Book Review – Sailing Warships of the US Navy

Here’s a book for anyone who is a fan of the age of sail.  Donald Canney’s Sailing Warships of the US Navy[1] presents a description and history of every sailing warship the US built.  The 200+ page, large format (10” x 12”) book is organized into chapters that address specific time periods and trends such as “The Frigates”, which covers the Constitution and her five sisters, “The Ships of the Line”, which covers the larger ships, and “American Sloops of War”, among many others.
 
The individual ships are presented in a roughly chronological order with context that places them within national and world events so that the justification comes through clearly.  Each ship write up includes a detailed service history, contemporary artwork of the vessel, where available, and large photos of the builder’s plans for those that exist and speculative plans for those that lack surviving builder’s plans.  The plans are the highlight of the book, for me, as I love to study the evolution of sailing ships through the sequential changes in their designs.  It is interesting to compare the attractive, curved, flowing lines of British ships with the harsher, more angular and horizontal lines of American vessels.
 

The section on ships of the line was especially fascinating.  We’re all familiar with the Constitution and her sisters but few are familiar with the American ships of the line.  The USS Franklin, for example, built in 1815 was a stunningly attractive ship with magnificent lines and the detailed plans bring it to life.
 
The ship histories are well written and informative without being dry and offer a glimpse into the times and the challenges of building and operating a navy.  Even then, cost, Congressional approval, material availability, production time lines, and fitting out were concerns no less important or different than today.
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the chapters on the smaller sloops, brigs, and schooners are equally fascinating.
 
The author even includes a chapter on “Vessels of the Northern Lakes”.  We forget that a robust naval war occurred on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain.  Remember Oliver Hazard Perry?  It is interesting to see the how the ship designs were modified for shallow draft operations on the lakes.
 
It is interesting to note some of the trends that manifest throughout the various ship histories.  The American emphasis on armor (in the form of much heavier and stronger framing than British counterparts) and firepower (overgunning) compared to standard British practices stands out and one can’t help but believe that those trends contributed to American naval successes.  These trends continued through WWII before being abandoned, unwisely, by the Navy.
 
While the book is, admittedly, a niche book, I highly recommend it for the naval historian.  Potential model makers will especially find the book to be a treasure trove of information.
 

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[1]Canney, Donald L., Sailing Warships of the US Navy, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001, ISBN 1-55750-990-5

Age and Armor

Battleship armor was not a constant.  It was an ever evolving concept that saw continuous changes in metallurgy, manufacturing, and structural arrangement.  In other words, armor was continuously improving … at least until the post-WWII years at which point it was fairly abruptly abandoned for reasons that remain a mystery (though not for lack of undocumented speculation!).  As such, it is reasonable to expect that the more modern the ship, the better the armor protection.  Given that a ship’s design is locked in at the moment it is laid down, the following list shows the dates that various representative battleships were laid down.  This chronological list suggests that the effectiveness of the ship’s armor scheme was greatest on the latter ships and least effective on the earlier ships.  Thus, the Iowa class would have been the ultimate in battleship armor development both in terms of metallurgy and structural arrangement.  Of course, we’ll never know for sure.
 

 
 

There’s no particular point to this post, just an interesting observation and speculation. 
 

Iowa Class Armor Scheme Cross Section - 
note the internal main belt and incline

 

Goes Boom!

Here’s some tidbits of good news about restoring our industrial ‘boom’ capacity.
 
How much TNT explosive does the United States produce?  None. 

TNT is used to produce an array of explosive weapons including ammunition, bombs and 155-millimeter artillery rounds, but the military has been reliant on overseas sources.[1]

In a bit of good news, the Army is going to resume TNT production by building a new facility. 

As part of the Army’s quest to boost weapons production, it is reestablishing TNT production on US soil, inking a deal to build out a new facility in Graham, Ky.
 
“For the first time in decades, America will produce TNT on its own soil, manufacturing the explosive material our military uses for everything from hand grenades to 155mm artillery,” outgoing Sen. Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said in a press release.[1]

Boom!

As Army acquisition head Douglas Bush notes, control over our own explosives supply chain is vital. 

“[Restoring] TNT production gives us the ability to control and secure our supply chain for this vital component, especially in an era of increasing global challenges.”[1]

How could we ever have allowed such a vital industrial capability to vanish from our shores?  The military and civilian leadership that allowed this were derelict in their duty, if not treasonous for knowingly and willfully endangering America’s national security.  The military leadership should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed.
 
Setting that aside, the good news gets better … 

By fiscal 2026, the service is aiming to have the capacity to produce 100,000 rounds each month. To get there, Bush previously said the Army plans to spend $4.2 billion to build up the industrial base across various initiatives, to include commissioning three new domestic facilities to support 155mm production and a new metal parts production facility in Canada.[1]

Admittedly, I’m praising something that should never have been necessary and that's sad.  A country/military that doesn’t have its own explosives production capability is a fool and that’s exactly what we’ve been.  Still, it’s refreshing to see us begin to restore what we lost. 
 
I love being able to present positive posts.  It’s a shame that there are so few opportunities to do so, so enjoy this one!
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Army inks $435 million deal for new TNT production facility”, Ashley Roque, 11-Nov-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/11/army-inks-435-million-deal-for-new-tnt-production-facility/

The Next Secretary of Defense

Fox’s TV commentary show, ‘Outnumbered’, had a discussion about President-elect Trump’s cabinet picks and had a brief discussion about the Secretary of Defense position and the type of person needed to fill the role.  Fox News contributor, Steve Hilton, offered some very interesting perspective, saying,
 

… at the Defense Department, you need a really good manager there who will sort out the corrupt mess of our defense procurement.  I think Elon Musk would be brilliant in that role, actually.[1]

 
Asked for more specifics about the type of person needed, Mr. Hilton offered this:
 

Someone who knows how to run things.  I mean, it’s no good putting in some General, right?  That place is a absolute cesspit of corruption.  You’ve got to have someone who can deal with that and get the modernization of our defense forces going.  It’s a management role we need there.[1]

Mr. Hilton could not be more correct.  We have a badly broken defense department that appears to be irredeemably corrupt.  The procurement process, in particular, stands out as an example of fraud, corruption, and incompetence.  Hilton’s suggestion that a strong businessman is required, as opposed to a former military officer, is worth serious consideration.
 
Without offering an opinion one way or the other, the suggestion that Elon Musk would make a good Secretary of Defense merits serious contemplation not so much for the idea of Musk, personally, but for the idea of a strong, successful businessman.
 
