You’ll recall that the Navy made exactly this ‘threat’ just
prior to the Washington’s 2016 (delayed until 2017) RCOH. The result?
Congress allocated more money for the Navy. What a surprise. And now, the Navy is once again floating the
idea of retiring the next carrier due up for refueling. What a surprise. This is just a transparent attempt to get
more money from Congress.
Consider a few factors that demonstrate the fraudulent
nature of this threat:
Supposed Savings –
Supposedly, an early retirement would save several billion dollars in overhaul
costs plus twenty some years of operating costs for a total of, perhaps, $30B
spread over the 20-30 years of the carrier’s projected remaining lifespan. These savings figures are inflated but, even
so, represent only around $1B per year – almost peanuts by Pentagon
standards. If the Navy were serious
about cutting costs they’d scrap the worthless LCS and all its manning and
operating costs … but they haven’t so this is just another budget game.
Law – The Navy is
bound by law to maintain 11 operational carriers (1). Congress doesn’t need to do anything in
response to the Navy’s threat because the Navy can’t legally retire the
carrier. It’s an empty threat.
Precedent –
Retiring a carrier early would be all the precedent and motivation that
Congress would need to institute punitive budget cuts and flag officer cuts,
neither of which the Navy will risk.
Again, retiring a carrier is an empty threat.
Air Wings – This entire
issue is almost irrelevant since we only have 9 air wings anyway. So, whether we have 10 carriers or 11 is a
moot point since we can only supply 9 carriers with aircraft.
The Navy is already getting the reaction it wants which is
Congressional outrage.
Top
lawmakers are blasting the Pentagon’s decision to retire one of the Navy's 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier two decades early, with one prominent Senator calling the move
“mind-boggling.” (3)
The next step in the Navy’s plan is for Congress to pony up
more money for the Navy. I can almost
hear the Navy’s Admirals snickering behind their closed doors.
Although the threat to early retire a carrier is just a
budget game and Congress doesn’t need to take any action, they should take
action – they should fire CNO Richardson for attempting to blackmail Congress. This kind of action by the Navy is reprehensible
and despicable. CNO Richardson and the
Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer, who obviously approved this blackmail
attempt, must be fired.
Come on, Congress. It’s
past time to remind the Navy that they work for you, not the other way around.
(1)Title 10 › Subtitle C
› Part I › Chapter 507
› § 5062: (b)The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 11 operational aircraft
carriers. For purposes of this subsection, an operational aircraft carrier
includes an aircraft carrier that is temporarily unavailable for worldwide
deployment due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.
(2)Breaking Defense website, “Pentagon To
Retire USS Truman Early, Shrinking Carrier Fleet To 10 ”, Sydney J.
Freedberg, Jr., 27-Feb-2019,
https://breakingdefense.com/2019/02/pentagon-to-retire-uss-truman-early-shrinking-carrier-fleet-to-10/
(3)Breaking Defense website, “Carrier
Cutback Plan ‘Mind Boggling’: Sen. Kaine”, Paul McLeary, 1-Mar-2019,
https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/carrier-cutback-plan-mind-boggling-sen-kaine/
"Air Wings"
ReplyDeleteSo does the navy have justification for the increasingly small amount of aircraft for their CVs? Is it just don't worry when we have the F-35 it will do everything?
"don't worry when we have the F-35 it will do everything?"
DeleteYou got it! The F-35 will solve all our problems. You might be interested in this post, "Navy To Stand Up New Squadrons"
Additional thought could the USN not simply fit out the first two America class as all F-35B loaded and say they just added 2 CVs? Filling the gap while they build more Ford class ships to save the feared crew cost thing.
ReplyDeleteThe America LHA is rated for about 22 F-35B when operating in the all fixed wing mode. Aside from the half size air wing, there would be no E-2, EA-18G, or tankers so they couldn't really do much in the way of effective combat.
DeleteThat was sarcasm. They than demand more bulk Ford orders...
Delete"That was sarcasm."
DeleteI got that but someone in the Navy or Marines clearly had/has visions of exactly that - a mini-supercarrier of F-35Bs and, as I noted, that can't happen effectively due to the lack of supporting aircraft and the limited number of F-35s.
I don't know what they were thinking. My best guess is the Marines want an F-35 'carrier' of their own to go play air force with and, for reasons that elude me, the Navy went along with it.
It's an old idea. As far back as the 70s, CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt had the idea of the Sea Control Ship, the idea being to take an LHD loaded with Harriers and make like the British and play light carrier against people you need to flex on, but don't have a CVN to spare with a full air wing.
DeleteRunning F-35s makes this idea more viable than if you were running Harriers, but ultimately the people you can do this sort of flex are most certainly not peer opponents to the US.
otoh, from a certain point of view, the last time the USN fought a peer opponent was the first half of the Pacific War...
"I don't know what they were thinking..."
DeleteI would think if they had a sky jump as well and the USN just admitted they were light carriers they could be useful. If the F-35 really lives up to hype - which is an even bet at best or maybe worse. They could provide additional capacity to a group of CVs. But than again I've not seen any operations with the USN large CVs to suggest the navy is actually thinking that (or any group maneuvers at all).
If you wanted to send a message to I dunno somebody with interests in the Pacific. Deploy two Nimitz class and the USS America and if possible even if you need American planes get Japan to add an Izumo for the next RimPac acting as carrier group.
If you could do that without while maintaining other deployments it would be a significant demonstration of capability.
" USN just admitted they were light carriers they could be useful. ... They could provide additional capacity to a group of CVs."
DeleteThis is really questionable, in my mind. An America LHA brings only 22 F-35s to the table and no supporting AWACS, EW, or tankers. While 20 extra aircraft would be nice, it's questionable whether they would even be all that helpful. I wonder what the F-35B takeoff weapons load capacity really is? Without catapults, it's got to be reduced and, I'm guessing, significantly so. If so, 20 extra aircraft with just a few weapons each is a really marginal extra capability for the cost.
I just don't see F-35B LHA carriers as useful.
I suppose they could be used to rapidly shuttle replacements to carrier groups that were taking combat attrition. After being rebased to a catapult equipped CVN, weapons load capacity would become acceptable.
Delete" rapidly shuttle replacements to carrier groups"
DeleteWhere are these replacement aircraft going to come from? We have only 9 air wings and no reserve to speak of. It's not like these are F6F Hellcats and we can produce 100 per week or whatever. Replacements will be few are far between.
That aside, yes, they could shuttle aircraft although that's a $4B shuttle!!!! One would think a commercial cargo ship could shuttle aircraft just as well.
This is so obvious a money play from USN, so outrageous, Congress should be calling for heads to roll!!!
ReplyDeleteNavy saying nuclear carriers too expensive to maintain, which is true as Truman’s RCOH [Refueling & Complex Overhaul] said to be between $4B and $6.5B (would like to know source of figures) and Ford costing approx $22B including R&D, so Navy contracted for two new Ford class block buy, think they meet Eienstein's definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, but expecting different results.
