Assault Carrier

Over the course of the blog, many commenters have suggested using the big deck LHA/LHD (LHx) as baby carriers.  We’ve discredited this notion in terms of traditional carrier operations (see, “LightningCarrier”) due to the limited size of the air wing and the complete lack of ability to operate E-2 Hawkeye AEW, tankers, and E/A-18G Growler EW aircraft that are crucial to combat effective air operations.
 
Other commenters have suggested using supercarriers for ground support to make up for the complete absence of naval gunfire.  This is a non-starter as the role of the carrier in an amphibious assault is interdiction of enemy strikes and reinforcements and the proper place to do that is hundreds or thousands of miles from the assault site.  It is suicidal folly to ‘tie’ a carrier to one location which is what would be required for a carrier to provide direct ground support for an amphibious assault.  And, lest we forget, we also lack a true ground attack naval aircraft.
 
However, the possibility exists that a dedicated, small, assault carrier could be useful in supporting amphibious assault operations.  Well, wait … don’t we already have ground support carriers in the form of our big deck amphibious ships (LHA/LHD)?
 
Yes, we do, but not effectively.  Consider, currently, the aviation component of an assault is housed on the LHx ships of which we only have a few (9 total LHA/LHD) and they have very limited air wings.  A typical LHx air wing consists of:

 

That’s a limited capability mix that lacks the number of aircraft to be effective in any of its roles.  Six strike aircraft can’t provide effective ground support, a dozen tiltrotors can’t transport a useful number of troops and gear, and four heavy lift helos can’t provide rapid, efficient heavy equipment transport.  Like most mixes, the air wing is a compromise that can do a little bit of everything but nothing well and ‘nothing well’ is not how you succeed in combat.  We’ve thoroughly analyzed the shortcomings of the LHx as regards aviation (see, “Aviation Amphibious Assault Ships”)  and provided the rationale for splitting off aviation from assault (see, “Separate Aviation FromAmphibious”) so I won’t belabor it any further, here.
  
The LHx came about because the Marines, institutionally terrified of being abandoned by the Navy (the Guadalcanal legacy) tried to combine the functions of both a carrier and an assault transport and, not surprisingly, managed to construct an unaffordable monstrosity that places too many eggs in one basket while performing neither function well.  So, why don’t we try separating the two functions into dedicated ships, each optimized for their role?  We previously discussed dedicated attack transports (see, “Attack Transport - APA”).
 
Having established the problems with an LHx and the rationale for separating the aviation and assault functions, let’s now consider what a dedicated amphibious assault aviation support ship (an assault carrier) would conceptually look like.
 
Focus – Separating the aviation component from assault allows us to eliminate the transport function leaving the carrier able to focus on ground attack/support.  This is crucial for a ship that will, hopefully, be substantially smaller than a full size carrier.
 
There is no need for transport helos.  They’re inefficient at their function and they’re non-survivable over a battlefield as amply demonstrated in Vietnam, Soviet Afghanistan, US Afghanistan, and elsewhere.  If we really think we need helos for some limited aspect of logistics support, we can easily provide a dedicated transport/cargo helo carrier by converting a merchant ship.
 
Aircraft – This is key to determining what an assault carrier would look like.  The choice of aircraft will determine the size and characteristics of the carrier.
 
Stealth aircraft are not needed and, indeed, stealth is largely useless when providing close range ground support (CAS).  The enemy can see you and the main threat is guns (ZSU-ish weapons) and small heat seeking, Stinger-type, shoulder launched anti-air missiles.  Radar stealth offers no benefit against either of those threats.
 
What is needed is an aircraft with the best possible combination of the following characteristics:
 

• Inexpensive so that appropriate numbers and replacements can be procured
• Armored for maximum airframe and pilot survivability
• Redundant and manual control systems enabling the aircraft to absorb tremendous amounts of damage
• Minimal IR signature to mitigate the main threat of Stinger-type missiles
• Minimal complexity which allows for easy repair/maintainability for excellent availability rates and combat damage repair
• Low maintenance per flight hour
• High sortie rates
• Excellent low speed maneuverability
• Minimal carrier operating requirements such as no, or simple, catapults and arresting gear
• Maximum number of weapons (hard points) as opposed to payload weight maximums.  In CAS, it’s far more useful to have a large number of weapons rather than a high payload weight.  To illustrate, it would be far more useful to have an aircraft with, say, ten weapon stations (hard points), each rated for a 500 lb bomb (5000 lb total payload) than an aircraft with four weapons, each rated for a 2000 lb (8000 lb total payload).

 
Having identified the desirable aircraft characteristics, let’s consider some candidate aircraft.
 
F-35B - The F-35B is often touted as a CAS aircraft but, in reality, is ill-suited for the ground attack/support role.  It is a large, fuel hogging, maintenance intensive, complex, non-damage resilient, limited hard point aircraft with staggeringly atrocious availability rates.  In addition, it is hideously expensive to procure and operate.
 
A-10 - The A-10 has many of the characteristics we’d like such as armor, redundant/manual flight controls, low maintenance, high sortie rates, and 11 weapon stations.  Of course, a naval version of the A-10 does not exist and would have to be developed.
 
