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Monday, March 4, 2019

Chinese Amphibious Capabilities

In our recent post about the Chinese Type 075 LHD (see, “Chinese Type 075 LHD”), the discussion turned (okay, I nudged it towards) to the role of Chinese amphibious forces and the need for major amphibious ships and forces.  As we examine Chinese amphibious capabilities, it is wise to note that air force and naval power can deny an enemy access to territory but only ground forces can seize and hold territory.  Thus, the ultimate purpose of amphibious forces is to seize and hold territory.  Yes, they can conduct raids, rescues, embassy security, and other missions but the main mission is seizing territory.  This is the lens through which to view Chinese amphibious capabilities.

With that in mind, it is important to recognize the purpose of China’s amphibious forces as opposed to the US.  We are tempted to compare the raw numbers of ships and Marines and conclude that China is only a minor amphibious threat.  This conclusion, however, fails to grasp the purpose behind China’s amphibious force (as well as their amphibious force growth rate!).  Remember that the US has military commitments and presence all over the world.  Whether that’s wise is a subject for another time.  It means, though, that the US has amphibious forces in the Middle East, Pacific, or anywhere else at any given moment.  Also, the US operates far from home waters. 

In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force operates only in the very localized home waters of the recently annexed South and East China Seas.  Whereas the US needs several amphibious groups to cover all its potential commitments, the Chinese only need one or two to cover their limited region. 

Because of the distances involved and the time required to prepare for, and deploy to, the areas of concern, the US is compelled to maintain a force of 30+ amphibious ships in order to provide a constant forward presence of two or three Amphibious Ready Groups.  In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force is based in their home waters and can almost instantly transition between maintenance, training, and deployment as desired.  Thus, they do not need the 30+ ships of the US amphibious force in order to accomplish the same degree of ‘forward’ presence.

We also need to understand the missions that the Chinese amphibious force is intended for.  The US amphibious force, while theoretically capable of a wide range of missions throughout the combat level spectrum, is intended for major assaults during high end combat.  That we can’t actually execute that mission is irrelevant for this discussion.  In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force is not intended to conduct major assaults against the US.  The Chinese amphibious force is intended to support their low end annexation efforts against the various territories surrounding the South and East China Seas.  This does not require the 30+ amphibious ship fleet of the US.

It is also important to understand that China views military-enabled territorial expansion as perfectly legitimate and acceptable.  In other words, their amphibious force is intended to be used whereas the US force is intended, ideally, to be an unused deterrent.  Even unused, there is a difference.  China’s amphibious force is intended to intimidate as opposed to the US intention of deterrence and, increasingly, humanitarian assistance.

Chinese Amphibious Light Tanks


As we contemplate a map of the East and South China Sea regions and the pattern of expansionist behavior of China, it is clear that it is only a matter of time until China begins knocking on the doors of the various small countries bordering the E/S China Seas.  When China knocks, standing right behind the smiling Chinese face at the door will be the amphibious force, ready to kick the door in if they don’t get what they want.

I think this leads to another aspect of Chinese amphibious operations philosophy and that is the use of overwhelming force.  I strongly suspect that the Chinese have observed the US example/lesson of the use of overwhelming force as exemplified by Desert Storm and the various Iraq/Afghanistan operations.  They’ve seen that the best results are obtained when the attacker has massively superior power.

We’ve seen hints of this in recent Chinese actions.  They send three ships when one is sufficient.  Their interactions with Vietnam, Philippines, and others are executed with vastly superior force when possible.  I think this is an operational tendency that is going to become more pronounced as their naval assets increase in number.  Thus, the Chinese may view a full up amphibious ship and amphibious group as desirable for actions that the US would be content to use a single, lesser ship or group for.

Finally, it is important to note that while the anticipated US opponents are peer or near-peer enemies which would require large amphibious forces to attack with, the Chinese anticipated opponents are far less capable.  While China’s eventual goal is to confront the US, toe to toe, the nearer term use for their amphibious force is against second or third rate militaries such as Vietnam, while they expand and consolidate their periphery around the South and East China Seas.  Thus, for the near to moderate future, China does not require as large an amphibious force as the US because their opponents are far less powerful and capable.

