Air Force Follows Navy Playbook for A-10

You probably know that the Air Force has attempted to kill the A-10 Warthog, the best close air support aircraft ever built, for many years now but has been repeatedly thwarted by Congress.
 
The Navy faced a similar situation with the Ticonderoga class cruisers.  They attempted to early retire them, multiple times, only to be thwarted by Congress.  The Navy’s solution was to agree to a blatantly bogus “modernization” program which, in reality, was a way to remove funding for the cruisers while they literally rotted pier side until the Navy could claim that they could no longer be economically upgraded.
 
Like the Navy, the Air Force has, yet again, been prevented by Congress from retiring the A-10 but, ignoring the intent of Congress, has settled on the tactic of simply no longer funding the operation, maintenance, and support of the A-10.  As Redstate website reports,
 

… by the end of this year, the A-10 will be without depot support, without a training pipeline, without weapons-school instruction, and without operational-test capacity.[1]

With no funding for support, the aircraft  will rapidly fall into unflyable status.  The Air Force will have, technically, kept the A-10 but will have achieved practical retirement.
 
Congress should fire every Air Force general and withhold all Air Force funding until A-10 support is restored.
 
The military seems to feel it is above the will of Congress.  It is past time for Congress to re-exert its authority.
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Act Now: Fund A-10 Warthog or Lose Combat Power Forever”,  Ward Clark, 24-Jun-2026,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2026/06/24/act-now-fund-a-10-warthog-or-lose-combat-power-forever-n2203670

Weakly Built Ships

ComNavOps has long stated that the Navy is building its ships weaker and weaker with each succeeding ship class. 

 

The Burkes, our top of the line, front line combat vessel, for example, required strengthening strakes to deal with normal sailing conditions. 

 

The Freedom class LCS had its flight deck weakened as a cost savings measure early in the design and construction process. 

 

The Freedom class LCS suffers from excessive vibration due to insufficient structural strength which has led to Mk 110 (57 mm) gun accuracy issues. 

 

The latest example is a Navy Times report that Independence class ships are suffering structural cracking which is forcing them to adopt restricted operating envelopes.[2]  From the USS Omaha Temporary Standing Order Number 073,

 

NAVSEA assessed LCS 4-28 have under-designed structural defects at FR 35, 36, and 46.  Metal fatigue is assessed to be caused from stresses in the lateral and vertical plane.  To limit crack propagation;  speed and sea state restrictions are imposed.

 

Ship operations restricted to 15 kts in Sea State (SS) 4 (max significant wave height 2.5 m/8.2 ft, avoiding bow and beam seas as far as practicable. … No operation in SS 5 or greater.[1,2]

 

Those are some pretty severe restrictions and negate the ship’s usefulness as a warship … to the extent that it had any to begin with.

 

Hull Cracks From Normal Sailing

The ship’s crew have been instructed to monitor crack growth daily when sailing.

 

The Navy has been steadily and unwisely weakening the structural strength of its ships, presumably as an ill-advised cost savings measure.  Of course, the use of aluminum doesn't help matters.  These kinds of measures always come back to bite the Navy in the butt.

 

There has been a mini-flurry of LCS problem admissions recently and the extent of the LCS problems is surprising even me.  This was truly a disaster of a program.  The fact of the matter, however, is that all the problems were self-inflicted by the Navy so there is no sympathy to be had.

 

Bear in mind that the Navy has announced that they are going to retire, essentially, the entire Freedom class, keeping the Independence variant.  However, it’s the Independence variant that is showing this class wide cracking problem and that will be forced to operate under severe limitations.  Is keeping a known crippled ship class really a wise decision?

 

The LCS main strength and most important characteristic [3], arguably, was its speed.  The entire ship was built around that single requirement.  Now, the class is limited to slow speed and mild seas.  The entire rationale for the ship’s design is now invalidated … if it wasn’t already.

 

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

[1]USS Omaha (LCS 12) Temporary Standing Order Number 073, 8-Jul-2021

 

[2]Navy Times, “The littoral combat ship’s latest problem: Class-wide structural defects leading to hull cracks”, Geoff Ziezulewicz, 10-May-2022,

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2022/05/10/the-littoral-combat-ships-latest-problem-class-wide-structural-defects-leading-to-hull-cracks/

 

[3]The other characteristic that could be argued to have been the main design feature was the module swapping ability.  Of course, that has long since been found unworkable and has been abandoned.