ReplyDeleteNeed to revert back to conventional carrier option, the Brits built the 70,000t QNLZ for $4B, would expect US shipyard to build CATOBAR version for approx $6.5B?, whatever as said nuclear too expensive both in build costs; time; maintenance costs; disposal costs, if the Navy ever want 355 fleet that Congress can fund.
Why 355? I mean if the LCS is only fit to be a expensive glorified Coast Guard cutter and destroys can't back out of a port without hitting something... What are they building for? Why not 360 or 290 is there a white paper around describing the basis for the number?
DeleteI doubt the LCS is an even worse fit for the CG than it is for the Navy. Their budget is far smaller, so their spending has to be far more effective in terms of being high reliability/low operational costs.
DeleteAt this point, I think any one you could give the LCS to would rightly consider even being gifted them to be attempted sabotage.
Maybe turn them into super yachts like the ex-HNLMS Piet Hein or scrap them/sink them for artificial reefs.
I didn't mean to suggest the USCG would actually take them. Rather since they seem to be reduced to just doing Coast guard work I am curious as to why Congresses is still allowing itself to be talked into buying them. Since I assume the Guard can probably do its own job better. An LCS not bought buys a lot of more Sentinel class cutters or Ice Breakers. Its one thing for Russia to have an absurd amount of them in the arctic but when even Norway is on track to a larger arctic force (of armed ice breakers and ice durable ships) something is wrong.
DeleteI am thinking in return for ignoring the recent crappy run on human rights issues we could maybe get the house of Saud to accept the LCS. They can run them with mercenaries from Pakistan.
As a side note while we are OT on the LCS was it going to have the Prairie-Masker system installed as part of ASW mission?
CVN 77 commissioned in 2008, when adjusted for inflation, would cost about $7.5 billion today. Then there would be the cost of its own RCOH. I wonder if the days of the nuclear-powered supercarrier are over and we resume building Kitty Hawk-size conventional carriers.
Delete"is there a white paper around describing the basis for the number?"
DeleteThere are a few reports/papers that address fleet size but none are based on combat needs. They're based on peacetime Combatant Commanders task requests.
"LCS was it going to have the Prairie-Masker system installed as part of ASW mission?"
DeleteNo.
" I wonder if the days of the nuclear-powered supercarrier are over and we resume building Kitty Hawk-size conventional carriers."
DeleteThis question has been beaten to death over the years. Every study I've seen has the lifetime costs about the same. The Navy believes that the operational advantages of nuclear power are the deciding factor. I can't really disagree.
"CVN 77 commissioned in 2008, when adjusted for inflation, would cost about $7.5 billion today."
DeleteThe question you should be asking is not conventional versus nuclear but, rather, why the Ford, also a nuclear ship, costs twice the last Nimitz even on an inflation adjusted basis. Carrier costs are far outstripping inflation which leads one to ask WHY????
For the Ford, yes, the EMALS and other new tech cost a fortune in R&D but the purchase costs are around the same as conventional. So where is the double cost coming from? I have no idea - well, actually I do - it's from the overhead and drawn out construction time frames, in large measure.
"No."
DeleteThen any admiral who suggested it could really do ASW should loose their job or military pension or both.
Masker injects air bubbles into the propellers. The LCS uses water jets so Masker isn't even applicable. Prairie injects air bubbles along the hull to mask hull machinery noise. The LCS is reportedly so loud that its own noise rules out hull mounted sonar. Prairie probably wouldn't help much against that level of noise. I've got to believe the water jets are an enormous acoustic beacon for subs in a hundred mile radius!
Delete"Comnavops I've got to believe the water jets are an enormous acoustic beacon for subs in a hundred mile radius!"
DeleteAhhh, The Lightweight Carrier Simulator is really
a torpedo decoy, finally the truth is revealed.
"The LCS uses water jets so Masker isn't even applicable..."
DeleteThat would appear to rise to the level of criminal negligence. To propose a ship as an ASW platform that cannot use what by all accounts is very effective system/technology when used an every ship it was attached to is a decision that should see people fired if not face court martial (*). Your last sentence (original post) is true in this case. Congress needs to wake up and ask real questions and enforce credible building decisions and not just building to some fantasy number whatever the ship.
* maybe even treason. At this point the LCS seems to be shading into providing aid and comfort to any US enemy or potential enemy.
"Lightweight Carrier Simulator"
DeleteVery good. I've been going with 'Literally not a combat ship'. But that is better.
I understand that lead times and serial production disruption are large issues, but large enough to continue pushing them through?? After the Ford costs rose and the new systems became problematic, why couldnt we have restarted Nimitz production for one, possibly two hulls, then revisited the Ford after the tech matured? Restarting Burke production (all Zumwalt insanity and Burke inadequacies aside) seemed like a reasonable idea. Although the basic Nimitz design is getting old, theyve evolved and matured... Is this just the Admirals pushing shiny new tech in spite of all the issues? Did anyone raise their hand and say "umm maybe we should do another Nimitz?" Notional sortie rates aside, whats the rationale here, and by whom??
ReplyDeleteWhat the military in general is missing is combat rationales based on strategic requirements. Instead, the military has substituted the pursuit of technology in place of strategic need. What does the Ford offer, combat/strategy-wise? Nothing that anyone has elucidated. It offers some new tech but whether that enhances our strategic combat requirements is a highly debatable question.
DeleteThe main claims of the Fords new tech are:
1.Elmination of steam equipment - don't know why that's so vital?
2.Enhanced sortie rates which claim has been proven false and wasn't a combat limiting factor to begin with.
3.An enhanced radar which wasn't needed to begin with since carriers always sail with Aegis/AMDR vessels anyway.
4.And … Uh, that's all I got.
The Ford class solves no strategic combat need that I'm aware of. It's tech for the sake of tech and questionable tech, at that.
As I suspected (and was afraid of)...
Delete@CNO
Delete4. IS MBA style cost cutting the crew by what a third like its a Walmart. That way you get those lifetime cost saving numbers. Of course your effective damage control will collapse, but that is not anything anyone is worrying about. Or realistically a ship with an over worked and under trained crew that (if the recent accidents and results of the minimal LCS crews are anything to go by) will have difficulty just sailing let alone combat.
" rather that a steam cat having only a single setting "
DeleteIncorrect. Go back and research the workings of a steam cat.
Note that this does not rebut the other issue I pointed out with regards to all that high pressure steam piping that you need to run from the reactor plant all the way to the cats. I would rather work with electric wiring than steam piping - electric cabling doesnt have the same rupture/leak risk that steam has.
Delete" I would rather work with electric wiring than steam piping - electric cabling doesnt have the same rupture/leak risk that steam has."
