandoning the parent concept.  Thus, using a design that was intended to meet specific requirements that are decades old, and may no longer be valid, is unwise, to put it mildly.  The Burke, for example, was never designed for today’s electromagnetic environment and advanced stealth requirements and there is very little that can be done about it.
 
Design Limitations – Many design characteristics are inherent to the original design to a very large degree.  Things such as weight margins, stability, metacentric height, fuel capacity, structural strength, armor (or the complete absence thereof), speed, endurance, etc. are largely fixed by the original design barring a major redesign in which case it’s no longer the parent design.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The conclusion is painfully obvious.  The parent design concept has so many inherent flaws and limitations that it is simply not a valid, useful approach even if it were executed flawlessly.
 
This makes one wonder why the Navy even began attempting the parent approach?  Well, the answer is obvious.  The Navy has had so many failed, disastrous shipbuilding programs that the priority changed from a useful, lethal, modern combatant to simply getting hulls in the water without controversy and failure.  It no longer matters to the Navy whether the ship is useful.  They just desperately want a shipbuilding program to “succeed”, meaning, hulls in the water, on time and on budget … effectiveness be damned.
 
I completely understand the Navy’s mental state, at the moment.  They’re gun shy in the extreme and terrified of yet another failure.  Congress is incensed at their ineptitude and has begun inserting more and more restrictive oversight and conditions on budget allocations (as they should!) and the Navy is adamantly opposed to oversight.  The only way the Navy can get Congress off their back is to produce a “successful” program, no matter how ineffective it is.  The NSC-FF is barely one step beyond combat canoes but it serves the Navy’s purpose.
 
We should be producing beyond-Visby corvettes and, instead, we’re producing decades old NSC cutters as our “new” frigate.