F-16 – The F-16 is fairly maneuverable at moderately lower speeds but has only 6 (possibly 7?) weapon hard points and, like the A-10, does not exist as a carrier variant.  It also lacks any useful ground sensors, is unarmored, and lacks rugged, redundant controls.
 
A-1 Skyraider - A candidate you might not think of is the prop driven A-1 Skyraider.  It is incredibly simple (compared to a jet), free by current standards, easily maintainable and repairable (a wrench and duct tape), armored, highly maneuverable at low speeds, has very high availability rates, has 15 weapon stations, and can use simple catapults and arresting gear.  Further, it is a carrier aircraft and would need no development, whatsoever!
 
It is clear that high performance jets are not desirable for the aviation support role.  The best match to the desired aircraft characteristics is the A-1 Skyraider!  This, then, is the conceptual basis for an assault aircraft.  Having determined that, we can now focus on the design of the ship, itself.
 
Air Wing – Having chosen a conceptual aircraft, we now need to decide how many aircraft are needed in the air wing.  The answer, of course, is ‘as many as possible’.  Well, that’s not very helpful.  A better answer is that the number of aircraft is derived from a combination of factors such as the resultant carrier size/cost, combat effectiveness, dispersal of risk, etc.  A reasonable answer would seem to be somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 aircraft.  More than that and the carrier gets too large and costly.  Less than that and combat effectiveness drops precipitously.
 
Carrier – The first determination is whether we need a straight deck or angled deck.  Ideally, we’d like a straight deck, operated like WWII carrier, with no catapults and simple arresting gear.  If we could launch B-25’s off a Yorktown class carrier, I’d like to believe that we could design a Skyraider type aircraft that could launch unassisted.  Elimination of catapults would greatly reduce mechanical and utility (steam or electric) requirements which reduces the size and cost of the ship.  Assuming we can do this, we’ll be able to use a straight deck design which, again, reduces the size and cost of the ship.
 
As a point of reference, the US Navy WWII escort carriers were around 500 ft long and 10,000 – 20,000 tons with air wings of 30+ aircraft.  That seems like a good conceptual starting point for a design.
 
If we can keep the cost low enough, we can afford to build the carriers in sufficient numbers and be able to replace the inevitable losses of a vessel that is purposely placed in harm’s way.
 
The final consideration in this discussion is the fact that I don’t think there’s a strategic or operational need for amphibious assaults so the entire discussion is moot.  However, if we did want to maintain an amphibious capability, an assault carrier would be a step in the right direction though ultimately pointless without lots of large caliber naval guns.

The High Cost of Ground Attack Helicopters

Guest author Mr. Bustamante returns with a fascinating and thought provoking post about attack helicopters.  This one will challenge your conventions.  Enjoy!

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The High Cost of Ground Attack Helicopters

Are they really worth it? Are they survivable?

Just for fun: which aircraft has greater general flight performance characteristics?

Fieseler Fi 167 (circa 1938)

Bell AH-1Z Viper (circa 2000)

                              Source: Wikipedia

Point in fact: the Fieseler Fi 167 dominates the AH-1; with a maximum speed of 176 knots it was 20 knots faster, with a range of 703 nm it flew over twice as far, its service ceiling was 8,200 m - almost 2.5 times higher, and the Fi 167 could carry a 1,000 kg bomb or large torpedo, while the AH-1 is rated for 1,134 kg, the weight and configuration of weapon mounting points limits it to about a 500 kg ordnance loadout.  Purist will be aghast at this comparison, after all, the biplane lacks the modern sensors, weapon controls, and communications of the AH-1, but the performance characteristics of attack helicopters deserve closer scrutiny, particularly given the high cost of procurement and operations (the acquisition cost of the AH-64D Apache longbow at one point was almost $70 million - as much as an F/A-18).  

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Few weapon systems are as enshrined in American military thought as the attack helicopter, but this reputation has never been proven in high intensity war.  In fact, considering the origins of the attack helicopter, its performance relative to alternative aircraft, its astronomical procurement and total ownership costs, the current and future threat environments, and historical battlefield performance; we should be very concerned about the tradeoffs made in buying attack helicopters.  The attack helicopter is arguably a niche airframe that is both costly, and deficient in performance relative to fixed-wing alternatives.  We must also consider that field artillery, now can deliver both precision and massed fires at ranges exceeding those of the attack helicopter. Justification of a weapon system is not governed simply by whether the system can do the job, but whether it does the job better than competing alternatives.  We have to remind ourselves that the mass purchase of attack helicopters was driven largely by United States Army.  The Army is motivated to view Close Air Support (CAS) as "aerial artillery" and it seeks to retain operational control of air power, in the same way as it controls artillery.  The USAF won the “control debate” in WW2, while still a branch of the Army, and then it won independence as a separate service.  The inter-service politics were nasty, but the Army was effectively pushed out of the business of fixed wing tactical aviation to any great degree, and saw the helicopter as a means for replacing assets lost to the Air Force.[1]  The wisdom or stupidity of this decision is debatable, but the driving argument in favor of the attack helicopter was not performance, but rather a bureaucratic response to the creation of the United States Air Force!  The few advantages that helicopters have over fixed wing aircraft is the ability to use terrain for cover and concealment, to take off, hover, and land vertically.  I argue that those capabilities are not sufficiently advantageous to overcome the huge performance and cost penalties, which makes it very tough to justify the purchase of attack helicopters for tactical aviation use. 

