Showing posts with label Logistics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Logistics. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 16, 2025

Five Tons of Unmanned Stupidity

I just read yet another article extolling the wonders of unmanned surface vessels for logistics and/or attack.[1][3]  This one was singing the praises of the Leidos Sea Specter slow, low profile boat which Leidos claims can carry a 2-5 ton payload for 1000-2200 nm at 8 kts in sea state 3.[2]   The manufacturer’s original concept was for this craft to be used as a logistics delivery platform.  A recent article suggested it could be used to attack Chinese carrier or surface groups using a containerized torpedo.

Let's consider a couple of important aspects to this concept.
 
Speed – This craft, like most unmanned craft, is appallingly slow;  it can’t get anywhere useful in any tactically relevant time frame.  While the manufacturer claims the craft can sail from Guam to any point in the first island chain on a single tank of gas, it would, as a relevant example, take 5+ days, best case, to make a 1000 nm journey.  This demonstrates the idiotic nature of a combat use for this craft.  Say a Chinese surface group was spotted transiting past an island, it would take around a week for the craft to carry its single containerized torpedo to that point.  Of course, the target group would be long gone.  People are making this stuff up without thinking it through.
 
Payload – The payload is very small with severe volumetric limitations which will reduce the effective payload substantially.  The cargo area is limited in volumetric size to a maximum payload storage area of 29’ x 4’ x 4’ which, essentially, means just small boxes as opposed to any sizable equipment.
After seeing the tiny cargo area in a manufacturer’s video, it is obvious that the claimed payload of 2-5 tons would only be for bricks stacked in the area with no space.  Any realistic cargo, with packaging and space will be far less.  One ton might be optimistic.
 
This is far too small a payload to be logistically significant for any but, perhaps, a lone coastwatcher on an island mountain.  For example, an infantry division in combat consumes some 1000 tons of various supplies per day and that’s probably unrealistically low!  An armored division uses some 600,000 gal (2000 tons) of fuel per day in combat and, again, that’s probably ridiculously optimistic.
 
If someone thinks we’re going to resupply Guam or some far flung, hidden Marine missile shooting outpost using these tiny boats, they’re sadly mistaken.
 
Leidos Sea Scepter


 
Conclusion
 
The only thing this craft can deliver is five tons of stupidity.  I understand why industry keeps producing these kinds of nonsense products … they make profits for the company because the military is so enamored with unmanned technology that they’ll buy anything, regardless of whether it has any viable use.  It is up to us to recognize stupidity because, clearly, the military can’t.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Marine Corps Trials Unmanned Logistics Concepts in the Indo-Pacific”, Carter Johnson, 25-Apr-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/u-s-marine-corps-trials-unmanned-logistics-concepts-in-the-indo-pacific/
 
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-xNZwlH8sM
 
[3]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Pairs Heavyweight Torpedo with USV in a New Program Effort”, Carter Johnson, 15-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/u-s-navy-pairs-heavyweight-torpedo-with-usv-in-a-new-program-effort/

Friday, March 14, 2025

USNS Wally Schirra Maintenance

Here’s an interesting piece of potential good news.  According to a press release, the Lewis and Clark class dry cargo ship, USNS Wally Schirra, T-AKE-8, completed a several month maintenance overhaul in Korea at the Hanwha Ocean Co. (previously Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering) facility.[1]  If this turns out to be a viable option, the flexibility to obtain maintenance at a foreign yard increases our maintenance capacity and improves fleet availability.
 
What wasn’t spelled out in the press release was the actual cost compared to budget or the adherence to the planned schedule.  The work was originally supposed to be completed in Dec 2024 but ran into March 2025 when the scope of the work was increased due to additional maintenance requirements discovered during the course of the project.  Thus, it appears that the schedule overrun was an add-on approved by the Navy rather than an inability to meet the original schedule.  It was also not revealed whether all of the maintenance items were addressed within the allotted time frame – typically, US ships in US yards leave their maintenance periods with significant work unaddressed due to time pressures – a practice that simply kicks the maintenance can down the road and causes worse problems in the future.  For example, the USS Port Royal grounding was, in part, directly attributable to the failure to complete work on a faulty navigation system.
 
USNS Wally Schirra Entering Hanwha - that is
one beat up looking ship!

 
A Navy press release gives a hint of the scope of the work: 
ROH [Regular OverHaul] conducted aboard Wally Schirra in the Republic of Korea included dry docking, and more than 300 work items that addressed hull corrosion and a full rudder replacement.
 
“Hanwha addressed extensive deterioration and damage to the hull, propeller, rudder, and rudder post/steering gear,” said Cmdr. Patrick J. Moore, commanding officer, MSC [Military Sealift Command] Office-Korea. “Notably, Hanwha engineers reverse-engineered the damaged rudder, completely replacing the unit when blueprint were not available.[2]

A concerning item is the replacement of the rudder and the lack of a blueprint to do so.  How is it possible for the Navy to not have a blueprint for the ship’s rudder?  That’s mind-boggling.
 
That aside, if the work was completed on time and on budget, that’s a tremendous accomplishment both for the Korean company and for the general Navy maintenance effort.
 
USNS Wally Schirra Leaving Hanwha - that's what
a ship should look like!
 

Hanwha Ocean is currently executing an overhaul on USNS Yukon.
 
If obtaining maintenance from a foreign company turns out to be a viable and effective option, the beneficial impact on Navy readiness cannot be overstated.  This would increase our maintenance capacity, increase ship availability, increase readiness, and improve overall ship quality. 
 