We see, then, that the US and Chinese amphibious forces have very different reasons for existing.  With this understanding, we can now better assess the Chinese amphibious force rather than just, simplistically, comparing it by the numbers to the US amphibious force.

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The link below (1) offers an excellent summary of Chinese amphibious capabilities although the article is strongly pro-Chinese/anti-American.



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(1)South Front website, “Military Analysis: Chinese Amphibious Capabilities”, Brian Kalman, 10-Mar-2016,
https://southfront.org/military-analysis-chinese-amphibious-capabilities/

47 comments:

  1. " While China’s eventual goal is to confront the US, toe to toe, the nearer term use for their amphibious force is against second or third rate militaries such as Vietnam, "

    This will get them what they want, as well as get them excellent knowledge and experience for their amphibious groups.

    Our amphibious groups at this stage seem like a tremendous waste of money; because we spend a lot of money on things that can't really do the job they say they can.

    I'm not happy about what the Chinese are doing. But I can respect how they are doing it.

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  2. The Chinese clearly have ambitions beyond the SCS, particularly the Indian Ocean and Africa. Currently they are just buying what they want but that won't be enough and then the amphibious force will lose its near-shore advantages. Everyone obsesses about the coming conflict with the USA - I think conflict with India will come first and the US needs to spend a lot more time, energy and money getting India on its side. US technology plus Indian numbers would put the Chinese in a difficult position.

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    1. " I think conflict with India will come first"

      Fascinating perspective. I agree totally with your comments about partnering up with India.

      Excellent comment. I'd love to see you expand on it. Where/how will China and India come into conflict? Are there Chinese moves that India would view as unacceptable and worth fighting over? Do you see a ground war or a more limited sea/air conflict? What do you think China wants from Africa (raw materials, rare earths, obviously but what else?)? Partnering with India is a good idea for the US but what can we do to contain the Chinese in Africa as there are no militarily strong countries to partner with?

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    2. India and Pakistan don't get along very well and Pakistan is a major customer of Chinese military arms. Instead of a direct armed conflict with India, China might well use Pakistan as a proxy in a war with India. Conversely, China might use a war between India and Pakistan as a pretext to fight India, coming to the aid of an ally as it were.



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    3. "contain the Chinese in Africa as there are no militarily strong countries to partner with?"

      I think you do that by not thinking militarily first. We don't need to repeat the cold war and just say who cares if he is murdering dictator as long as he is not a commie one.

      Bush Jr AIDs/HIV initiative was a good start. As was the overall huge effort the US puts into combating Ebola. Frankly the introduction of gene altered mosquitos to eliminate malaria should be a no brainier on the US dime if you want convince Africa you care about its people and future prosperity not just its resources for extraction. Support aggressively countries like Rwanda and Botswana that do an excellent job on the rights of their citizens and suppressing corruption.
      Highlight the way your help does not come with the kind of strings China's loans do. Since they are more or less payday loans for poor countries.

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    4. There's a number of relevant factors, I think. China is facing a number of issues and they all hit at the same time.

      - China is currently forecast to achieve financial parity with the USA somewhere in the mid to late 2030s.
      - China is forecast for its population to peak and then start declining from 2029.
      - China has approximately 15 million men more than women in their 20s and 30s due to the 'one child' policy. They can't get wives or carry on their family name and this causes a problem.
      - China has put 1.5M of their muslims in 're-education' camps in the desert.
      - Sea level rises will hit a huge proportion of population and defences will cost a fortune. It will also submerge most of the SCS islands and therefore wipe out China's bases and claims.
      - The mountain ranges that feed all the major rivers in South-East Asia are showing signs of many of the springs drying up - if that trend continues, large areas of India, China etc will become infertile.
      - India's population shows no sign of peaking.
      - Increased wealth in China coupled with reducing family size may lead Chinese to become better educated, less crowded and may continue the trend of moving towards western consumerist values. The effect of this is unknown but it does at least threaten the future of the communist party's control as happy people may not wish to see their only children killed in a war when winning won't really gain them benefits.

      The overall effect of the above is that China's opportunity to act as we fear they intend to peaks in the late part of the first half of this century. So, unless their leadership changes, they will have to act by then or probably miss the boat.

