Pages

Wednesday, March 6, 2019

What If - Stopping D-Day

It’s time for an invigorating round of historical ‘what if’.  The discussion portion of our recent post on Chinese amphibious capabilities took an inexplicable detour (as post discussions often do!) to debating what Germany could have done differently to defeat or prevent the Allied D-Day invasion.  The usual list of suspects was discussed including unified command and control, air superiority, better intel, etc. 

ComNavOps, always believing that the best defense is a good offense, suggested that, rather than waiting on the defensive and then trying to stop the assault, the Germans would have been better served to go after the buildup of troops, supplies, and equipment in England and stop the invasion at its source, before it ever started.  This is analogous to conducting ASW not by fighting subs out in the open ocean but by attacking the factories that produce the subs and the ports where they are serviced.  It’s easier to destroy the source of submarines and their support facilities than to battle them one-on-one at sea.

Had Germany been able to significantly impact the buildup, the invasion would have been indefinitely delayed.  Of course, this is easier said than done.  Let’s kick around some ideas and see if it could have been done.

D-Day - Could This Have Been Prevented?

First, it is necessary to understand that the Germans would not have had to destroy 100% of the men and materiel – an on-going destruction of, perhaps, 20% would likely have been sufficient to disrupt the training and buildup to the point of causing perpetual delays in the assault timing, thereby accomplishing the goal of ‘defeating’ the invasion before it ever began.

So, understanding the fairly limited scope of the task, what methods could the Germans have used to accomplish this task?


Strategic Bombing – Instead of focusing on bombing London, the Luftwaffe could have focused on troop, supply, and equipment concentrations.  Yes, men and material were dispersed across England but it’s impossible to prepare a D-Day size invasion and not have significant concentrations of men and materiel.  In fact, the very dispersal that was used, to the extent it was, would have worked against the RAF’s defensive efforts since they would have had to disperse their defending aircraft as well.

Recognizing that, ultimately, an amphibious assault depends on transport ships, the bombing should also have focused on the transport ships.  These would have been relatively known, fixed point locations and easy targets (neglecting, of course, the surrounding anti-aircraft (AA) defenses and RAF!).

It is also worth wondering if, instead of massed bombing attacks, the Germans should have engaged in smaller, low level, nighttime aircraft raids.  Launched against known depots, troop concentrations, and transport vessels, such raids ought to have been difficult to detect, nearly impossible to predict the targets, difficult to defend against, and fairly effective since total destruction would not have been the goal – 20% overall destruction should have been fairly easily achievable.

German Bombers Attacking Depots, Troop Concentrations, and Transport Ships

Commando Raids – The very short distance across the English Channel and North Sea (ranging from 60 miles at the SW end to a narrow point of around 20 miles at the Calais-Dover area and back out to 100 miles between Belgium/Netherlands and England across the North Sea) lends itself to undetected transport of small raiding units across the Channel.  Raids from Company down to squad size units would have been undetectable and difficult to defend against.  E Boats were able to routinely operate undetected in the Channel and nighttime, small transports would have been very difficult to detect and interdict.  Again, total destruction would not have been the raider’s goal.  Constant disruption would have sufficed to indefinitely delay the planned invasion.

German Brandenburg Commandos Attacking Allied Supply Depot


U-Boats and Mining – The Germans might have been better off concentrating a portion of their U-Boats not to direct sinking of ships in convoys in the mid-Atlantic but to continual clandestine laying/re-laying of mines at each port.  It doesn’t matter how many ships arrived from the US if they couldn’t get into a port to unload.  This would also have had the effect of avoiding direct combat with the Royal Navy (RN), thereby preserving U-Boats.  Of course the RN would have heavily patrolled the port approaches but without the U-Boats ‘announcing’ their presence in the form of revealing attacks, detection would have been much more difficult.  Extensive mining would also have taken a toll on the RN destroyers and rendered their defensive efforts much more difficult and dangerous.

Type TMB Mine Being Loaded Aboard U-Boat To Seal The English Ports


E Boats (Schnellboot) – German E Boats should have focused on finding and destroying landing vessels more so than merchant vessels or warships.  Sneaking near or into ports and sinking transports would have definitely caused invasion plans to be postponed.

E Boat Attacking Transport Vessels


Naval Bombardment – The time frame in question, here, is 1940-1944.  Especially during the early years, Germany had the use of Bismarck (later Tirpitz) and several heavy cruisers.  With co-ordinated support from the Luftwaffe, dedicated Luftwaffe anti-torpedo plane screens (English torpedo planes of the time were barely advanced beyond WWI levels and should have been easy prey for German fighters), E Boat screening, and U-Boat support and mining to prevent the British Home Fleet from approaching, bombardment raids aimed at the Allies transport vessels could have been conducted with a reasonable chance of success. 

Bismarck Attacking Transport Vessels


Shore Artillery – Though not capable of direct attacks on Allied men and materiel in England, shore artillery at the Calais-Dover chokepoint could have sealed the northeast entry to the Channel from RN naval forces.  The fact that such artillery was fielded and produced very little success wouldn’t have changed the thinking at the time that the RN couldn’t risk that approach.  Combined with mining, the northeast approach would have been secured from Allied naval intrusion thereby facilitating the above listed methods.

Calais-Dover Shore Artillery


Summation and Lessons for Today - With some effort and refocusing of priorities, the Germans could have turned the English Channel into an A2/AD zone and a fairly secure base from which to indefinitely disrupt the Allied buildup for the Normandy invasion. 

