LCS Hellfire Update

The Navy seems to be committed to mounting the AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire missile on the LCS for use against small craft.  Hellfire had previously been tested in March 2017 for launch capability and the Navy was working on problems with tip over – trying to get the missile to tip over from the vertical launch to horizontal flight and pick up the target.  That issue has apparently been solved, at least enough to allow further testing. 

USNI News website reports that the Navy conducted a live fire test in which four Hellfires were vertically launched from the USS Milwaukee, LCS-5, cued from ship’s radar and “other systems”, and hit small craft targets.  Thus, the test appears to have been an integrated launch using the ship’s combat control system.  The conditions of the test and the results are unknown although the Navy released footage showing one missile hitting a target.  Whether the other missiles hit is unknown.  The targets appeared to be moving although speed and range were not stated and it is unknown whether the targets were maneuvering.  The website article contains a brief video of the launch, if you’re interested. (1)

Just to refresh, here’s a few specs on the Longbow Hellfire, which is the Apache helicopter version of the missile.

Weight     100 lbs

Length     64 in

Diameter   7 in

Seeker     millimeter wave radar

Warhead    20 lbs

Range      ~4 miles with a minimum safe range of 546 yds

Hellfire missiles have a variety of warhead types (fragmentation, shaped charge, etc.) and it is unknown which type or types will be used by the LCS.

LCS Hellfire Launch

Range is less than for helo launched missiles due to the vertical launch.

The LCS launcher appears to be an adaptation of the Army M299 launcher in an embedded box mounted in the former NLOS weapon pit.  The launcher can hold 24 missiles. (2)

Recall the lineage of this LCS weapon. 

1. The original surface to surface missile for the LCS was to have been the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) networked munition

2. After cancellation of NLOS, the Navy looked to develop a custom replacement missile but dropped this project.

3. The Griffin missile was announced in 2011 as the next replacement but was also dropped.

Note that the Navy has still not officially committed to the Hellfire.  The project is considered developmental and is due to wrap up in 2019-20 at which point a decision will be made about deploying the system.

Successful integration of the Longbow Hellfire missile into the LCS will finally provide a credible anti-swarm capability.  Of course, the range is too short and the warhead too small to be a serious threat to corvette or larger size ships.  Thus, the Hellfire will offer a substantial improvement over the current, well … nothing, but still falls woefully short of the original anti-surface and land attack requirement of the ASuW module.

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(1)USNI News website, “USS Milwaukee Launches Hellfires in LCS Surface-to-Surface Missile Module Test”, Megan Eckstein, 16-May-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/05/16/uss-milwaukee-fires-lcs-surface-surface-missile-module-developmental-test

(2)Navy Recognition, “Q & A with the U.S. Navy on Lockheed Martin Hellfire missiles for Littoral Combat Ships”, 17-Jul-2014,

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/naval-technology/1900-q-a-a-with-the-us-navy-on-lockheed-martin-hellfire-missiles-for-littoral-combat-ships.html

LCS Module Update

The original LCS program called for 55 LCS and 62 (if I recall correctly) mission modules.  As the program was whittled down, the number and type of modules was left in limbo.  Now that the LCS program is down to around 32 ships, here’s the latest on the number of modules that will be procured, courtesy of a USNI summary of a government report (1).

• 10 SUW
• 10 ASW
• 24 MCM

This gives a total of 44 deployable mission modules.  Here’s a more detailed breakdown of where/how the modules will be assigned and used:

• 24 modules (8 SUW, 8 ASW, 8 MCM) to outfit the focused mission LCS ships that make up the LCS divisions of 3 deployable ships and l training ship

• 3 modules (1 SUW, l ASW, l MCM) in Mayport, FL to ensure high operational
  availability (Ao) of the training systems for the training ships in the LCS divisions
  and to provide spare systems for each focused mission area

• 4 modules (1 SUW, l ASW, 2 MCM) in San Diego, CA to outfit the test ships (LCS l-4) and provide additional spare capacity for training ships and deployers

• 4 modules (4 MCM) to outfit LCS 29-32 to mitigate warfighting capability needs across the MCM mission area

• 9 MCM modules for use on other Vessels of Opportunity (VOOs) to meet the warfighting capability requirements and account for MCM maintenance cycles

There are a few interesting observations from this.

Note the 9 MCM modules that are for “Vessels of Opportunity”.  The Navy doesn’t actually need or want these modules and has no ships to use them but are required by law to procure 24 MCM modules.  From the article,

“An overall total of 24 MCM [modules] are required to comply with Section 1046 of the FY 2018 NDAA which prohibits the retirement of legacy MCM forces until the Navy has identified replacement capability and procured a quantity of such systems to meet combatant MCM operational requirements that are currently being met by legacy forces.”