Another Nail In The LCS Coffin

The LCS has failed on so many levels that it’s no longer even noteworthy when new failures are identified.  However, I’d like to document one more new failure, not because of the failure itself, but because of lessons behind it.

 

 

The Failure :   It’s Loud !

 

The failure is the ASW capability of the LCS.  As you know, the Navy has officially abandoned the LCS ASW effort (see, “Stunning LCS News”).  Without revisiting the entire sordid history of the LCS ASW module development effort, suffice it to say that the initial ASW module concept was totally abandoned and then subsequent versions attempted to fill the void, with no success.  Now, we hear that LCS ASW efforts were doomed to failure by an inherent characteristic of the LCS ship, itself.  From CNO Gilday,

 

First of all, the ASW Modules just didn’t pan out; the VDS [Variable Depth Sonar] didn’t work as it should.  LCS is as noisy as an aircraft carrier and so there are some big challenges there that we should have [picked] up on way earlier.[1]

 

This is saying that the LCS self-noise is so loud that it negated the successful use of ship sonars, whether towed, hull mounted, or variable depth (VDS).  Where is the noise coming from?  The water jets, of course!  This is not something new.  I’ve been pointing out that the LCS is a deafening acoustic beacon for years.

 

What did you say?  I can't hear you!

Was this really a surprise to Admiral Gilday?  Apparently so.  He says that the Navy should have picked up on this ‘way earlier’.  Come on, admiral.  Are you really so ignorant about ASW that you didn’t realize that deafening water jets would be a detriment to ASW operations?  You and all the CNOs before you should be ashamed that you allowed this pile of hot, steaming LCS to continue.  You knew better and yet you went right along with it.  You’re complicit along with the rest.  If you had any integrity, you’d resign in shame.  But you don’t … and you won’t.

 

 

Lessons

 

Okay, so much for beating up the LCS about yet another problem.  I mentioned that I wanted to highlight this because of the lessons underlying the problem.  Those lessons are:

 

Foresight / Hindsight – It’s far too easy to excuse the LCS personnel for not seeing the various problems except in hindsight.  This, however, is completely false.  Almost every LCS problem was readily recognizable from day one.  In this specific case, anyone contemplating ASW operations for the LCS should have stopped the development effort on day one and pointed out that water jets were problematic.  Hindsight is not an excuse.  Foresight was readily available and there was no end of naval analysts pointing out these problems. 

 

The lesson is that we need to listen to foresight.  Again, almost every LCS problem was readily apparent on day one of the program.  If the Navy is too inept to see the problems with foresight then they should listen to the crowd … the large, deafening crowd that saw all this from the start.

 

Modularity Versus Optimization – ComNavOps has long decried the concept of modularity (see “The Myth of Modularity”), as attempted by the LCS.  The very concept is fundamentally and foundationally flawed.  Modules cannot compensate for a platform that is not exquisitely integrated and optimized for whatever the function is and this is a perfect example.  No ASW module can compensate for a host ship that is, inherently, a deafening acoustic beacon.  Modularity, by definition, produces sub-optimal, mediocre platforms.  Modularity is a fool’s dream born of a business case rather than a combat case.

 

 

The LCS should have died at the napkin stage.

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]Naval News website, “Admiral Gilday Explains LCS ASW And MCM Module Decisions”, Peter Ong, 5-May-2022,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/05/admiral-gilday-explains-lcs-asw-and-mcm-module-decisions/

I’m Blind … Or Lying

The Navy is attempting to retire large numbers of ships in a misguided effort to increase funding for unmanned vessels and other nonsensical items.  In particular, the Navy has been trying for many years to retire the Aegis cruisers, the world’s most capable and powerful warships.  After being repeatedly rebuffed by Congress, the Navy settled on the ploy of allowing the ships to sit pier side and, literally, rust away and then claim that it would cost too much to upgrade them.  Now, the Navy is going a step further and outright lying to Congress.  CNO Gilday had this to say to the House Armed Services Committee about the Aegis cruiser retirement requests:

 

 “The older SPY radars can’t see the threat. If they can’t see it, they can’t shoot it down.”[1]

 

So, according to the admiral, Aegis/SPY-1 ‘can’t see the threat’.  Really?  Aegis originated the motto,

 

‘If it flies, it dies’.

