Who Needs a Navy When You’ve Got a P-8 Poseidon?

The Navy (and the US military) have received yet another miracle of technology from industry.  Boeing and Northrop Grumman have now simulated (they didn’t actually do anything but simulation is good enough – reality is never an issue) teaming between a manned P-8A Poseidon and unmanned MQ-4C Triton.[1]
 

Boeing and Northrop Grumman successfully simulated teaming between a manned P-8A Poseidon and unmanned MQ-4C Triton … [1]
 
The P-8A cued the Triton transit to a specific area. After receiving the request, the Triton autonomously planned and executed a transit to the area, employed sensors per the tasking, processed findings onboard, and reported results back to the P-8A Poseidon.[1]

So, the unmanned Triton flew to a waypoint and sent telemetry back?  Truly, the stuff of miracle and legend.  I’ve never even heard of “waypoints” … well, except for back in the 1970’s when that was just a routine capability … but to do that in a simulation instead of for real like we’ve done for decades is just a stunning achievement.  How do they come up with this stuff?
 
What does this miraculous development mean for the US?
 

Jane Bishop, vice president and general manager, global surveillance division, Northrop Grumman: “MQ-4C Triton and P-8A are the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s maritime patrol and reconnaissance force, delivering complementary capabilities unmatched by any other platforms. … Our commitment to pushing the boundaries of advanced technology ensures that the U.S. and allied nations operators maintain an unparalleled edge against evolving maritime threats.”[1]

“Unparalleled edge” !!!!  No other country in the world has the ability to fly waypoints and transmit data.  We are light years more advanced than anyone else.
 
This highlights the wonders of the P-8 Poseidon. 

The P-8A Poseidon is the world’s most advanced multi-mission maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft that provides anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and search and rescue mission capabilities.[1]

So, …
 

• ASW
• ASuW
• ISR
• S&R

 

Why do we even need a Navy?  Half a dozen P-8s should suffice to win any war.

 
 

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Just out of idle curiosity, is anyone getting tired of these constant announcements about miraculous technologies that have actually existed for decades?  To paraphrase:  Those that can, do. Those that can’t take old technologies and pretend they’re new.
 
I wonder how much we paid to simulate waypoints and data transmission?

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[1]Naval News website, “Boeing and Northrop Grumman Successfully Simulate P-8A Poseidon and MQ-4C Triton Teaming”, Staff, 6-Aug-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/08/boeing-and-northrop-grumman-successfully-simulate-p-8a-poseidon-and-mq-4c-triton-teaming/

P-8 Contract

The Navy has awarded Boeing a $3.4 billion dollar contract to produce 17 P-8 Poseidon aircraft.[1]  That’s $200M each!  Yikes!
 
Hmm … What does that price tag do to the aircraft’s Concept of Operations (CONOPS)?  Is anyone really going to risk a $200M airplane anywhere near the battlefield … you know, where it would actually do some good?
 
Has the cost priced the P-8 out of the realm useful contributions? 
 
Given the cost-risk, will we relegate the P-8 to peripheral scouting, well away from any danger?  If so, couldn’t we make do with a much cheaper aircraft?
 
In a similar vein, does anyone really think we’ll risk a $20B Ford (yeah, that’s a lot closer to the real cost than the Navy’s fraudulent $12B cost cap claim) where it can be sunk?
 
Cost impacts operations and tactics.  It’s unavoidable. 
 
With $3B destroyers, $20B carriers, $177M F-35 unit costs[2], $200M P-8, and $1.1B frigates, among other examples, are we pricing ourselves out of viable combat operations and tactics?
 
Should a ‘combat-riskable’ cost point be a design criterion for future ships and aircraft?
 

$$$$$$$$

 
 
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[1]https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/boeing-awarded-3-4-billion-contract-for-17-p-8a-poseidon-aircraft/
 
[2]Per June 2023 GAO Weapon Systems Annual Assessment report, p.207.

P-8 Poseidon – Ship Killer

The Navy is awarding Boeing a contract to begin integration of the LRASM with the P-8 Poseidon.  Given that we already have multiple ways to launch anti-ship missiles (LCS, Burke, F-18 Hornet, Constellation, etc.), why is the Navy doing this?  Well, the Navy’s answer is,

 

The whole goal here, at the broadest level, is to create problems for Chinese military planners. [2]

 

Hmm … Let’s circle back to that in a bit but, for the moment, let’s review the P-8 concept.