President-elect Trump has an opportunity to make a good start at reforming the Defense Department.  No one can completely fix it in just four years but a good start could be made by selecting the right SecDef and, if I might add a personal suggestion, firing every flag officer and starting over with the uniformed leadership.  Trump had an opportunity to do this his first term and failed by failing to recognize the depth of corruption and taking ruthless action.  Hopefully, he’s learned lessons and will do better this time around.
 
 
Update:
 
As of this moment, it’s being reported that Trump has selected Pete Hegseth as his nominee for Secretary of Defense.  If so, and if confirmed, Mr. Hegseth would be the polar opposite of the type of person described by Mr. Hilton.  Hegseth is a former National Guard officer who has served in Guantanamo, Iraq, and Afghanistan while rising to the rank of Major.  He has been heavily involved in politics and veteran’s affairs.
 
He has demonstrated a dedication to the welfare of veterans and the good of the service.  What he lacks is any experience running a massive organization like the DoD.  The key will be whether he recognizes this and can surround himself with people who can run an organization.  If so, his job will be to steer them in the right direction.
 
I have to be honest, this is a disappointing pick although the potential for success is certainly present.  Firing every flag officer would be a good start for him!
 
 
 
Note:  This is a military leadership discussion.  I will not allow political comments.  Fair warning.


 
________________________________

 
[1]Steve Hilton speaking on Fox Outnumbered, 12-Nov-2024, transcribed by ComNavOps

Chinese Prototype

Naval News website has an article about a Chinese experimental (prototype) unmanned, or optionally manned, small combatant surface vessel.  Here’s a description of the vessel:
 

The new imagery confirms a substantial vessel in trimaran configuration. The ship is armed with at least four vertical launch cells, equipped with multiple sensor panels likely for an electronically scanned array and additional sensors, and a sizeable aviation pad at the rear supporting a VTOL UAV. An organic UAV capability could support the USV particularly in over the horizon (OTH) -targeting for maritime and land attack-roles.
 
If previously shown models of a slightly different configuration are indicative, the design may contain further weapons in recessed bays, including an autocannon on the bow, and torpedo launchers at the sides. Forward of the four missile cells is a notable square area which may incorporate further missile cells.[1]

The vessel is an evolution or refinement of a previous version built in 2019. 
 
The article indicates that the manufacturer currently retains ownership of the craft and that the Chinese navy has not yet expressed any interest in procuring the design.
 
It is possible that the main purpose of the prototype is to assist in international marketing but, regardless, there is no better way to persuade your own government to buy your product than by building a prototype.
 

Chinese Prototype Combat USV

 

I’m not going to discuss the actual combat capabilities because that’s pointless without a CONOPS to reference against.  Still, there are a few noteworthy aspects to this.
 
Manufacturer’s Dime.  All indications are that the vessel was built by the manufacturer, at their cost.  This was once routine in the aviation industry and should be revived as standard practice.  Of course, there’s a limit to how much prototype cost a manufacturer can absorb.  A $20B prototype aircraft carrier, for example, is simply not feasible.  However, producing aspects of a $20B prototype carrier is perfectly reasonable.  For example, that new gravimetric warp launch catapult that is planned to replace the non-functional EMALS should be built and installed on a second hand cargo ship for at sea testing under realistic operating conditions.  That gravity-nullifying, instantaneous, matter transporter that will replace the finicky Ford weapon elevators should be installed on a used, throwaway cargo ship to prove it works before including it in a production design.  Those kinds of prototype costs are within the financial capacity of a builder who is steadily producing $20B+ carriers and, if they aren’t, that alone should be a giant red flag about cost, reliability, and scheduling. 
 
Testing.  It should go without saying but I’ll say it anyway since the Navy seems oblivious: prototypes are invaluable for both demonstration purposes and as a developmental aid.  Build, test, and feed the results back into the design before you commit to production.  China gets to see what works and what doesn’t without committing to something like a massive 55 LCS program before the first ship was even designed.  If/when the Chinese navy wants to build the vessel, both they and the builder will know what the strengths and weaknesses of the design are and can incorporate modifications into the design, as needed.  The LCS, by comparison, was already deep into the production run before the first lessons learned had a chance to feed back into the design process and the result is half a dozen or so LCSes have already been retired and several more are on the chopping block.
 
Cost Estimates.  A prototype hugely reduces the uncertainty about the cost of a new ship.  It should!  You just built it!  You now know exactly what it costs.  Now you can realistically work on cost reductions.
 
 
Conclusion
 
Again, it seems blindingly obvious but I’ll say it anyway.  There is nothing but good that can come from the routine construction of prototypes.  As noted, the use of prototypes provides the ability to wring out the problems from a design and develop very accurate cost estimates.  The manufacturer benefits from an increased likelihood of obtaining a production contract for an existing vessel.  The mere fact that the vessel already exists is a major selling point.  Manufacturers should be eager to build prototypes.
 
Of course, as noted, there is a limit to the amount of money a manufacturer can spend on a prototype with no guarantee of a production contract.  When a prototype gets too big and too expensive for the manufacturer to absorb the total cost, the government can provide partial payment (not full payment!).  The key is to force the manufacturer to put skin in the game.  This encourages higher quality to increase the likelihood of sales and reduce the cost of quality related reworks.  It also motivates the manufacturer to engage in ruthlessly efficient cost cutting and eliminates the practice of continuous change orders.  When you’re building a ship on your own dime, you suddenly become intensely interested in minimizing costs and getting the most bang for your buck as opposed to the perverse, reverse incentives we now have where the manufacturer gets paid more money for poor quality (via reworks) than they do for good quality (no reworks).
 
We should do this for every new ship class.  Build a single prototype, test it thoroughly, and then, and only then, consider a production contract.  The Navy will never do this so Congress should mandate this approach by law.with criminal penalties associated for failure to comply.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Chinese Experimental Aviation Platform And Combat USV Emerge In Detailed New Imagery”, Alex Luck, 7-Nov-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/11/chinese-experimental-aviation-platform-and-combat-usv-emerge-in-detailed-new-imagery/

Philippines Strategy

You’ve probably noticed that several of ComNavOps’ fictional stories revolve around the Philippines.  This is not by random chance.  The strategic value of the Philippines cannot be overstated.  The country, along with Taiwan, forms two gigantic ‘forts’ that China must deal with in any war.
 
From China’s perspective, those two countries act as forward enemy bases that dominate the surrounding seas and impact any operations the Chinese would attempt.  Their removal from the strategic equations is imperative.  Ideally, China would turn the tables by seizing both countries and using them as forts against any American response.
 