      The Chinese have had a number of clashes with India and there are still 3 areas on the border where the ownership is unresolved. China has clear interest in Pakistan, Tibet and Bangladesh and India cannot expand in any land direction without coming into conflict with China. I don't believe China will allow Pakistan to fall to India without intervening but less sure about the other two.

      So, India's population expanding, fertile ground reducing, the people will move and they can only move into hostile territory. I think illegal migration and an over-reaction to that by a surrounding country will be the trigger.

      I think China can keep buying Africa and there is a very large Chinese population there too so the risk there is any threat to the supply line - chances are that would only be skirmishing (mines, the odd warning shot etc) rather than a full-on conflict.

      We can't gain influence in Africa unless we are prepared to seriously invest - we (the west) have the contacts through previous colonial activities but the Chinese are just throwing the money around and we aren't and the result of that is obvious.

      Anyway, that was my thinking...as you asked!

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    5. "I think you do that by not thinking militarily first. ...

      Bush Jr AIDs/HIV initiative was a good start. As was the overall huge effort the US puts into combating Ebola."

      Excellent thoughts. However, we could well wind up with many friendly Africans while the Chinese wind up with raw material rights, basing rights, annexed territory, etc. as is currently happening. Through unscrupulous means, China is acquiring business, rights, and basing. How do you deal with that?

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    6. "The overall effect of the above is that China's opportunity to act as we fear they intend to peaks in the late part of the first half of this century. So, unless their leadership changes, they will have to act by then or probably miss the boat."

      Excellent contribution. I'm intrigued by your population effects and, in particular, your population movement predictions.

      Interestingly, China has been using population emigration as a means to wrest control of neighboring countries. Philippines, for example, has a large and growing Chinese population which is slowly but surely taking control of local governments, businesses, finances, manufacturing, etc. The conquest of Philippines is underway and moving smoothly ahead. This illustrates that excess population doesn't need to be a detrimental factor for China. Properly controlled and directed outward it can be a tool for non-violent annexation. What do you think?

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    7. I agree - China doesn't need to resort to military force to take most of South-East Asia. Indonesia is the big one after the Philippines - that secures access to the Indian Ocean. Japan, Taiwan etc are really irrelevant once Pacific access via the Philippines is gained.

      The only way to defeat Chinese soft power is to out-invest them but with most of Europe refusing to support the US and the US not apparently even having a strategy for Africa below the Sahara, it's an open goal.

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    8. "I think you do that by not thinking militarily first. ...

      Bush Jr AIDs/HIV initiative was a good start. As was the overall huge effort the US puts into combating Ebola."

      Germany was still fighting when the French were rewriting history to remove the rest of the allies from the liberation of France.

      "Goodwill" can work, in some circumstances, but a tin pot cnl who came to power in a glorious coup 6 months ago, deposing the tyrant who came to power 18 months before that is unlikely to be a reliable partner able to repay your goodwill 5 years down the line.

      South Africa is currently rewriting the constitution to legalise seizure of land.
      No reason that won't happen to Chinese financed mines, railways and power stations across the continent.

      China could of course, correct, that behaviour, but that requires occupation troops, forever, whom the US can arm guerillas against, and the US can threaten mainland China whilst the Chinese army is off playing in the Jungle
      Or it requires Genocide,
      But even if China killed or expelled every South African, it would still be facing an insurgency from those who escaped North.

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    9. History says otherwise - the British held on to South Africa for a very long time and it was only really the weakening of the Empire by World Wars elsewhere that changed that.

      The wild card would be that South Africa had nuclear weapons and no-one really knows how easy it would be to generate a limited number of devices now - they have the knowledge and the materiel.

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    10. "History says otherwise"

      You completely lost me. History says otherwise about what? I think you're trying to tie this into Chinese actions but I'm totally missing the connection. Try again.

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    11. Britain held South Africa for decades and the insurgents were never more than a nuisance. The black population was thoroughly suppressed and there was large scale white migration. There was no need for genocide to win as there was a massive technological advantage - as there would be for the Chinese today. China could easily use migration to ensure that there was never a black majority ever again and could sit back and use South Africa as a stepping point while claiming they had a nice democratically elected government to undermine western protests.