 

The primary function of the P-8 is anti-submarine warfare (ASW) although, in typical Navy fashion, as documented on the NavAir website, they’ve loaded on broad area maritime surveillance, directing Triton UAVs, maritime and littoral operations, strike warfare, and search and rescue.[6]  As we’ve seen, multiple functions dilutes training time/focus and produces less-than-expert operators … woefully less than expert.

 

P-8 Poseidon

Heading into 2020, the Navy had a validated requirement for 138 P-8 Poseidons[1] but halted purchases with an inventory of 128.[2]  So, optimistically, on any given day we have 80-100 aircraft available to cover the world’s oceans and operate against Russia, China, Iran, and NKorea, among others.  That’s a lot of ocean to cover with not many aircraft!

 

GAO puts the program unit cost at $200M each in 2012 dollars (program unit cost = $270M each).[3]  The combination of limited numbers of aircraft and high cost suggests that the wise commander will very carefully utilize and preserve the aircraft and avoid high risk operations that place the aircraft too near enemy anti-air forces.

 

The P-8 is capable of carrying torpedoes, Harpoon missiles, and SLAM-ER.  The Navy is also looking at adding additional weapons to the aircraft.

 

NAVAIR states that possible weapons systems to be integrated on the P-8A include “the 500 [pounds] to 2,000 [pounds] class of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) variants, Mk 62/63/65 Quickstrike mines, the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB II), Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD), Bomb Rack Unit BRU-55, and Universal Armament Interface (UAI).” [4]

 

So, not only has the Navy loaded the aircraft/crew with multiple functions on top of the primary mission, they now want to turn the aircraft into a multi-mission strike aircraft capable of mining, stand off strike, and close in strike … identical to the F-18 Hornet.  Isn’t that kind of multi-faceted strike capability a full time training effort by itself?  Where’s the time for ASW and all the other multi-missions?

 

Does every platform in the military really need to be capable of conducting every type of mission with every possible weapon?  Isn’t that how you become incompetent at every mission instead of expert at one?

 

Just out of curiosity, where will the P-8 get its targeting data (see, "LRASM - A Good Half Of A Weapon System")?  Yes, the aircraft carries its own radar but a large, slow, non-stealthy aircraft that is radiating is another way of describing a dead aircraft.  If the P-8 is close enough to a target to detect it, it’s close enough to be easily detected and killed by the enemy.  Let’s bear in mind that naval targets (meaning ships) are not going to be spotted at a thousand miles.  Every ship, today, is stealthy to varying degrees.  Chinese ships, in particular, visually appear to be more stealthy than ours and a searching aircraft will have to get quite close to target them.  I’m guessing Chinese ships will be detectable at around 30 miles.  That puts the P-8 well within the ship’s AAW kill zone.  Is this the kind of risk we want to take with our only fixed wing ASW asset and one that is limited in numbers and exorbitant in cost?

 

Returning to the LRASM issue, the P-8 will likely be able to carry 4 LRASM.

 

The P-8 has four wing pylons. Each of these stores stations, which are rated at 2,500 pounds, are able to carry standoff cruise missiles, such as AGM-84 Harpoons and SLAM-ERs, and eventually the stealthy Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). [5]

 

Does the ability to launch a maximum of 4 LRASM justify exposing rare and expensive aircraft to enemy defenses?

 

So, to sum up, with the P-8 program we have,

 

• not enough numbers to be effective given the mission load
• an aircraft too expensive to risk
• an aircraft/crew tasked with too many missions to be expert at any of them and the focus/training for the primary mission will be diluted
• an aircraft that cannot self-target without exposing itself to destruction
• a concept that will result in operating a large, slow, non-stealthy aircraft too near enemy defenses

 

Now, as promised, let’s circle back to the initial bit about how a LRASM missile-armed P-8 will ‘create problems for Chinese military planners’.  How will a large, slow, radiating, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable, defenseless aircraft create problems for the Chinese?  To the enemy, the P-8 is what is known as a target drone and all the Chinese need is for the aircraft to fly within range so that they can leisurely shoot it down.  How is serving up a valuable, rare, expensive target drone on an aerial platter creating a problem for Chinese military planners?  Isn’t it far more likely that the Chinese will be sending us thank you notes rather than scratching their heads over the problems we’ve created?

 

This kind of delusional thinking is how people will get killed when war comes.