Of course, there is always the issue of sensitive/secret equipment and how to ensure the security of that equipment while in a foreign yard.  It’s probably not that significant an issue for logistics ships but warships are crammed with sensitive/secret equipment.  Still, even being able to obtain additional maintenance on the logistics fleet would be a tremendous help.  I love to be able to say this:  well done, Navy!
 
If nothing else, maybe we can pull into a foreign dock and get the rust removed from our rotting ships!
 
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Hanwha Ocean completed its first MRO on US Navy ship”, staff, 13-Mar-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/hanwha-ocean-completed-its-first-mro-on-us-navy-ship/
 
[2]Navy website, “USNS Wally Schirra Completes Major Maintenance at South Korean Shipyard”, Grady Fontana, 13-Mar-2025,
https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/4118860/usns-wally-schirra-completes-major-maintenance-at-south-korean-shipyard/
 

Monday, June 17, 2024

Gaza Pier

ComNavOps has been keeping an interested eye on the Gaza aid pier (or causeway) as a moderately realistic simulation of a combat unloading operation involving one component of the Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS).  Would it work as advertised?  How effective and efficient would it be?
 
Surprisingly, the pier has already been shut down. 
… Pentagon announced the "Gaza pier" will be dismantled due to damage.[1]
Here’s a time line of the pier:
 
  • Mar 7 – Biden announces Gaza pier plan
  • Mar 9 – U.S. Army support ship General Frank S. Besson leaves to begin construction
  • May 17 -  pier opens
  • May 28 - pier ops suspended after piece breaks off
  • Jun 8 - operations resume after repairs
  • Jun 15 – Pentagon announces pier will be torn down
  
So, what can we learn from the Gaza pier effort?
 
The first noteworthy aspect of the pier was how long it took to build.  President Biden announced the pier on 7-Mar-2024 and construction was completed 17-May.  That’s around a 70 day time frame.  As a point of comparison, the Normandy Mulberry Harbors were put into operation in less than two weeks despite being hugely larger and more complicated and despite being done under combat conditions.
 
It appears that the pier was in operation approximately 18 days out of its 30 days of existence.  That’s disappointing.  That would not effectively support an amphibious operation.
 
The next noteworthy aspect is the pier’s apparent fragility.  While weather can be severe on any body of water, the Mediterranean is not exactly the North Atlantic or a Pacific typhoon.  I never heard a detailed description of the weather conditions that disabled the pier but there were no reports of any major storms.  One would have expected that such a key element of an amphibious assault would be a good deal more robust. 
 
Mulberry Causeway


 
Conclusion
 
So, what are we to conclude from this ill-fated exercise?  Well we see that the concept has not been exercised nearly enough and under nearly realistic enough conditions for nearly sufficient periods of time.  In other words, we’ve established a key piece of our amphibious concept without sufficiently testing it.  Some might be tempted to try to defend the pier/causeway by claiming that it just encountered some bad luck but … hey … isn’t that what war is?  If you can’t weather some bad luck and difficult conditions (to the extent there were any?) then you haven’t got a combat-robust system.
 
Therefore, we conclude that the pier/causeway is not a viable component of the JLOTS system and this must, in turn, make us question the entire JLOTS system.
 
The only way to prove otherwise is through extensive testing.  Come on, Pentagon.  How about a long term, realistic test?  It would seem mandatory, now, since the system failed its actual use test quite badly.
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “RIP to Biden's Gaza Pier As He Chalks Up Another Foreign Policy Disaster”, Bonchie, 15-Jun-2024,
https://redstate.com/bonchie/2024/06/15/rip-to-bidens-gaza-pier-as-he-chalks-up-another-foreign-policy-disaster-n2175519

Wednesday, May 8, 2024

Logistics Surge Exercise Results

Do you recall the no-notice, 2019 TransCom logistic surge exercise in which 80%-86% of the ships were able to sail within the required 5-day window?  We discussed whether this was a good result or bad and kind of concluded that it was not horrible but not great (see, “Logistics Surge Exercise”).  Well, I finally remembered managed to track down the after exercise report so let’s take a closer look.
 
The Maritime Executive website published a summary of the exercise findings.[1]
 
Not surprisingly, as with any Navy related activity, the results weren’t quite as good as initially claimed. 
 
The exercise resulted in 27 of the 33 (82%) ships activated being ready to sail within the 5-day window, however, 6 of the 27 that sailed subsequently experienced problems that would have prevented them from executing any mission.  That drops the ‘sail and mission capable rate’ to 21/33 or 64%.  Not quite the 80%-86% success initially claimed.
 
Worse, 12 ships of the 61 ship fleet were excluded from the exercise due to known, pre-existing problems, 10 others were excluded due to planned maintenance, and one could not leave port due to a bridge height clearance issue.  Thus, 23 of the 61 (38%) ship fleet were unavailable for the exercise. 
 
Apparently, the sailing included ship’s speed tests and it was noted that,  
 … none of the four Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off ships (LMSRs) in the test completed their operational speed runs at the target speed of 24 knots. One heavy lift vessel, the Cape Mohican, also failed her operational speed run due to a control automation casualty.[1]
I think we can revise our previous assessment of ‘not horrible’ to ‘extremely disappointing’ especially since these ships were all supposed to be manned with caretaker crews whose job was to maintain them in ready-to-go condition.
 
 
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My apologies for having let this slip until now.
 
