 |
| LX(R) / LPD-17 Flt II |
As
a reminder, the LSD-41 (Landing Ship, Dock) Whidbey Island class, built in the
1980’s, was designed specifically to transport and launch LCAC vessels and has
a capacity of four LCACs which is the most of any amphibious ship.(1) It can
also provide docking and repair services for LCACs and for conventional landing
craft.(1)
In
1987 the Navy began construction on LSD-49 Harpers Ferry class which reduced
LCAC capacity to two while increasing cargo capacity.(1)
Here’s
a few basic specifications for the LSD-41/49 class. (1) Note the LCAC capacities.
LSD-41/49
Specifications
|
||
LSD-41
|
LSD-49
|
|
Length,
ft
|
609
|
609
|
Beam,
ft
|
84
|
84
|
Displacement,
tons
|
16000
|
17000
|
LCAC
Capacity
|
4
|
2
|
 |
| LSD-41 Whidbey Island Class |
There
are several questionable aspects to the LPD-17 Flt II program that warrant a
bit of discussion.
Well Deck Size. The LX(R) is intended as the replacement for
the LSD-41/49 class. The problem is that
the LX(R) has a significantly smaller well deck than the LSD-41 class and can
only carry 2 LCACs. Here are the well deck dimensions for recent classes of
amphibious ships (see, “Wither The Well Deck”). Note
the generally decreasing well deck sizes.
Amphibious Ship Well Deck Size
|
|
Whidbey
Island LSD-41
|
440’ x 50’
|
Harpers
Ferry LSD-49
|
220’ x 50’
|
Tarawa LHA-1
|
268’ x 78’
|
Wasp
LHD-1
|
267’ x 50’
|
America
LHA-6
|
none
|
San
Antonio LPD-17
|
170’ x 50’
|
The decreased well deck and LCAC capacity represents a significant decrease in ship to shore amphibious capability which seems incongruent with the LSD/LPD’s main function of amphibious assault. One can’t help but wonder what the Navy sees as the main function of the new LPD-17 Flt II since it clearly isn’t amphibious assault.
Cost. Navy’s cost target for the LPD-17 Flt II is
$1.8B (FY2019$) for the lead vessel, LPD-30, and $1.5B (FY2019$) for the follow
on ships (2), however, LPD-31 is now estimated to cost a bit over $2.0B (5) so,
as always, the Navy’s cost estimates are significantly understated.
Huntington
Ingalls announced a sole-source $1.5B fixed price incentive contract for the
lead ship, LPD-30, in Mar 2019. As
usual, this is only a partial cost and does not include advanced procurement
funds already expended, Government Furnished Equipment, or post-delivery
construction which is an ever-increasing portion and is intended to get around
cost caps and make acquisitions seem cheaper than they are. The true cost is likely $2B+. Indeed, the Navy’s budget request documents
show a cost of $1.7B without GFE or post-construction costs. (4)
As
usual, the Navy is not pursuing responsible contracting practices and is doing
everything it can to obscure costs. From
the CRS report,
The Navy plans to
award sole-source contracts to Huntington Ingalls—the only shipbuilder of
Flight I ships—for Flight II construction. Further, the program did not request
a separate independent cost estimate for Flight II prior to awarding the LPD 30
detail design and construction contract. At the same time, the Navy identified
no plans to establish a cost baseline specific to Flight II. Without this
baseline, the Navy would report full LPD 17 program costs—rather than Flight II
specific costs—constraining visibility into Flight II. (4, p.14)
Design Basis. The Navy’s driving force for the ship design
was the cost target rather than functionality or combat effectiveness. As we have repeatedly stated, cost is a
secondary consideration for warship design and cannot be the primary design
factor. No good ship was ever designed
with cost as the primary design criteria.
From
1Q 2013 to 1Q 2014, the Navy claims to have conducted an Analysis of
Alternatives (AOA) with three alternatives considered:
- modified (reduced capability/reduced-cost) LPD-17
- brand new designs
- foreign design
Given
the Navy’s documented half-hearted or non-existent AOAs for other ships, one
can’t help but wonder about the rigor and validity of this AOA. The LCS, Ford, Zumwalt, Burke Flt III, and
new frigate never got rigorous AOAs.
They were either never performed or they were conducted for show with
the outcome having been pre-determined.
Indeed, the selection of the modified LPD-17 strongly suggests that this
was yet another example of a pre-determined AOA conducted purely for show.