 

What is it with the Navy’s refusal to become outstanding at one task?  The belief that a single platform/crew can competently perform dozens of functions is delusional.  The dilution of training time, alone, guarantees that this cannot happen.

 

 

 

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[1]Forbes website, “US Navy Plans To Stop Buying P-8 Poseidon Sub Hunters Despite Growing Undersea Threat”, Loren Thompson, 2-Dec-2019,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2019/12/02/us-navy-plans-to-stop-buying-p-8-poseidon-sub-hunters-despite-growing-undersea-threat/?sh=2857adb159fe

 

[2]Breaking Defense website, “With missile upgrade, P-8A Poseidon brings capacity, complexity to China fight: Analysts ”, Justin Katz, 2-Dec-2021,

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/with-missile-upgrade-p-8a-poseidon-brings-capacity-complexity-to-china-fight-analysts/

 

[3]Government Accountability Office, “Defense Acquisitions, Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs”, Mar 2012, p.117

 

[4]The Diplomat website, “US Navy to Arm P-8A Poseidon With Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile”, Franz-Stefan Gady, 6-Feb-2020,

https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/us-navy-to-arm-p-8a-poseidon-with-long-range-anti-ship-missile/

 

[5]The Drive website, “The Case For Stripping The P-8 Poseidon Down Into An RB-8 Multi-Role Arsenal Ship”, Tyler Rogoway, 22-Jul-2021,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40859/the-case-for-stripping-the-p-8-poseidon-down-into-an-rb-8-multi-role-arsenal-ship

[6]https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/P-8A-Poseidon

MAC Update

Here’s an update on the P-8 Poseidon’s Multi-Static Active Coherent (MAC) sonobuoy system from the Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) 2015 Annual Report.

MAC, you’ll recall, is a sonobuoy system that uses active acoustic transmitter buoys combined with passive receiver buoys to enhance detection capabilities.  In other words, one buoy transmits and the others listen.  MAC was the key ASW enhancement provided by the P-8.

Here’s what DOT&E had to say.

“DOT&E assessed that the MAC system provides the P-8A and the P-3C aircraft with a wide-area ASW search capability in some environments and for select target scenarios, but that MAC falls short of what the fleet identified as the capability needed to protect high-value units.   … DOT&E assessed MAC detection performance was similar to the P-3C’s performance and independent of the aircraft platform.” [emphasis added]

Further,

“The data also show operators are only able to recognize a small fraction of valid system submarine detections as a possible target and spent time assessing and prosecuting false targets.”

This is hardly surprising.  ASW has always been conducted against a backdrop of a high rate of false contacts and their corollary, missed contacts.  The reality is that finding very quiet targets in a very large and noisy ocean is an exceedingly difficult task.  That we would believe this new system somehow changes that basic reality simply demonstrates the arrogance of our belief that technology can magically set aside reality. 

We see, then, that MAC offers no demonstrable improvement over the traditional sonobuoy approach.  Theory suggests that there ought to be some improvement and perhaps there will be, eventually, as the system is exercised and developed but the reality is that there is no improvement as yet and no hard reason to expect that there will be.

This again illustrates the folly of developing an entire product, the P-8 in this case, based on a non-existent technology.  The P-8 was supposed to offer a vastly improved wide area ASW capability due to the MAC system.  Instead, we have a P-8 that offers no improvement and may be slightly inferior to the P-3 because the MAD sensor was deleted!

We previously talked about the wisdom of building new P-8s versus upgrading exiting P-3s and this finding suggests that there was even less reason for new builds.  Of course, new airframes are always nice even if the capabilities remain unchanged but the cost is significant for no gain in capabilities.

The point of this post is not to re-examine the P-8/P-3 new or upgrade debate.  The point is that this is another example of a non-existent technology that was pushed into production before it was ready.  MAC should have been developed as an R&D product and if it ever panned out then it could have been integrated into whatever ASW aircraft we would have at the time.  Instead, we have a hugely expensive new aircraft whose core ASW capability appears no better than the aircraft it replaced.

We need to leave developmental products in R&D until they’re ready.

P-8 and PBY

ComNavOps has long had doubts about the wartime role of the P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft.  The doubts arise from the combination of the aircraft’s slow and defenseless nature plus the necessity that it broadcast its presence (operating its radar) when performing the maritime patrol function (MPA).  Thus, the enemy is given a free location fix against a high value, slow, defenseless asset.  In other words, the P-8 is a sitting duck in combat if used as envisioned. 