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    12. http://www.circleid.com/posts/20141001_infographic_where_in_the_world_do_chinese_people_live/

      2014 data but interesting nonetheless.

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  3. Nice article. I wasn't even seeing much of the bias CNOps indicated until the conclusion, where it gets pretty Sinophilic. So, China has a pretty serious sea lift capability. How do we make it worthless, or maybe just worth less?

    In the last post on this topic I highlighted that amphibs are as vulnerable as they are expensive. Unfortunately, China invested sufficiently in their blue water combatants to make attacking an ARG non-facile.

    Our amphibious capabilities seem to be paralyzed by our OTH amphibious assault doctrine. Given that China doesn't place the same value on marines' lives as the USA, how can we best impose costs on them and force them into a similarly risk-averse OTH doctrine? In the short term, I think fortifying the most strategically valuable beaches in WestPac is more cost effective than a distributed threat like an anti-ship ballistic missile or widely deployed submarines. In the longer term (when China is more realistically considering operations over 200 miles away), submarines probably give you the scariest fog of war for your buck, if not the most amphibs sunk as well.

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    1. "how can we best impose costs on them and force them into a similarly risk-averse OTH doctrine? … fortifying the most strategically valuable beaches"

      Interesting that you're, essentially, describing the question the German's faced as they contemplated the cross-channel invasion which resulted in D-Day. Attack the force at sea? Fortify and contest the shoreline? Allow the landing and mass a counterattack?

      You might want to consider their solution and how it played out versus your inclination. Is there a lesson for us from D-Day? What do you think?

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    2. There are a few lessons that are still relevant.
      Having proper intelligence...
      The disinformation the Allies spread pre-Dday achieved wonders. It left the Germans looking in the wrong direction and having forces placed incorrectly.
      Air superiority...
      Absolutely a major factor.
      Local control...
      Generals waiting for authorization from Berlin to move forces cost time that hurt the defense badly.
      Defenders are at a disadvantage...
      The Allies waited until they could build and bring enough capability to win. Static defense is a speed bump, not a roadblock.
      These are shortcomings I feel the Germans had that made the outcome inevitable.


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    3. The Philippines sprung to mind instantly as it's my second home.

      An archipelago with more than 7000 islands, beaches everywhere. I think if the Chinese wanted it, it would be darn difficult to stop them.

      It also makes a pretty good jumping off point if you have further ambitions in the area.

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    4. "There are a few lessons that are still relevant.

      Having proper intelligence...

      Air superiority...

      Local control...

      Defenders are at a disadvantage...

      The Allies waited until they could build and bring enough capability to win. Static defense is a speed bump, not a roadblock."

      Well, sure. Who doesn't want air superiority, perfect intelligence, etc.? I mean, sure, those are lessons but they're kind of universal wishes more than specific lessons.

      Your last point,

      "The Allies waited until they could build and bring enough capability to win. Static defense is a speed bump, not a roadblock."

      has the potential to be a valuable, specific lesson. The Allied build up was mandatory for success. What could the Germans have done to prevent it?

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    5. "The Philippines ... if the Chinese wanted it, it would be darn difficult to stop them."

      Given Duterte's Chinese leanings and the heavy influx of Chinese citizens, how can the US counter the eventual annexation of Philippines?

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    6. @CNOps; funny thing, that. I was just looking back at your D-Day summary in the archives. The distributed threat posed by an amphibious assault force is hard to counter economically by a coastal fortification strategy, but the Nazis made a lot of mistakes in their implementation.

      Rather than focusing on speed bumps to their marines (which are attritable), we should focus on supplying allies with mines, mine layers, maritime patrol aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles, and heavy coastal artillery. Some of these can defend multiple landing areas by threatening ships OTH. Others present more concentrated defense for the most likely/valuable targets. Together, these may not be enough to stop an assault, but they're sufficient to require a major assault and to impose high costs on it.

      Besides tieing up PLAN assets so we can conduct our own strikes and assaults, this is also a good way to reassure (keep) allies and ensure that they're paying for a major portion of their defense.