DeleteOn the other hand, electric power runs the risk of arcing, shorts, electrocution, electrical interference, and fire. We're not talking about household 110 VAC in this system - it uses extremely high voltage, high current electricity and is very dangerous. I see no net increase in safety - just a different type of risk. At least steam leaks can be seen, heard, and avoided. Electrical shorts, in contrast, are generally undetectable until you inadvertently electrocute yourself and at those voltages/currents, the result would be fatal.
Again, try to be objective.
"I over simplified for the audience"
DeleteIt was your main point that you used to contrast with the EMALS and, being wrong, invalidated your argument. Oversimplifying to the point of making false statements doesn't help the audience or your credibility. I've told you before, I won't allow incorrect statements. Do your homework before you write.
Hi, student Naval Architect here, from everything I've read the EMALS equipment is much better (or will be, at least, once they fix the issues. More transparency so that people actually know what's going wrong would be nice), and I'd personally prefer working with everything involved in that particular system compared to a steam one. Steam is more intertwined with the overall design of the ship, much harder to maintain in a lot of cases, and while it can be adjusted it's much harder to do than it is with an electromagnetic system. You can also achieve a much smoother acceleration because the system is under complete control at every point in the launch.
DeleteThere's also energy savings, which mean potential future defensive system upgrades such as point defense lasers are less taxing to operate, and there's weight saved from not needing thousands of feet of steam pipes that can be used for stuff like increased plane capacity, more space for the crew so they aren't cramped full time, or increased stores for longer operations.
"student Naval Architect here, from everything I've read the EMALS equipment is much better"
DeleteBe very careful that you distinguish theoretical but irrelevant benefits from real benefits. For example, in the aggregate you may save large volumes of space by not running steam pipes and be tempted to think that you can translate that into extra crew berthing or work spaces. However, the reality is that you can't. All you'll save is one pipe running through each compartment and removing one pipe (you'll still have to run additional electrical conduits) from each compartment gains you no USEFUL additional space in the compartment.
All that said, EMALS may offer overall useful benefits but it's hardly as clear cut as proponents suggest. Further, EMALS comes with a set of disadvantages. For example, the inability to repair one cat without taking them all down is a huge combat liability. The couple hour 'wind down' of the capacitors before repair work can begin is another major repair disadvantage. The much-hyped 'smooth acceleration' has yet to be realized as the aircraft are still bouncing unacceptably. And so on.
What it comes down to is whether the REAL benefits of EMALS (far fewer than proponents suggest) are worth the enormous cost that has gone into developing the system and the inherent drawbacks that accompany the system.
As a student, it's easy to get sucked into the theoretical descriptions without considering the real world advantages and disadvantages.
"Let's try again."
DeleteYou're just repeating common knowledge and offering no insight or value.
The inability to take down one catapult at a time was a cost saving measure by the navy to save about 400 tons of weight (because weight is a lot more finicky than you seem to think, given your armor posts), and is over all not a necessary part of the system. I'd be unsurprised if that wasn't an issue on later ships as they find other places to make those weight savings that don't compromise the launch system.
DeleteIn addition, many of the "theoretical" benefits of the system have been demonstrated in the other main application of this form of the technology, roller coasters. Electromagnetically launched roller coasters have the most fine control of launch speed by any on the market, in addition to being able to provide force that would have required significantly more expensive drops to provide, in addition to being less water intensive than the few steam driven launch coasters, which is a factor that's great on an aircraft carrier because you don't need to run a desalination plant every time you want to launch a plane, saving tremendously on power. The maintenance part is worse on those coasters, but I'd bet that that's the people who purchase and operate roller coasters tend to be cheapskates who are willing to not pay for stuff to make it reliable and are wiling to skip taking it down every so often to check to make sure everything is working.
"cost saving measure by the navy to save about 400 tons of weight"
DeleteI've never heard that and have no idea whether it's true but I'll accept it for the moment. 400 tons represents 0.4% of the carrier's displacement which is an insignificant amount given that the trade off is the inability to individually repair catapults - an enormous disadvantage in combat. If it was a cost savings measure, it was unwise in the extreme. That cost savings could wind up costing a $14B sunk ship. I would hope it's re-evaluated and redesigned in future ships but we're now committed to building two more with the same failing, as far as I know.
The theoretical benefits may or may not eventually be realized. They have not, as yet. Further, you missed the main point which is the question of whether they have any real benefit. Given that aircraft are designed to withstand the current 'hard' launches for a lifetime, a slightly smoother launch would seem to be of no practical benefit. Aircraft lifetimes are currently limited not by catapult stress but by flight hours, wing fatigue, and other factors.
"The maintenance part is worse on those coasters, but I'd bet that that's the people who purchase and operate roller coasters tend to be cheapskates who are willing to not pay for stuff to make it reliable and are wiling to skip taking it down every so often to check to make sure everything is working."
That's hilarious! You're aware, I assume, of the Navy's habitual deferral of maintenance which has led to entire ship classes being retired early due to lack of maintenance? The Navy is the least likely organization to properly conduct maintenance!
" weight is a lot more finicky than you seem to think, given your armor posts"
DeleteI'm well aware of the impact of weight on ships. I'm also aware of metacentric height, weight margins, stability, etc. However, I've studied what we designed and built in WWII and I've seen that we can build well armored ships that retain the required performance. This isn't opinion on my part, this is simple historical fact. A budding naval architect ought to be thoroughly familiar with the historical record, as I assume you are.
I had to do some checks on some numbers, but ultimately none of the ships that were in the same mass range as the Burkes (generally light cruisers/earlier heavy cruisers) had substantial armor either. The Atlanta class was, in its stock configuration, about 100 tons lighter than the a Flight II Burke and only had about 4 inches of armor along the belt, which is insufficient to stop all but the smallest of projectiles, and is unlikely to stop, say, a shipwreck. They also didn't need to carry around 50-ish tons of equipment for BMD, in addition to having to offset the much higher center of gravity that VLS have compared to the turreted five inch guns on the Atlantas. They also didn't need to be capable of handling helicopters, or a heavier propulsion system. They also had less overall electronic weight, which gets heavier.
DeleteYou could build a ship with decent armor, but ultimately it would likely be much closer to the Kirov in size than anything currently in Western service.
You're missing the point and purpose of armor. Read, "Armor"
DeleteYou're also missing the role of the Burke. The Burke IS our Navy's capital ship of today. It is, conceptually, the battleship of our fleet. As such, it warrants as much protection as we can reasonably give it.
DeleteComparing a Burke to an Atlanta is to incorrectly compare their roles. The Atlanta was the lowest end of the battle line, if that. It was a AA platform and not even a particularly robust one compared to, say, a battleship or a Wichita or Baltimore class cruisers.
The Burke is our premier strike, AAW, BMD, and ASW (among other roles!) platform. Arguably, it has more roles and value than a WWII battleship and, therefore, warrants extraordinary protection.