The major lesson to be gleaned from this is that defense, ultimately, seldom succeeds.  The best defense is a good offense.  This is relevant today for the US Navy.  Our entire fleet is heavily slanted towards defense (Aegis, AMDR, BMD).  Our carriers with their shrinking and short ranged air wings have almost reached the point of existing merely to protect themselves.  We have produced no offensive ship or weapon in decades.  Navy leadership has recently publicly acknowledged exactly this and now claims to be focusing on offensive operations – yeah, we’ll see.

Another major lesson is strategic thinking.  The German military’s strategic thinking was dominated by Hitler, personally, both in his explicit orders and the stifling effect he had on his military leadership.  No one ever accused Hitler of being a strategic genius.  Had Hitler not elected to attack Russia in June 1941, Germany would have had double the men and materiel to oppose the Allied invasion and would have been in a far stronger position to carry out the actions listed above.  Today, our military and Navy suffer from the same complete lack of intelligent strategic thinking.  Witness our absolutely floundering and nearly non-existent response to the Chinese annexation of the South China Sea.  Witness our complete lack of a military strategy for war with China.  We need to begin serious offensive strategic thinking and wargaming.

Mine warfare is another obvious lesson for us, today.  The power of mines has been demonstrated time and again throughout history and yet, for practical purposes, the Navy has no offensive mine warfare capability.  We need new, more capable mines and multiple ways to deliver them.  We need to integrate mine warfare into our operational planning (you know, whenever we get any operational planning).

This kind of ‘what if’ thought exercise is not only enjoyable but it offers insights and lessons applicable to our situations today.

62 comments:

  1. I wonder what would happen to a Chinese Amphibious Force if Taiwan was turned into a giant version of Iwo Jima.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Bear in mind that for all the Japanese preparations and fortifications, the battle lasted only five weeks. As a general statement, an isolated defender cannot win - it only remains to determine the price of the attacker's victory.

      Delete
  2. Though a more on topic comment would be this.
    The German Navy couldn’t challenge the Brits or the Americans but they could raid shipping well. If the Germans weren’t as skittish with using the Tirpitz they could inhibit the build up of forces in the area for D-Day. Speaking of Tirpitz she is also an example of what’s needed to sink a BB. Three fortress crushing Tallboy bombs were needed. Imagine modern bombers trying to deploy a bunker buster on an actual moving erratic target rather than one stuck in port. They still missed with the majority of them and it took the Brits four years to get her.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "The German Navy couldn’t challenge the Brits or the Americans but they could raid shipping well."

      Gotta disagree, here. Every German raider was tracked down and sunk with little to show for their efforts. Yes, the Germans could have executed their commerce raiding more effectively but it was destined to be an irrelevant action in any event.

      Using the German navy as I've described here would, at least, offer a useful, potentially survivable, action in support of a strategic goal.

      Delete
    2. To be fair, while it took three raids and several bombs to sink (or at least capsize) the Tirpitz, the very first bomb that hit her caused massive damage and rendered her unusable as anything other than a floating gun battery. You could take the efforts to sink the Tirpitz as an example of how difficult it was to sink a large battleship, or you could see it as a demonstration of how even a ship as fearsome as the Tirpitz could be permanently mission-killed by one (admittedly very large) bomb.

      Delete
  3. Having just finished reading "The Mare's Nest", the Germans were considering disrupting the invasion build up by launching their V1 campaign against the south coast of England but for some reason Hitler or his cronies held off until after the invasion and then targeted only London. Makes for an interesting “what if” consideration.
    RA

    ReplyDelete
  4. Had Hitler not invaded Russia, there's always the possibility that Stalin would have attacked first in 42 or 43. The Red Army was huge, and offensively orientated in hardware and doctrine. They had thousands of fast BT series tanks in forward positions, entire airborne armies, and a a "deep battle" theory of operations geared towards the attack, which kind of explains their disastrous defensive performance in 41.

    ReplyDelete
  5. Stopping D-day:

    All good points, however...
    The day Hitler attacked Poland, his fate was sealed. England made good on it's commitment to support Poland and declared war on Germany and nothing short of mass starvation in England, would have kept the English from demanding, through military force, that Germany return to it's pre-war borders. When Germany attacked France, England was further obligated to war in Europe.

    In 1940, Hitler might have tried to negotiate a non-aggression pact with England but, having just broken 2 such agreements, and with England's honor at stake, it seems extremely unlikely that Churchill would have supported this. Even if Germany had stopped bombing England, and tried to consolidate the victories in Western Europe, England would have continued to wage war against Germany.

    When Japan attacked the U.S. Pacific fleet, congress declared war on Japan, and it's ally Germany, having gained the support of the public. The U.S. went on a war footing and became wholly committed, ensuring the shortest possible war in Europe.

    Germany had no means of building up its military, every port and most industrial areas were within reach of the RAF. The U.S. was manufacturing war materiel in safety and could stockpile an invasion fleet.

    Germany was working an the A-bomb, but was years away from a nuclear explosion. IF the war had lasted 3 more months, the first U.S. bomb would probably have been dropped on Hiroshima, and the second one on a German city.

    I've skipped a lot!! So I apologize if this seems incomplete.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Way to suck the fun out of a 'what if'!

      Delete
    2. Germany declared on the U.S. first. U.S. did not declare on Germany due to Pearl Harbor, but in response to the German declaration.

      Delete
    3. IF the war in Europe would have lasted longer. or the atomic bomb been ready sooner, the first atomic weapon would have (and should have) been dropped on Germany...

      GAB
      GAB

      Delete
    4. I cant agree that the end was scripted for Germany in Sept '39... I feel that turning east was the major cause, and secondly, the US entering the war. England wasnt quite on the ropes in Dec '41, but certainly could have been. Many strategic and tactical level mistakes (often in the form of Hitler interfering with his commanders), as well as the fortunes of war conspired to write history as it stands.