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    7. " The distributed threat posed by an amphibious assault force is hard to counter economically by a coastal fortification strategy"

      You're close to an epiphany, here, I think. Waiting of the defensive for an invasion is almost inherently a losing proposition unless you have perfect intelligence about the location, timing, and methodology. HOWEVER, the Allies exhibited a potential vulnerability in the form of the massive build up in England of troops, supplies, and equipment. Had Germany been able to attack those concentrations they could possibly have caused the attack to be postponed indefinitely. Yes, the troops and supplies were dispersed to some extent but not that much. Further, it would not have been necessary to inflict 100% destruction on the build up - even 20% losses and the resulting disruption might have been adequate to cause the Allies to perpetually delay the invasion.

      Saying that, is the easy part. The hard part would have been executing the required attacks on the troop concentrations and supply dumps. Here's where I have to bow out to a large extent because I simply don't have detailed enough knowledge about what resources and capabilities the Germans could have brought to bear on the build up. Maybe they simply lacked the resources.

      I would think that this would have been the ideal time/place to apply cross channel bombing attacks rather than the Battle of Britain. This would also have been ideal for small unit, commando type raids to destroy depots and troop concentrations.

      One can also wonder if the Germans should have pushed forward with their plans for their own cross channel invasion of England. At that point, England was pretty well fought out and was hanging on by a thread.

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    8. @CNO Not sure of the scope of the answer you expect... But what i think youre looking for is that they should have been thinking and acting offensively. While both their naval and air forces were largely depleted by D-day, for years previous, resources were misspent on defensive measures, bombing cities, etc.
      In a larger scope, going to war before their military expansion plan was complete (which if completed, still left them second best to the RN and a resurgent USN) was a major blunder. Waiting til 1945 would have significantly grown the crucial Uboat force, and although ASW tech would have matured albeit at a slower rate, the much larger numbers of boats at the outset could have altered history.
      In a small scope, the Germans failed to deny the Allies beach access. The best available tool for that was mines. If they couldnt destroy the invasion fleet while in England, then their top priority should have been mines dense enough to walk across the Channel. Alternatively or additionally, mining of British ports could have impacted the preinvasion buildup...

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    9. Defending the beach is like trying to fight a sub at sea - it's the worst way to do it. The preferred way to fight a sub is to destroy the factory where it's made and destroy the port where it's serviced. Similarly, the best defense is to destroy the invasion fleet before it launches. You kind of got that with your comment about acting offensively. See my comment above about attacking the build up in England.

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    10. Yes... We thought similarly. And in that vein, with the limited ability to get to and attack all the massing forces, denying their ability to grow further or ultimately embark for the invasion would be the best choice, ie... Attacking the ports, sinking the transports, wrecking port facilities, and importantly, mining the harbors. When lacking accurate intelligence on where the massing forces are, the ports and facilities are default daily targets since they dont move...

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    11. "One can also wonder if the Germans should have pushed forward with their plans for their own cross channel invasion of England. At that point, England was pretty well fought out and was hanging on by a thread."

      @ComNavOps: not really, no. Germany didn't have the same sort of amphibious sealift that the Allies had, and the Kriegsmarine would not have been able to secure the Channel against the Royal Navy. Operation Sea Lion wasn't a viable option for them. Also, Stephen Bungay in "The Most Dangerous Enemy" notes that the RAF actually ended the Battle of Britain with more aircraft and pilots than when they'd started: the balance of strength steadily shifted in the RAF's favor during the Battle of Britain. Saying that England was hanging by a thread isn't an entirely correct reading of the strategic situation.

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    12. "Given that China doesn't place the same value on marines' lives as the USA, how can we best impose costs on them and force them into a similarly risk-averse OTH doctrine?"

      I suspect that the Chinese versions of LCACs (small LCACs on up to the large Zubr) are intended for initial wave use, unlike our LCACs which are relegated to follow on use due to the risk and their non-survivability. If the Chinese are willing to accept the risk and attrition by using LCACs in the initial assault wave, they can, potentially, land much heavier equipment, tanks, armor, and artillery than we could in a similar situation.

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    13. Duterte, love him or hate him, is something of a realist. I think there's a quote there, "what do you want me to do? Fight them?" when referring to the Chinese.

