Chinese Amphibious Capabilities

In our recent post about the Chinese Type 075 LHD (see, “Chinese Type 075 LHD”), the discussion turned (okay, I nudged it towards) to the role of Chinese amphibious forces and the need for major amphibious ships and forces.  As we examine Chinese amphibious capabilities, it is wise to note that air force and naval power can deny an enemy access to territory but only ground forces can seize and hold territory.  Thus, the ultimate purpose of amphibious forces is to seize and hold territory.  Yes, they can conduct raids, rescues, embassy security, and other missions but the main mission is seizing territory.  This is the lens through which to view Chinese amphibious capabilities.

With that in mind, it is important to recognize the purpose of China’s amphibious forces as opposed to the US.  We are tempted to compare the raw numbers of ships and Marines and conclude that China is only a minor amphibious threat.  This conclusion, however, fails to grasp the purpose behind China’s amphibious force (as well as their amphibious force growth rate!).  Remember that the US has military commitments and presence all over the world.  Whether that’s wise is a subject for another time.  It means, though, that the US has amphibious forces in the Middle East, Pacific, or anywhere else at any given moment.  Also, the US operates far from home waters. 

In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force operates only in the very localized home waters of the recently annexed South and East China Seas.  Whereas the US needs several amphibious groups to cover all its potential commitments, the Chinese only need one or two to cover their limited region. 

Because of the distances involved and the time required to prepare for, and deploy to, the areas of concern, the US is compelled to maintain a force of 30+ amphibious ships in order to provide a constant forward presence of two or three Amphibious Ready Groups.  In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force is based in their home waters and can almost instantly transition between maintenance, training, and deployment as desired.  Thus, they do not need the 30+ ships of the US amphibious force in order to accomplish the same degree of ‘forward’ presence.

We also need to understand the missions that the Chinese amphibious force is intended for.  The US amphibious force, while theoretically capable of a wide range of missions throughout the combat level spectrum, is intended for major assaults during high end combat.  That we can’t actually execute that mission is irrelevant for this discussion.  In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force is not intended to conduct major assaults against the US.  The Chinese amphibious force is intended to support their low end annexation efforts against the various territories surrounding the South and East China Seas.  This does not require the 30+ amphibious ship fleet of the US.

It is also important to understand that China views military-enabled territorial expansion as perfectly legitimate and acceptable.  In other words, their amphibious force is intended to be used whereas the US force is intended, ideally, to be an unused deterrent.  Even unused, there is a difference.  China’s amphibious force is intended to intimidate as opposed to the US intention of deterrence and, increasingly, humanitarian assistance.

Chinese Amphibious Light Tanks

As we contemplate a map of the East and South China Sea regions and the pattern of expansionist behavior of China, it is clear that it is only a matter of time until China begins knocking on the doors of the various small countries bordering the E/S China Seas.  When China knocks, standing right behind the smiling Chinese face at the door will be the amphibious force, ready to kick the door in if they don’t get what they want.

I think this leads to another aspect of Chinese amphibious operations philosophy and that is the use of overwhelming force.  I strongly suspect that the Chinese have observed the US example/lesson of the use of overwhelming force as exemplified by Desert Storm and the various Iraq/Afghanistan operations.  They’ve seen that the best results are obtained when the attacker has massively superior power.

We’ve seen hints of this in recent Chinese actions.  They send three ships when one is sufficient.  Their interactions with Vietnam, Philippines, and others are executed with vastly superior force when possible.  I think this is an operational tendency that is going to become more pronounced as their naval assets increase in number.  Thus, the Chinese may view a full up amphibious ship and amphibious group as desirable for actions that the US would be content to use a single, lesser ship or group for.

Finally, it is important to note that while the anticipated US opponents are peer or near-peer enemies which would require large amphibious forces to attack with, the Chinese anticipated opponents are far less capable.  While China’s eventual goal is to confront the US, toe to toe, the nearer term use for their amphibious force is against second or third rate militaries such as Vietnam, while they expand and consolidate their periphery around the South and East China Seas.  Thus, for the near to moderate future, China does not require as large an amphibious force as the US because their opponents are far less powerful and capable.

We see, then, that the US and Chinese amphibious forces have very different reasons for existing.  With this understanding, we can now better assess the Chinese amphibious force rather than just, simplistically, comparing it by the numbers to the US amphibious force.

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The link below (1) offers an excellent summary of Chinese amphibious capabilities although the article is strongly pro-Chinese/anti-American.

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(1)South Front website, “Military Analysis: Chinese Amphibious Capabilities”, Brian Kalman, 10-Mar-2016,

https://southfront.org/military-analysis-chinese-amphibious-capabilities/