The opportunity cost with the Ford has been highly unpleasant.
ReplyDeleteThere's a video presentation on the Ford by Tal Manvel, who was an officer leading design back when when it was a concept:
http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2017/07/building-right-carrier-heavy-medium-or.html
The enhanced radar was called out in the presentation as the worst of the choices made on the Ford, which is saying something. It hurts that FORD has better radar than ZUMWALT. Ugh.
The enhanced sortie rates and lower RCS have been the biggest things that I've heard about- but I don't even see how it'll matter if the aircraft can't make it to the fight.
The E-Mag catapults and the AARG were supposed to be gentler on aircraft than the existing systems, but we still haven't figured that one out yet:
https://news.usni.org/2019/02/13/navy-hopes-advanced-arresting-gear-will-be-ready-for-fleet-super-hornet
What we could have done, instead, would been to have just kept right on building and buying mature Nimitz-class, developed the electic catapult and AARG on land until they were ready, and then, only once ready, built a FORD. We'd have more and better carriers that way.
But it does appear that once a program gets big enough, all the good, disciplined, smart acquisition rules go right out the window.
Lots of talk suddenly on boards to replace Trumman with 3 amphibious carriers....ok, hopefully it's not orchestrated? and people just talking but that has got to be the dumbest idea since LCS, Zumwalt, Ford....if a freaking carrier with a full wing and escorts can't survive a Chinese attack, how exactly are 3 amphibs with realistically a smaller escort force going to survive it??? Dispersal? If they spot and target a carrier, than they can spot and target an amphib! Numbers? No way 3 amphibs are going to have same complement as a full carrier wing and you can't operate E2 and E18G from an amphib....so F35 is going to produce another miracle now!!!
ReplyDeleteThe breaking defense article suggests that the cost savings from Truman's refueling (which would also by default include SLEP and systems updating) could go towards the purchase of two new carriers; the rationale is you're giving up 1 old CVN now to get 2 new CVNs in the future.
DeleteThat's not the same thing as trading a CVN for three LHAs.
You can make arguments for skipping refueling and SLEP for a CVN if you plan to replace it with newer CVNs, but that is predicated on those two extra CVNs being built.
The snag to the two-for-one is that it isn't. Generally speaking, the Fords are to replace the Nimitzs at the end of their 50yr lives... So unless the next two are to built simultaneously (which they arent), or two when the gap appears when Truman is really due to be retired, then its just a numbers game that doesnt fly. Its throwaway of a young ship, which I agree, isnt going to happen because its just budget extortion...
DeleteTruman isn't old, but she ain't a new ship either; launched in 1996, commissioned in 1998, she's been in the water for 23 years now. Even if the reactor didn't need refueling, that's still about the age for a service life extension and systems update.
DeleteLike I said, I can see the rationale for an early retirement in order to get 2 newer ships into the fleet, faster, but I don't think that would actually happen. Best case is Newport News hits their stride and speeds up carrier construction: scuttlebutt I've heard 2ndhand from a dockworker there is that the yard can build ships faster, but prefers to build at the current pace in order to keep workers employed with constant work, so as not to lose institutional knowledge from having to fire workers once there are no more carriers to be built.
"cost savings from Truman's refueling (which would also by default include SLEP and systems updating) could go towards the purchase of two new carriers"
DeleteNo, the purported cost savings are mostly fictional. The only actual cost savings would be the cost of the RCOH which is four or five billion dollars or so. That won't buy two new carriers. That won't even buy a third of one carrier.
The remaining cost 'savings' are supposed operating costs OVER THE 20-25 YEARS of the retired carrier's life. Thus, the 'savings' dribble in over a couple of decades and can't go in any useful way towards the purchase of two new carriers.
Further, if we did somehow, magically, purchase two new carriers, we would incur TWICE AS MUCH OPERATING COSTS as the one retired carrier. Not only would there be no net savings, there would be a net loss.
I'm just repeating the article's suggestion, I'm not saying it's in any way credible.
DeletePersonally, I'd find it more credible if the navy had suggested skipping RCOH and using the 4-5 billion saved to offset the costs of the next carrier in construction - that, to me, would be a reasonable offer. But that's not the offer that was made, and on the whole, I don't think the Navy is being honest in this scenario.
"I'm just repeating the article's suggestion"
DeleteExactly the point - you're repeating. There's no need to repeat what's already been made available. Instead, add some value. Add some analysis. Add opinion, backed up with data. Add logic. Further the discussion, don't repeat it.
You have the passion for this. Now you need to add the substance. Don't write just to write. Have a purpose.
@wild goose I certainly think that the yards ability to build faster, but not doing so is a key factor in things including cost...
DeleteI looked at that and using just published keellaying-to-commissioning dates, I found some interesting numbers, and some that clearly show projected dates to be questionable...
The Nimitz class had an avg build time of 5.6 yrs, or 68 months. The time gap between ship deliveries was 45 mos, the last two significantly raising the average.
The Ford class average build time (using projected dates for first 5) is 7.4yrs/89 months. The Ford took 7.5 yrs, yet the JFK is projected a year longer. Other projections show a delivery schedule every 36mos, although Enterprise shows 7year gap after the JFK. So basically we are seeing an additional 2 years construction time. Why? Thats a lot of extra months to be paying yardbirds. I grasp a new ship/production line taking somewhat longer, but almost 30% longer?? While not a naval engineer, at a construction level, guys are still welding bulkheads and decks together,cableways are run, boxes are hung on bulkheads, piping is installed, etc. So while the blueprints have changed, the process has not. The additional man hours being projected/billed are excessive. Production could speed up eventually, as the Ike took 86 months, and the Truman dropped to a class low of 50 months!!! But Im just not seeing the Ford build times being legitimate...
"But Im just not seeing the Ford build times being legitimate..."
DeleteThey're completely legitimate - just misunderstood. The build rate is not determined by worker speed or anything similar. The rate is determined by contract issuance frequency which is, in turn, determined by the Navy's budget.
The Navy would love to build a carrier every year but they can't afford it. What they've determined is that they could afford one carrier every five years during the Nimitz class build and, indeed, that is just about what was achieved.
When the Ford came along, the construction cost skyrocketed. What's a budget-limited Navy to do? The Navy's (incredibly stupid) solution was to stretch out the procurement/construction time span. This has the effect of reducing the yearly cost but increasing the eventual total cost. From the Navy's yearly budget-driven perspective, reduced yearly costs and increased total costs are preferred over higher year costs and lower total costs. That's just a function of annual budgets. Industry is susceptible to this exact same false savings quest.
Thus, as you've already figured out, if a ship takes 7 years to build rather than 5, that's two extra years worth of manufacturer's overhead that has to be absorbed by the build and added to the cost.
This is your classic example of 'penny wise and pound foolish'.