 
 
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[1]The Maritime Executive website, “Activation Exercise Reveals Challenges Facing U.S. Sealift Fleet”, 31-Dec-2019,
https://maritime-executive.com/article/activation-exercise-reveals-challenges-facing-u-s-sealift-fleet

Saturday, March 9, 2024

Gaza Aid Port

Biden has announced plans to build a port, of sorts, to enable ships to deliver aid to Gaza.  As noted in an Axios article, the aid effort has been thwarted by the lack of access to a deep water port. 
Efforts were already underway to coordinate shipments by sea but the biggest complication was the lack of a deep-water port to enable big ships to dock and off load aid.[1]
 
The U.S. military will establish a temporary pier in the sea off the Gaza coast with a causeway that will allow trucks to bring aid to shore … [1]
 
… it will be at least a few weeks before it's operational.[1]
Update:  Pentagon spokesman, Gen. Pat Rider had this to say about the timing,
Finally, in terms of timing, we're working to set this up as quickly as possible, but we expect that it will take several weeks to plan and execute.[2]
Several weeks???  This should be a canned plan, sitting in a planning book.  It's a basic operation, not even a combat operation.  This should be about a week to set up.  As an example, the American Mulberry was operational 12 days after D-Day and that was a much larger operation executed under combat conditions and in extremely unfavorable weather.

This operation illustrates a couple of points relevant to our military discussions:
 
  • It is not possible to logistically support a military operation of any size by air.  Support/supplies must come from ships.
  • A readily accessible port is a mandatory requirement for any overseas military operation and is often the purpose behind an amphibious assault (Normandy D-Day, for example).
 
This is as close to an actual combat amphibious assault logistics operation as you can get in peacetime.  It is going to be fascinating to see how the military goes about establishing this port.  In theory, this is exactly what the US military should be able to do in their sleep.  Can the US build a port/causeway in the time frame required?  Given our failure in recent logistic exercises and our failure to surge amphibious ships when required, this is by no means certain.

Mulberry Causeway at Normandy, WWII


 
On a related note, this places the US perilously close to becoming involved in the Israeli-Hamas conflict.  I hope someone has thought through the ramifications.  This also showcases the highly vulnerable state of a port in a combat action.  Either side, or a third party actor, could opt to launch an attack to disrupt the operation.  Will the US put any defensive assets and policies in place and what will our response be to an attack?
 
 
Warning:  It should go without saying but I’ll say it anyway:  this is purely a military analysis of the operation and does not indicate any political position, pro or con, towards either side in this conflict.  There will be no political comments allowed.  Period.
 
 
 
 
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[1]Axios website, “Biden to announce "emergency mission" to build port in Gaza for aid shipments”, Barak Ravid, 7-Mar-2024,
https://www.axios.com/2024/03/07/biden-port-gaza-humanitarian-aid-state-union







Saturday, August 26, 2023

A Prototype, Subsidized, Convertible, Merchant Ship

Logistics will be a major issue in a war with China.  Of course, logistics are a major issue in any war so that wasn’t exactly the world’s most earth-shaking statement, was it?  Nevertheless, it’s true.  Now, what does the Navy/nation lack in regards to China war logistics?
 
Well, we lack a large, ready merchant fleet to carry supplies to Guam, Taiwan, Japan, etc.
 
Moving on to a seemingly unrelated topic (which you know we’re going to directly relate to shortly!), we’ve discussed ship prototypes and the Navy’s near total unwillingness to explore ship designs, tactics, and CONOPS via the use of prototypes (see, “Prototypes”).
 
So, to summarize … we lack a merchant logistics fleet and we don’t make use of prototypes.  Could those two things be related?  Of course they are!
 
One major advantage China has over us is that all their merchant ships are constructed with military adaptations built in.  In a war, China will have an easily convertible merchant fleet available for military use.
 
Here’s thought … why don’t we copy China for once and build a military-convertible merchant fleet?
 
Let’s start with a single prototype, funded by the government.  It would be a merchant ship that has military adaptations and ‘convertibility’ built in.  We could try it out by practicing rapidly converting it to military use (troop transport, military supply transport, military vehicle transport, oiler, or whatever other use we might need). 
 
Once we debug and prove out the concept, we can embark on a production program in which the government subsidizes (or totally pays to build) a convertible merchant ship and then loans/leases it to commercial shipping companies with the agreement that they maintain it to acceptable standards.  If war arises and we need it, we have a well maintained, readily convertible, military logistics fleet and if war does not occur during the ship’s lifespan, the commercial shipping company gets a nearly free ship to use.  Win, win.
 
Logistics Fleet in Waiting?


This potentially solves multiple problems. 
  • We establish a well maintained, readily convertible logistics fleet.
  • We strengthen our commercial shipping industry.
  • We increase demand for new merchant ships and encourage the growth of our shipbuilding industry while possibly gaining new shipyards to meet the increased construction.
  • The Navy/government gets a fleet of ready logistics ships while off-loading the yearly operating costs to the shipping industry.
Note:  I have no idea what the exact degree of subsidies or specific loan arrangements would be.  That would require an economic analysis that I lack the data to conduct.  Someone would have to work that through to see what makes sense.
 
Thus, for a minimal initial outlay (subsidy or total construction cost), the Navy gets a modern, ready, reserve fleet of logistic ships and our shipping and shipbuilding industries get a much needed boost.  Ideally, we’d simultaneously revamp our shipping-related laws and regulations to further encourage domestic shipping but that’s another topic.
 
Here’s some example merchant ship construction costs in FY22 dollars.
 
Dry bulk                        $49.6 million
General cargo               $17 million
Container                      $68.2 million
 
As you can see, these are almost free relative to typical Navy ship costs!  We could buy 71 container ships at $70M apiece for the cost of a single $4B Zumwalt.
 
The key to this concept is to build a single prototype and use it to learn how to best design a ship for rapid wartime conversion.  With that knowledge in hand we can then begin a production program that benefits both the military and the shipping industry.  That’s a lot of benefit for very little money!
 