 

Was that a lie? 

 

The threats haven’t changed all that much since Aegis/SPY was first introduced.  The threat was missiles back then and today the threat is … ah … missiles.  Yes, stealth has come along but that affects all radars not just Aegis/SPY radars.

 

Ah … here’s a thought … don’t the Burkes use the same SPY-1 radar, albeit a slightly different version (-D versus –A/B).  Is the version difference so great that Burkes are front line warships capable of seeing every threat and yet Ticonderogas are blind barges, unfit for even harbor patrol?  Or, is Gilday lying to get what he wants which is to retire the cruisers?

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Breaking Defense website, “Decommissioned ship funds would go towards buying missiles, Navy says”, Aaron Mehta, 11-May-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/decommissioned-ship-funds-would-go-towards-buying-missiles-navy-says/

Navy 30 Year Shipbuilding Plan

After ignoring the law for the last few years and not providing Congress with an annual, 30 year shipbuilding plan as mandated in Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code, the Navy has finally delivered a plan to Congress.  The Navy’s blatant and illegal disregard for the law is both appalling and criminal although, disappointingly, no criminal penalties are specified in the legislation.  But, I digress …

 

Let’s take a look at the plan.

 

The first thing that jumps out is that the Navy couldn’t even come up with a plan.  Instead, they’ve submitted a group of three alternative shipbuilding paths.  Two are predicated on constant shipbuilding budgets in terms of real growth and one is predicated on substantial real growth.  Apparently, despite taking multiple years to produce this plan, the Navy couldn’t even settle on a single plan.  So, instead of a plan we have nebulous optional paths.  That’s pathetic that our professional warriors couldn’t even map out a shipbuilding plan.  Instead, they’ve opted for options, presumably, so as to avoid having to commit to an actual plan.  There’s no responsibility if there’s no actual plan, is there?  Way to avoid responsibility, Navy.

 

All three plans share a common first five years (2023-27, the so called Five Year Defense Plan or FYDP period).  Since the out years (beyond the five year FYDP period) are just pure fiction, let’s take a look at the five year FYDP period.

 

 

FYDP

 

New Construction

 

Per Table A1-2 in the plan, the FYDP period calls for the construction of 50 new ships (32 combat vessels plus 3 SSBN plus 15 logistics and support vessels).  That’s an average of 10 new vessels per year.  The new construction type breakdown is:

 

Decommissionings by year:

 

2023  24

2024  13

2025  13

2026  14

2027  13

 

Total  77

 

That's an average of over 15 per year versus the construction rate of 10 per year.

Of the decommissionings, 31 of the 77 will be early retirements.

 

The retirements include, among others, 2 carriers (Nimitz, Eisenhower), 17 Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers, 11 LCS (9 Freedom and 2 Independence), the entire remaining Avenger class MCM vessels, 10 of the remaining 11 Whidbey Island and Harper’s Ferry class LSDs which carry the bulk of our LCAC landing craft and well deck capacity, 3 of the 4 SSGNs which are the most potent offensive assets in the Navy, 7 Henry J. Kaiser class T-AO oilers, and assorted other logistic and support ships.

 

So, over the next five years we’re decommissioning 77 ships and building 50 new ones for a net decrease of 27 ships.  Anyone see a problem, here?

 

Unmanned

 

Here’s the Navy vision for unmanned vessels:

 

… unmanned platforms will achieve 89-149 platforms in FY2045 … [1, p.8]

 

As you can see, with no proof of concept, the Navy has already committed to a significant portion of the fleet being small, unmanned vessels.

 

 

Sealift Capacity

 

The report cites a current requirement for 85 sealift ships versus a current inventory of 71 ships for a net deficit of 14 ships.  The Navy plans to address the deficit by acquiring 22 used ships for conversion to sealift at a total cost of $1.011B (average $46M per ship).