So, the build rate is not a function of the shipyard and is not an attempt by the shipyard to gouge the Navy. Rather, it is just the shipyard's response to the Navy's desire to stretch out the build for short-sighted budgetary reasons.
Hope that made sense - the explanation, I mean, not the rationale! The rationale is idiotic.
That does make sense. In a nonsensical way lol but...
Delete"When the Ford came along, the construction cost skyrocketed"
With R&D aside, this is also what Im questioning. Maybe the line between "building a ship" and the R&D is blurred now since ships are being delivered incomplete(?) This procurement process is so complex. I know my analysis was grade school level but I thought it was an interesting comparison. The idea as youve explained it is crazy. This just seems to compound the fiscal irresponsibility!!!
"this is also what Im questioning."
DeleteI, too, am puzzled by the cost of carriers. The cost has been increasing beyond the rate of inflation going all the back to the Nimitz. A while ago, I went through the exercise of getting all the carrier costs from the Nimitz until now, adjusting them for inflation (common basis), and comparing the costs. Each was more expensive then the one before even allowing for inflation. I can find no good explanation aside from the increasing construction periods but even that only applies on the last couple of carriers. There's something else at work, here, that I haven't been able to identify.
The Nimitzes were repeats and should have cost the same when adjusted for inflation. If anything, they should have decreased as serial production kicked in - but they didn't.
Exactly my thoughts... I think serial production cost savings when applied to the military seems be be touted yet nonexistent. It certainly should be there, considering the considerably shortened production times I noted...
DeleteId really like to have the answers to this question!!!
Well, it looks like this plan wasn't entirely the Navy's idea.
Deletehttps://amp.businessinsider.com/mattis-navy-aircraft-carrier-argument-led-to-defer-truman-refueling-2019-3
The tl;dr: SecDef Mattis told the Navy that if they wanted their two new carriers, they were going to have to retire Truman. He was apparently of the opinion that the carrier's days were numbered.
The current Acting SecDef does not appear to be deviating from his predecessor's POV.
CNO "This question has been beaten to death over the years. Every study I've seen has the lifetime costs about the same. The Navy believes that the operational advantages of nuclear power are the deciding factor. I can't really disagree."
ReplyDeleteWhy nuclear carriers are too expensive
Some input taken from GAO August 2018 report on AIRCRAFT CARRIER DISMANTLEMENT AND DISPOSAL GAO-18-523
A few highlights
Enterprise served 51 years, deploying 25 times and sailing more than 1 million miles during that time, light displacement 76,000 tons. So on average steamed approx 20,000 miles per year which at 20 knots would equate to 1,000 hours - 42 days, like all averages need to treat with a large degree of caution, but does call into question why need of nuclear power.
CVN 65 ENTERPRISE - NAVY DISMANTLEMENT AND DISPOSAL Program
1) Inactivation Phase 12/2012 to 12/2017 - Actual Cost $863M to date which included removing the nuclear fuel from the ship’s reactors and taking off equipment and other materials in preparation for dismantlement of the ship.
2) Post-inactivation Phase 2018 to 2021
3) Planning dismantling and disposal finalization phase 2022 to 2033
4) Dismantling and disposal start 2034 - estimated 10 year dismantlement and disposal period - CVN 65 2016 plan estimate cost $1.05B to $1.55B, rectors will be shipped to Department of Energy’s low-level waste site in Hanford, Washington, their costs not mentioned. Current plans require 3 years pier side to prepare the propulsion space section for dismantlement and reactor compartment disposal and about 5 years in a dry dock for the actual dismantlement.
Cont'd as exceeding word limit
For CVN-65 the issue is size. There is only one dock which will take her complete, and that's the only CVN capable dock on the west coast (and really in the entire pacific unless it's critical emergent work). It is a poor plan to tie it up for several years with 65 scrapping. Numbers I've heard is about 4 years production work just due to the shear volume of work and material to move.
ReplyDeleteDismantlement and disposal of the nuclear Enterprise may cost $2.4+B, the Navy often uses commercial industry to dismantle and recycle its non-nuclear ships, including aircraft carriers, such as ex-USS Constellation and ex-USS Ranger completed in 2017 with costs ranging from 1¢ to $6 million, because of the resale value of their scrap metal.
Navy use Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington for dismantlement and disposal of nuclear submarines and ships, shipping the reactors to the Department of Energy’s low-level waste site in Hanford, Washington. The problem is that PSNS priority is maintenance of current fleet and already has a backlog of 10 nuclear submarines and the ex-USS Long Beach cruiser in storage awaiting disposal with the Ohio class submarines starting in 2027 plus the Nimitz class starting in 2022?
The alternative is to use commercial industry, but and a big but, though the Navy has regulatory nuclear authority for the naval shipyards and has a long history, Navy is arguing that for industry it should come under the civilian Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or agreement of the individual States, NRC saying they don't want to get involved for various reasons, its purley a Navy responsibility .
The take away is that as is well known nuclear is a very, very expensive option, my guess Ford two nuclear reactors cost ~$2B which maybe more than double conventional propulsion, the RCOH of the Truman said to cost $6.5B by Breaking Defense, unknown is the $B cost included for of nuclear defueling and refuelling, the CVN dismantlement and disposal another ~$2.4B for Enterprise, looking at total of approx $8.9B per Nimitz carrier, that's more than the build costs.
The other major cost with nuclear carriers is operational crew numbers, ~ 2,500 excluding air component, nuclear appears very manpower intensive, total ~ 5,000 so to say operational costs are only $1B per year is fiction as Ray Mabus back in 2012 referring to LCS “Every sailor costs the Navy roughly $300,000 a year, so we decided to give them all generous separation packages and rehire them as contractors at double their enlisted salary, it won’t cost a thing to recruit or train them.” (a sad reflection on Navy leadership) , allowing for inflation say now $350K per sailor x 5,000 = $1.75B operational costs for carrier crew alone.
"Why nuclear carriers are too expensive"
DeleteYou're doing exactly what every study, pro or con, does. You're selectively choosing what factors to include in your 'analysis' to support your preconceived position.
For example, you're ignoring the cost of the additional oilers/tankers that would be required to support a fleet of non-nuclear carriers (they're huge consumers of fuel!), the cost of crews to man them, the yearly operating costs of those ships, the maintenance required to support those oilers, the costs to retire and dispose of those oilers, etc.
You're also not critically examining the data you cite. The supposed 'cost' of the nuclear deactivation includes a huge amount of work that has nothing, per se, to do with the nuclear aspect itself but because the work gets performed at the same time, the costs are lumped in. For example, disconnecting the electrical lines to/from the reactor controls are not nuclear work but the costs are included. If it was a conventional system you'd still have to disconnect all the same electrical lines. So, to be accurate, you need to subtract out that kind of work from the nuclear costs. Multiply this many times over for all the non-nuclear work that gets lumped in and you wind up with a significantly smaller cost. Critics of nuclear power include those costs because it makes their case look better and they figure no one, like myself, will critically examine them.