      Delete
    5. @JJ Yes... but Germany's primary goal was lebensraum: territorial expansion eastward. This geopolitical goal was not unique to the Nazis, but also fundamental to Imperial Germany. It appeared from the 1890’s, essentially the entire existence of Germany as a nation state (the unified German state was created in 1871).

      GAB

      Delete
    6. "Germany's primary goal was lebensraum"

      GAB, do you think Germany could have achieved this if they had taken the Chinese long view and settled for just seizing an occasional small country from time to time rather than engaging in a world war?

      Regarding China, do you think they believe in their own lebensraum or do you think their territorial expansion goals are rooted in some other motivation?

      Delete
    7. My long view is that the Germans and Russians are not through with each other yet!

      Germany’s best opportunity for eastern expansion was likely WWI; once the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, war in east was inevitable, it did not matter if Germany was ruled as Imperial Germany, Weimar Republic, or National Socialism, it was a case of who moved east or who moved west first.

      Imperial Germany was unable to effectively control its new-found territories during WWI, it is not clear that they could have even if the western allies had agreed to a return to 1914 borders.

      The Chinese remain an enigma: a truly ancient country nursing many, many millennia old grudges. My sense is that the USA needs to be off the Korean peninsula ASAP and also full disinvested from South Korea. When Korea re-unifies, the Chinese will naturally wield massive influence over 75 million Koreans and the 12th largest economy (South Korea’s) in the world.

      GAB

      Delete
    8. "When Korea re-unifies, the Chinese will naturally wield massive influence over 75 million Koreans and the 12th largest economy (South Korea’s) in the world."

      I'm missing the connection, here. How/why would China exert any more influence after reunification than before?

      China is not particularly popular in Korea, as far as I'm aware. Chinese economic 'punishments' over the THAAD affair did not sit well with Korea. Korea seems to officially want good relations but China's actions seem to consistently test that resolve!

      Delete
    9. China will wield significant influence over a reunified Korea for the same reason that Iran dominates Iraq: geography and economics.

      China is already SK’s top trading partner 34.4% ($162.2 billion + $46 billion from Hong Kong) and of course ~86% of NK trade is with China. For contrast the United States represents only 12.1% at $73.1 billion of SK trade; Japan only 5.1% at $30.6 billion. But the trade figures will grow rapidly as the former NK is developed after reunification. SK is already the number one tourist destination for Chinese. Mandarin is the language experiencing the most growth in SK schools.

      A reunified Korean state will be forced to cooperate closely and on a continuously with the PLA on a PLA on a host of issues. For example, SK is heavily industrialized, but lacks capacity, and in some cases, the types of industries, to rapidly rebuild the north, so it is that the Koreans will not rely heavily on the Chinese for infrastructure (e.g. transformers) and construction. Further, it is inconceivable that Korea would choose to not to integrate their electric grid with the Chinese (electric grids get exponentially more robust the bigger they get). Then consider the Amrok (Yalu river) and all the issues from industrial usage, dams and water rights, fishing, the 200+ islands with Korean and Chinese nationals. Korea is also mountainous, only ~18% of the land is arable, much of that food is coming from China and will continue to come from China as the PLA continues to apply U.S agricultural technology stolen from the USA.

      GAB

      Delete
    10. "China will wield significant influence over a reunified Korea for the same reason that Iran dominates Iraq: geography and economics."

      Hmm … fascinating. I'll have to give that some serious consideration. Of course, all this projected cooperation is countered by China's continued confrontational actions such as contesting fishing locations and rights, projecting EEZ and Air Defense Identification Zones over Korean zones and territories, penetrating Korea's ADIZ without following protocol, etc.

      China appears willing to accept Korea as a tributary state but not as a full peer. This will continually hamper cooperative efforts.

      Do you see a danger that a reunified Korea will so closely attempt to walk the line between China and the US that Korea will become a de facto neutral and unreliable as a US ally?

      Delete
    11. Countries have interests...

      Korea is a divided country; although SK will not tolerate subjugation (forceable reunification dictated by NK), they are keenly interested in a peaceful resolution, and are understandably loath to slaughter fellow Koreans with the misfortune of living under NK rule.

      So, the Koreans would dump a U.S. alliance in a heartbeat, and no one could blame them, *IF* they could reunify Korea as a free and independent country. Older SK people are genuinely appreciative of U.S. sacrifices in the 1950s, but no sovereign nation will tolerate a foreign army on their soil forever, even one that backs their government.

      A glimpse of Korean sensitivity is that in their first meeting, President Moon asked President to transfer of wartime command of all Korean and U.S. armed forces on the Korean Peninsula to a Korean Army four-star general.

      GAB

      Delete
    12. "So, the Koreans would dump a U.S. alliance in a heartbeat, and no one could blame them, *IF* they could reunify Korea as a free and independent country."

      So, in that sense, the US is better off with an ongoing, separate NKorea rather than peace and reunification if it results in a more independent, China-leaning (China-influenced?), unitary Korea.

      It would be unfortunate if the result of reunification and the removal of NKorea as a threat were the loss of a reliable and powerful ally against China.

      "no sovereign nation will tolerate a foreign army on their soil forever"

      Conversely, no sovereign nation should tolerate the deployment of their army on foreign soil forever. This is the Europe argument. SKorea looks to be strong enough, now, to stand on its own without our constant presence.

      Delete
    13. We are being a bit too black and white; also countries are not monolithic, the actions of a few individuals or group can make, or spoil relations between governments in spite of the intent.

      Larger US interests coincide with SK.