 

 

Summary

 

The plan random paths offered by the Navy paint a clear picture of a Navy that is floundering, unable to even offer a coherent, single plan.  We are retiring, and will continue to retire, ships at twice the rate we’re building new ones.  Worse, the ships we’re shedding are large and powerful and are being numerically replaced by small, nearly defenseless, unmanned vessels.  As we’ve demonstrated in previous posts, the Navy VLS inventory is going to shrink drastically along with a shortfall of submarines.

 

This so-called 30 year plan is both a joke and a horrifying nightmare demonstration of incompetence on a scale that leads to the inexorable conclusion that our nation’s maritime security is in great danger.

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023”, Apr-2022

 

JHSV Update

When the Spearhead class transports (Joint High Speed Vessel, JHSV; now referred to as Expeditionary Fast Transports, EPF) came into the Navy, ComNavOps severely criticized them for lacking any useful mission or purpose.  As you recall, the JHSV was intended to be a fast intra-theater transport and was to be operated by civilian crews under the Military Sealift Command.  Unfortunately, as reported by DOT&E, problems have plagued the class.[2]

 

Joint High Speed Vessel - No Mission, No Purpose, No Need

See the following posts for background information, issues, and concerns:

 

“JHSV”

 

“More JHSV”

 

“JHSV Update”

 

“Joint High Speed Vessel Missions”

 

DOT&E Report:  “Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) Report”

 

 

Now, some 10 years later, ComNavOps’ concerns about the lack of a mission have been validated. 

 

The twelve Spearhead Class Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) currently in the battle fleet have enormous potential, but these small “theatre” transports have failed to capture the imagination of fleet sponsors. They’re not getting integrated into innovative day-to-day operations, and the Military Sealift Command hates the cost of maintaining these underutilized and poorly understood auxiliaries.[1]

 

Now, the Navy is quietly semi-retiring the vessels after less than ten years service.

 

Last year, two of the fast transports, the nine-year-old USNS Spearhead (T-EPF-1) and the seven-year-old USNS Fall River (T-EPF-4), were consigned effectively to the scrapyard, placed in an ignominious “Reduced Operating Status 45.” Reduced Operating Status 45—where the ship needs 45 days to get underway after an activation order—is the maximum amount of time a ship can be placed in reduced operating status and still remain “counted” as an active member of the battle fleet.

 

Rumors suggest that all the Spearhead Class Expeditionary Fast Transports outside of the yet-to-be-built medical variants may well be on the budget chopping block this year and consigned to storage status.[1]

 

This is, now, the third instance of the Navy [very] early retiring ships/classes that just a few years ago were claimed to be revolutionary and vital to the future of naval combat and dominance:

 

• LCS
• Mobile Landing Platform (MLP;  now referred to as Expeditionary Transfer Dock, ESD)
• Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV; now referred to as Expeditionary Fast Transports, EPF)

 

How can multiple ships/classes be so vital and then so useless in just a matter of a few years?  It all goes back to the complete lack of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  None of these classes had a CONOPS, none had a mission, and now they’re being dumped due to the lack of a mission.

 

How many times do I have to say it?  You can’t build a successful ship design without first developing a detailed CONOPS.

 

How many times can the Navy make the same mistake before they start paying attention to CONOPS before design?

 

How many abject failures can the Navy have before Congress starts removing Navy leaders?

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Forbes website, “The 2023 Defense Budget May Sink More Navy Ships Than Pearl Harbor”, Craig Hooper, 22-Mar-2022,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2022/03/22/the-2023-defense-budget-may-sink-more-navy-ships-than-pearl-harbor/?sh=2318eab61fbe

 

[2]DOT&E, “Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) Report”, Sep-2015,

https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Science_and_Technology/16-F-0250_(REPORT)_Follow-On_Operational_Test_and_Evaluation_(FOT&E)_Report_on_the_Joint_High_Speed_Vessel_(JHSV).pdf

Massive FY23 Ship Retirements

The Navy just announced that it wants to retire 24 ships next year (FY23).

 

The Navy wants to decommission 24 ships in the upcoming fiscal year to save $3.6 billion over the next five years, the service announced today.[1]

 

The planned retirements are:

 

• 9x Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships
• 5x Ticonderoga-class cruisers
• 2x Los Angeles-class submarines
• 4x Landing Dock Ships
• 2x oilers
• 2x Expeditionary Transfer Docks.