Army and Marine doctrine puts attack helicopters in competition with fixed-wing TACAIR.  Both services doctrine on attack helicopters is similar and assigns them the role of attack, reconnaissance, and security operations, although the USMC adds “anti-helicopter operations” and “… terminal control for …. CAS, artillery, mortars, and NGF.”[2]  More troubling, Joint Publication 3-03 Joint Interdiction, and Army doctrine list attack helicopters as assets capable of conducting interdiction operations; that is operations to prevent adversaries from employing surface-based weaponry and reinforcing units at a time and place of their choosing.  The interdiction mission has traditionally been a fixed –wing TACAIR mission because it has generally been conducted beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) – inside the FSCL, fires from any source must be coordinated with the ground commander; beyond the FSCL, any asset may attack without coordination.  Helicopters intrinsically have large acoustic and radar signatures, which makes them excellent targets.  This doctrine exposes attack helicopters to the full spectrum of enemy anti-aircraft systems without the raw airframe performance capabilities of fixed wing TACAIR (altitude, speed, and range), the ability to carry effective standoff weapons to minimize exposure to air defense systems, nor the sophisticated counters to protect TACAIR from these systems (e.g. jamming pods, stealth, etc.).

The issue of attack helicopters should be decided upon the merits, but any review of airframe performance makes it clear that fixed-wing solutions dominate the performance/cost debate; and this at a time when even vertical envelopment supporters are calling for, and funding, platforms with performance characteristics that exceed the performance envelop of any attack helicopter in service or under consideration (e.g. the V-22 and the forth coming Army led joint Future Vertical Lift program). Table 1 below compares U.S. attack helicopters with other tactical fixed wing aircraft:

Table 1. A Comparison of Common Tactical Ground Attack Aircraft¹

                    Source: Federation of American Scientists, Wikipedia, and Global Security.

1.    These figures are for comparison only, actual combat loads, meteorology, and mission profiles dramatically affect performance.  Costs are even more difficult to quantify.

2.    No inflation adjustments have been made to this table.

3.    The GSh-30-2 is a dual barreled, recoil operated autocannon.

4.    Other AH-64 models (e.g. the AH-64D) can be equipped with launch rails for four air–to-air missiles.

5.    Ordinance load outs for attack helicopters are challenging.  The primary limitation is not weight but weapons hard points.   The AH-1 and AH-64 both carry an autocannon, and have four hard points for rocket pods (5” Zuni, or 70mm), or for a four AGM-114 Hellfire missile launch rack.  Additionally, some models add launch rails for AIM-9 air-to-air missiles.

It is worth noting that helicopter performance in “high hot” environments degrades substantially faster than fixed wing aircraft.  From the table above it is clear that fixed-wing aircraft dominate rotary wing attack aircraft in all measurable performance categories.  Specifically they are:

1.    More expensive to buy; and are much more expensive to operate and repair.

2.    Have lower performance (slower, less range, lower service ceilings).

3.    Have lower sortie rates.

4.    Carry dramatically lower armament load outs compared to fixed wing aircraft.

5.    Are less flexible than fighters or light attack aircraft (fighters have been pressed into service as attack aircraft, and most light attack aircraft can function as fighters, but attack helicopters cannot perform the fighter role).

So where exactly do attack helicopters excel? All of the aircraft in Table 1 have been successfully operated from makeshift dirt or grass runways, and all have excellent slow speed maneuverability, although only helicopters can hover, take off and land vertically. I contend that that ability is of limited use as the historical record of helicopter shoot downs demonstrates any low and slow moving tactical aircraft will be hugely vulnerable.  It is no surprise that the USAF prefers fixed wing solutions to close air support and never purchased attack helicopters, although it has acquired large numbers of rotary wing aircraft to meet other mission needs.  To summarize, when the costs and other performance metrics are considered; rotary wing aircraft fare very poorly compared to fixed wing tactical aircraft.  The final judgement on any weapon system is combat, so how have attack helicopters fared in combat operations?

The presumption is that attack helicopters are effective combat assets; but historical analysis does not support this.  The first mass employment of attack helicopters was in Vietnam; the Army and Marine Corps lost over 5,000 helicopters as complete write-offs, of which 277 were AH-1s.  This figure does not include aircraft that were shot down, or put out of commission due to ground fire, but later repaired to flying status.  It also does not count the number of UH-1s, AH-47s (they existed!), and OH-58s operating as attack helicopters.  Significantly, most of these losses occurred over South Vietnam or friendly airspace where the enemy could not deploy his most sophisticated air defenses.  Still, the AH-64, and to a lesser extent the upgraded AH-1s have benefited from a number of protective features to improve aircraft survivability.  So how attack helicopters performed in recent combat operations? Consider the 2003 invasion of Iraq:

“During the course of planning for ground operations in Iraq, the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and British Army all considered, and actually planned for, air-assault operations in front of the advancing armored columns. … Once operations started, however, no air-assault missions in front of the leading edge of the armored advance were conducted. [Emphasis added]  Interviews with all three ground forces indicated that the risks of these operations were seen as outweighing the possible benefits, so the senior ground commanders elected to cancel the planned missions.” [3]

It is worth recalling that the Iraqi military in 2003 was broken.  Yet the decision of the UK, USA, and USMC commanders to cancel vertical envelopment operations against doctrine is profound.  Commanders curtailed attack helicopter operations, but even with these limitations, attack helicopters still suffered serious losses against an enemy with no effective air force, and no organized air defenses.