“Used as envisioned”, of course, brings up the subject of the concept of operations (CONOPS).  How will the P-8 be used?  What will its main function be – ASW, MPA, both?  Will it perform its searches actively or passively?  Will it be defended by fighter aircraft or used independently? 

Most importantly, how close to the contested air/water space will it be used?  Certainly, the further back from the front line, the safer.  Of course, the flip side of that is that the further back from the front line, the less useful and effective it is.

The next question is where is the front line?  Well, that’s a nebulous concept that depends on the weapons being considered.  Considering an enemy rifleman, the front line is a hundred yards or so.  Considering enemy surface to air missiles which would be targeted at a P-8 aircraft, the front line is the range of the SAM systems which is 250 -300+ miles.  Here’s some range data on Russian SAM systems for consideration.

S-200 (SA-5)             190 miles

S-300 (SA-10)           121 miles

S-400 (SA-21)           250 miles

S-500 (?)                   250 – 300+ miles

Of course, the reported Russian SAM ranges are, undoubtedly, maximum theoretical ranges.  Effective ranges are probably half that.

Now, compare the SAM engagement ranges to the P-8’s detection range which is reportedly up to 200 miles for large targets with low resolution.  An effective range is probably more on the order of 100 miles. 

Comparing the SAM ranges and the P-8 detection range, it’s clear that the P-8 will have to enter the SAM’s engagement range to see anything assuming the SAM systems are on the front line.  The point is that unless we’re willing to consider P-8s as expendable, they’ll have to be held well back from the front line.  With that in mind, what will the P-8s be looking for? 

So far, this is considering only SAM ranges.  If thousand mile fighters and UAVs are considered, the P-8’s will be pushed even further back from the front line.

Knowledge of the location and movement of enemy units behind the front lines is immensely useful.  Knowledge of the location and movement of enemy units many hundreds of miles on our side of the front line is useful (certainly!!!) but highly unlikely other than the odd submarine.  In simple terms, the P-8 will offer us no intelligence about what’s happening inside the Chinese first island chain which is exactly the kind of intel we’d like to have.

P-8 Poseidon - Useful in War?

Let’s switch gears, momentarily.  ComNavOps is ever one to study and learn from history and it occurs that the WWII PBY Catalina is a relevant comparison to the P-8.  The PBY was designed as the MPA aircraft of its time and, indeed, functioned in that role for the first couple of years of the war before being superseded by long ranged, land based aircraft.  Like the P-8, the PBY was large, slow, and defenseless.  Data is difficult to come by but here’s the best summary of the early PBY loss rates that I could assemble, divided into the two main operational areas.  The operating area is followed by the number of PBY’s deployed and then the number of PBY’s lost.

Location                     Deployed       Lost

Pearl Harbor                   68               56

Philippines                      28               26

The loss rates are staggering.  Admittedly, many of the aircraft were destroyed on the ground but the loss rates in the air were also appalling.  On the other hand, the aircraft performed its function.  For example, the 30 PBY’s based on Midway found the Japanese fleet and set the stage for the battle that followed.  Thus, as a cheap, plentiful, expendable detection system the PBY was effective.  We had lots of PBYs and could afford to send them deep into potential enemy waters as expendable detection devices.  Locating an enemy fleet was deemed worth the loss of the aircraft.  Does this hold true today?  Are we willing to send $200M P-8’s on one-way missions?  Even if we are, we’ll likely only have around 80 P-8’s after the production run is done.  Note that we lost 82 PBY’s in the first couple years of WWII in just two relatively localized theaters.

PBY Catalina - WWII's P-8 Poseidon

Also note that the preceding discussion is focused on the MPA role, using radar for long distance surveillance.  The situation becomes far worse for the ASW role.  ASW detection does not occur at 100-200 mile radar ranges – it occurs at sonobuoy range.  How will P-8’s possibly penetrate far enough into the battlespace to perform useful ASW without being shot down?  I have no answer for that and, indeed, the answer would seem to be that it can’t.

This suggests a disturbing scenario – that we have spent the last few decades building a military force optimized for uncontested operations and one ill-suited for contested operations.  How will we perform ASW inside the first island chain?  Our own submarines can perform ASW and that is, of course, one of their main functions but that then brings the looming submarine shortfall into much sharper focus.  If submarines are to be our main ASW platform why are we allowing such a shortfall in numbers?.  Far from a shortfall, perhaps we should be increasing our submarine numbers?