Of course, none of this addresses the issue of manning those ships during war but, again, that’s a different topic.

Tuesday, July 11, 2023

Wartime Production Plan – Part 2

Continuing the theme of pre-war production planning …
 
We previously discussed wartime production planning (see, “Wartime Production Plan”) and noted that our war plans should not focus on the number of ships and planes we currently have but, instead, the ability to quickly produce more ships, planes, and everything else we need during a war.  Indeed, the pursuit of large fleets of ships and aircraft can easily become counter-productive as noted in the landmark Army Green Book series, 
… preparedness may take one of two forms. A nation may choose to maintain an aerial fleet-in-being or, as an alternative, it may choose to rely upon its capacity to build an air fleet in time of emergency. The fleet-in-being or "Big Stick" form of preparedness has certain advantages. It can be used as a diplomatic weapon to terrorize an opponent into surrender without a fight, as Hitler found. But at the same time, the fleet-in-being has serious limitations. Obsolescence in aviation is so great that large numbers of old aircraft rapidly become relatively vulnerable to fewer aircraft of newer design and superior performance, as France found to her sorrow after the outbreak of World War II. In the United States, officers of the War Department in general and the Air Corps in particular were firmly committed to a policy that emphasized the importance of capacity to build, the importance of industrial potential, the power to create and replenish an air force, rather than a fleet-in-being.[1, p.158-9] [emphasis added]
Consider a couple of example issues about pre-WWII planning, as documented in the Army Green Book report on pre-WWII planning for aircraft procurement and see what lessons it offers.
 
One lesson was that people get so caught up in the minutiae that they lose sight of the big picture.  The pursuit of minutiae then delays the effort to the point that the effort is no longer useful.
 
For example, 
In 1936 Air Corps officers were still computing the aluminum requirements for the 1933 mobilization plan … [1]
Those officers were given a task and were determined to pursue it to its bitter end no matter how irrelevant the passage of time rendered their task.  They were unable to see the larger picture and adjust.
 
Another lesson is that people tend to focus on the wrong aspects of planning.  For example, there was a pre-WWII mobilization plan but, 
War Department General Mobilization Plan," which was "based on personnel and not upon supply and equipment."[1, p.158]
This was a fundamental flaw since personnel are useless without equipment.  Planning has to be for both.
 
One of the best ways to plan for, and enhance the ability of, wartime production is to establish a set(s) of standardized construction programs that are fully detailed, fully resourced, and ready to go.  For example, a basic destroyer that has been prototyped, debugged, and is ready to put into mass production would be an invaluable aid to have on the shelf.  As the Green Book notes, 
An educational order is an order designed to familiarize a manufacturer with the item he will be expected to produce in an emergency.  In its simplest form, an educational order might involve little more than acquainting the contractor with the item he is to make. In its most complex form it might even include the construction of jigs and fixtures as well as tools and dies to be held on a stand-by basis.[1, p.159]
Another critical pre-war planning issue highlighted by the Green Book is that of expansion of existing industries to meet increased war demand versus conversion of industries from a non-war product to a war product.  An example of the latter would be the conversion of the auto industry to tank production.  As with most things, a mix of the two approaches is probably preferred. 
 
Regardless of the approach, pre-war planning is required.  A survey of industries to see which can be usefully and efficiently converted, and to what product(s) is required along with plans for doing so.  Sets of construction/modification blueprints for facilities should be maintained and resources should be identified.
 
And the list of issues and lessons goes on and on …
 
As in sports, you win because of the planning and effort you put in before the game.  We can win the war with China by putting in the planning and effort now, before the actual shooting starts.  Instead of directing our budget towards new ships – that lack CONOPS or usefulness and are being retired decades early – we should be budgeting the planning of industrial capacity and logistics.


 
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[1]Irving Brinton Holley, Jr., United States Army in World War II, Special Studies, “Buying Aircraft:  Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces”,
https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/CMH_Pub_11-2.pdf

Sunday, July 9, 2023

“We’ve Run Out Of Ammunition”

Here's an exact quote from Joe Biden:

"We’ve Run Out Of Ammunition”
 
Yes, Joe Biden just confirmed that the US cannot win a peer war with China by stating, on camera, that the US has run out of ammunition.[1]  I know half of you don't believe me so go to the link and listen to the video for yourself.  It’s only a few seconds long.  Here’s the direct link to the video: https://twitter.com/i/status/1678012747513200640
 
This means that the US lacks the inventory of weapons to even supply a minor (not even regional, as it’s only two countries) conflict between Ukraine and Russia, let alone sustain a war with China.  Far, far worse, we’ve been draining our munitions inventories since the start of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and we’ve been unable to produce enough new munitions to even replace what we’re giving away.  At this point in WWII, we were well on our way to gearing up and factories were churning out vast quantities of weapons. 
 
The damning conclusion is painfully obvious:  we lack the infrastructure and industrial capacity to produce the quantities of arms necessary to sustain a war with China.
 
Just as we beat Germany and Japan by outproducing them, it would appear that China can outproduce us in a sustained war.  They’re already demonstrating on a daily basis that they have more industrial weapons production capacity than we do and we’re supposedly well over a year into gearing up for production.  In other words, China is outproducing us while we’re in the midst of stepped up production!!!!! 
 
Now, obviously, ‘running out of ammunition' doesn’t mean that every munition is we have is down to near zero levels but we’ve already heard, publicly, that many types are down to a third or less of their pre-Ukraine inventory levels.  One example is the ubiquitous 155 mm artillery shells, as noted below. 
Biden told Zakaria that the cluster munitions were being sent as a “transition period” until the US is able to produce more 155mm artillery.[1]
I’ve stated repeatedly that you don’t win a war with what you have to begin;  you win with what you can produce during the war.  Terrifyingly, it appears that we have only a very limited capacity to produce enough to win a war.  This isn’t really all that surprising.  We’ve been talking about it for years.  Consider our front line ships and aircraft.  When war starts, how many replacement ships and planes can we produce per year?  The answer is … almost none.
 