Taiwan’s seizure (or ‘reunification’ as the Chinese would euphemistically put it) is absolutely mandatory for both strategic and cultural reasons.  Wisely or foolishly, China’s leadership has linked themselves to the seizure of Taiwan as a national and cultural imperative.  For those reasons, Taiwan will be the first operation in any war.
 
The Philippines present a somewhat different situation for China.  The Philippines cannot be allowed to become a US forward base but it is not necessarily a requirement that the country be physically seized and occupied.  Forcing Philippines to declare neutrality is almost as good as seizing it.  A declaration of neutrality would eliminate Philippines as a forward base for the US and would have the added benefit of not tying up any Chinese forces in an occupation. 
 
Ideally, of course, China would like the Philippines to enter a war as an ally of China, thereby allowing China to use it as a base without the difficulties of an invasion and occupation.
 
By far, the most likely course of action is that Philippines would declare neutrality rather than place themselves as a target between the US and China.
 
Neutrality, however, will not prevent China, which cares nothing for international laws, from occupying areas of the Philippines that it finds advantageous in its war efforts against the US.  This, of course, leaves Philippines in a bit of a no-win situation.
 
All of this is fairly obvious so where is this going?  Let’s consider scenarios in which the US has access to the use of the Philippines, either because the Philippines enters the war as an ally of the US or because Philippines declares neutrality and China ignores that and attempts to seize or operate from the country, thereby negating Philippines’ neutrality. 
 
In this case, the US would attempt to set up bases and, perhaps more importantly, surveillance assets (radar, elevated optical sensors, etc.).   Obviously, China is not going to sit back and allow that to occur without hindrance. This raises the scenario of the US having to fight to establish and operate a base – something that we haven’t had to do since Guadalcanal.  Do we have the capability to seize suitable land, set up a base while under fire, and defend that base well enough to keep it operational?
 
The answer is no and certainly not with the equipment, units, and training we have currently.  This strongly suggests that we should be developing – quickly! – the capability to seize, set up, and defend a major base.  I’ve often suggested that the Marine’s core mission should be port seizure and this type of operation would be a logical extension of that.  Note that the Army does have existing units dedicated to the seizure of existing airbases.
 
Seizure of land for a not yet existing base could range from ‘walk in unopposed’ to a full fledged, contested, amphibious assault depending on how extensively the Chinese manage to get established.  As we’ve thoroughly discussed, our ability to conduct an opposed landing is extremely limited as we lack naval gun support, sufficient ship-to-shore connectors to allow for attrition, armor, logistic support, sea bases (if we don’t seize a port), mines to protect our sea flanks, and mobile anti-air defenses to protect forces ashore.  In addition, our ability to establish local air superiority is highly suspect and would be largely limited to the understrength air wings of our carriers which would be hard pressed to conduct simultaneous air-to-air and ground support operations with just thirty or so combat aircraft per air wing.
 
 
As we contemplate seizing land and establishing a base, consider these questions:
 

• Do we have the ability to transport and very quickly (instantly!) set up anti-cruise and anti-ballistic missile defenses to protect a base?
• Do we have ground forces who have been trained for base defense?
• Can we transport armor to the Philippines for base defense.  Yes, we’ll certainly be facing Chinese armored forces.
• Do we have sufficient numbers of C-RAM (counter rocket, artillery, and mortar) weapons to defend a base against constant, high volume attacks?
• Do we have sufficient portable, mobile sensors to establish effective surveillance and early warning systems?
• Are we doctrinally willing, and trained, to move our Aegis ships in close to land to provide anti-air protection for the ground forces until they can establish their own defenses?
• Are we capable of quickly constructing hardened and/or underground hangars and fuel/weapons storage?
• Do we sufficient airbase repair equipment that can be transported to the site?
• Do we have sufficient engineering units to build a base under fire, continuously repair it, and keep it operational under fire?
• Can we operate modern, finicky aircraft under primitive conditions with few spare parts, computers, and no modern state of the art repair facilities?  That’s what a forward, contested base would be, after all.  Our abysmal aircraft readiness rates during peacetime suggest that this, alone, almost rules out establishing an airbase in the Philippines.  If you can’t keep aircraft operational, there’s little point having an airbase.  If you recall, we were only able to sporadically operate F4F Wildcats from Guadalcanal and they were robust, easy to maintain aircraft by comparison, requiring only a wrench and duct tape to repair!

 
This kind of thought exercise is exactly what the US military should be doing all day, every day and yet we’re not.  Not even a little bit.  Instead we’re engaged in all manner of social programs, diversity, gender issues, environmental issues, climate concerns, etc.
 
We must start planning for the China war.  If the war never comes, that’s fine but failure to plan for it is dereliction of duty at its most extreme.

Blast from the Past

In the sidebar ‘Blast from the Past’ you'll see a post from July 2012 which discusses the relative merits of new construction versus upgrades.  The post also calls for a moratorium on new construction!  What?!  Stop new construction?  Wouldn't that be a disaster?  Find out.

Enjoy!

What’s a Navy To Do?

In the Ukraine-Russia war, the Russian navy has been rendered nearly irrelevant through a combination of factors, not the least of which is their sheer incompetence which has allowed Ukraine to dominate the seas.  However, there is another, larger factor at play, here, and that is that the Russian navy has no useful role ... or at least none that they’re capable of executing.
 
Consider the traditional roles of a navy in a war and how they relate to Russia.
 
Blockade/Interdict Shipping – There is no shipping moving to or from Ukraine with the exception of the so-called ‘grain corridor’ which operates under an agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
 
Destroy the Enemy’s Navy – Ukraine has no navy.
 
Conduct Land Strikes – The Russian navy has almost no land strike capability.  Early in the conflict, Russia did attempt some small degree of land strike during the attempt to seize Snake Island, however, Russia did not follow that up with any serious attempt to seize and hold the island.
 
Amphibious Assaults – Aside from the short lived attempt to seize Snake Island, the Russians have not attempted any amphibious assault because they largely control all the land that borders the sea.  The one exception is the 70-some mile strip of land centered around Odesa.  This would seem to be a candidate for assault except that Russia lacks both the amphibious transport and sufficient available land forces for such an attempt.
 
Logistics – Russia’s logistics are largely satisfied by overland supply routes.  Some degree of maritime resupply has been conducted via the ‘backdoor’ of Crimea.
 
Aerial Supremacy – Carrier based air power is capable of establishing localized aerial supremacy and supporting land operations.  Of course, the Russians possess no carriers so this is a moot consideration.
 
 
Discussion
 
Consideration of the above naval roles makes it obvious that there is little significant role for the Russian navy or, at least, little significant role that the Russian naval force structure is capable of successfully executing.
 