      GAB

      GAB

      Delete
    14. "England made good on it's commitment to support Poland and declared war on Germany and nothing short of mass starvation in England, would have kept the English from demanding, through military force, that Germany return to it's pre-war borders." lol This comment reeks of the typical English jingonism and arrogance. England was already a dying power, as shown by the fact that it still lost its empire despite winning the war. The war was too much for it to bear despite being supported by the two most powerful states on earth. On its own, without the US and the SU it could not have done much especially not getting Germany to return to its Pre-War borders.

      Delete
  6. By the time 1944 roled around the allies had complete air superiority over the English channel. This allowed them to dominate the u boats as well. There was not one successful u boat attack on the invasion fleet. Germany was a spent force in 1944 waiting for the inevitable end.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. What is your contribution to this 'what if' post?

      Delete
    2. Since we are what-iffing... Sometimes alliances, personalities, even small actions by everyday people alter history...

      Admiral Raeders disappearance after his affair with Eva Braun came to light put Admiral Donitz in command of the German Navy in mid 1939. His conversations with other leaders allowed him to shelve or delay much of Plan Z, instead pushing Uboat production as the priority, as well as convincing Hitler to wait until late 1940 to attack west. His force of nearly 140 Uboats were in place to start unrestricted sub warfare on October 25th.
      A nonagression pact with the USSR (coupled with a secret, joint plan for a push into the middle east) allowed Germany to consolidate its hold on western Europe by late December, and focus on strangling Britain.
      It was mid 1941 when a junior German naval attache in Japan got wind of preparations for the Pearl Harbor attack after a Japanese staff officer had too many cups of sake. The Germans began snooping, and by September 41 had full understanding of the plan. Many in Berlin distrusted the Japanese, and felt eventually they would become rivals. Worried about the US joining the war, the decision was made and the information was leaked to the US govt, as well as the Russians. A month later the Pacific Fleet massed and sailed west to meet them, but when American scout units were unknowingly detected, the Japanese reversed course. All offensive operations were cancelled until the situation could be reevaluated. The Pacific Fleet arrived in the Phillipines on Dec 8, the same day the Russians attacked multiple Japanese installations in a wide front, forcing them to end their eastward expansion plans, and turn northwestast defensively.
      American public opinion for Lend Lease and entering the war against Germany disappeared overnight just a week later, after Henry Ford brought to light Germanys involvement in avoiding Pearl Harbor. The Uboats "Happy time" continued until the summer of 1942,with nearly 250 Uboats at sea. Even the surface fleet enjoyed success, with the Bismarck, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, and 9 destroyers sinking an entire convoy in the spring after seizing the Azores. Britain sued for peace in September 1942 when incoming shipping had been cut by over 65%, Royal Navy fuel stocks were nearly nonexistent,the ships largely trapped in port by a massive German aerial mining campaign, and their ability to stop the upcoming German Operation Sea Monster came into doubt...

      Delete
    3. 🔼my contribution to the fun what-ifs...

      Delete
  7. The most obvious WIFs would be:

    1) German agreement in 1940 to largely return to its western borders (with minor territorial gains) *and* a guarantee of German neutrality in North Africa, which was of far greater strategic consideration for GB than Poland or France.

    2) More German armored reserves and a willingness to release them within the first hours of the invasion.

    3) Use of chemical weapons against the allied invasion beaches.

    4) Wholesale destruction of all ports from Caen to Antwerp. The allied armies were almost paralized at the Rhine until Antwerp was opened up. BTW, the crossing of the Rhine itself was arguably as challenging as the Normandy invasion, but river crossings are largely ignored by western armies.

    GAB

    ReplyDelete
  8. Deception as a weapon has its merits here. Maybe. If I had been Hitler I would have told the allies any cross channel invasion would be met by the total destruction of major allied cities by a new super weapon, a physics device. Without detail it might have implied a atomic device.

    ReplyDelete
  9. APO 696 file for interested parties

    ReplyDelete
  10. Might as well toss in a "Operation Sea Lion 1943/1944." Having a convincing threat to invade the Home Islands would have made planning Overlord more challenging.

    ReplyDelete
  11. Unfortunately, for the germans, they would have needed reliable Intel to even know where they needed to commit forces to attempt to disrupt the staging areas, which they never were able to really develop.

    Concentration of the uboats would have in turn lead to the concentration of ASW assets. Having, a sub or eboat that could deliver frogman similar to how the Italians did would have been more viable, in my opinion.

    Overall, if I was in charge of France's defense, I would have invested more in the defenses of Cherbourg, making it a citadel to buy time for building up the Rhine river's defensive capabilities.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "building up the Rhine river's defensive capabilities."

      That would have been a 100% guaranteed losing proposition. It would have been a Maginot Rhine Line, easily bypassed to north or from south. Allowing the Allies to establish themselves on continental Europe, in France, would have guaranteed the Allies the needed time and space to build up an absolutely overwhelming force, able to strike anywhere.

      History is clear about the value of static defensive lines and fortifications. They ultimately guarantee defeat because they cede mobility and flexibility to the enemy.

      Let's be clear, Germany had zero hope of ultimate victory no matter what course of action they took but some courses, such as this would have guaranteed defeat in relatively short order.

      Delete
    2. "Intel to even know where they needed to commit forces to attempt to disrupt the staging areas"

      This is an interesting topic. I'm unaware (as in, I haven't studied it enough to know) of any extensive, concerted effort to locate staging areas because the Germans had no intention of attempting to disrupt them. It's kind of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because they had no interest in finding the areas, they had no intel on the areas.

      Had attacking the staging areas been their plan, I've got to believe they could have easily found enough to allow them to disrupt the staging effort. It's not like you can keep staging areas that large and extensive an absolute secret.