 

We noted in the previous post that the LCS were being retired in large part because of the now official failure of the ASW module.

 

“They also do happen to be Freedom class, which also happens to have the drive train challenge. But if I were to be completely transparent, that drivetrain fix isn’t an exorbitant amount of money,” Gumbleton [Navy deputy assistant secretary for budget Rear Adm. John Gumbleton] added, referring to the 9 LCS. “But when you target your savings at one variant, there’s savings programmatically instead of having to sustain two different lines. So, collectively, ASW [and] drive train, led us to this.”[1]

 

And yet,

 

Asked about decommissioning the 9 LCS, Meredith Berger, who is currently performing the duties of the under secretary of the Navy, said doing so allows the Navy to “free ourselves of some really costly repairs and maintenance.”[1]

 

Are the Admiral and the Under Secretary on the same page?  One says that the drivetrain fix isn’t that expensive and the other says it will be really costly.  Get your stories straight, people!  You’re looking like the morons you are.

 

Are all those 24 ships past their service lives and ready for retirement?

 

Sixteen of those 24 ships have not yet reached the end of their service lives, meaning the Navy will need to ask for waivers, Gumbleton noted.[1]

 

What is with this insane pattern of early retiring ships?  I hope all you naval observers who keep calling for 40+ year service life ships with future proofing and upgrade capabilities built in are grasping this.  All you people who keep arguing against my proposal to build ships with a 10-20 yr service life need to reconcile this reality with your fantasies.

 

The Expeditionary Transfer Docks are the former Mobile Landing Platforms which the Navy assured us were absolutely vital to amphibious assaults.  There are two MLPs, the Montford Point and John Glenn, and they completed trials in 2013 and 2014, respectively, which makes them 10 yrs old and 9 yrs old in 2023.  Another nail in the coffin of amphibious assault.  Which begs the question, why are we continuing to build America class amphibious assault vessels and why are we continuing to operate amphibious assault ships?

 

Didn’t we just do a post that discussed the Navy’s belief that we will have a war with China in the next 8 years?  And we’re still retiring ships as fast as we can?  That’s more insanity!

 

In FY23, we’re retiring 24 ships but we’re only building 9.[1]  Can anyone do the math on that?  It’s over my head and, apparently, the Navy’s!

 

Here’s the Navy’s new construction request for 2023:

 

• 2x Arleigh Burke class Flight III destroyers
• 2x Virginia class submarines
• 1x Constellation class frigate
• 1x San Antonio class amphibious transport dock
• 1x America class amphibious assault ship
• 1x John Lewis class oiler
• 1x Navajo class towing, salvage and rescue ship

 

Ignoring counting the tugboat as a warship, that’s 8 new ships while retiring 24.

 

Again, tell me why we’re early retiring the Mobile Landing Platforms while building America  and San Antonio class amphibious ships?  Are we in the amphibious assault business or not?

 

We retire two oilers and build one.  Again, someone do the math on that.

 

The Navy’s own projections call for a decrease in fleet size from 297 ships in 2022 to 280 in 2027.  Ah … is that the direction we want to go when we’re expecting a war with China in the next 8 years?  Also, bear in mind those numbers hold only if Congress gives the Navy everything it wants for new construction.  Any markdowns will make the drop in fleet size even more pronounced.

 

Regarding budgets and fleet size,

 

Gumbleton said the request accounts for inflation, with five percent “real growth” for the Navy … [1]

 

So, a five percent real growth in the Navy budget results in a 5.4% drop in fleet size.  The budget goes up and the fleet size goes down.  Ah, Mr. Gumbleton, are you sure you’re getting your money’s worth from the budget? 

 

Before we close this bit of insanity theater out, there’s one more entry:

 

For personnel, the Navy projects cutting about 10,000 sailors between FY 2023 and FY 2027.[1]

 

Didn’t we just do a post about the Navy being short several thousand at-sea billets?  Yes, we did!  See, “At-Sea Billet Gaps”.  So, the solution is to cut 10,000 sailors?  Math, please … anyone?

 

The Chinese could not do to our Navy what we’re doing to it ourselves.

 

Some of you think I’m too hard on our Navy idiots leaders.  Still think so?