As I said, when I've looked at the various reports and critiqued them as best I can, I see a rough wash. Costs are essentially the same depending on what you want to include/exclude.
Personally, I'm ambivalent about nuclear power. What I'm not ambivalent about is slanted data and information about the issue.
Thought it very unlikely conventional carriers would be huge consumers of propulsion fuel, making assumption that ship's range would be say 8,000 nm and on average Enterprise only steamed ~20,000 miles per year, accepting 'average' can be very deceptive. The carriers are huge consumers of aviation fuel, but do agree to your point that there would be call for more oilers, but think not that many.
DeleteOn your other point on deactivation costs disagree, if understanding correctly GAO gave example re the as ex-USS Constellation and ex-USS Ranger with costs ranging from 1¢ to $6 million, because of the resale value of their scrap metal, whereas the Enterprise as a nuclear ship current estimate is $2.4B+, nuclear deactivation is a minefield of rules and regulations and costs just skyrocket, the nuclear USS Long Beach de-commissioned in July 1994 and yet 24 years later to this day Navy has failed to complete disposal, with the Enterprise Navy putting off dismantling start date 2034 and then to take 10 years. To speed up dismantling nuclear carriers and subs Navy needs to invest more $Bs in Bremerton, beside the Enterprise and Long Beach they have a backlog of ten SSNs stacked up.
Nuclear requires specialized shipyards, the consequence if you do not fund them, GAO analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards, another GAO quote Navy Lost 1,891 Days of Attack Sub Operations Waiting for Repairs; Spent $1.5 Billion Supporting Idle Crews.
Bear in mind that in combat ships don't sail at a leisurely, fuel efficient 14 kts. They sail at a fuel-gulping 20-30 kts.
DeleteCarriers also, traditionally, refuel their escorts. Whether that would be an operational standard today, I don't know. Presumably, it would. If so, a conventional carrier would be sharing its fuel.
Clearly, additional oilers would be needed. How many is unknown. As I said, the additional requirements are part of the cost comparison and most nuclear proponents ignore that cost.
Without question, our nuclear support facilities are woefully lacking!
With regards to the EMALs, perhaps we should look at a some previous posts on this specifically EMP and Sigint and ponder.
ReplyDeleteWhat happens to EMALs after an EMP? Steam is mechanical and create care less. But even if it doesn't fully shut it down, the sophisticated software and voltage regulation regulations could mean too much or too little power, a problem it has now without being hit with an EMP.
And that massie electromagnet is going to create a discernible signature that can be picked up by enemy passive signals intelligence. A sub, or stealth boat could detect when we launch, the operational tempo etc without the enemy fleet using radar. A small advantage but useful.
Im not clear on why scrapping the Enterprise is such a project. Once the reactor and all hazardous/classified stuff is removed, why cant it go to Brownsville like all the other carriers??
ReplyDeleteHousehold voltage in the US & Canada is 120 volts, not 110. 110 volts is a 19th century standard which was eliminated by 1967.
ReplyDeleteThere are, of course, disadvantages in an electrical system compared to steam (or other alternatives like hydraulics on the Navy's WW2-era carriers or even pneumatics as on the cancelled German Graf Zeppelin carrier).
The electrical shorts issue is, however, a red herring. An electrical short results in the circuit having near zero resistance. Per Ohm's Law, this results in current increasing to near infinite levels (or rather it rises until it destroys the circuit). But all electrical circuits have overcurrent protection devices (circuit breakers). These are very effective and reliable. Consider the circuit breakers in the electrical panel in your house. A short circuit is immediately detected by the circuit breaker tripping.
The main danger with high voltage electrical systems is arc faults. Look up some Youtube videos for "arc flash". The results are not pretty and often lead to death. Normal practice is to deenergize the system before any work is performed, though with proper safety equipment and precautions it is possible to work on energized circuits. None the less owing to the extreme danger OSHA intends to prohibit working on energized circuits in the future.
It is certainly easier to work on a high voltage electrical system than a high pressure steam system. And you can work on an energized circuit, whereas I don't believe you can work on an operating high pressure system system.
As far as battle damage goes, I am not sure which is better. The electrical system would shut itself off faster and be easier to repair than the steam system. But damage to the steam system should not cause explosions of the same magnitude or start fires.
Electrical interference from enemy activities strikes me as highly unlikely. The extremely high energy of the Ford's electrical system mean that it would not be possible for enemy electromagnetic warfare to induce meaningful current within the Ford's electric system (which is also contained within a functional Faraday cage that is the ship's steel hull) short of a nuclear strike.
The Navy originally shifted to steam catapults from hydraulic I believe because the steam was viewed as "free" since carriers already had boilers. The Gerald Ford class still has boilers. Seems to me that they ought to have shifted to something like a gas-cooled reactor coupled to a gas turbine now that steam is not needed for the catapult.
Agree that there was no compelling military requirement for shifting to EMALS and this reflected the brainless pursuit of "technology".
" electrical shorts issue is, however, a red herring"
DeleteHardly. For example, there have been multiple aircraft fires and systemic failures resulting from worn insulation creating shorts and arcs which, in turn, have caused fires. The F-35 and some helos have, notably, suffered from this in recent times.
"circuit breakers). These are very effective and reliable"
No. Circuit breakers are moderately effective for the limited function they are designed for and they are reasonably reliable. Look up FPE Stab-Lok breakers as an example of unreliable breakers. Circuit breakers are intended to prevent overheating of wires, leading to fires. They do not prevent electrocution or arcing. Breakers have a failure rate like everything else though we consider the rate acceptable.
"Electrical interference from enemy activities"
You've misunderstood this one. The electrical interference is self-induced. High voltage/current lines interfere with other electrical devices and require great care to isolate their effects. The Navy has extensive testing protocols to find and eliminate catastrophic interference with radars, sensors, munitions, navigation systems, etc. High voltage power lines have long been suggested to cause adverse health effects on people living near them. Whether that's true or not, I don't know. They can certainly affect compasses, computers, phones, and other electrical devices.
None of this is reason alone to avoid EMALS. The point is that the rationale for switching from steam to electrical is far from as clear cut as proponents claim.
The overarching issue is whether EMALS delivers any combat benefits and there is little evidence that it does. In fact, the repair drawbacks of EMALS make it a liability in combat. Again, the rationale is far from clear cut as you note in your concluding sentence.
With respect to electrical shorts I was referring to undetected shorts which are uncommon. Sorry for not being clear. Obviously shorts are a problem even when overcurrent protection devices function as intended.
DeleteWorn insulation is indeed a serious problem, particularly in the Ford's environment (military, marine, high voltage, etc.).
It's true that anything, including overcurrent protection devices, can fail. Was not aware of the FPE Stab-Lok issue. I'll look at for that if I'm ever buying an older home, thanks.