      Delete
    3. Can't think of any book on Third Reich that I've read that mentions anything on Intel of staging areas and any planned attacks be it by air or SF. Even just a few attacks would have forced massive build up of defenses and diverted forces to that effect. Combined that with an enhanced precision V1, launched at night to avoid intercept on ports and staging areas would have possibly delayed Dday.

      Delete
    4. That was my thought... The "V" weapons would have been much better used against ports and staging areas...

      Delete
    5. The problem with trying to launch V weapons at specific targets is that they were hopelessly inaccurate. A significant number of the V1s fired at London during the war failed to hit the city, and that was a target 25 miles across! The accuracy improved over the course of the war but the CEP was still several miles, which meant they were only suitable for area bombardment, not attacking a precise target.

      Delete
    6. "V weapons"

      The V1 issue is insignificant, militarily. They were a waste of resources given the inaccuracy. If they insisted on using them, they should have been launched at ports and, if they happened to hit something worthwhile then great, other wise small, nighttime, low level bombing raids would have been much more effective.

      For this 'what if' scenario, I completely dismiss V1 weapons. They offered no combat effectiveness.

      Delete
  12. Ok to throw some water in the fire Germany (Hitler) from what Uve read actually didnt have a problem with Britain his Main Goal all along was to erase the WW I Versailles treaty and to do the Same Napoleon did that was to invade and occupy Russia which he felt was and truthfully a mortal enemy of the Germans He may have actually succeeded if 1. Had not Allied with Japan and 2. NOT declared war on the US the second that was done Germanies Fate Was Sealed not a Question of if But When

    ReplyDelete
  13. The third Reich was notoriously bad at intel and counter intel operations. Likewise, the allies (particularly Britain), were able to repeatedly use it against them. This played a role in V1 buzzbombs missing London due the Germans being feed bad info or likewise the British developing a counter to a new German radar based on its German codename of "Cyclops" alone. Likewise, the Luftwaffe failed to bomb the port of Alexandria due to deception, repeatedly. With the disinformation campaign surrounding the D Day landing, I don't feel they would have been successful with airstrikes or V1/V2 strikes, based on their past performance. Look up "double cross system". Frogman would have been possibly the better option, the could conduct on site recon while also conducting attacks.

    The issue with fixed fortifications is the attempt to use them as a standalone deterrence. Lets take the Maginot line for example, it fulfilled its design... it forced the Germans to go thru Belgium, which was part of the plan. The fact that the French and British failed to mobilize the required forces during the Phoney war and the disjointed way both nations utilized C&C over their airwings is what makes it seem pointless today. It was supposed to be the first line in a defense-in-depth strategy that failed to work out as was wargamed.

    Me, as the German commander in charge, fortifying Cherbourg and the Rhine would be the only plan capable of delaying the inevitable more so then what really happened. Most German commanders at this time realized the war was lost, and only continued to fight on in the vague hope of "wonder weapons" or that the allies would start fighting each other. Likewise, the Normandie fortifications ended up being a wastes of resources due to the naval superiority we enjoyed anyway. At least Cherbourg and the Rhine would have avoided concentrated naval bombardment due ones implied importance and the others distance from sea.

    But as GAB pointed out, any significant delays to VE would have resulted in Nulcear bombs being dropped on Berlin, forcing the USA to invade the Japanese Homelands due to not having them available for Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

    Its rare for you to do historical "what-ifs". If and when you do another, may I suggest discussing Japan invading Hawaii on December 8th.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. While the Germans were misguided by false accuracy reports, the V-1s were lauched by the thousands. Thats a lot of explosives wasted on civilian buildings. If they had been targeting ports, harbors, and other invasion marshalling choke points, they could have seriously disrupted the D-day planning.

      Delete
    2. If they were had difficult targeting citys, I believe the effectives would have been further reduce by aiming at smaller targets such as ports. You must remember the accuracy "improved" to a 7 mile area. They were kind of worthless exempt as terror weapon against large cities.

      Delete
    3. Possibly true, but like CNO suggested, a 20% damage rate would have probably been enough to delay things. Plus, military targets and certainly ammo/fuel ships have a higher flammability/ secondary explosion/ chain reaction potential, especially nested together in high numbers. A single lucky V-1 had the potential to be a silver bullet that couldve set the invasion back a year!! Placing simple cheap assets offshore (eboats, midget subs...?)could have given some usable BDA... If I was on charge, I wouldve gambled on the odds that attacking ports would yield more gains than knocking down flats in London....

      Delete
    4. Unlikely, fortunately. If we take late war standards of 7 mile diameter impact area, to increase successes of hitting multiple, important and disperse targets, would require a large salvo of V1s. Concentrating them as close to the target would increase accuracy, if Wikipedia is to be trusted on V1 specs, could yield some results. If the allies allowed the buildup of V1 infrastructure to go unhindered...

      I feel low-level Ju88 or BF110 hit and runs would probably yield better results, especially if the first raids sank large transport or LSTs.

      The actual invasion had a near 10% casualties rate if you include fatalities, according to Wikipedia numbers. The removal of 20% of the invasion force before would probably increase the actual percentage lost during the invasion, but it most likely would have still been able to successfully breakout of the beachheads.

      Now, an off the cuff idea would be to load up a Uboat with as much explosives as possible and pull a St Nazaire raid on LST and transport staging area. That would be hard to stop and could be repeatedly done.