The inescapable conclusion is that Russia built an incorrect naval force structure.  The Russian navy lacks land strike, anti-air , amphibious assault capability, broad area maritime surveillance, and effective small boat / USV defensive capability.
 
Putin didn’t wake up one morning and suddenly say, “Let’s invade Ukraine today”.  The Russian navy knew this was coming for quite some time, dating back at least to the 2014 Crimea annexation and, obviously, that didn’t happen spontaneously.  It had to be in the planning stage for years.  So, the Russian navy had ten to twenty years advance notice and yet they failed to plan for the war with Ukraine or, if they did attempt to tailor the navy to the planned war, they badly failed to anticipate the form of the war.
 
The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that the Russian ship designs have been found incapable of conducting effective surveillance or self-defense.  Indeed, various Russian ships have been pulled out of the war zone and production of some classes has been halted as the Russian navy has come to recognize that their ships are inappropriately designed and fitted.
 
 
Conclusion/Warning

Considering all of the above, it’s apparent that the Russian hasn’t been defeated as much as they simply have no relevant, vital role.  The proof of this is the fact that, having ‘defeated’ the Russian navy, Ukraine is in no better position, overall.  This is a land war, pure and simple.  Lacking a role, the navy has, wisely, pulled back to a relatively safe distance to preserve their forces.
 
What this tells us is that you had better know your enemy and your own strategy against that enemy as you build your force structure.  Failure to do so will guarantee that you have an inappropriate and ineffective naval force.  We need to keep this lesson firmly in mind as we build toward the inevitable war with China.  Currently, we have substituted technology for strategy and, as a result, have produced ships with no useful purpose in a China war (Zumwalt, LCS, AFSB, MLP, every amphibious ship, etc.).

PT Gunboat Reaction

Wow!  I mean … wow!  The almost universal reaction to the last post on a PT gunboat was to hugely upgrade it by doubling the size and adding large guns (up to 76 mm), anti-ship missiles, radar fire control, UAV aviation, mines, etc.  No one was content to let the gunboat be a simple, small gunboat with the missions listed in the post.
 
Speaking of missions, no one really objected to the mission list nor did they amend the list to account for their proposed changes in weaponry and sensors.  Instead, they instantly jumped to more and bigger hulls and weapons.
 
Does this sound familiar?  It should.  It’s exactly how the Navy designs ships.  They start with a potentially focused, common sense idea and then instantly double the size, add every thing  and every function they can think of, and gold plate the entire design.
 
Don’t get me wrong, I have nothing against discussing a large patrol ship (corvette) which is what almost everyone was describing (even the ‘you should look at xxxx’ references were, invariably much larger vessels), however, none of the proposed ships retained any real relationship to the original PT gunboat subject of the post.
 
Don’t understand why the Navy designs are always so bad?  This is why.  We did it, ourselves!
 
Re-read the post and then the comments and note the instant upsizing.  Not a single person stuck with the scope and missions of the PT gunboat.  Hey, maybe you didn’t like the gunboat idea.  That’s fine but to start designing a vastly increased substitute without modifying the mission list and CONOPS is exactly how the Navy gets it wrong.
 
This was an eye opener!  I honestly didn’t expect that.  I guess I have more work to do to hammer home the proper design principles.

PT Gunboat

As we have previously discussed, the gunboat version of the WWII PT boat was the most effective form of the PT Boat (“PTboat”) and, along with its surveillance (ISR) duties, were the most useful functions.  Interestingly, we have modern PT boat equivalents in the Mk VI and, in a larger form, the Cyclone class, although both are being eliminated from service.  There have been other small boats, as well, in recent decades.  The Navy, although it has toyed with small boats from time to time, has rejected all attempts at establishing a persistent small boat naval component within the fleet.
 
Pivoting our thinking away from the ship-sinking role for the PT-ish boat (we’ll use the term ‘PT boat’ in a generic sense for the rest of the article) and keeping in mind that the most effective use was as barge-busting gunboats and ISR, we could easily imagine a very useful PT boat component in the Navy, today.  For example, we could flood the Persian Gulf with PT boats to monitor and eliminate Iran’s maritime harassment, ship seizures, and ship mining.  Of course, that would require us to have the will to use force, as necessary, otherwise there would be no point.
 
 
Weapons
 
Consider the impressive density and types of weapons on PT gunboats.  As an example, listed below is the weapons fit on PT-596 later in the war:
 
PT 596

• 4x torpedo
• 1x M4 37 mm autocannon
• 2x Mk50 5” Rocket Launcher
• 2x Twin .50 cal MG
• 1x 20 mm single
• 1x 40 mm single

 
In addition, many PT boats added various types of weapons as desired and as availability allowed.  Such ad hoc weapons included the 37 mm anti-tank gun, depth charges, mounted bazooka, .30 cal MG, 40 mm dual, 20 mm dual, 81 mm mortar, and so forth.
 
All that weaponry was packed on an 80 ft boat!  We struggle, today, to mount one CIWS on a 500+ ft Burke.
 
Now, consider modern equivalent PT boat weapons on a small boat.  With such a boat, what kinds of missions could we effectively perform?
 
 
Missions
 
Here’s a partial list of missions that could be performed by a modern PT gunboat:
 

• Persian Gulf anti-Iranian maritime harassment
• Philippines anti-Chinese patrol
• Fishery anti-Chinese incursion patrol
• Africa and South America riverine patrol and raid
• Anti-terrorism

 
Note:  None of the above missions are major war missions.  The PT boat is simply not suited for major combat, today.  It would, however, offer benefits in the pseudo-peacetime role as long as we’re willing to use them forcefully, when necessary.
 
It’s also noteworthy that the missions we’ve discussed generally occur at a useful level, meaning at the source of problems rather than at the high end, geopolitical level where we wind up having Burkes standing by watching bad actors instead of taking action because we’re too afraid of escalation or international hurt feelings.
 
One argument against a modern PT boat is that they’re rendered ineffective by the whole ‘don’t fire until fired upon’ philosophy that so many people believe is some kind of ironclad, mandatory requirement that prevents us from using force.  This, however, is complete bilgewater.  There is nothing in the law or the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice) that prohibits US forces from firing first if they feel sufficiently threatened.  That a prohibition against firing first appears in some Rules of Engagement is a purely self-imposed constraint and, arguably, contradicts the military Code of Conduct.
 