“During the course of the roughly 25 days of major combat operations up to the fall of Baghdad, the Army and Marine attack helicopter forces suffered considerable damage. Several aircraft were effectively destroyed, and many others (for example, 46 of 58 USMC Cobras) took battle damage, mostly from infantry-type weapons, such as machine guns, RPGs, and small arms fire.”[4]

How bad was the situation for attack helicopters?  On 23 March 2003, the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment was drawn into a fight where one AH-64 Apache was shot down, and all 31 Apaches in the regiment took various amounts of battle damage. Following the incident, PBS interviewed Thomas White, Secretary of the Army and asked him to comment:

“I was disappointed that we didn't do better.  I mean, this was an Apache [AH-64] raid. We have invested an enormous amount of resources in attack helicopter operations in the U.S. Army. [Emphasis added] … We were very fortunate we didn't lose more aircraft.”

We need to be frank about casualties - they are inevitable - the real question is value: combat effect versus the costs of alternative options.  By this metric, attack helicopters were unable to perform their doctrinal role and did not deliver the combat effectiveness that was expected of them during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 

It is now an open question how our rotary wing attack helicopter force would fare against a well led, well trained, well-motivated, force with effective weapons like the 2K22 Tunguska, which was designed to deal with threats like the AH-64 (see figure 2).[5]  Nor do we know how attack helicopters will fair when facing sophisticated artillery threats (modern multifunction fused tube or rocket artillery projectiles) employed en masse by our potential enemies.

 

Figure 2. The 2K22 Tunguska Anti-Aircraft System

                            Source: www.ausairpower.net

To re-state the situation, not only have attack helicopters proven to be costly, and less capable than fixed-wing tactical aircraft, they have proven ineffective and vulnerable.  In fact, if the justification for buying attack helicopters is for use as a middle-weight force (which I take to mean COIN and ground attack in permissive environments), then the USMC has not only purchased the most expensive, and least capable aircraft for the mission; it bought into a weapons platform that it was unwilling to employ per doctrine due to survivability concerns.

So what conclusion can we draw?  The U.S. Army is constrained by long-standing policies on fixed-wing tactical aircraft, but the Department of the Navy is unconstrained and is free to pursue better alternatives.  From a price performance ratio, an amphibious task force would be far better served with two, or three squadrons of fixed-wing aircraft like a 21^st century A-4, operating from an austere aircraft carrier (e.g. Midway class), than the current LHD/LHA with attack helicopters, and VSTOL jets.  Any shortfalls in cargo space could be addressed by other sealift (new AKA/LKA).  Someone will scream about the loss of vertical take-off and landing capability.  My response is: 1) a small carrier could conduct ground support flight operations to the limits of OMFTS – effectively the combat radius of the V-22; 2) the logistics/maintenance penalties of operating from FARPs will reduce sortie production to the extent that it is more effective to operate aircraft from ships; 3) if the ground force is operating so far inshore as to make carrier operations unfeasible, then fixed wing aircraft are capable of operating from improvised runways ashore (including dirt runways!); and 4) no rotary wing aircraft in production, or on the drawing boards, can keep up with the V-22.  

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Mr. Bustamante is a retired naval officer who served the majority of his career as a Naval Special Warfare Officer; he also served as a Surface Warfare Officer and Foreign Area Officer.  He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy with a degree in Systems Engineering.  He also holds a Master of Science degree in Defense Analysis (Operations Research) from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. After retiring from the Navy, Mr. Bustamante worked for the legislative branch as an auditor and analyst, as a civil servant with the United States Department of State, and also in the private sector as an analyst in information technology project management.

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[1] The key point for this discussion is that the Army argued successfully that the attack helicopter fulfilled its requirements for close air support, but the origin of the attack helicopter is entangled in the larger inter-service debate over air power, particularly as argued between the United States Army and Air Force.  The most extraordinary claims are made by proponents on both sides of the issue; the two best summaries avoiding the partisanship are: The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate, by Douglas N. Campbell, May 1, 2003; and Army-Air Force Relations: The Close Air Support Issue, Rand R-906-PR, 1971.

[2] MCWP 3-2 Aviation Operations articulates USMC doctrine on aviation to include attack helicopters; Field Manual No. 1-112 articulates Army doctrine on attack helicopters.  Significantly, the two services organize attack helicopters very differently.  The Army organizes, and emphasizes the employment of attack helicopters in battalions consisting of 24x AH-64 helicopters.  Typically two attack helicopter battalions are assigned to division and corps in aviation brigades.  The Army also emphasizes that its attack helicopter battalions, even when conducting independent battalion sized operations, are always employed to complement other maneuver forces.  Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HMLA) mix utility and attack helicopters in a squadron of 9x UH-1 and

12x AH-1 helicopters.