      Delete
    5. Admittedly this is moot, as ideally the V-1s needed to be used in the weeks preceding D-day, and they werent used til weeks AFTER...
      As far as the casualties, I wouldnt have tried to strike the troops, but instead the delivery and logistics of the invasion. If 20% of landing craft/ LSTs, fuel or ammo was destroyed or damaged (even temporarilly), it certainly could have been postponed... And with weather giving limited opportunities, it could have been delayed into 1945...
      Germany also developed a few different midget subs, and they could have been worth their weight in gold if used against harbors crowded with transports.
      The Germans failed to think and act offensively to stop the invasion. They had some technologies and ability, but its almost as if they didnt believe it was an actual threat. Their own style of warfare showed that static defenses failed, yet they bet the farm that itd work for them. Disregarding the Eastern front, it was a matter of national survival to stop the invasion, yet they never acted that way....

      Delete
    6. "discussing Japan invading Hawaii on December 8th."

      Now that's a fascinating topic! What do you think would have happened?

      Delete
    7. " V1 ... low-level Ju88 or BF110 hit and runs"

      The V1 issue is insignificant, militarily. They were a waste of resources given the inaccuracy. If they insisted on using them, they should have been launched at ports and, if they happened to hit something worthwhile then great, other wise small, nighttime, low level bombing raids would have been much more effective, as you noted.

      Delete
    8. "The removal of 20% of the invasion force before would probably increase the actual percentage lost during the invasion,"

      You may be missing the point, purpose, and timing of the suggested 20% destruction figure. That figure is NOT intended to apply to the actual assault. Once an assault is begun, casualties are figured in and 'absorbed' - 20% loss during the assault, while serious, would have been accepted and would not have changed anything.

      The 20% figure is intended to be applied to the pre-invasion buildup of supplies, men, equipment, and ships. If successful, that would likely have been sufficient to disrupt and delay invasion plans/timing. 20% casualties to troops, for example, would have meant ineffective units with constant turnover of officers and constant influx of new replacements both of which would require continual 'new' training. Similarly, 20% loss of transports, meaning 20% of the planned troops couldn't even be transported to the invasion site, would have, undoubtedly postposed the assault. 20% loss of minesweepers would have likely halted the invasion due to the reduced ability to clear mines. And so on. The 20% is a pre-invasion effort.

      Delete
    9. In regards to a December 8th invasion of Hawaii, I feel that deserves a post all to itself.

      Personally I feel they could have done it. It would have required shifting of priorities from Australia and the abandonment of the idea of America surrendering at the start of hostilities, but I feel their decision not to, ranks near the top with the top military blunders of any war.

      Delete
  14. A side note, had the Normandie invasion failed, Italy or the soviet Union would have received more "attention" as potential locations for mainland US/British armies to put boots on ground.

    ReplyDelete
  15. I like the suggested idea of fortifying Cherbourg and Caen to the detriment of beach fortifications. You dont have to worry about where the invasion hits and to a certain extent, the invasion comes to you on a predictable path since even in Normandy, Allies needed to get those ports to really move on to Germany. Doesn't apply as much to PTO but today, US would need to grab a port and airport for sure. So maybe we shouldn't bother with defending the beaches but the big infrastructures needed to invade...

    As for V1, as it was operational mainly after Dday and had poor aiming,yes, it was pretty useless, that was why I suggested an enhanced improved targetting V1, that was my what if...a better V1 with more precision to target ports could have delayed somewhat DDAY.

    ReplyDelete
  16. The Germans did pursue a bombing campaign against England in 1944 called Operation Steinbock. It was unfortunately one of their typical "vengeance" campaigns and was directed at London. Having far fewer resources at their disposal than during the Blitz (and facing stronger enemy forces), it was even less effective.

    Employment of their limited air assets to disrupt Allied buildup would certainly have been a better use of airpower.

    Mining was certainly under-exploited by the Germans, especially given their technological lead in mines at the time. In addition to using u-boats to mine, S-boats and aircraft could have been used. Night time mining operations by S-boats and aircraft would have been almost impossible to disrupt.

    It is worth pointing out that the Luftwaffe had the worst leadership of the German armed services unless we count the Waffen SS, but Waffen SS divisions (many of which ultimately developed into fine fighting units after the early war fiascos) were ultimately under the command of army leaders.

    Shore bombardment by naval gunfire seems to have been under-exploited by all of the belligerents in the war. The Axis here at least has the excuse of extreme limited resources of fuel.

    Cross-channel commando raids were to my knowledge never pursued by the Germans. I am not sure why. They did employ special forces effectively in land warfare. The Italians generally accused the Germans of having a purely "continental" strategic mindset, and certainly their ineffective operations against Britain suggest the Italians were right.

    As far as Operation Barbarossa goes, Hitler's strategic thinking is somewhat understandable. Neither Germany nor Britain had the means to subdue eachother, but Britain did have the hope of attracting in other powers to defeat Germany (USA and USSR).

    Germany of course had no means to attack America, and instead planned the largest capital investment program in European history to develop the economic resources needed to defend itself against the combined economic resources of the USA and the British Empire. Europe however was very poor in raw materials, which placed Germany into dangerous dependence on the Soviet Union.

    Hitler's lebensraum thinking aside, the Soviet Union was a difficult "friend" to have. When Molotov visited Berlin in October of 1940, he demanded among other things naval bases on the North Sea, the right to again invade Finland, and more territory from Romania. The Germans had hoped to possibly bring the USSR into the Axis and direct its expansion against the British Empire, but this was not to be.

    It's easy to criticize Operation Barbarossa since it failed, but we don't know what would've happened if the Germans hadn't invaded the USSR. As it was Barbarossa came close to succeeding.

    At the end of the day the Germans had a weak hand to play and no good options. WW2 for them represented an extraordinarily ambitious gamble to throw everything they had at the dream of becoming a superpower, and it's not surprising that they failed.