For example, if an Iranian boat makes an attack run on a US vessel, we should assume it’s real and fire first.  We are not responsible for reading the enemy’s mind.  We cannot depend on past behavior to know for certain that the attack run is just a bluff.  Indeed, the local commander would be derelict for not taking action if it did turn out to be a real attack.  Most importantly, after a few Iranian boats are destroyed while attempting reckless harassment, they would stop harassing us, knowing that to do so is fatal.  Iran is responsible for the consequences of its own stupid acts.  It’s not our job to be responsible for their stupid behavior and to rescue them from the consequences of their own stupid behavior.
 
Additional benefits of a PT gunboat, authorized to take appropriate action, would be that it would provide low level command opportunities and would be a great way to begin identifying personnel with actual combat mindsets and promoting them into higher commands instead of the cowering crap we have for captains and admirals today.
 
What do you think?  Are there useful missions for a modern PT gunboat?
 
 
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Note:  For a fictional story describing the use of a PT gunboats, see, “MkVI –Gunboat Diplomacy Story”

ET, Phone Home

Here’s a little tidbit from the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict about radio signal security. 

On top of the strikes themselves, Lebanese civilians describe shock at Israel’s ability to obstruct and overtake radio frequencies in Lebanon in order to broadcast an announcement warning people to stay away from Hezbollah sites and forecasting the air strikes to come.[1]

One of the foundational beliefs among US military planners is that our communications will be secure … despite no evidence supporting that belief and a fair amount of evidence to the contrary (see, “Communications Vulnerability”).
 
So many of our weapon systems depend on guidance signals, telemetry, data flow, and so forth and the security of those communications has been taken as an article of faith despite evidence to the contrary.  For example, Iran has had success disrupting and/or capturing our UAV control signals resulting in loss or capture of UAVs.
 
The US military consistently refuses to test communications under realistic conditions during field exercises and, in a display of unbelievable illogic, has publicly stated that using our full capabilities would be too disruptive during an exercise.  Do we not believe that China will have capabilities at least equal to our own?  Should we not, then, subject our communications to the maximum disruption possible in exercises to see what works and what doesn’t and to learn how to work in the face of disruptions?
 
I have consistently heard from military communications specialists that our communications are nowhere near as secure as we’d like to believe.  That doesn’t necessarily mean that China can decrypt our signals.  Decryption is not need to learn a great deal.  Signal frequency (number of signals, not wavelength), strength, location, etc. can offer a great deal of information as the British found out in the Battle of Heligoland Bight (see, ”The Battle of Heligoland Bight”).
 
I would hope that the military has conducted extensive and realistic tests and just aren’t sharing the information publicly but I doubt that’s the case.  It’s simply impossible to keep large scale tests of that nature a secret.  It might be possible to keep the results secret but not the event.
 
This is just a brief post to remind us about our potential communications vulnerability.  We need to begin realistic tests and exercises yesterday or we’re going to be rudely surprised when war comes.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “For Lebanon, a war in all but name has finally arrived: Experts”,   Agnes Helou, 25-Sep-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/09/for-lebanon-a-war-in-all-but-name-has-finally-arrived-experts/

SEAL Deaths

You may recall the deaths of two SEALs back in Jan 2024, off Yemen, during a night boarding operation in poor weather with 6 ft seas.  One man slipped while climbing a scaling ladder and fell into the sea.  The second man dove in to assist the first man who was struggling to regain the ladder.  The Navy’s report states that the deaths were preventable and attributes the deaths to, 

The cause of the deaths was attributed to poor training, unfamiliarity with flotation gear, and possible improper maintenance of personal flotation devices.[1]

It is also noteworthy that the men were heavily loaded with gear. 

Each SEAL carried about 50 pounds of personal and mission equipment.  Navy Special Warfare Operator 1st Class Nathan Gage Ingram, 27, dived into the sea to assist Chambers. Ingram is believed to have carried about 80 pounds of gear when he dived in.[1]

Diving into high seas with 50-80 lbs of gear is not a formula for success.
 
The Navy identified what they consider the root cause of the tragedy to be: 

The root cause of the incident was unfamiliarity with personal flotation gear and a lack of standard procedure for using, training with, or wearing it.

Other team members told investigators that while they knew the importance of their tactical flotation system — which includes two inflatable floats that attach to a belt and foam inserts that can be added — few had ever operated one in training and there is little instruction on how to wear it.[1]

Contray to the Navy's claim, that is not the root cause and the statement clearly indicates that the Navy doesn’t have the faintest idea what the term ‘root cause’ means or how to conduct a root cause analysis.  A root cause is the ultimate reason something occurs and, inevitably, produces a cascading chain of lesser causes leading to the event itself.  Almost invariably, the true root cause of anything lies with flawed leadership at fairly high levels and, almost inevitably, organizations stop their root cause analysis at a low level, well before they get to the true, upper level (leadership) cause (I wonder why they stop, he asked sarcastically, knowing exactly why).
 
In this instance, the root cause was not the SEAL’s lack of familiarity with the flotation equipment.  That was a low level cause but nowhere near the true root cause.
 
Moving up the root cause chain a bit, the person who selected/specified unfamiliar equipment for the unit was a cause but, again, not the root cause.
 
Proceeding further up the root cause chain, the assignment by leadership of a mission in questionable weather by inadequately trained personnel was a higher level cause but, again, not the true root cause.  This is similar to whoever assigned the riverine boats a mission beyond their capabilities which resulted in the boats and crews being seized by Iran.
 
The true(er) root cause, then, was high level Navy leadership who were unaware (or uncaring) of the equipment and level of training of the unit and proceeded to assign a mission anyway under very questionable weather conditions.
 
The truly ultimate root cause was a Navy system that encouraged lackadaisical training, a never say no culture, an ignorance of real world conditions, and a lack of personal responsibility towards those under their command.  To be clear, I’m talking about SecNav and Chief of Naval Operations who fostered a flawed culture.  This flawed culture has been evident repeatedly in collisions, groundings, waivers leading to fatalities, capsized amphibious vehicles, a surrender rather than fight mentality, acquisition failures and coverups, prioritizing social issues over combat readiness, and so on.  There can be no disputing the failed culture of the Navy.
 
Aside from the root cause, there is another aspect to this tragedy and that is personal responsibility.  Frankly, given the SEALs supposed creed of attention to detail, I’m astounded that they would embark on a mission with unfamiliar equipment and known shortcomings in their training.  I know they (and the Navy/military, in general) have a ‘can do’ attitude (arrogance, when it comes down to it) that drives them to do foolish things but there comes a point where personal responsibility comes into play.  In addition to knowingly endangering themselves, each SEAL knowingly allowed their fellow SEALs to begin a mission that they knew their fellows were not adequately trained or prepared for and that danger was compounded by the darkness and weather conditions.  Even if they wish to ignore the danger to themselves, each SEAL is obligated to be responsible for his fellow team members if he sees them about to do something foolish.  Each SEAL member failed their obligation to their teammates.
 