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “FY 23 Budget: Navy Wants to Shed 24 Ships for $3.6B in Savings Over Next Five Years”, Mallory Shelbourne, 28-Mar-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/03/28/fy-23-budget-navy-wants-to-shed-24-ships-for-3-6b-in-savings-over-next-five-years

2022 Ship Retirements

China is outbuilding the US in terms of warships.  That means their fleet is growing faster than ours.  However, we’re making a bad situation worse by retiring ships at a far greater rate than we’re building new ones.  Here’s the Navy’s FY22 Retirement List[1,2] with each ship’s service life shown.

 

USS San Jacinto (CG 56), 34 yrs

USS Lake Champlain (CG 57), 34 yrs

USS Monterey (CG 61), 32 yrs

USS Hue City (CG 66), 31 yrs

USS Anzio (CG 68), 30 yrs

USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), 29 yrs

USS Port Royal (CG 73), 28 yrs

 

USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), 10 yrs

USS Coronado (LCS 4), 8 yrs

USS Detroit (LCS 7), 6 yrs

USS Little Rock (LCS 9), 5 yrs

 

USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), 37 yrs

 

USS Providence (SSN 719), 37 yrs

USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723), 34 yrs

 

USNS Apache (T-ATF 172), 41 yrs

 

 

We’re retiring 15 ships[3] that are all capable and most have service life remaining.  These retirements are unnecessary.  Their replacements – the few that will be – are going to be small, unmanned craft, generally speaking, with an occasional obsolete Burke or Constellation thrown in.  We are, quite literally, cutting our own naval throats.

 

As we predicted, the Navy is looking to quietly retire the LCS class.  By the end of 2022, six LCS will have been retired or designated for retirement, all with ten or fewer years of service. 

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]Defense Brief website, 18-Jun-2021,

https://defbrief.com/2021/06/18/here-are-all-the-ships-the-us-navy-plans-to-retire-and-buy-in-fy2022/

 

[2]https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jun/17/2002744915/-1/-1/0/PB22%20SHIPBUILDING%20PLAN%20JUNE%202021_FINAL.PDF/PB22%20SHIPBUILDING%20PLAN%20JUNE%202021_FINAL.PDF

 

[3]The two Los Angeles class submarine retirements had been previously announced or reclassified in 2021 and have been designated for scrapping/recycling in 2022.

Carrier Retirement Rationale

Much is being made of the Navy’s “plan” to forego the USS Truman’s midlife refueling and overhaul (RCOH) and retire the Nimitz class carrier decades early.  ComNavOps has stated that it’s just a ploy by the Navy to get additional funding from Congress.  However, for sake of discussion, let’s take the Navy at face value and see if their rationale holds up.

There appear to be two ?related? reasons being offered by the Navy for early retiring the carrier:  money and survivability.

Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan made the hard call to retire the USS Truman decades early — cutting the Navy’s carrier fleet by nine percent — to free up funding for new weapons more likely to survive a war with China. (1)

So, the Navy sees the carrier as not being survivable in a future war with China and wants more funding for weapons that it believes will be more effective.

What are the projected savings from retiring the carrier?

Not refueling the nuclear reactor core of the USS Truman would save the roughly $6.5 billion it would have cost to overhaul, plus $1 billion a year in operating costs thereafter, at the price of retiring the carrier about 25 years early. (1)

These savings figures are highly suspect but, again, let’s take them at face value.  After all, the Navy wouldn’t lie to us, right? 

So, what would be done with these savings?  The Navy/military would acquire new types of weapons supposedly better suited to future combat.  These weapons would include,

...large numbers of smaller, robotic vessels, both small surface ships and mini-submarines … a mix of robotic scout ships … and unmanned missile boats … arsenal of long-range, precision-guided, non-nuclear missiles …  hypersonic missiles … (1)

All right, we’ve laid out the Navy’s rationale.  Now, let’s examine the logic of it.

Survivability – If the Navy believes carriers are not survivable then why are we not retiring more carriers given how expensive they are to operate?   More to the point, why are we building new carriers?  The Navy’s position, as they’ve laid it out, appears to be:  “Our carriers aren’t survivable so let’s build more of them.” 