We did a post on how much our munitions orders have increased in the last year and it was … almost none (see, “2024 Weapons Procurement Increase”) – not because we don’t want to produce more and don’t want to fund more but because we lack the production capacity.  Manufacturers are publicly stating that their capacity is max’ed out.
 
The United States is no longer the arsenal of democracy.

This should scare the pudding out of us but there seems to be little reaction from the military or government.
 

 
Note:  This is not a post about the geopolitics of supporting Ukraine.  It’s about our industrial weapons capacity.  We’re not going to discuss politics.
 
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[1]Red State website, “Foreign Policy Genius Joe Biden Openly Proclaims 'We've Run out of Ammunition,' and That Seems Like a Problem”, Bonchie, 9-Jul-2023,
https://redstate.com/bonchie/2023/07/09/foreign-policy-genius-joe-biden-openly-proclaims-weve-run-out-of-ammunition-and-that-seems-like-a-problem-n773688

Monday, March 6, 2023

Amphibious Construction Battalion 2 Eliminated

The Navy is deactivating Amphibious Construction Battalion 2 (ACB).[1]  The ACB was tasked with supporting amphibious landings by providing engineering support for causeways, cranes, and ferries among other duties.  ACB 1 is still being maintained although, apparently, at greatly reduced manning levels.[1]
 
The Navy decided in July to deactivate the battalion after the elevated causeway system — a modular pier stretching up to 3,000 feet to provide logistic support to Marine Corps and Joint Expeditionary Forces — was removed from the command’s Table of Allowance.[1]


Elevated Causeway System

 
 
I don’t necessarily have a problem with deactivating the unit as I see very little realistic need for amphibious landings in the foreseeable future.  However, the move does raise a few questions. 
  1. If the elevated causeway system has been eliminated, how will supplies get from ship to shore?  We seem to be early retiring the MLP/AFSB so one has to wonder how sustainment materiel will get to shore.  Have we pigeon-holed ourselves into only fighting/sustaining from secure ports?  In today’s world of multi-thousand mile missiles, there are no secure ports!

  2. This is yet another indication that the Marines, the Navy, and the military are out of the amphibious assault business.  If that’s the case, why are we still building multi-billion dollar amphibious ships?

  3. If ACB 2 serves no purpose, why maintain ACB 1?
More generally, the Marines – and the military, in general - are eliminating lots of units and capabilities and I don’t see any corresponding establishment of new combat capabilities to replace them other than the completely unproven and, thus far, demonstrably combat-incapable unmanned fad.
 
I’ve long stated that the Marine’s core mission should be port seizure and this is yet more proof of that need.
 
 
 
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[1]Stars and Stripes website, “Navy Seabee battalion honored in decommissioning ceremony after 80 years of building and fighting”, Caitlyn Burchett, 3-Mar-2023,
https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2023-03-03/gator-bees-decommissioning-9334218.html

Wednesday, March 1, 2023

Fuel Logistics for a Pacific War

One of the ‘givens’ that I assumed about any China war was that the US would be hard-pressed to supply enough fuel (or any other materiel, for that matter!) for sustained combat operations.  In other words, I assumed that the US would face extremely problematic logistics.  However, reader ‘Austin Vernon’ has written an article on his website that suggests that fuel logistics are not only possible but actually not very problematic.  Do I need to re-think my assumption?  I urge you to follow the link (see, “Fuel Logistics for a Pacific War”) and read the article.  Here’s a few quotes from the article to whet your appetite:
 
The vast majority of fuel usage is for aviation. The Air Force requires nearly 750,000 barrels per day, and Naval Aviation another 100,000 barrels per day. Warships and amphibious units only use ~160,000 barrels per day at full steam. I'm not including Army figures, but ten armored divisions would use about the same as the Navy's ships.[1]
Not only are China's ~9 million barrels per day of seaborne imports vulnerable, but ~30% of China's four million barrels per day of crude oil production comes from offshore platforms. Those facilities should be easy targets that are difficult to repair. The country will suffer a 75% reduction in oil supply, leaving onshore production and Russian pipeline imports.[1]
There are 800+ Very Large Crude Carriers that hold 2 million barrels, 570+ Suezmax tankers that hold 1 million barrels, 650+ Aframax tankers, and ~1000 misfits that hold a few hundred thousand barrels.[1]
There are ~650 tankers worldwide in just the Aframax classification, and ~10 could keep the Navy supplied from the US West Coast since each ship holds 500,000+ barrels.[1]
 
The author discusses US military fuel usage rates and presents tables itemizing the consumption according to branch/type.  In addition, he addresses capacity and delivery methods.  Not to be one-dimensional, he also discusses China’s needs and capacity.
 
All of this is accomplished in a relatively short, very easy to read, well written piece.  If amateurs discuss tactics and professionals discuss logistics, this is your chance to enhance your professionalism.  Read the piece and come back here to discuss it!
 
 
Here’s a few of my own questions/thoughts for potential discussion:
 
Desert Storm demonstrated that bulk delivery of supplies to a theater is only part of the issue.  The other part is distribution to the individual units.  In other words, we saw that individual units had to stop due to lack of fuel even though bulk fuel at ‘depots’ was readily available.  Do we have the unit level distribution capability to support sustained operations?
 
What happens to our capacities if a reasonable amount of combat losses (destroyed fuel farms, sunk tankers, etc.) occurs?
 