[3] Rand briefing DB472, “Assessment of Navy Heavy-Lift Aircraft Options,” page 87. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB472.pdf

[4] Rand briefing DB472, “Assessment of Navy Heavy-Lift Aircraft Options,” page 87.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB472.pdf

[5] In addition to RAND studies, readers desiring more information on helicopter survivability may wish to read the article: “Are Helicopters Vulnerable?” by Dr. Carlo Kopp, published in the March 2005 edition of Australian Aviation.

S-3 Viking Gunship

We’ve seen that the Marines are trying to create a poor man’s gunship out of their KC-130J Super Hercules tankers using the Harvest Hawk add-on kit.  The Marines are also toying around with turning the MV-22 into a mini-gunship.  So, can the Navy get in on this?  Maybe an E-2C/D Hawkeye gunship?  That probably wouldn’t be any sillier than what the Marines are doing but, just for fun, let’s take a look at a study that was done many years ago about turning an S-3 Viking into a gunship.  Taylor Emanuel did the study for his Naval Posgraduate School thesis (1).

To begin with, the author notes that organic fire support capability was being steadily reduced. 

“This study provides analysis that shows a huge reduction in expeditionary fire support capability. The Marine Corps has experienced a 45 percent reduction in cannon artillery, the loss of self-propelled artillery capability, and reductions in tactical aircraft. The Navy has decommissioned all battleship NSFS 16-inch gun platforms and mine threats coupled with limited littoral water depths will probably make NSFS 5-inch guns a non-factor.”

So, even back in the early 1990’s the trend of steadily shrinking fire support was obvious and this trend provides the foundation and justification for his examination of gunship options.  Interesting, isn’t it, that the author saw the inadequacy of the 5” gun for fire support long before the Navy opted to retreat to 25-50 miles offshore?  Those artillery reductions have only gotten worse and have been joined, now, by tank reductions.  The organic fire support situation has only gotten worse - far worse.

The author’s solution is to increase Close Air Support (CAS).

“To offset reductions in organic fire support, more frequent and sustained application of CAS and CAS/TIC [TIC = Troops in Contact]  will be required by joint expeditionary forces.”

He uses four measures of CAS to determine merit:

• target detection/recognition
• lethality
• survivability;
• combat persistence.

That’s not a bad group of measures for CAS.  Of course, just as important, or more so, is the direction of the battle – the ability of the pilot (or observer) to see, assess, and direct the battle.  However, that’s a function of training and doctrine and the author is focused on the platform so he can be forgiven this omission. 

Here is the author’s summary of desired characteristics.

“The sensor suite consists of a turret mounted forward looking infrared and low-light-level television to provide 360 degree battlefield coverage and to cover the entire electromagnetic spectrum. The weapons suite consists of one 25-MM Bushmaster chain gun for area suppression of personnel and use against light armor, one 30-MM Bushmaster II gun for destruction of vehicles and armored vehicles, and eight Hellfire missiles for hard-target kill and forward-firing, non-orbit firing capability. In addition, the platform will be survivable. It will have state-of-the-art self-defense capability coupled with armor plating and redundant systems. Finally, combat persistence will be good. The CBG [carrier based gunship] will be carrier-capable and have at least a 1,500 nautical mile range.”

The platforms that the author examines for CAS suitability are the E-2C, S-3, and V-22.  The specific relevant characteristics of the S-3 Viking in the gunship role are:

• High wing – minimize interference with weaponry
• Good range/endurance
• High speed
• Cabin height over 7 ft – allows full installation and operation of weapons
• Crew of 4 – would result in task saturation according to the author;  four is the minimum viable CAS crew size, according to the author
• Comprehensive sensor suite – FLIR and ISAR already part of the airframe
• High IR signature – means the aircraft would be susceptible to heat seeking weapons
• Low Radar signature – low on a relative basis, not compared to full stealth aircraft
• Good munitions load capacity
• Full weapons load
• 1x 25mm
• 2x 30mm
• 8x Hellfire

Gunship?

As the author points out, the Navy, and carrier groups, lack any real close air support.  As ComNavOps has pointed out, in a peer level assault the carrier's aircraft will be fully occupied trying to establish and maintain air control and protecting the carrier/amphib groups.  They will only sporadically be available for CAS, at best.  

The author’s thesis demonstrated that the S-3 offers the possibility of a dedicated CAS platform though it would not, of course, be as effective as a purpose designed, new aircraft.  Still it’s an interesting concept to think about and once again emphasizes the versatility of the S-3 which has operated in the ASW, ISR, maritime strike, ESM, tanker, and COD roles.  That’s a pretty impressive and versatile aircraft!

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(1)Taylor C. Emanuel, “Gunship Diplomacy: Carrier-Based Close Air Support For Joint Expeditionary Forces”, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, Dec 1994

Marine Harvest Hawk

If a policeman spends all day, day after day, year after year, helping old ladies cross the street, he eventually tends to forget that his main job is preventing crime, not being a crossing guard. 