    ReplyDelete
  17. As far as the V-1 goes, the Germans originally intended to use a radio control system on the V-1 to allow for accurate attacks. This was abandoned because it was decided to strike London. So this is a genuine missed opportunity.

    Even so, the V-1 program must be called a success because it diverted far more Allied resources than the Germans invested into the program. In this respect it was similar to the zeppelin raids of WW1.

    The same cannot be said of the V-2, which was more expensive than the Manhattan Project. Ironically, the fact that the V-2 could not be intercepted made it less useful than the V-1.

    There was a general tendency among all belligerents in WW2 to overrate the moral dimension of war (as important as it is). The Germans of course had the Blitz, various "vengeance" campaigns, exceptionally stubborn defenses of strategically useless areas, etc. The British based their strategic bombing effort on demoralizing German civilians, and they lost an early chance to win the war by shifting their bombing efforts from the Ruhr Area to Berlin in 1943. The Japanese assumed the Allies would be too soft to fight. Stalin thought the German Army would collapse after losing the Battle of Moscow. Perhaps most embarrassing all was the Polish belief that outbreak of war would lead to revolution in Germany and that the Polish Army would enter Berlin as a liberating force, which is why much of the Polish Army was deployed in forward areas where it was cut off and destroyed.

    ReplyDelete
  18. Late to the party, but I'll play:

    1) Unconventional warfare. Use U Boats to move some of your excellent special operations troops to Northern Ireland. Whether or not you can spark a real uprising against British rule, the UK's typically heavy handed tactics in such a situation would likely do it for you.

    2) Unconventional Warfare 2. Land commando teams (deployed by U Boat and S Boat) to attack rail lines, bridges, electrical transmission lines, and telephone lines near the coast. This kind of quick in and out strike would likely cause the British to expend extraordinary efforts to stop it. The Germans would know about this effect because it happened to them!

    3) Naval mines are offensive weapons! Germany laid millions of naval mines, but they set most of them off their own coast! Instead, mine British ports and the waterways approaching them. Mines can be emplaced by S Boats, U Boats, aircraft, and even special operations units using civilian fishing boats. Unlike a bomb, which either hits or misses, a naval mine is the gift that keeps on giving. Port operations have to stop or slow down until it is painstakingly cleared. This, combined with attacking transport targets, should greatly reduce the UK's ability to build up forces. As a bonus, mined harbors also reduce their ability to deploy those forces going forward.

    4) Learn from your ally. Japan had extensive experience defending against amphibious assault. They learned early that stopping the enemy on the beach is a futile tactic. So plan for a defense in depth. Set a few outposts on the beach, and build defenses inland where shore bombardment won't wipe you out.

    5) Build the infrastructure to move your army fast. A quick counter attack is a possibility the German army had but the Japanese one didn't. Instead of pouring millions of tons of concrete into an Atlantic wall, most of which won't see combat, build a highway system to move your own units.

    6) Combat engineering. Germany emplaced millions of land mines and booby traps, most of which were nowhere near the actual fighting. Instead of wasting your time laying minefields on beaches where allied troops weren't going to come, put your efforts into readying the demolition of bridges, railroads, highways, airstrips, port infra structure, and anything else you can. The army's new orders aren't "hold the line at any cost" they are "hold until the combat engineers are done."

    7) Finally, hold your surface combatants as a threat in being. No amount of commerce raiding by the German heavy ships could equal the effect of the intact High Seas fleet on World War I. The Royal Navy in the first World War was unwilling to support an amphibious operation against Germany even though they had the ability to mount them. They were happy to launch one at Archangelsk against the Russians, who didn't have a fleet though. While it seems like a waste of good battlecruisers to set them in a defended port, the enemy's invasion planners will have to make the worst caste assumption about your readiness and capabilities. That's likely to seriously delay their efforts until they are sure that the fleet can't get to their transports.

    Note that the Japanese Navy posed a serious threat to US invasion forces in the Philippines even though they were badly outgunned and outnumbered by that point. Allied war planners were worried about the risk of a few torpedo boats getting at the vulnerable transports and landing craft of the D Day fleet. Battle cruisers and destroyers would have terrified them!

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Points 5 and 7 don't really work. Nice post otherwise.

      The Germans didn't have the resources in trucks or fuel to make use of hypothetical French highway system.

      As for point 7, the Kriegsmarine was far smaller than the Kaiserliche Marine. And Doenitz did use the remaining surface fleet as a fleet-in-being, which was the only reason the German surface fleet wasn't scrapped entirely in 1943. This probably did help prevent an Allied invasion of Norway, which would have had disastrous consequences on the German war effort as it was substantially dependent on Swedish iron ore.

      See here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Raeder_resignation_and_later

      "At a meeting on 6 January 1943 Hitler for over 2 hours savaged Raeder, complaining that he had spent millions of Reichsmarks in the 1930s building a fleet that proved useless when war came, instead of spending the money on building U-boats, which had proven far more useful in the war. Hitler went on to castigate the navy, saying that navy had done nothing in the wars of unification, that the High Seas Fleet "played no important role in the World War" and lacked "... men of action who were determined to fight with or without the Kaiser", that the navy were a nest of traitors whose only contribution to World War I was the High Seas Fleet mutiny of 1918, and that given this history, it was no surprise that the navy's record in World War II with the notable exception of the U-boats was one of failure after failure.[5] Raeder, who had always taken great pride in the history of the navy, was very hurt by Hitler's account of German naval history, which was almost certainly Hitler's intention.[5] Hitler offered up the recent Battle of the Barents Sea as just one more example of how the navy except for the U-boats failed him time after time.[5] Hitler went on to accuse naval officers of being cowards not fully committed to victory, and offered a contrast with the Army, which Hitler claimed was run by brave men unafraid of death in their quest for total victory.[6] Finally, Hitler announced that since Germany's capital ships had proven so useless, he was planning to scrap all of the capital ships and use their guns for coastal defence.[7] The gun crews would be assigned to coastal defence, while the rest of their crews would be redeployed to the U-boats and the E-boats or re-trained and sent to the Eastern Front as infantry.[7][8] Raeder left the meeting of 6 January very depressed, especially over the prospect of seeing his beloved capital ships scrapped and of Hitler's criticism of his leadership.[7] Raeder told Hitler on 14 January 1943 that he could not preside over the scrapping of the capital ships, and informed the Führer of his wish to resign as of 30 January 1943 rather than carry out a policy that he did not believe in.[5]