Can China significantly interdict our fuel shipments/convoys?
 
While there may be many tankers in the world, how many can the US actually obtain given that few are US flagged (according to my understanding)?
 
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By the way, if any of you have a topic you’re knowledgeable on and passionate about to the point of writing about it, let me know.  I’m quite open to hosting/referencing reader writings.
 
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[1]austinvernon website, “Fuel Logistics for a Pacific War”, Austin Vernon, 1-Mar-2023,
https://austinvernon.site/blog/fuellogistics.html

Monday, December 5, 2022

Merchant Ship Conversions to Wartime Use

It is no secret that the Navy has nowhere near enough amphibious and logistic support ships to prosecute a sustained war with China.  New construction of sufficient numbers and types of ships when war comes will be impossible given the state of US commercial shipbuilding.  An alternative to new construction is to acquire and convert commercial ships as was done routinely during WWII, especially at the start of the war.

 

Consider the case of troop transports.  At the start of WWII, we had nowhere near enough Attack Transports which were the backbone of the entire Pacific campaign.  Instead, we converted commercial ships to troop transports until we were able to ramp up our wartime shipbuilding.  Here’s a few examples:

 

McCawley Class - The McCawley class consisted of two converted commercial ships built for the American shipping company, Grace Lines, by Furness Shipbuilding Company.  The ships were completed in 1928 as Santa Barbara and Santa Maria. They were bought by the Navy in 1940 and converted to troop transports as the USS McCawley (AP-10) and USS Barnett (AP-11).

 

USS Harry Lee (AP-17) - The Harry Lee was built as the passenger ship SS Exochorda by New York Shipbuilding Co. in 1931 before being acquired by the Navy in Oct-1940 and converted to the Harry Lee (AP-17) in Dec-1940.

 

USS John Penn (AP-51/APA-23) - The John Penn was built as Excambion in 1931 by the New York Shipbuilding Company as one of American Export Lines's original "Four Aces."  She was acquired by the Navy 8-Jan-1942 and converted to a troop transport in Apr-1942.

 

 

Even prior to WWI, the US recognized the need for vastly increased numbers of commercial ships that could be converted to wartime use.  With the 1916 Shipping Act, Congress established an organization to do just that – the United States Shipping Board which, in turn, founded a business, the Emergency Fleet Corporation whose mission was to acquire merchant ships for war needs.

 

Paraphrased from various Wikipedia entries,

 

The Shipping Board had been established while the United States was at peace, with the intent to restore the nation's Merchant Marine.

 

Ten days after declaration of war, on 16 April 1917, the Board created the Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) in the District of Columbia with a capital stock of $50,000,000.  The EFC’s purpose was to acquire, maintain, and operate merchant ships to meet national defense, foreign and domestic commerce during World War I.

 

When the United States declared war against Germany the purpose and policy of the Shipping Board and the Fleet Corporation changed from a body established to restore the American Merchant Marine to a military organization tasked with providing transport of war materials to Europe. 

 

The EFC was renamed the U.S. Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation in February 1927, then abolished entirely in October 1936. Its functions were transferred to the United States Maritime Commission.

 

The EFC operated together with some 80 shipyards throughout the country to design commercial ships suitable for conversion to war use.  For example, the Design 1029 ship (full name Emergency Fleet Corporation Design 1029) was a steel-hulled passenger/cargo ship designed to be converted in times of war to a troopship.

 

Today, China does something along these lines with their commercial ships being designed for rapid conversion to wartime vessels.

 

We see, then, that acquisition and conversion of merchant ships to wartime use has been a common practice throughout history.

 

Given our appalling shortage of transport and logistic ships, we will definitely need to acquire and convert merchant ships.  Unfortunately, the US flagged merchant fleet is lacking in numbers.  The U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, lists only 180 US flagged, privately owned, oceangoing ships of 1,000 tons or greater, as of 2021.[1]  The breakdown by type is shown in the table below.

 

 

Ship Type

Qty.

Containership

63

Dry Bulk

4

General Cargo

20

Ro-Ro

26

Vehicles Carrier

3

Tanker

64

Total

180

 

 

Of the 180 vessels, 157 were deemed militarily useful.[1]

 

We don’t need to attempt to build more amphibious or logistics ships but we do need to ‘change the landscape’, so to speak, with the following actions:

 

  • Need to require merchant ships to include military conversion features in their design.
  • Need to increase the number of US flagged merchant ships by modifying the applicable laws.
  • Need to plan for acquisition and conversion of merchant ships.
  • Need to have conversion plans for each individual ship in hand and ready to go.
  • Need to assess shipyard capacity to accomplish conversions.

 

Most of all, we need some kind of organization tasked with the described acquisition and conversion.  It is unclear to me whether such an organization exists within the government/military.  The ‘s responsibilities have, over the decades, been diluted and distributed among various organizations such as the United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) but none seem to have the charter to produce/ensure that commercial ships are designed for easy and rapid conversion to wartime configurations.

 

Of course, converted merchant ships won’t be perfect fits for wartime uses since they are, after all, merchant ships at heart.  For example, we can easily convert a merchant ship to a troop transport, like we did in WWII, but we can’t convert it to a big deck, aviation ship of the type the Navy currently procures.  However, this fits well with the blog’s overall ship design philosophy of single function, cheaper, smaller ships.  The Navy needs to institutionally come to grips with this reality – and desirability!  We then need to revise our doctrine and operations to include these types of ships instead of the big deck, aviation ships we have today.