Let’s take it a step further.  If carriers aren’t survivable, does it make more sense to lose $1B-$8B (the construction cost range of the Nimitzes from first to last) as each is sunk or to lose $15B which is the cost of the Fords that the Navy wants to continue to build?  Wouldn’t it be better to let China sink cheaper, older carriers instead of brand new, hideously expensive carriers?

I’m beginning to think that the logic of survivability does not support the Navy’s rationale.

Money – Here’s where it gets tricky because you can make almost any case you want by manipulating what is and is not considered.  Still, let’s give it a look.

The Navy wants to retire a carrier so as to save money that can then be used to finance new, alternate weapon systems.  Okay, how much money is really being saved?  Using the Navy’s own, suspect figures,

Truman Savings
Refuel/Overhaul*	$6B
Operating Cost at $1B x 25 yrs	$25B
Total Savings	$31B
*Published costs range from $4B-$7B, depending on what is included in the figure.

That’s a lot of money!  No wonder they want to retire a carrier early.  Hmm …  Just for shits and giggles, I wonder how much money the Navy could save if, instead, they simply didn’t build a Ford?

Ford Savings
Construction	$15B
Midlife Overhaul*	$2B
Operating Cost at $1B x 50 yrs**	$50B
Total Savings	$67B
*A carrier intended to operate for 50 years will still need a midlife overhaul even if its reactor does not need refueling. ** Presumably, the operating costs will be the same but the lifespan will be double that of the Truman.  Reduced personnel costs will be offset by greater complexity and maintenance costs.  Manning will, undoubtedly increase as it did for the LCS and will for the Zumwalt.  Costs will probably be a wash, in the end.

Wow, I thought the Truman savings was a lot of money but simply not building one Ford would save over twice as much! 

Wait a minute …  If foregoing a Ford would save twice as much money shouldn’t the Navy want to keep the Truman and drop a Ford?

I’m beginning to think that the logic of the money savings does not support the Navy’s rationale.

Well, there you have it.  Even accepting the Navy’s rationale and cost figures at face value, the scenario is illogical.

I’m beginning to think the Navy has concocted a nonsensical scenario in a transparent attempt to extort more budget funds from Congress.  No.  No, wait.  I apologize.  The Navy has the utmost integrity and is the most honest and transparent organization this proud nation has.  The Navy’s leaders have nothing but the good of America foremost in their hearts and minds.  So, despite the illogic, I’ll place all my trust in the Navy.  Go get ‘em, Navy!  Stick to your guns, do the illogical, and make me proud!

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(1)Breaking Defense, “Why DoD Cut A Carrier in 2020 Budget: Survivable Robots & Missiles Vs. China ”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 12-Mar-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/why-cut-a-carrier-to-fund-survivable-robots-missiles-vs-china/

Carrier Truman Early Retirement

The Internet is abuzz with the reports that the Navy plans to skip the carrier Truman’s 2024 mid-life refueling and overhaul (RCOH) and then retire the ship around 20-25 years early (2).  I’m sure regular readers expect ComNavOps to go off on a rant but the reality is that this is a big to-do about nothing.  The Navy is just playing budget games.  They have no intention of skipping Truman’s refueling/overhaul and retiring the ship. 

You’ll recall that the Navy made exactly this ‘threat’ just prior to the Washington’s 2016 (delayed until 2017) RCOH.  The result?  Congress allocated more money for the Navy.  What a surprise.  And now, the Navy is once again floating the idea of retiring the next carrier due up for refueling.  What a surprise.  This is just a transparent attempt to get more money from Congress.

Consider a few factors that demonstrate the fraudulent nature of this threat:

Supposed Savings – Supposedly, an early retirement would save several billion dollars in overhaul costs plus twenty some years of operating costs for a total of, perhaps, $30B spread over the 20-30 years of the carrier’s projected remaining lifespan.  These savings figures are inflated but, even so, represent only around $1B per year – almost peanuts by Pentagon standards.  If the Navy were serious about cutting costs they’d scrap the worthless LCS and all its manning and operating costs … but they haven’t so this is just another budget game.

Law – The Navy is bound by law to maintain 11 operational carriers (1).  Congress doesn’t need to do anything in response to the Navy’s threat because the Navy can’t legally retire the carrier.  It’s an empty threat.