I had not realized that you meant the Ford's electrical system interfering with the ship's own systems. I should've thought of that. A good point.
"Ford's electrical system"
DeleteOne of the potential problems that concern me with the Ford and Zumwalt is battle damage. When electrical wires and conduits get torn apart, there will be some very high voltage/current lines exposed and with flooding and firefighting water all around, the potential for electrocution has got to be severe. Ruptured steam lines are every bit as deadly but at least they can be seen and avoided. An electrified bulkhead is undetectable. Unfortunately, this is where my limited electrical knowledge fails me. I know only enough to ask the question about battle damage but not enough to answer it! Maybe you can fill in some blanks?
Assuming the Ford-class has an earthed distribution system, which I assume it does, then conduction across the ship's haul would be a short circuit and cause the overcurrent protection system to trip.
DeleteThere are likely additional measures for safety. The additional measures are required if the electrical distribution system is not earthed (France for instance does not have an earthed distribution system).
I found this link about ship earthing, the details of which are correct: https://www.brighthubengineering.com/marine-engines-machinery/38231-electrical-grounding-on-ships/
That additional protection (or other structural elements of the ship) would be through the use of a ground fault current interrupter (GFCI), also known as a residual current device (RCD). These devices detect an imbalance between outgoing and incoming current and shut off power when this imbalance is detected.
The advantage of these devices within an earthed distribution system (as we have in the US & Canada) is that they will act sooner than overcurrent protection devices will. A small amount of current after all is enough to kill a human. Even in a residence the smallest circuit breaker is rated at 15A, which is 500 times the amount of current that can induce a heart attack. For this reason the National Electric Code requires the installation of GFCI outlets in bathrooms and kitchens. You've probably seen those funny outlets with two buttons on them, one red and one black.
I would ASSUME that all electrical circuits in the Ford-class, and likely all our warships, are GFCI protected.
Another likely safety measure (again I don't know--only knowledge I have of the Ford's distribution system is that it operates at 13,600 volts) is the use of arc-fault circuit interruption. These break circuits when electric arcs are detected.
Arc-fault interruption devices present some possible problems in a naval application. They rely on electronics that detect current of frequencies characteristic of electric arcs, and thus they cannot be guaranteed to detect all electric arcs. They can also detect false positives.
It appears someone wrote a paper in 2010 about their application in ship electrical systems: https://web.a.ebscohost.com/abstract?direct=true&profile=ehost&scope=site&authtype=crawler&jrnl=18446116&asa=Y&AN=50465102&h=hYbeTfLLVQKomY0gDuvohmptMMETyBlQtPC4up7tnBimV0OH1YzAE9oyR9Hvb0FlaZuEZft%2faXcQ%2br708LF4PA%3d%3d&crl=c&resultNs=AdminWebAuth&resultLocal=ErrCrlNotAuth&crlhashurl=login.aspx%3fdirect%3dtrue%26profile%3dehost%26scope%3dsite%26authtype%3dcrawler%26jrnl%3d18446116%26asa%3dY%26AN%3d50465102
Thanks for the links. I found the first one to be fascinating. In particular, I noted the contrast between residential philosophy which is to protect the house by shutting down current in the event of a problem versus maritime philosophy which is to MAINTAIN current in the event of a problem so as not to disrupt critical functions (steering, propulsion, etc.). I wonder how this translates to personnel safety in the event of battle damage? The article attempted to explain it in moderate detail and I grasped the basic idea but the nuances escaped me. Electrical has always been my weakest area.
DeleteI'm also intrigued by the concept of maritime circuit loads versus residential. In a house, if a circuit trips out, multiple devices may be rendered inoperable but that's nothing more than a minor nuisance. There is no significant drawback. On a ship, if a circuit drops and it has multiple devices on it, you lose functions and relatively few functions on a ship are unimportant. I wonder if ship circuits are less heavily loaded (in terms of number of devices, not amp loads) so as to avoid losing multiple functions? If so, that means more circuits are needed. The ridiculous extreme being that every device has its own circuit.
Just musings and wonderings on my part. I'd love to talk to an actual marine electrical engineer.
A critical load will be on its own circuit, including in a residence. Sump pumps for instance.
DeleteAs far as personnel safety goes, more circuits means more wiring and thus more that can be damaged. But this also reduces the possibility of essential systems being knocked out in battle, some of which might be very important for crew safety.
Presumably there are differences in approach between naval electrical engineering and civilian marine electrical engineering. Civilian ships would have both fewer critical loads and more unessential loads.
Backup power supply is also an interesting question. The Ford-class has backup diesel generators. I wonder if it also has local battery backup energy sources for essential equipment. These would be useful in the event the ships's electrical distribution grid is damaged or, god forbid, the nuclear reactors and the diesel generators are knocked out of action.
As usual there are tradeoffs. Battery backup systems take up space and require maintenance. Depending on the battery chemistry damage could result in nasty consequences.
@CNO Somthing that I recall seeing mentioned constantly thru the 70s and 80s in ship design discussions was redundancy. But that seems to have faded away. Whether those requirements have truly dropped or not I cant say with certainty, but Im assuming they have, as ships are built to increasingly lower survivability levels and rely more on "dont get hit"...
Delete@David Nystrom - So, what is your overall assessment of naval electrical power trends? Is the movement towards greater dependence on electrical power for functions a good thing or a bad thing? Are we right or wrong to abandon steam, hydraulics, etc.?
Delete"redundancy"
DeleteRedundancy is absolutely vital for survivability and combat resilience and, yes, we've ignored it of late. Consider the LCS with its initial series of engineering failures due to the single point of failure combining gear. Consider the Zumwalt which, during trials, had major electrical power problems and couldn't compensate. And so on. Putting all of our eggs into the single electrical basket may not be a good combat decision. The four catapults on a carrier should represent redundancy except that they can't be independently repaired - that's the opposite of redundancy!
@David Nystrom
DeleteThe latest detailed reporting on the Fitzgerald exposes not a very impressive amount of redundancy in critical systems. Including battery back up and down to a lack of flashlights. Yep Batteries can be nasty but so is not completing damage control because you can't see and nothing works. I mean batteries can't be any more dangerous than having your ammo cook off. Given the way the navy as tried to hide the Fords from shock testing I not thinking durability and redundancy was mission one.
I'm afraid that I do not have an overall assessment because the information I'm privy to is scarce. For instance while looking up information I found that the USS Gerald Ford class has a 13,600 volt distribution system (which indicates that the distribution is in the form of alternating current). I don't know much else other than that it has a more powerful nuclear powerplant, some backup diesel generators, and of course the infamous electromagnetic systems.
ReplyDeleteI do know as well that the Zumwalt class was a failure. That said the failure of the Zumwalt and Ford seem typical of most big ticket procurement programs rather specific to these and their electrical systems. You can look at the army's repeated failures to procure ACVs & small arms for instance.