 

One final consideration is the cost of naval amphibious or logistic ships – they’re expensive to buy and operate!  By having a fleet of merchant ships capable of being usefully converted to wartime work, the Navy largely avoids the cost of procuring and operating the ships while still having access to the numbers and capabilities the ships represent.  Thus, the cost of administering such a program would easily pay for itself.

 

 


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Related Note:  Following is an example of a commercial ship, the SS United States, designed for conversion to wartime needs.  The ship was designed and acquired under the direction of the United States Maritime Commission (MARCOM) which succeeded the United States Shipping Board.  From Wikipedia entries,

 

… the US government sponsored the construction of a large and fast merchant vessel that would be capable of transporting large numbers of soldiers. Designed by American naval architect and marine engineer William Francis Gibbs (1886–1967), the liner's construction was a joint effort by the United States Navy and United States Lines. The US government underwrote $50 million of the $78 million construction cost, with the ship's prospective operators, United States Lines, contributing the remaining $28 million. In exchange, the ship was designed to be easily converted in times of war to a troopship. The ship has a capacity of 15,000 troops, and could also be converted to a hospital ship.

 

The vessel was constructed from 1950 to 1952 at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in Newport News, Virginia. The hull was constructed in a dry dock. United States was built to exacting Navy specifications, which required that the ship be heavily compartmentalized, and have separate engine rooms to optimize wartime survival.[2]

 


SS United States



 

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[1]https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/2021-04/DS_USFlag-Fleet_2021_0316_Bundle.pdf

 

[2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_United_States


Friday, July 29, 2022

Navy Lays Down the LAW

The just-released CNO Navigation Plan 2022, aside from being a buzzword-filled, worthless piece of garbage, contains a piece of information that dooms Commandant Berger’s entire missile-shooting concept.  The document calls for 18 Light Amphibious Warships (LAW) to be built by 2045.[1, p.10]

 

Berger’s entire concept is predicated on the LAW which will transport his small units and their massive missiles, clandestinely, to hidden bases deep inside enemy waters.  The LAW will then relocate the Marines in the unlikely event they’re spotted and will conduct resupply on a regular basis, again, undetected.

 

Setting aside any mocking of the LAW or the concept, it is clear that the LAW is the foundation of the concept.  Without transport and logistics there is no concept, right?  The Navy appears to be providing only very limited support to the Marines.  Eighteen LAW is woefully insufficient to support the concept.

 

Even if a single LAW could fully transport, relocate, and indefinitely resupply a single unit, the maximum number of units deployed is, then, limited to eighteen.  Now, factor in the need for the LAWs, like any ship, to return to base regularly to repair, replenish, rest, etc. and you see that multiple LAWs are needed to support a single missile-shooting unit. 

 

Add in attrition – does anyone really think that 14 kt, non-stealthy, defenseless vessels trying to operate deep in enemy waters are not going to suffer significant attrition? – and 18 LAWs can only support a few Marine units for a short time;  and even that’s wildly optimistic.  With any realistic attrition factor, it is clear that the concept needs something north of forty LAWs for the concept to have even a small chance of working.


 

Light Amphibious Warship - Artist's Concept


Thus, it appears that the Navy is not on board with the Marine’s concept and is only paying token lip service to the concept. 

 

At best, the Marines may get a couple of LAWs per year over the next couple decades.  The Commandant will be retired in a year or so.  Will his concept still be around by the time the Navy gets around to building LAWs?  It seems unlikely.

 

If the Navy’s forecasted war with China occurs in the next several years, the Marines won’t have any transports and will be relegated to the sidelines.

 

Even if you think Commandant Berger is a genius whose concept will revolutionize warfare and bring China to its knees, it is clear that he has utterly failed to get buy-in from the Navy.  He has failed to convey and communicate the merits, as he sees it, of his concept.  Navy buy-in should have been one of the very first things he accomplished but it appears that was not the case.

 

Eighteen LAWs by 2045, Commandant?  The Navy is telling you what you can do with your concept.

 

 

 

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[1]https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22121320/navigation-plan-2022_signed.pdf

 

Friday, December 3, 2021

Mobile Nuclear Reactors – The Dumbest Idea Ever

‘Spitballing’  is a time-honored method for generating ideas and spurring innovation.  If you’re not familiar with the practice, it’s basically a mental free-for-all where participants toss out ideas, no matter how wild or unconventional and nothing is ruled out.  There are no bad ideas at this stage.  The concept is that the flow of ideas either produces a good one or, more likely, triggers a new, good idea from the germ of one of the oddball ideas.  The second stage of the process is to filter the assembly of ideas and begin weeding out the ridiculous ones and focus in on the better ones. 

 

Well, it appears that the military has been engaging in spitballing but without the second step wherein the ridiculous ideas are weeded out.  A case in point is the concept of mobile nuclear reactors, as reported by an Army Times website article.(1)  According to the article,

 

The Army is seeking to develop and field a mobile nuclear reactor to power forward operating bases. (1)

 

The program, known as “Project Pele,” is prototyping the mobile advanced microreactor concept under the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office.

 

The purpose is “to provide deployable, reliable, resilient and safe operational power for a variety of DoD missions,” said Navy Cmdr. Josh Frey, a Defense Department spokesman.

 

“Project Pele offers a transformative capability to deliver resilient electrical power for years without refueling and in a size small enough to be transported by existing defense infrastructure,” Frey said. (1)

 

In a 148-page 2018 report commissioned by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-4, the authors claimed the benefits of such reactors would help reduce fuel logistics and storage problems, reduce infrastructure challenges for large-scale power, aid in power generation for areas lacking electrical grids and provide power to energy-intensive systems.

 

Congress approved funding for prototype reactors and the Army awarded $40 million in contracts to three nuclear reactor companies in March 2020 for Project Pele, according to the NPPP report. (1)

 

 

 

Here’s an accompanying illustration. 