Precedent – Retiring a carrier early would be all the precedent and motivation that Congress would need to institute punitive budget cuts and flag officer cuts, neither of which the Navy will risk.  Again, retiring a carrier is an empty threat.

Air Wings – This entire issue is almost irrelevant since we only have 9 air wings anyway.  So, whether we have 10 carriers or 11 is a moot point since we can only supply 9 carriers with aircraft.

The Navy is already getting the reaction it wants which is Congressional outrage.

Top lawmakers are blasting the Pentagon’s decision to retire one of the Navy's 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier two decades early, with one prominent Senator calling the move “mind-boggling.” (3)

The next step in the Navy’s plan is for Congress to pony up more money for the Navy.  I can almost hear the Navy’s Admirals snickering behind their closed doors.

Although the threat to early retire a carrier is just a budget game and Congress doesn’t need to take any action, they should take action – they should fire CNO Richardson for attempting to blackmail Congress.  This kind of action by the Navy is reprehensible and despicable.  CNO Richardson and the Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer, who obviously approved this blackmail attempt, must be fired.

Come on, Congress.  It’s past time to remind the Navy that they work for you, not the other way around.

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(1)Title 10 › Subtitle C › Part I › Chapter 507 › § 5062: (b)The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers. For purposes of this subsection, an operational aircraft carrier includes an aircraft carrier that is temporarily unavailable for worldwide deployment due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.

(2)Breaking Defense website, “Pentagon To Retire USS Truman Early, Shrinking Carrier Fleet To 10 ”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 27-Feb-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/02/pentagon-to-retire-uss-truman-early-shrinking-carrier-fleet-to-10/

(3)Breaking Defense website, “Carrier Cutback Plan ‘Mind Boggling’: Sen. Kaine”, Paul McLeary, 1-Mar-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/carrier-cutback-plan-mind-boggling-sen-kaine/

Aegis Cruiser Retirement Schedule

As you know, the Navy has tried for several years to eliminate the Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers before their service life is even up.  The reason for this is a baffling mystery other than the Navy’s constant fixation on new hulls, no matter how useless (looking at you, LCS).

Congress has, thus far, thwarted the Navy’s efforts which has led the Navy to concoct a scheme of de facto retirements whereby Aegis cruisers are placed into “modernization” for multiple years and will only be brought back into the fleet on a one-for-one replacement for decommissioned cruisers.

Here is the retirement schedule for the Aegis cruisers and their service length at that point. (1)

Year      Ship                           Service Yrs

2020  Mobile Bay         33

2020  Bunker Hill        34

2021  Antietam           34

2021  Leyte Gulf         34

2022  San Jacinto        34

2022  Lake Champlain     34

2024  Philippine Sea     35

2024  Princeton          35

2025  Normandy           36

2025  Monterey           35

2026  Chancellorsville   37

You’ll note that the service life retirement ages do not agree with the recent ship service life extensions that have the Ticonderogas serving 42-52 years!  I guess we’ll ignore that little inconsistency since the service life extensions were nothing but wishful thinking anyway.

This accounts for 11 of the 22 Aegis cruisers.  The remainder will have undergone the “modernization” and displace the ships listed above.  Presumably, after 2026 the “modernized” cruisers will be retired in short order.  This is not at all what Congress intended.  Once again, the Navy has found a way around Congressional intent and direction.

The Navy is continuing to push to put around half the class into a reduced operating status but Congress’ earlier resistance and distrust continues.  Recall Congress’ earlier feelings,

Lawmakers made clear in hearings last year that they didn’t trust Navy leadership to bring the ships back into the fleet once they were taken out of service, particularly in bulk quantities. (2)

For the time being, the 2/4/6 plan remains in effect

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(1)Defense News website, “The US Navy will start losing its largest surface combatants in 2020”, David B. Larter, 8-Oct-2017,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/10/09/the-us-navy-will-start-losing-its-largest-surface-combatants-in-2020/

(2)USNI News website, “FY 2017 Budget: Navy Wants to Modernize Last 7 Cruisers Instead of Following 2/4/6 Directive from Congress”, Megan Eckstein, 9-Feb-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/02/09/fy-2017-budget-navy-wants-to-modernize-last-7-cruisers-instead-of-following-246-directive-from-congress