If you have more detailed sources with more information I would be interested.
If all else is equal (which it is not, of course) then I think moving to greater dependence on electric power is a good thing. Electric distribution is more compact and efficient than alternatives. Control is also easier.
The only exception I would make is heating, as converting heat into power (whether electric or mechanical) is inherently inefficient.
With respect to the Ford's dysfunctional electromagnetic systems, these are obviously not mature technologies. It is extremely risky and irresponsible to plan a warship, let alone an aircraft carrier, around unproven experimental technologies. In the absence of an urgent military requirement, which as you've documented does not exist in this case, such technologies should first mature on land.
First maturing these technologies on land would also allow for them to be fully exploited by developing a new types of nuclear powerplants to maturity to fully exploit the possibilities of these technologies.
I'm reminded of the WW2 German "Bomber B" program. Rather than design four-engine bombers (which would use a lot of raw materials and labor, very scarce in Nazi Germany), the Germans bet on designing a new generation of heavy bombers around experimental high output engines (mainly the opposed-piston multibank Junkers Jumo 223) which were theoretically possible. These engines never materialized, leaving Germany reliant on bombers designed in the mid-1930s for the entire war (only one of which remained competitive, the Ju-88).
After the war the British solved the riddle of the opposed-piston multibank engine and put the Napier Deltic into service. The Napier Deltic went onto a long and successful career in marine, locomotive, and stationary application. Development took seven years, and it was always known as a maintenance intensive design.
As for all four catapults sharing the same single point of failure, I can only shake my head.
I'm reminded of a comment I made on Vox Day's blog about the Navy's REAL strategy:
The Navy's "strategy" is two-fold:
1 - Maximize the number of capital ships (they're always promoting a larger navy) in order to maximize the number of flag-officer ranks
2 - Do the bidding of defense contractors so that retired flag officers gain lucrative jobs in retirement with military-industrial complex and MIC-controlled think tanks
"The Navy's "strategy" is two-fold:..."
ReplyDeleteSad but likely true. Although I blame congress for failing at oversight. Budgets get cut so maybe ship numbers do (as in after the USSR collapsed). But Congress (party aside) needs to hammer home that they hand out the cash and they expect the best functioning and capable navy for their dollar and not power point presentation fantasy techno wonders. But that kind of thinking is hard to avoid look at everyone who bought into the Theranos blood test techno wonder con. Elizabeth Holmes would have been right at home in the Pentagon.
Also its not like Congress is not a practitioner of revolving door lobby jobs, but they should extend the time before for flag officers can walk into industry (related to their service).
Late update on my contention that nuclear too expensive :)
ReplyDeleteCame across defensedaily article dating back to March 31, 2014 "How to Keep an Aircraft Carrier: The Navy’s $7 Billion Problem" when Navy was planning to cancel the RCOH of George Washington when fighting off sequestation , quote "Finally, if the Navy refueled the George Washington, the bulk of the cost would be the refueling itself. The Navy lists this as a $4.393 billion cost for the refueling, plus a few additional associated costs that lift the total to $5.077 billion to refuel and modernize the aircraft carrier".
Often only when matters are in dispute are the true cost figures disclosed as above of $4.4B for nuclear refuelling.
Conventional diesel propulsion as an alternativer - Two 14,000 TEU container ships, (not the largest as there are ~ 50x ~20,000 TEU ~200,000t ships) YM Warranty and YM Wellspring, were named last Tuesday, ~150,000t; 1,202' x 168' x 51'. The vessel can cruise at a speed up to 23 knots. “With the modern, eco-friendly and highly efficient new vessels, Yang Ming will be able to provide customers worldwide with more efficient and cost-competitive services,” the company said in a statement.
My takeaway is that the that large commercial diesel ships can cruise at 20 or more knots and do not consume huge amounts of fuel.
"The Navy lists this as a $4.393 billion cost for the refueling, "
DeleteThis is patently false. The name says it all: Refueling and Complex Overhaul. It's a total, rip-out everything, overhaul of ship's systems in addition to refueling. As part of their accounting games, the Navy lumps a LOT of stuff under the refueling banner.
Think about it. In the example you cited, the Navy was TRYING TO DELAY THE REFUELING (or threatening to so as to obtain more funding). It was in their interest to inflate the cost of the refueling. You've seen the games the Navy plays. Do you really think playing with RCOH costs is something they wouldn't do?
While obviously building an assembly is easier then servicing one deep in the hull of a ship, I cant imagine the refueling being more than half of the RCOH price tag, since Ive seen reactor build costs cited around $200M each...
DeleteCNO thanks for reply and correcting my interpretation, it sounds eminently true that Navy/Admirals would play fast and lose with figures to suit their own agenda.
DeleteWould still like to know true figures for the cost of the nuclear refueling and compare overhead costs of NNS verse Ingalls Pascagoula shipyard to establish cost of the nuclear shipyard premium.
"Would still like to know true figures for the cost of the nuclear refueling"
DeleteYou and me both! Consider, as an example, the act of drydocking. You had to do it for both the refueling (does that really require drydocking?) and the overhaul. Are the costs of the act of drydocking part of the refueling or the overhaul? Well, it depends on what case you're trying to make, pro-nuclear or anti-nuclear.
You had to cut a hole in a bulkhead that enabled you to move nuclear materials and reroute new electrical. Where do you charge the cost? Again, it depends.
The portion of cost that is truly, exclusively nuclear related is a subset of the 'quoted' cost but how much, I have no idea.
There's definitely some numbers juggling going on...No way are those figures accurate!!! If the refueling truly costs $4.3B, Im gonna underbid Newport News by at least half a billion!!! Theres enough money there to build my own drydock. Ill order up two brand new reactors for $500 million, Ill spend two weeks cutting holes from flight deck to reactor compartment, rent some cranes and hire a gaggle of ex-nuke buddies to install em. Boom. 6 months later, all done. Then ill subcontract out the rest of the $700M overhaul and bonus them $100M so its completed early!!! And my profit margin...well, Id have to give some $$$ back to keep my conscience clean!!!
ReplyDeleteOf course I oversimplify, but as a blue collar guy, the costs and time associated with overhauls, new construction, etc just seem to have too many zeroes attatched!!
Which brings another related thought to mind. With the backlog of ship overhauls and nuclear dismantlings, I wonder why more entrepreneur-types havent tried to open new/reopen old yards for a piece of the Navys pie?? Are the big companies just too controlling? I understand that shipbuilding is basically dead except for USN contracts, but... The BRAC disposal of excess capacity is now killing us. The San Diego lobbys assassination of Long Beach not only killed the only under budget public shipyard, but also eliminated 50% of west coast carrier-capable drydocks... Admittedly, LBNS wasnt nuke-overhaul capable but certainly could have been... Hindsight is painful...