I’m deeply disappointed in the SEALs individually and as a group culture.
 
Some of you may be offended by this analysis but that doesn’t change the reality.
 
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Investigation Reveals Drowning of Two Navy SEALs During a Boarding Operation Was Entirely Preventable”, streiff, 12-Oct-2024,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/10/12/investigation-reveals-drowning-of-two-navy-seals-during-a-boarding-operation-was-entirely-preventable-n2180468

Blast From The Past

If you look to the sidebar of the post, you’ll see a new feature called ‘Blast from the Past’.  In it is a link to a single post pulled from the early archives.  The post will change with some frequency and will be a post that remains pertinent today but may have been missed by many current readers who had not yet joined the blog at the time of the posting.  The posts will reveal the timelessness of ComNavOps’ wisdom and his eerie foresight and omniscience.  Enjoy!

Prepare to Fight the Last War

There’s an old saying that generals always prepare to fight the last war.  Nowhere is this truer than the Ukraine-Russia war.  The US (and, to be fair, the entire world) is preparing to fight the Ukraine conflict for the next war. 
 
We noted the success Ukraine has had using unmanned surface drones against the Russian navy and so we are dutifully pushing ahead with unmanned vessels just as quickly as we can while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind example.
 
We noted the inability of manned aircraft to exert decisive effect and so we’ve begun revising our air doctrine and tactics to reflect this while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind example.
 
We noted the impact of small UAVs in attacking individual soldiers and vehicles so we’ve enthusiastically embraced all manner of small drones while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind example.
 
We noted the marked lack of success by tanks and their high rates of attrition and so we’ve eliminated the entire Marine Corps tank component and begun moving away from tanks and toward light vehicles while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind example.
 
 
There can be no dispute.  When we enter into a duplicate of the Ukraine conflict we will be more than ready.  On the other hand, when we take on China we’ll be lost, floundering, and wondering why we aren’t better prepared.  It’s because we’re preparing to fight the Ukraine war, not China.

Low-Manned Surface Vessel

There has been a good deal of discussion in the naval observer camp lately about some form of supplemental weapons vessel;  an arsenal ship/barge, as it was called in earlier times.  The vessel, by whatever name, would act as a supplemental magazine for manned ships thereby allowing … well … I’m not really sure what it allows.  Let’s take a look at the latest country to latch onto the fad and see what’s good about their design and concept and what isn’t.
 
The Royal Netherlands Navy is going to acquire two-low manned surface vessels which are euphemistically and optimistically referred to as ‘The Rapidly Increased Firepower Capability’ (TRIFIC, ‘terrific’? one assumes they’ll be called in a tortured acronym that some staffer probably received a promotion for coming up with) and, in some articles, Modular Integrated Capability for ACDF and North Sea (MICAN) and Multifunctional Support Ship (pick a name and stick with it!).
 
The vessel is 170-200 ft long and is based on a commercial offshore supply vessel.  It will carry up to 4 containers on the aft deck.
 

TRIFIC Low-manned Surface Vessel

 
From various articles, here’s a list of some of the claimed capabilities of the vessel:
 

• increase front-line firepower
• support surveillance efforts
• containerized weapon packages
• electronic warfare (EW) packages combining both intercept and jamming functionality
• operate as an ‘offboard’ magazine for RNLN air defence and command frigates (ADCFs)
• fire support/precision strike for the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps
• provide additional long-range surface-to-air missile capacity for the four De Zeven Provinciën-class ADCFs
• employ long-range precision-guided munitions against coastal targets in support of amphibious operations
• provide protection for infrastructure in the North Sea
• deploy the Harop long-range loitering munition
• precision strike capability against critical targets such as headquarters, artillery or rocket installations, and supply areas
• EW suite to collect information on radar emitters, jam threat radars, and disrupt control links associated with hostile drones
• deploy underwater vehicles/sensors to support surveillance and protection of North Sea infrastructures
• deploy above-water sensors to record the activities of suspicious ships for evidence 

 
Looking at that list, this vessel is a true miracle.  The only capability it doesn’t seem to have is the ability to operate an air wing while submerged.  Perhaps that’s coming?
 
What is the rationale for the vessel? 

The requirement for additional long-range anti-air missiles has been shaped by operational analysis which has determined that a massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles or swarming drones could rapidly exhaust existing ACDF [air defence and command frigates] magazine capacity. According to Tuinman [Dutch state secretary for defense Gijs Tuinman], the concept of ‘distributed operations’ developed by the RNLN will see a De Zeven Provinciën-class frigate operating in close company with a multifunction support vessel with additional missiles housed in containers on the aft deck.[1]

Will a couple of containers of missiles (2?  maybe 4 missiles per container?) make the difference to a frigate facing “a massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles or swarming drones”?  Of course not!  A massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles or swarming drones is not a winnable scenario for a single frigate … not even close.  To believe that a few extra missile containers will enable a frigate to defeat “a massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles or swarming drones” is pure fantasy.
 
We’ve already demonstrated that a ship – any ship – will be lucky to get off a single two-missile salvo against any incoming missile and a frigate has a basic radar, not even a Aegis type sophisticated radar.  As we’ve noted, having a million defensive missiles available is of no use whatsoever.  You can only launch two missiles per engagement and responding to “a massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles” is simply not possible.
 
Making the scenario even less likely is that the launch commands and missile guidance will be provided by the accompanying frigate.  How is a frigate that is under attack by “a massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles” going to have the time or resources to provide external missile targeting and guidance control? 
 
Even worse, a frigate that is controlling a remote vessel has to have constant communication between the control ship and the low-manned support vessel.  This means the ship’s location is being constantly broadcast.  Is this a good idea in combat?
 
The cost of this vessel is also concerning.  The budget for the multifunction support vessels is between €250 million and €1 billion. This covers procurement costs, a risk reserve, and operating costs through to 2039.[1]  It’s a certainty that the cost is going to be much closer to the high end of that enormous range than the low end.
 
The practical operating aspects of this vessel have clearly not been thought through.  This is an example of latching onto a fad because you have no grasp of the realities of combat.
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Netherlands Firms Up Plans For Multifunction Support Vessels”, Richard Scott, 27-Sep-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/netherlands-firms-up-plans-for-multifunction-support-vessels/

Multi-Year Amphibious Ship Buy

As reported by Naval News website, the Navy has awarded a multi-year contract for the purchase of three San Antonio LPDs and one America LHA. 