      Americans are generally very well thought of in the Philippines, but there has been at least one incident at Scarborough Shoal that suggests the mutual defense pact has about the value of use toilet paper. Duterte, his government and most of the better educated Filipinos are well aware of the issues.

      https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/01/04/the-real-reasons-rodrigo-duterte-flip-flopped-on-south-china-sea-disputes/#30a5be0e902c

      https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/04/14/take-defense-treaty-action-for-philippine-sovereignty-in-south-china-sea/#47f71ccb6ed3

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    14. (cont)
      https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/25/philippines-sabic-bay-fears-chinese-may-take-over-old-us-naval-base.html

      https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/2178749/chinese-workers-flood-philippines-yet-dutertes-officials-dont

      It seems there may be about 200,000 Chinese in the Philippines, about 3/4 may be illegal. The ties in somewhat with the estimate of about 200,000 Filipinos working in China, most of them illegal.

      The Philippines has a population somewhere around 110 million, so its not a flood as yet. The article about the Chinese perhaps wanting to buy the port facilities at Subic Bay is very interesting to me.

      I think the Philippines would like much better ties with the US, but the feeling is the US is somewhat of a paper tiger that far from home, and particularly against the Chinese is what is very nearly their home water. After the lack of action at Scarborough Shoal, what would it take for the US to get involved in actively supporting the Philippines? I'm certainly not clear.

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    15. " "what do you want me to do? Fight them?"

      You're quite right. The US has offered little in the way of a practical alternative although Duterte seems to have a decidedly unfavorable bias against the US. Until the US starts standing up to China, ourselves, we can't expect anyone else to sign up to join us.

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    16. "what would it take for the US to get involved in actively supporting the Philippines?"

      There are any number of actions the US can take but a good start would have been to actively resist the illegal islands (not useless Freedom of Navigation exercises) just short of weapons firing, actively resist all Chinese territorial incursions, supply Philippines with whatever military material they need (give them old Perrys, if they want them or give them LCSes), provide active ISR for anti-terrorist/counterinsurgency, partner with Philippines to improve ports for both commercial and military use, and so on.

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    17. Agreed. I do wonder about the political considerations about getting more involved in South-East Asia again.

      If action was contemplated, kicking the Chinese out of Scarborough Shoal would be a tremendous first start.
      a. Because its where the current mess started so the symbolism is very significant.
      b. Its very important for Filipino fishermen today, let alone resource development in the future, so highly practical concerns too.

      The squabble over rifle sales was big in the media, as was the squabble over helicopters. I think helos are now resolved. The rifle thing was simply stupid and churlish. You should never be a churl, particularly with the Chinese sniffing around and promising to be your best buddy.

      I think Perrys would be an excellent idea. Cause, Chinese subs among other problems. LCS not so much, cause - Chinese subs.

      Broncos or something Bronco-ish would be fantastic for the insurgency in Mindanao. Rough and ready, unimproved fields, loiter forever. Relatively easy to maintain.

      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-usa-rifles-idUSKBN12V2AM

      https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-philippines-defence-helicopters/philippines-to-buy-u-s-helicopters-not-russian-due-to-u-s-sanctions-official-idUKKBN1O6146

      Improved ISR support is also an excellent idea as it builds friendly contacts between the militarys.

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    18. A couple more things to consider about the Phils.

      Duterte is absolutely HUGE on build, build, build. Any infrastructure help would contribute to being "best buddies" and help counter China.

      China is neck-deep in the Philippine "shabu" epidemic. Either the crystal meth itself, or precursors, or manufacturing equipment and funding. It shouldn't be too tough to prove it, then offer some substantial help to shut it down.

      I expect everyone is familiar with the war on drugs in the Philippines.

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    19. I didn't see this before I mentioned Broncos, but hmmmmm.

      http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/22343/those-suped-up-ov-10-broncos-that-took-on-isis-in-iraq-are-being-sold-off

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    20. @CNOps:

      "You're close to an epiphany, here... [disrupting the buildup]"

      You were right, but the epiphany that was inspired by this very line of reasoning came later - while thinking about something else entirely - and is about a distinct but similar topic.