      Raeder offered his resignation rather than accept the scrapping of the capital ships and formally resigned from the Kriegsmarine in May 1943. Dönitz succeeded him in the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on 30 January 1943. By this point, Raeder completely detested Dönitz, and as such Raeder advised Hitler against appointing Dönitz as his successor, claiming that Dönitz was not qualified to run the navy and advised that his deputy Admiral Rolf Carls be his successor.[9] Dönitz talked Hitler out of the plan to scrap the capital ships after taking over as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, arguing successfully to Hitler that a fleet-in-being in Norway tied down British warships which could be used in the Battle of the Atlantic or against Japan.[10]"

      Delete
    2. RE Jones,

      Very nice comment. I like your emphasis on combat engineers, in particular. I also very much like your transportation infrastructure comment. Such infrastructure is susceptible to destruction by various means but with enough of it sufficient survival is assured.

      All in all, very nice!

      Delete
    3. "The Germans didn't have the resources in trucks or fuel to make use of hypothetical French highway system."

      I have no data on this but I'm somewhat skeptical, in this 'what if', for two reasons:

      1. Without the attack on Russia, Germany would have had double the resources of everything.

      2. Germany managed to fuel its mechanized/armored groups throughout the war (yes, localized shortages occurred but that happens to every army, winner or loser) so I see no reason why they wouldn't have been able to use a highway system.

      3. At the point in time that we're speculating about, Germany still had most of its oil/fuel production capabilities intact.

      Have you seen some data to lead you to believe Germany couldn't have made use of a transport system?

      On the subject of a reinforcement/transport infrastructure, I took RE Jones' comment to mean a more localized system around the projected invasion sites to facilitate rapid reinforcements and counterattacks rather than a France-wide travel system. Maybe I misunderstood what the author meant?

      Delete
    4. "Hitler went on to castigate the navy"

      Without a doubt the employment of the German navy was inefficient/incompetent. The piecemeal exposure of the capital ships was foolish. The navy/military never seemed to be able to formulate a strategic/operationally useful purpose for the navy and never were able to coordinate effective combined operations involving the navy. The latter is somewhat surprising as the German military seemed to have a pretty good grasp of combined arms warfare, in general.

      Delete
  19. Germany attempted a final wave of bombings against the UK in 1944, 1 in 20 planes bombing the right city was a good day. Germany simply lacked the ability to attack the invasion troops in any meaningful capacity, and the ships were all safely tucked away in the North West Coast, well outside the range of German Bombers.
    Commando Raids were occurring, but the other way. Germany was woefuly short of young fit capable men to mount those sort raids, and even if they were launched and successful, the allies could simply base anything valuable 20 miles in land, well outside the range of raiders.
    The EBoats had a range of 800miles, 400 each way, operating from Brest and Amsterdam, much of the UK simply beyond reach.

    Tirpitz was a threat, its existance was the reason the UK maintained the home seas fleet, rather than reinforcing the Mediterranean or Indian Ocean.
    It could have sailed to the UK, devastated Newcastle, but it wouldnt have survived, and its loss would have freed a dozen UK battleships. The allies could afford the loss, Germany couldnt.

    Even if Germany had managed to prevent the Normandy Invasion, Allied Forces had already taken Rome the Invasion of Southern France was mounted 10 weeks after D Day.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Checking the specs from Wiki on the ranges of the Heinkel He 111 and the Junkers Ju 88, it appears that most of the west coast of England would have been in range of bombers launching from near the French coast.

      That aside, staging supplies on the west coast of England would not allow an invasion to occur. Either the supplies would have to be moved to the east coast in a massive movement for the actual assault, allowing plenty of time for the Germans to attack, or the assault/transport ships would have had to load on the west coast and sail around England and up through the southern/western end of the Channel, running the gauntlet of mines, U/E boats, and air attacks - not a recipe for success.

      While small commando raids of half a dozen or a dozen men would be common, I would also envision raids in force - company size raids intended to inflict serious damage in localized areas and then retreat before a proper counterattack could be organized and launched.

      Also, you seem to be missing the concept a bit, here. We're not talking about Germany trying to suddenly stop the Allies on 1-Jun-1944. We're talking about ongoing efforts from the moment the US entered the war. Had the Germans done this, it would likely have had ripple effects on combat in other regions. Allied resources would have had to be diverted to compensate for the build up losses, priorities would have changed, etc.

      "Germany was woefuly short of young fit capable men "

      In the time frame we're discussing, pre-1944, largely 1942-1943, and 'what if'ing' that Germany had not attacked Russia, Germany had plenty of young, fit men. Not attacking Russia would have doubled all of Germany's available resources, manpower, supplies, and equipment.

      Delete
    2. The German bombers of 1941 were able to reach north and north west to the shipyards and factories of Belfast and even the Clyde River in Scotland. Based on reports they could carry a reasonable bomb load.
      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belfast_Blitz
      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clydebank_Blitz

      Delete

Comments will be moderated for posts older than 7 days in order to reduce spam.