Following
are LX(R) design features compared to the San Antonia Class (3):
- half the medical spaces
- smaller hangar for stowing two MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft
- no composite masts
- two main propulsion diesel engines instead of four
- two spots for Landing Craft Air Cushion hovercraft or one Landing Craft Utility boat
- reduced troop capacity from 800 to 500
- reduced vehicle storage space
- enhanced command and control facilities
Competition. According to the Congressional Research
Service, as recently as May 2017, the Navy had publicly stated that a
competition would be held between HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding of Pascagoula, MS,
the builder of LPD-17 Flight I ships, and General Dynamics’ National Steel and
Shipbuilding (GD/NASSCO) of San Diego, CA.
However, on April 6, 2018, the Navy announced that it would sole-source the
design and construction of LPD-30 to HII.
Again, this suggests that the previously announced ‘competition’ was for
show and that the builder had been pre-determined from the start.
CONOPS. One of the major justifications for the LX(R)
is the “requirement” to operate independently.
Of course, this is idiotic but that’s the Navy’s story and they’re
sticking to it. Under this concept, the
3-ship Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG/MEU) will routinely disaggregate and
operate as independent ships, widely separated geographically. This, the Navy/Marines claim, will increase
flexibility and responsiveness.
The
reality is that disaggregated ARGs have even less capability than the
mathematical 1/3 capability that splitting them up into three parts would
suggest. For example, the LPD, when
operating independently, carries less than a third of a MEU and almost none of
the aviation assets. Similarly, the
larger LHA-6 America class, when operating independently, cannot land heavy
equipment as they have no well deck.
The
Marines state that a MEU is the smallest full-function combat unit. Subsets of a MEU are, by the Marine’s own
definition, incapable of effective combat.
So, what does the Navy/Marines want to do? Why, split the MEU up and send the pieces off
to distant points where they cannot act as a complete unit nor support each
other! Stupid on a shingle!
Commandant’s
Vision. All of the preceding was background for the
real point of this post and that is to consider how the LPD-17 Flt II jibes
with the Marine Commandant’s recent statements and documents which call for a
movement away from the 38 amphibious ship and 2 MEB lift requirements.
It
is worth noting at the outset that the LPD-17 Flt II was conceived long before
the current Commandant took office.
Thus, it may be that the Flt II doesn’t fit his plans for the Corps, at
all !
Commandant
Berger has unilaterally and arbitrarily set the Corps on a radically different
path, assuming he follows through on his early statements. To be fair, there are, as yet, few details so
much is speculation, at this point. That
said, Berger has been pretty clear that the Marines will move towards small,
dispersed units using forward bases. The
question, then, becomes how does the Flt II fit into and support this concept,
if at all?
On
the one hand, the Flt II, with traditional well decks and LCACs may be
considered a relic of the old way thinking which involved massed combat power
and amphibious assaults and, thus, of little value in a small unit, dispersed,
forward based type of force structure.
On the other hand, a Flt II, being significantly smaller than the large
deck LHA/LHDs, might be quite useful in moving around and supporting small
units. Then again, the Flt II has very
limited aviation capability which is a cornerstone of the forward base concept
and the Marine’s recent push to become aviation-centric. As I noted, without details about Berger’s
plans, it is very difficult to pass judgment about the value of the Flt II in
the new Marine concept.
If
we take the Commandant at face value and assume that the Flt II is of limited
value, it calls into question the reason for the entire Flt II program. Should we immediately halt the program and
move in a different direction? Berger
has suggested that the Marines will look to smaller, cheaper, more numerous
vessels such as the JHSV or the Light Amphibious Warship (see, “Light Amphibious Warship Update”) for transport.
If that’s the case, we can build a lot of JHSVs for the cost of one Flt
II and we should halt the Flt II program immediately. At the very least, a pause in the LPD-17
program is warranted until the Commandant decides what ships he wants for his
Navy.
(1)Navy
website,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1000&ct=4
(2)Congressional
Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II (LX[R]) Amphibious Ship Program:
Background and Issues for Congress”, R43543, Ronald O’Rourke, 3-Jul-2018,
https://www.defensedaily.com/wp-content/uploads/post_attachment/202101.pdf
(3)Wikipedia,
“LX(R)-Class Amphibious Warfare Ship”, retrieved 10-Oct-2019,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LX(R)-class_amphibious_warfare_ship
(4)Congressional
Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress”, 10-Oct-2019
(5)Congressional
Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress”, 22-Jul-2020