Similarly, if the military spends all day, day after day, year after year, decade after decade, fighting very low end threats, they eventually tend to forget that their main job is to fight and win high end, high intensity wars.  The problem is that part of forgetting what their main job is, is the inevitable drift away from being high end combat capable.  They begin purchasing low end equipment, abandoning high end combat tactics and developing low end ones, shedding tanks and artillery in favor of light vehicles, researching non-lethal weapons, incorporating females into combat units out of a misguided emphasis on sociology instead of combat, buying patrol vessels for “presence” missions instead of warships, and so on.

The latest example is the Marine Corps’ move to convert their KC-130J Super Hercules cargo/transport/tankers into poor man’s gunships by adding the Harvest Hawk equipment.  As any professional soldier will tell you, there are never enough cargo/transport/tanker aircraft available for what needs to be done.  Converting such precious aircraft to second rate gunships is wasting a valuable platform. 

Risking such aircraft in a combat scenario is even dumber.  And for what?  The accuracy of the Harvest Hawk kit is marginal and the weapon load is small (Capability II is 4 Hellfires and 16 70mm rockets).  This add-on is not going to turn a KC-130J into an AC-130 Spectre gunship.

“… the lack of pinpoint-accurate, extreme-volume gunfire will be one of the principal differences between SOCOM’s AC-130s, and kit gunships like the KC-130Js or MC-130Ws.” (1)

The Marines envision additional capabilities being added over time.  Come on, haven’t we learned our lesson about never ending developmental costs?  If the Marines really want a gunship then buy an AC-130 and be done with it. 

It’s possible that there may be some utility for a poor copy of a gunship in the low end conflicts we seem mired in but I have to ask, “Why are we wasting valuable time, money, and resources developing questionable low end capabilities when the rest of the world is gearing up for high end combat?”  If we had no imminent high end threats (like Russia, China, NKorea, and Iran) flexing their muscles and gearing up for war then, sure, why not waste some time with yet another low end gimmick?  However, that’s not the case.  We’re in an arms race and possible countdown to war whether we want to acknowledge it or not.  We desperately need to develop supersonic cruise missiles, high end anti-ship missiles, intermediate range ballistic missiles, a naval air superiority fighter, a Bradley replacement, a new AAV-ish armored landing vehicle, and the list goes on.  What we don’t need is a Harvest Hawk gimmick that is going to tax already scarce aircraft and risk them in unnecessary low end combat.

Harvest Hawk - Poor Man's Gunship

Yeah, but, you say, we still have to deal with low end threats year after year and this Harvest Hawk can help us do that.  My answer to that is send an armored division to wherever the low end threat is and crush it.  Turn the division loose, exercise some serious explosive power, accept some collateral damage, and be done with it.  ISIS, for example, would be a one month live fire exercise for a WWII Gen. Patton and an armored division and there would be no threat left after a month.  Any collateral damage or civilian deaths would be far less in the long run than allowing ISIS to continue killing people day after day on a never ending basis.

You deal with low end threats by crushing them, not by allowing the threat to linger and developing gimmicks like Harvest Hawk that just perpetuate the threat.

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(1)http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/harvest-hawk-aims-to-arm-usmcs-kc-130j-aerial-tankers-05409/

What Might Have Been

What Might Have Been

An anonymous reader recently made a comment suggesting that the “B” model of the F-35 should have had different requirements and capabilities than it currently does.  Though he didn’t explicitly state it, the implication was that those differences would have led to a cheaper aircraft that would have been fielded sooner.

Note:  The reader commented anonymously.  I’d love to give proper credit which is why I encourage everyone to offer at least an informal username in the body of the comment text.

This is an intriguing idea and got me thinking about what the “B” should have been.

Let’s start with the most obvious consideration: the “B” is strictly for the Marines (I’m looking only at US application, now).  That means that, by definition, it’s not intended for air superiority, carrier group defense, deep strike, or maritime reconnaissance.  It’s intended for Marine ground support.  In other words, it’s intended to operate over a land battlefield.  That means that it doesn’t need exceptional speed, huge range (it will operate in close proximity to land forces), high degrees of stealth, exceptional maneuverability (I guess it achieved that one!), or 360 degree sensor fusion (let’s face it, that’s an A2A requirement).

What it did need was survivability to operate over a battlefield.  That survivability could take the form of armor, like the A-10, reduced size, reduced IR signature, enhanced ECM, redundant controls, and a moderate degree of stealth.  Stealth is only marginally useful in this role since the immediate low level battlefield threats are more IR and visual.

Another requirement should have been precision organic targeting.  Depending on external laser spotting, for example, is a very iffy proposition in high end combat.  The ground troops are going to be far too busy and pressured to conduct leisurely laser spotting.  The aircraft would need whatever onboard laser, IR, or visual targeting capability that could be had.  The ability to find and designate targets with minimal guidance from ground troops would be critical.

Hand in hand with onboard targeting should have been downward directed ISR.  Sensors designed to find and identify enemy troops, vehicles, armor, and artillery would be highly beneficial and would allow the aircraft to not only engage targets but guide friendly troop movements and strategy.  The ability to independently assemble a fairly comprehensive picture of the ground battle would be key.  JSTARS and similar aircraft have some of this capability so it’s not a total reach of fantasy.