The deal, which will fund three San Antonio-class LPDs and one America-class Flight II LHA, will save taxpayers an estimated $1 billion.[1]

I have a couple of problems with this contract award.
 
Savings – The supposed savings is estimated at $1B.  In the aggregate, that sounds impressive.  A billion dollars!  Wow!  However, across four ships that’s just $250M savings per ship.  That’s not nothing but it’s not a miraculous savings, by any means.  More importantly, you know those savings will never materialize.  With 100% certainty, the ships will come in over budget and behind schedule with a litany of excuses like supply chain disruptions, parts shortages, design modifications, and all the other usual suspects.  There won’t be any savings.  The absolute best case is that the ‘savings’ (let’s be optimistic and assume there will be actual savings) will slightly reduce the magnitude of the inevitable cost overruns.  Again, better than nothing but let’s not kid ourselves into thinking we’re actually going to save money.
 
Make no mistake, the Navy didn’t do this to save the taxpayers any money; they did it to lock down budget commitments.  The Navy doesn’t care what a ship costs.  It’s not their money.  Congress will always give them more money.  They did this to lock down budget share.
 
Doctrine – This is the real puzzler.  Neither the Navy nor the Marines have any intention of ever again doing an amphibious assault.  The Marines have publicly and explicitly stated that they are out of the assault business.  The Navy doesn’t care about amphibious assaults and, indeed, balked at procuring more amphibious ships when they instituted a ‘strategic pause’ in amphibious ship procurement. 
 
Similarly, the Navy’s total indifference to the Marine’s Light Amphibious Warfare ship is yet more evidence of their disdain for amphibious operations.
 
Further evidence is the Navy’s total abandonment of naval gun support for amphibious operations and the doctrinal decision to move amphibious ships 25-50 miles off shore – a distance at which it is impossible to conduct an amphibious assault with current technology. 
 
The Navy is never going to conduct another amphibious assault so why are we continuing to buy more amphibious ships?
 
Legality – By law, multi-year procurements can only be applied to a single design that is mature and stable.  While I’m not a lawyer, the mix of ship types and the inclusion of a single (not multi) LHA would appear to be illegal.  Of course, this would hardly be the first time the Navy has ignored the law.  Here’s the verbiage describing the main requirement for using a multi-year procurement. 

FAR17.105-1(b)(3) There is a stable design for the supplies to be acquired, and the technical risks associated with such supplies are not excessive [2]

This is intended to be applied to a single, stable design.  The Navy is most certainly violating the spirit and intent of the law, if not the actual verbiage.
 
 
 
Discussion
 
So, with no savings and no intention (Marines) or interest (Navy) in ever conducting an amphibious assault, tell me again, why are we continuing to procure any amphibious ships? 
 
It seems clear that the only viable reason for the Navy going down this path is the desire to lock in budget share.
 
Layer the potential illegalities on top of this highly questionable contract and it becomes even more clear that this is a budget machination, not a sincere attempt at saving the taxpayers money.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy’s First Ever Multi-Year Amphibious Ship Contract Awarded”, Carter Johnston, 25-Sep-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/us-navy-finalizes-first-amphibious-multi-year-buy/
 
[2] https://www.acquisition.gov/far/subpart-17.1

The Electronic Battleship

One observation that has clearly come out of the Ukraine-Russia war is the prominent role of electronic warfare (EW).  We’ve seen GPS disruptions, weapon guidance disruption, intercepted communications, unit localization using signals intercepts, and probably many other aspects that are not yet common knowledge.  So, while the exact manifestations of EW’s prominence are not yet fully clear, the overall thrust is.  EW is a major factor/force on the battlefield and its influence is likely to continue to grow.
 
This is a naval blog so what does the EW lesson mean for naval forces?  Obviously, all the same considerations apply to the maritime battlefield as the land battlefield.  Enemy forces and weapons detection, weapons guidance disruption, localization using signal intercepts, etc. are all vitally important for naval forces.
 
Naval forces (and for the rest of this post we’ll focus on US Navy forces unless otherwise explicitly stated) have had EW capabilities to varying degrees for many decades now so what’s the big deal?  The ‘deal’ is that naval EW has long been the forgotten stepchild of naval capabilities (along with armor, large caliber guns, survivability, robust steel construction, weapon density … boy, the Navy sure has a lot of forgotten stepchildren, don’t they?!).  EW has been an afterthought, at best.  It is only recently that the Navy has begun to belatedly, and even then only in a minor way, address EW with the SEWIP modernization program.
 
Currently, each ship has its own small SLQ-32/SEWIP EW unit and the units are constrained by space/volume/mounting requirements, power limitations, placement challenges, manning constraints, training deficiencies, etc.  In other words, each individual ship can, at best, take care of itself but is of little or no help to other ships in the area.
 
If EW is so important, doesn’t it make sense to have a ship that is a behemoth at electronic warfare?  An electronic battleship, so to speak?  Where is our EW ship that can electronically dominate the naval battlefield?  Where is the ship that can electronically ‘swat’ UAVs and missiles from the sky?  Where is our area EW as opposed to individual EW?  We wouldn’t dream of not having area air defenses so why don’t we have area EW?
 
Where is the EW battleship?
 
What’s wrong with individual ship EW, you may ask?  Nothing except that, by definition, it’s limited to just the host ship and it’s haphazardly implemented and suffers from being at the bottom of the ship’s training priorities because it’s not the main mission of the given ship.  This is the same problem the Burkes face with ASW.  They are theoretically capable of ASW but they rarely train for it and are, therefore, ineffective.  Anti-air is the Burke’s main mission so that’s what they train for on the rare occasions that they train for anything.
 
Consider this historical example:  the USS Stark incident was instructive as it illustrated problems with the SLQ-32 performance, interface, false alarms, and lack of training, as noted below. 

The electronic warfare technician at the SLQ-32 console heard the F-1’s Cyrano-IV again lock on to the Stark. The lock-on signal ceased after seven to ten seconds.
 
Neither of the two SLQ-32 operators saw a [ed. inbound] missile warning. The main operator at the console, however, had turned off the incoming missile audible signal warning. He claimed later that the alarm was typically set off too easily, and distracted him from performing other signal analysis.[1]

 
We need a ship whose main – indeed, only – mission is EW so that it gets the training that is required to achieve and maintain proficiency.  We need an electronic battleship.
 