All of the preceding also leads to the inevitable question, why do we even have P-8’s if they won’t be effective in war?  Why did we ever begin building P-3/8’s?  That answer lies with the nature of the enemy when long range patrol aircraft were developed.  During WWII, with only very short range surveillance systems available, enemy fleets could be anywhere in the Pacific.  Thus, PBY’s were needed to cover the entire ocean (or, at least, the areas of more immediate concern).  In more modern times, the Soviet Union was also a world-ranging naval force (submarines, in particular).  Thus, again, a patrol aircraft was needed to cover the entire world.  The plus side of this was that while the Soviet Union had far ranging submarines that needed to be detected their SAM systems and fighter aircraft were not present world wide.  Thus, the P-3’s were free to roam the world, hunting for submarines and conducting area surveillance, secure in the knowledge that they were relatively safe.

Today, however, our enemy of interest, China, is not a world ranging naval force (though they are moving in that direction) and is, for the foreseeable future, content to operate largely behind the first island chain.  Thus, we need to go into the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone thus created if we hope to generate useful intel.  This means that our primary ocean surveillance platforms, the P-8 and BAMS (Broad Area Maritime Surveillance) UAVs are particularly ill-suited for the mission.

We essentially replaced the P-3 with a duplicate, the P-8 – upgraded a bit, to be sure, but for all practical operational and tactical purposes, the same aircraft.  Over the life of the P-3, the operational and tactical landscape changed immensely from world wide surveillance to relatively small, focused surveillance on A2/AD zones and the threat to the aircraft changed from almost non-existent to very long ranged and lethal.  Despite those immense changes, we simply replaced the P-3 with its duplicate.  Perhaps we should have examined the CONOPS a bit closer and come up with a better means to accomplish the mission – a means that might have been something other than the P-8 or other than an aircraft, at all.

Some will say that the F-35 is how we will obtain our deep penetration intel.  This ignores the reality that the F-35 has neither the flight range nor the radar/sensor range to cover the entire East/South China Seas.  The F-35 might be useful for looking at a specific, tiny spot but it is not a maritime patrol aircraft.  Add to that the likelihood that every available F-35 will be fully occupied trying to establish air superiority and none will be available for generic surveillance work.

Thus, we are left with the conclusion that the P-8 and BAMS will not be particularly useful in high end combat and the question, how will we gather useful A2/AD zone surveillance information?

Upgrade vs. New

You have wonder about the wisdom of constantly building new aircraft and ships at the expense of existing ones.  Here’s an example from the Defense Industry Daily website.

“Lockheed Martin is to perform mid-life upgrades  to Greece’s P-3 Orion fleet. The US Navy awarded the $141 million modernization contract, which will provide an extension of service life by 15,000 flight hours. Four P-3Bs will undergo the structural mid-life upgrade, while Lockheed Martin also will reactivate one aircraft. Lockheed Martin will also provide for the inclusion of a Greek indigenous mission integration and management system, new avionics, and other ancillary hardware and services. The upgrades are to be completed by July 2019.”

Greece will get 5 modernized P-3 Orions for less than the cost of a single P-8 Poseidon.  I think I’d rather have 5 modernized P-3’s than one P-8.  Frankly, the P-8 doesn’t have any capability that’s that much better than a modernized P-3. 

The 15,000 flight hour extension is equivalent to ten years or so, depending on usage rates. 

What capability does the P-8 have that we couldn’t have added to the P-3’s?  We could add new radars, multi-static sonobuoy analysis, or whatever else. 

5 vs 1

Gotta wonder.

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https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/

P-8 Contract

Boeing has received a $2.5B contract for the production of 20 P-8A Poseidon aircraft. That's $125M per aircraft!  

A couple billion here, a few billion there and pretty soon you're talking real money!

P-8A and MAC

The P-8A Poseidon has been routinely held up as an example of a well run and technically successful program.  Let’s take a closer look at the technical aspects of the program.  To an extent, this is a familiarization article intended to assist in future ASW and surveillance discussions.  A better understanding of the P-8’s role and effectiveness will enhance the quality of our discussions.

The P-8 is the replacement for the venerable P-3C Orion.  It is tasked with ASW, surveillance, and surface warfare mainly from a support perspective. 