All of this requires maximum endurance (time over target).  The ability to loiter and develop a ground picture and remain available for ground troops is paramount.  Passing overhead once at Mach 17 is nowhere near as useful as being able to loiter and develop an understanding of the ground situation and monitor changes over time.  That type of understanding would be of great benefit to the ground commander – perhaps more beneficial, even, then weapons on target.  This requirement further suggests consideration of a two seat aircraft allowing the backseater to develop the ground picture and coordinate with ground forces without having to be distracted by actually flying the aircraft.

Finally, the “B” should have had a significant weapons payload.  The weapons should have been a combination of high volume, suppressive fire like rockets as well as precision missiles like Hellfire and small guided bombs.

So, what does this give us when we assemble these requirements in one package?  It suggests that the F-35B should have been a fairly basic and straightforward airframe, possibly a two seater, possessing moderate stealth, great endurance, maximum IR signature reduction, armor and redundancy, and average speed and maneuverability.  It should have featured ground-directed sensing systems and the ability to interface with ground commanders.  Weapons should have been plentiful (maximum use of hardpoints since stealth would not be an emphasis) with a combination of precision and area suppressive munitions.  It should have had no emphasis on A2A beyond self-defense.

In short, the F-35B should have had far more in common with the A-10 than with the current F-35B.

Rolling In Hot

Breaking Defense website has a report on a Close Air Support (CAS) summit sponsored by the Air Force (1).  There were a few nuggets of information that reveal just how little interest the AF has in CAS.

"Carlisle [ed. Gen. Hawk Carlisle, head of Air Force Air Combat Command] told us “gaps” were spotted in training and to, some degree, in future equipment.

The biggest gap in Close Air Support right now, Carlisle told reporters, is the training CAS pilots currently have to operate in what the Air Force nicely calls “contested environments” — places where the enemy has a decent chance of shooting you down."

"Pilots have operated in uncontested environments over the last 13 years and haven’t had time to train for high-end operations, the general said."

The biggest gap in AF CAS is training for contested environments!?  Isn’t that kind of what CAS is all about – providing direct air support to ground forces at the front edge of the battlefield in what is, almost by definition, a contested environment?  That the AF is not providing that training pretty well indicates their level of commitment, or lack thereof, to CAS.  However, beating up on the AF about their lack of commitment to CAS, which has been a poorly kept secret for many years, is not the point of this post.  We’ll move on.

"... the three versions of the F-35 will, Carlisle noted, be the main CAS weapons operating in hot environments."

The F-35 is not even remotely an optimal platform for CAS.  That’s not even a debatable point and, again, that’s not the point of this post. 

Instead, for the sake of discussion, let’s accept the use of the F-35 in the CAS role.  What I want to look at is the F-35’s ability to provide gun support in CAS. 

What we currently have, in the A-10, is the GAU-8 30 mm Avenger rotary gun which carries and fires up to 1350 rounds of depleted uranium armor piercing shells at a rate of 3900 rounds per minute.  The gun is installed at a slight downward angle to assist in strafing runs.  Contrast that to the F-35’s gun system, the 25 mm, four barrel, 3300 round per minute, rotary GAU-22/A.

The A-10 projectiles weigh 13.3-14.0 oz, depending on type.  The F-35 projectiles weigh 6.5-7.5 oz.

The A-10 carries up to 1350 rounds compared to the F-35A which carries 182 rounds.  The F-35B/C do not have an internal gun.  They carry the gun in an external pod with a capacity of 220 rounds.  Of course, the external pod impacts the aircraft’s stealth.

So, we see that the A-10 has a larger gun with around 5 times the ammo capacity, firing depleted uranium shells that are twice the weight, from a gun that is mounted and optimized for ground attack, compared to the F-35 whose gun is, literally, an afterthought add-on for the Marines and Navy.  Anyone claiming that the F-35 is capable of performing the CAS role is playing loose with the facts.  The F-35 is capable of performing the gun support portion of the CAS role only in the sense that it has a gun that can be pointed at the ground.  In no other way is it capable or effective.  A man shooting a handgun from a glider can be claimed to perform CAS, too, I guess.

Of course, there is much, much more to CAS than just the ability to fire a gun at the ground.  There is also much more to it than just the characteristics of the CAS platform.  Training is paramount.  The understanding of ground force strategy and tactics, the understanding of where, when, and how to best support ground forces, the ability to effectively interface with ground controllers, knowledge of the local terrain, understanding of enemy forces and their movement, and so on are as important or more so than the weapon characteristics of a given platform.  There are also many more CAS weapons than just a gun and we won’t examine those today.

Today’s post simply points out the inadequacy of the F-35 gun system when used for CAS when compared to the A-10.  Combine that with the AF’s acknowledged lack of training and it’s obvious that anyone claiming the F-35 will adequately fill the CAS role is kidding themselves and their audience.