More than that, we need a multi-ship, coordinated EW effort.  Currently, each ship is its own EW entity, separate and isolated from any other ship.  There is no integrated, multi-ship or group EW effort as there is with missile control and usage via Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA).  Navy air defense utilizes a central command and control function typically located aboard the Ticonderoga class cruisers.  Again, we need a group wide, area EW control that integrates the EW of all the ships in the group.  We need an EW CEC.
 
Further, we need the group’s chaff and decoy systems tied into the EW control system.
 
Having established the need for an EW battleship and the general concept of large scale, area EW let’s now look at the specifics of an EW battleship.
 
 
EW Battleship
 
Analogous to a conventional battleship, the three main categories and levels of ‘weapons’ for an EW battleship are:
 

• Main battery - electronic attack
• Secondary battery - electronic protection
• Tertiary battery - electronic support

 
More specifically, the EW battleship requirements are, in no particular order:
 

• radar warning
• targeting support
• countermeasures
• situational awareness
• threat warning
• signal collection / SigInt
• direction finding
• laser warning
• drone/missile communications jamming
• false signal injection
• enemy GPS (GLONASS, BeiDou) disruption at point of attack

 
With the specific requirements in mind, what kind of specific equipment (EW ‘weapons’) should an EW battleship have?  An examination of the myriad existing aircraft, vehicle, and ship EW systems provides a good candidate list while understanding that each system would be significantly scaled up in terms of power and antenna size (both sensing and emitting).  For example, a small EW pod on an aircraft might be functionally duplicated for use on a EW battleship but would have, for practical purposes, unlimited power and emitters/receivers many times larger.
 
To give a feel for the types of equipment, here’s a partial list of existing EW equipment on various platforms:
 
 
Ship:
 

• AN/SLQ-32(V)2 – Initially the most common variant, the (V)2 expanded on the (V)1's capabilities with new receiving antennas for increased radio frequency coverage. It added the ability to detect high frequency targeting and fire-control radars, providing early warning against an imminent anti-ship missile attack.
• AN/SLQ-32(V)3 – The (V)3 added antennas with electronic attack capability, able to actively jam targeting radars and anti-ship missile terminal guidance radars.
• Sidekick – active jamming in a smaller package as an alternative to (V)3
• AN/SLQ-32(V)6 – Part of the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP). (V)6 provides enhanced electronic support capability through upgraded antennas and open combat system interface. It is made up of the SEWIP Block 1B2, SEWIP Block 1B3, and SEWIP Block 2, which provide specific emitter identification (SEI), high gain high sensitivity (HGHS), and electronic support (ES), respectively.
• SEWIP Block 1 provides enhanced EW capabilities to existing and new ship combat systems to improve anti-ship missile defense, counter targeting and counter surveillance capabilities. The upgrade addresses obsolescence mitigation through introduction of electronic surveillance enhancements (ESE) and Improved Control and Display (ICAD) as well as incorporation of adjunct receivers for special signal intercept including specific emitter ID (SEI) and high gain/high sensitivity (HGHS). The SEI and HGHS capability provides improved battlefield situational awareness.
• SEWIP Block 2 provides early detection, analysis, and threat warning from anti-ship missiles by providing enhanced Electronic Support (ES) capability via an upgraded ES antenna, ES receiver and an open combat system interface for the AN/SLQ-32. These upgrades are necessary in order to pace the threat and improve detection and accuracy capabilities of the AN/SLQ-32.
• SEWIP Block 3 (AN/SLQ-32(V)7) will provide electronic attack (EA) capability improvements.
• SEWIP Block 4 is a future planned upgrade that will provide advanced electro-optic and infrared capabilities to the AN/SLQ-32(V) system.
• COBLU Command and Control Coordination - Integrates area ship sensors and provides a common picture using passive sensors.

 
 
Aircraft:
 

• EA-18G Growler: ALQ-218 Detection Pod  -  passive Radar warning receiver for airborne situational awareness and signal intelligence gathering. The AN/ALQ-218 detects, identifies, locates and analyzes sources of radio frequency emission.
• EA-18G Growler: ALQ-99 High Band Jamming Pods  -  radar and comms jamming
• EA-18G Growler: ALQ-99 Low Band Jamming Pod  -  radar and comms jamming
• EC-130H / EC-37B Compass Call – electronic attack;  disrupts enemy command and control communications and secondary EA capability against early warning and acquisition radars.
• MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAV - Multifunctional Electronic Warfare (MFEW) Air Large is the Army’s first organic brigade electronic attack asset mounted on an MQ-1C Gray Eagle drone.  brigade-level airborne electronic attack asset and providing limited cyberattack capabilities
• RC-135V/W is the USAF's standard airborne SIGINT platform.
• RC-135S Cobra Ball is a measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) collector equipped with special electro-optical instruments such an All Weather Tracking Radar and Medium Wave Infrared Array (MIRA) designed to observe ballistic missile flights at long range.[24] The Cobra Ball monitors missile-associated signals and tracks missiles during boost and re-entry phases to provide reconnaissance for treaty verification and theater ballistic missile proliferation.

 
Vehicles:
 

• Stryker - Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS) which combines cyberwarfare, signals intelligence and electronic attack.

 

The EW battleship combines all these functions, each in its own 'mount', on one ship.

Antenna Size
 
The key concept that makes the EW battleship work is the available size and power of the various emitter and receiver antennae. 
 
For example, passive sensing is a function of sensor size.  Inter-galactic frequency sensors are massive in order to collect the faint signals from distant stars and galaxies.  A man-portable - or even an aircraft mounted – sensor is limited in size.  A ship, on the other hand, could mount Aegis sized sensor arrays, thereby vastly increasing the sensitivity and effectiveness of the sensor.
 
Similarly, one of the problems with Army man-portable or even mobile electronic warfare (EW) systems is that they are small and inherently power-limited.  Ship size systems with, for practical purposes, unlimited power would eliminate this constraint.
 
 
Dispersion and Redundancy
 
One of the [many] limitations of small EW package systems is that each package must execute several different functions, switching between them as needed.  On a ship, each function can be its own ‘mount’ and, therefore, be continuously available with no need to switch or ‘ration’ power.  The functions can be dispersed as stand alone, complete units.
 
Ships also offer the ability to have more than one of any given function, just as a ship has (or used to have when we still designed WARships) redundant guns.  This allows for both damage resilience and the ability to engage multiple threats simultaneously.
 
 
 
Note:  I’ve not specified any size for this EW battleship.  The term ‘battleship’ refers to combat power, not size.  If everything needed can fit on a canoe, that’s great.  If it requires a ship the size of an Iowa class battleship, so be it.  My pure guess is that something the size of Burke would suffice but I’ll leave it to the engineers to determine that.
 
 
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[1]https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1988/may/stark-report