One of the major technical tools that will be employed is the Multi-Static Active Coherent (MAC) sonobuoy system.  Very briefly and simply, the MAC is an acoustic search system, like the traditional sonobuoys, that uses a single noise source buoy and multiple receiver buoys.  In contrast, the traditional active sonobuoys use a single buoy that is both the noise source and the receiver.  By using multiple receivers, the MAC system can, theoretically cover more volume and provide greater sensitivity since the sound echoes can be correlated over multiple receivers.  Of course, this requires a great deal of sophisticated analysis software and a high degree of operator skill to interpret the results.  If successful, the MAC will confer the ability for the P-3/8 to conduct wide area ASW searches.

So, how are the MAC system and P-8 doing?  Here’s what the 2013 DOT&E annual report has to say.  Regarding the MAC system, itself,

“Preliminary operational test results indicate that the MAC system provides P-3C aircraft with some limited wide-area ASW search capability in select scenarios but it falls short of what the fleet identified as the capability they need to protect high value units. Initial testing revealed unexpected performance shortfalls that are still being investigated.”

“The data also suggest operators are only able to recognize a small

fraction of the valid system detections as targets.”

For the P-8,

“Based on IOT&E results, the P-8A Increment 1 system provides maritime patrol mission capabilities similar to the legacy P-3C system in selected mission areas, but it is not effective for executing the full range of mission tasks required by the P-8A Increment 1 concept of operations.”

“The P-8A Increment 1 system provides effective small- area, cued Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) search, localization, and attack mission capabilities similar to the legacy P-3C system. Fundamental limitations in current sensor technology restrict search capabilities against more stressing adversary targets, making the P-8A not effective in some mission scenarios. The P-8A does not have an equivalent broad-area ASW acoustic search capability similar to that provided by the P-3C Improved Extended Echo Ranging system.”  Ed. Note:  Improved Extended Echo Ranging is the previous version of MAC

“In fact, current P-8A ASW search capabilities provide only a small fraction of what is needed for most Navy operational plans.”

“P-8A non-acoustic search capabilities are also very limited for evasive targets attempting to limit exposure to detection by radar and other sensors.”

“The P-8A is effective in conducting unarmed Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) missions against maritime surface targets. The radar and supporting sensor systems provide an effective, all-weather surface target search, detection, and classification capability at short to medium ranges for all maritime surface targets and at longer ranges for larger target vessels.”

“The P-8A is not effective for the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission. Radar performance deficiencies, sensor integration problems, and data transfer system interoperability shortfalls degrade imagery intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities.”

“P-8A aircraft flight performance meets or exceeds operational requirements and fully supports execution of the ASW, ASuW, and ISR concept of operations. The system provides increased range, payload, and speed compared to the legacy P-3C aircraft.”

A mixed bag.  What is the takeaway from this? 

On a general note, this yet again demonstrates that the claimed capabilities of new platforms are never fully met.  This should inform F-35 discussions, among other programs, where supporters jump totally on board with every claimed capability.



P-8A Poseidon



The P-8 is, currently, capable of short range ASW searches but lacks a broad area search capability.  The MAC system may, eventually, provide a broad area search capability but not for the near to moderate future.  Its general intelligence and surveillance capabilities are limited.  Software is often the limiting factor and is often the critical failure point in modern systems.  Again, this is seen in the F-35 program and needs to be kept firmly in mind when discussing any system.

The general conclusion is that the P-8 will offer a degree of ASW support but will not have a decisive impact on operations for the near to moderate future.  Of course, the incorporation of future improvements, including, hopefully, the MAC system, may well increase the usefulness of the P-8 over its lifetime.

Not surprisingly, the preceding suggests that ASW will continue to be a collaborative effort among multiple platforms.  Given the area and volume of the ocean(s), and the limited search effectiveness of any single platform, the most glaring ASW need is for greater numbers of platforms of all types.  In turn, this suggests that the demise of the LCS in its current form (one of which supposedly being an ASW version) leaves a gap in the Navy’s surface force ASW capability.  Some will answer that the Burkes will fill the ASW role but no sane person is going to risk a multi-billion dollar, undertrained Burke playing tag with a submarine.  The Navy needs a cheap, low end, dedicated ASW vessel as well as an S-3 Viking replacement to complement the P-8 and SSN force.  Let that be the takeaway for future discussions!