 (1) Breaking Defense, "Close Air Support Summit Sparks Nod To Textron’s Scorpion", Colin Clark,  March 09, 2015,

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/03/close-air-support-summit-sparks-nod-to-textrons-scorpion/

Assault Aviation Support

The Marine Corps has bet their future on becoming an expeditionary air force.  It’s a foolish path but that’s not the point of this post.  Instead, for the purpose of this discussion, let’s assume that the Marines will use their aviation assets primarily in an assault aviation support or close air support role, if you wish to use that phrase.  Thus, the Marines have fixed wing F-35s and some helos to provide support to their ground troops during an assault.  The Navy has gone along with that concept by building large deck amphibious ships including a couple of America class, aviation-only vessels.

It’s a good thing the Marines have their aviation capability and the Navy has built aviation-centric amphibious ships because we don’t have any shipboard gun bombardment capability to speak of, right?  Still, I wonder how useful air power will be in future assaults? 

Let’s set aside the fact that an assault against a peer will see most of the air assets devoted to protecting the fleet and struggling to establish even an aerial no-man’s land rather than conducting ground support.  Instead, let’s assume that we have helos and fixed wing aircraft available for ground support.  The question, then, is how useful will they be?  Everyone assumes that they will be vitally important – perhaps the key to the success of an assault.  Is that true, though?

Historically, air power used to support assaults has been used to provide suppressive effects and precision attacks against identified enemy targets.   However, over the last few decades, we’ve seen a movement away from area explosive effects (which is what suppressive effects are) in favor of precision attacks.  This movement is due to our obsession with minimizing collateral damage even at the risk of failing to achieve our objectives and failing to protect our own troops.  I’m not going to debate the wisdom of that in this post – it is what it is.  What does it mean, though?

It means that air power is going to be artificially constrained and, therefore, far less effective than it might be.  Let’s look at history to see if that statement is true.

The best example is probably the recent Israeli-Hamas conflict.  Israel essentially conducted an assault with total aerial supremacy and yet failed utterly to eliminate or even slightly suppress the Hamas rocket attacks.  Their air force was limited to occasional strikes against the odd target that could be identified.  For all practical purposes, the Israeli air force was ineffective, bordering on useless (setting aside the valuable surveillance capabilities).  Why?  Like us, the Israelis had an obsession with avoidance of collateral damage to the point of accepting daily, heavy rocket attacks on their country and assaults against their ground troops.

Consider the US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Air power was certainly useful when specific targets could be identified but, as a general statement, did not make any substantial difference in terms of ground support for the various assaults that were conducted. 

Consider the effectiveness of air power in Viet Nam when used in support of offensive operations.  It was nice to have.  It was occasionally helpful.  However, it was not, generally, the reason for success or failure of an assault operation.

Given our emphasis on avoidance of collateral damage, we have to recognize that aircraft can only attack targets which can be seen and positively identified.  History strongly suggests that only a very small fraction of an enemy’s forces can be so targeted.  That means that air power can only be employed sporadically which means that air power will not, indeed cannot, be a decisive factor in an assault.  Thus, we’re pursuing a fixed wing (F-35B) aircraft that will only be sporadically useful (at least, as a strike platform).  When we consider the aircraft, the carrier (LHA), and all the personnel and materiel required to operate and support them, it becomes obvious that a lot of resources and expense are being devoted to an asset with a fairly minimal benefit.

Finally, even if I’m completely wrong, can the half dozen or dozen F-35Bs that might be part of a MEU (or MEB or whatever) really make a significant difference?  The numbers are just too small.  Many people (and the Navy!) will casually state that Hornets or F-35C’s from the accompanying carrier will assist in the ground support, thereby vastly increasing the aircraft numbers.  Again, that’s just fantasy and wishful thinking.  In an assault against a peer, those aircraft will be completely occupied with fleet defense.

Can this situation change?  Can air power be a decisive factor in an assault?  The answer is, guardedly, yes but only if we alter our approach to combat and become willing to accept a significant degree of collateral damage and area effect explosives.  As I’ve said many times, our insistence on precision targeting and avoidance of collateral damage stems from a steady diet of police actions.  We’ve forgotten the reality of war.  We think we can conduct a non-destructive, non-lethal war.  The reality is that war against a peer will involve massive, widespread, and indiscriminate damage and destruction.  We need to relearn, now, how that applies to an amphibious assault or we will pay a steep price in blood to relearn it later.

The next, obvious, lesson from this is that we need a source of area explosives that is available round the clock, is available regardless of weather, is immune to enemy air defenses, is available whether we control the skies or not, and is available in sustained amounts.  Of course, what we’re describing is naval bombardment.  But, that’s another, though closely related, topic.

So, is ComNavOps arguing against air power in an assault?  Of course not!  Air power will be vitally important but not as a surrogate for naval gunfire and not as a decisive ground support element.  Instead, air power’s role should be protection of the assault fleet, establishment of local aerial control to allow relatively unhindered movement of helos, and surveillance.

Air power should function to protect and enable naval gunfire on a massive scale.  Unfortunately, naval gunfire is non-existent.  Hence, aircraft are being pressed into a role for which they are ill-suited.  Even if aircraft were effective as substitutes for naval gunfire, every aircraft so tasked is an aircraft that is unavailable for fleet defense which, against a peer defender, will be a task that requires every aircraft we can muster and then some.

The Navy/Marine assault force needs to re-examine their own doctrine, recognize the gaps, and begin filling those gaps with the proper equipment.