      A long time ago, you were very skeptical about the payload and overall capabilities of USN's LHAs ("Aviation Amphibious Assault Ships" post). The epiphany is that their CONOPs is (partly) a lie, and they're a specialized component of a very effective shipping interdiction task group able to "disrupt the build-up of war material" in China. Everything that "air cavalry" marines lack in shore-storming, they make up for in ship-boarding. If you intend to interdict non-combat ships without sinking them, without necessarily killing the crew, and with minimal diplomatic repercussion then you use marines every time. The America LHA adds a concentrated volume of that capability that exceeds what the type 075 or anything else brings to the PLAN. It isn't a "combat" mission for hard-nosed battleship lovers, but if we actually *executed* an embargo then the value would be much easier to discern.

      If building lots of "conventional" ballistic missiles and springing up air defense identification zones in the (inter)"national" waters of the SCS falls short of open hostilities then an embargo certainly does too. Why not? A political question...

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  4. D-Day lessons, don't lose air superiority, tough to run troops around with airplanes shooting up your log tail & arty.
    BBs are wizard at counterbattery, the only thing missing were
    VT 14in shells.

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    1. What would you have done differently, if you were the German commander?

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    2. Shot Hitler, fortified the Rhine instead, thrown all my reserves into holding back Stalin and then folded to the western allies hopefully while the USSR was on the other side of the Vistula.

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    3. But seriously on D-Day. I guess the first clear thing is that there should have actually been a real German commander. Rommel or Rundstedt but somebody with full operational control of all German units in the theater - Air, Sea, Land. Convoluted command killed the defense before it got started.

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    4. Exactly... And Id have certainly thrown every Naval asset possible at the Allies. Once they gained a toehold, the end was just a matter of time!! Its interesting that, even though the "Arsenal of Democracy" was the key, Axis leadership and command handed us victories and the ultimate result through so many strategic and tactical mistakes. Winning war is about making fewer mistakes than the enemy. Even though I dont see many variations where we actually lost as feasible, the war certainly could have been much longer and costly on both fronts... A lot of those mistakes are ours to make in the future if we arent wary of them!

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    5. "somebody with full operational control of all German units"

      Absolutely. And what should that commander have done differently with his assets?

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    6. " Id have certainly thrown every Naval asset possible at the Allies."

      The Germans, at that point, had no surface naval assets sufficient to affect the outcome. Possibly, the U-boats could have had an impact, if used differently. Want to think about this one a bit more? You might start by taking a look at the listing of Allied naval assets that were used for D-Day and comparing them to Germany's. Give it some more thought and let me know what you think.

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    7. Germany could have won Normandy, but not easily.
      The idea that the allies would build a mobile port was just beyond their thinking
      Beyond that, poor command and control limited their ability to respond decicivly and then of course, sheer lack of resources.

      The classical answers are sinking the landing ships with the troops on them.
      That was the fear the UK had in the Falklands, we had destroyers to spare, the loss of a landing ship with 3000 men on it would have been a national disaster.
      Luckily Argentina decided it needed to knock out the destroyers first.

      The alternative is let them land and then mount a massive counter attack, but that requires knowing when and where with notice enough to prepare.
      The first landers in chains is a solid case for there not being second landers.

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    8. "Germany could have won Normandy, but not easily."

      You've described generalized alternatives but what would you, the German commander, with complete command and control authority, have done differently with the resources you had? Or was there simply no hope?

      Delete
    9. Had all 10 panzer divisions held in reserve been thrown at Normandy, it's possible the attack would have been blunted.
      Had Normandy failed, and badly, especially if the Mulberry's were lost, it's possible the Germans could have pushed for a peace.

      But allied deception had utterly convinced German high command Normandy was a feint, by the time they realised, it was too late.
      They did eventually attempt an encirclement, in the hope that sufficient PoWs could be held out for peace, but realistically, it was hopeless.
      Even if they did counter attack quickly enough and destroy Mulberry, the allies could have spent winter building another set, and have continued to push through Italy in the interim.

      Delete
  5. Just an observation; we pour alot of resources into our amphib offensive capabilities..

    Do we have any conops for repelling an amphib assault or invasion? Any script or tactic beyond "If the PRC attacks Taiwan we'll show up and (nonspecifically) whoop some ass!"

    If a couple of those Type 75 Jeep Carriers popped up off the coast of Diego Garcia or Anderson would we be ready or able to do anything other then stare all slack-jawed like navy brass vacationing in Hawaii circa 1941?

    ReplyDelete

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