 

 


What would the specific requirements be?

 

The original proposal, approved by the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office asked for industry solutions in January 2019 on providing a less than 40-ton small, mobile nuclear reactor design that could operate for three years or more and provide 1 to 10 megawatts of power.

 

Planners want the reactor to fit inside a C-17 cargo plane for air transport to theater. More recent moves have reduced the power output to 5 megawatts.

 

Other requirements include: the reactor must shut down safely without intervention in the event of an attack, rely on passive cooling and avoid significant release of radioactivity or health consequences to people nearby. (1)

 

 

Where would these reactors be used?  Among other places,

 

The 2018 G-4 report recommended the following locations where it saw potential use for the mobile reactors:

 

  • Thule, Greenland
  • Kwajalein Atoll
  • Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
  • Diego Garcia
  • Guam (for both a naval and Air Force facilities on the island)
  • Ascension Island
  • Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico
  • Camp Buehring, Kuwait
  • Fort Greely, Alaska
  • Lajes Field, Azores

 

Just out of curiosity, don’t all of those places already have power?

 

 

Not everyone agrees with the concept.

 

Alan J. Kuperman wrote the 21-page report titled, “Proposed U.S. Army Mobile Nuclear Reactors: Costs and Risks Outweigh Benefits,” in his role as coordinator of the University of Texas at Austin’s Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project. (1)

 

Kuperman makes some excellent and common sense points:

 

High cost – Kuperman said the Army’s claims that nuclear power can provide cheaper electricity for powering future forward bases is “based on unrealistic assumptions.” Those include that such a reactor would have low construction costs and operate for 18 hours a day over 40 years. The more likely scenario is a mobile reactor would run for half that time over about 10 years, meaning nuclear electricity could cost 16 times more than estimates and still seven times more than diesel-generated power.

 

Vulnerability to missile attacks – The report points to the 2020 missile attack on forces at al-Asad air base in Iraq. Even with warnings hours ahead of time, more than 100 U.S. personnel suffered traumatic brain injury from the 11 strikes that hit the facility. And the missiles were 10 times more accurate than the Army has predicted in its report on the vulnerability of reactors to precision strikes. The service admits that a direct hit on a reactor would destroy the device. Kuperman notes that even the Army’s plans to protect the reactors, by burying them underground, could inadvertently cause meltdowns by impeding air cooling and causing overheating. A similar strike on an similar such future base with a reactor could cause far more devastating consequences.

 

Captured reactors – Should a U.S. base housing a mobile reactor be overrun or abandoned, the radioactive waste from the reactor could be used in “dirty bomb” terror attacks.

 

No mission for reactors – One of the chief purposes of pursing such reactor programs was to reduce casualties from diesel transport to remote bases. But Defense Department data shows a dramatic drop in casualties of five per 1 million gallons of fuel delivered in 2005 to nearly zero by 2013.

 

High-energy weapons don’t need reactors – Kuperman states that the justification that future high-energy or laser weapons that the Army hopes to have protecting bases don’t require a reactor to power. “A high energy weapon would have to be fired millions of times to justify a reactor,” Kuperman said. “In reality such a weapon would be fired perhaps hundreds of times in its lifetime.”

 

Transport problems – The Army wants to air deliver these reactors to combat posts. Kuperman questions the “regulatory nightmare” that would create. The program calls for initial tests flying the reactors domestically to run then returning them, and their radioactive waste, to another domestic location. Foreign transport would require approval of countries airspace traversed and the approval of a host nation where the reactor would be placed, he said. Other Army recommendations include truck or rail transport domestically and either ship or over-the-ocean flights to friendly ports to then move the reactors again via truck or rail.

 

 

 

Is there any relevant experience with small reactors that we can look at?

 

The military did have a small reactor program during the Cold War. The Army Nuclear Power Program, which ran from 1954 to 1977, developed eight small nuclear reactors. Those reactors ranged in power production from 1 to 10 megawatts.

 

How five of the eight reactors were used:

 

The PM-1 reactor was used in Sundance, Wyoming, from 1962 to 1968.

The PM-2A was used at Camp Century, Greenland, from 1961 to 1964.

The PM-3A was used at McMurdo Base, Antarctica, from 1962 to 1972.

The ML-1 was used in developmental testing from 1962 to 1966.

The MH-1A was used in the Panama Canal Zone from 1965 to 1977.

 

Lyman [Union of Concerned Scientists and its then-director of the Nuclear Safety Project, Edwin Lyman] notes a major failure with one of the original eight designs in 1961 when a core meltdown and explosion of the SL-1 reactor in Idaho killed three operators.

 

The three deployed to Antarctica, Greenland and Alaska proved “unreliable and expensive to operate,” Lyman wrote in his response to the Army’s 2018 report on the mobile reactor program.

 

Lyman told Army Times on Thursday that a number of those old reactors required decades of decommissioning and one used at Fort Belvoir, Va., near Washington D.C. is finally scheduled for decommissioning in late 2021. (1)

 

 

 

Let me summarize this as briefly as I can:  this is one of those ideas that doesn’t even require ten seconds thought to see that the idiotic aspects outweigh the benefits by a wide margin.  Does the military have no one with the courage to stand up and say, this is stupid?  There are so many things we desperately need to be doing and yet we continue to waste time on things like this.  So sad.

 

 

 

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(1)Army Times, “Mobile nuclear reactors? Scathing report slams ‘disturbing’ military program”, Todd South, 1-May-2021,

https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2021/04/30/mobile-nuclear-reactors-scathing-report-slams-disturbing-military-program/