Thus, the actual total of “wanted” modules is 35 for the 32 LCS seaframes.  This is the final, official nail in the coffin of swappable modules. 

Further, setting aside the 9 MCM modules that will be set aside on the Island of Misfit Weapons and discounting the MCM modules that are dedicated to the training ships, the total operationally deployable LCS mine countermeasure modules is 8 plus, potentially, 4 for LCS 29-32.

Let’s say that again because it’s incredibly important.  The total LCS MCM capability is 8 ships with an ultimate potential of 12.  That’s our total future U.S. military mine countermeasures capabiity.  We’re replacing 14 Avenger class minesweepers and two squadrons of MH-53E MCM helos (total inventory is 28 helos) with 8-12 LCS.

Does anyone really believe that’s adequate?  China, Russia, Iran, and NKorea each have hundreds of thousands of mines and we think 8-12 LCS are adequate to deal with that threat?  There goes any hope of conducting an amphibious assault.  On a larger scale, our Navy is going to be paralyzed by mine threats it can’t deal with.

I trust I’ve made my point about the inadequacy of our MCM force?

Moving on …

ASuW Module.  This module is currently a joke and consists of a couple of 30 mm machine guns and a helo.  The anticipated Longbow Hellfire missile which will provide some actual, though short ranged, firepower is scheduled for operation in 2019-20. 

Hellfire testing to date has demonstrated 83% success rate (1, full doc p.6) from 24 tests.  That’s surprisingly low given the scripted, simplistic, “designed to succeed” nature of such tests.  Real world performance is likely to be half that.

Current projected module purchase cost for the 30 mm guns, Hellfire, and RHIBs is $23.1M per module (1, full doc p.6).  The helo costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

The ASuW performance is underwhelming, to say the least.  The Navy has established two levels of performance for the Key Performance Parameters (KPP):  a minimum threshold and a better, desired objective.  The ASuW module, even with the Hellfire missiles, will only barely meet the threshold requirements and will not even be remotely near the objective requirements.  The Navy’s graphic depiction of the actual and projected performance versus threshold and objective is so bad that they didn’t even include scales with actual values (1, full doc p.7).  Further, you know that the Navy’s projected performance is overly optimistic so the performance versus threshold/objective will be even worse than depicted.

ASW Module.  This module currently consists of,

• Continuously Active Variable Depth Sonar (VDS)
• Multi-Function Towed Array (MFTA)
• Light Weight Tow Torpedo Defense (LWT)
• MH-60R Helo
• MQ-8 UAV

There is no realistic scheduled operational date for the module although the Navy is suggesting sometime around 2020-21.  As always, that will be delayed.

Current projected module purchase cost for the VDS, MFTA, and LWT is $19.8M per module (1, full doc p.14).  The helo/UAV costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

As with the ASuW module, the performance when compared to the KPP threshold and objective requirements is barely adequate.  Further, the DOT&E testing demonstrates that the Navy’s reporting on performance results is “optimistic”, to put it politely.

The MFTA is the only individual component that has achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC).  Overall module IOC is scheduled for late 2019.  It is certain that will slip.

MCM Module.  This module uses a cobbled together collection of components that seem to change daily.  Current components include,

• Knifefish UUV for buried or bottom mine detection
• AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) for near surface (top 30 ft) mine detection
• AQS-20 Sonar for suspended mine (volume) detection
• ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) – acoustic and magnetic
• DVS-1 Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) for beach and surf zone mine detection
• MH-60S helo
• MQ-8 Firescout
• EX64 Archerfish neutralizer

Additional components are being developed such as an unmanned surface tow drone for sonar and sweep components and the Barracuda system for near surface mine neutralization.

The various capabilities are expected to trickle in over the next several years.

The various module subsystems are not meeting their performance requirements and many are not even close (1, full doc p.22-23).

Current projected module purchase cost for the various non-helo components is $87M per module (1, full doc p.22).  The helo/UAV costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

The Annual Report lists module development costs as totaling $2.6B (1, full doc p.28).  Of course, those costs will increase well beyond that before all development is complete!

The report lists total anticipated module procurement costs, including the separate “common” category as (1, full doc p.29),

Module  Qty    Tot Cost   Mod Cost

ASuW     10      $319M     $ 32M

ASW      10      $267M     $ 27M

MCM      24      $2.5B     $100M

Common   44      $576M     $ 13M

Total    44      $3.6B     $ 82M

The key column is the Mod Cost  which is the unit cost for each module of the indicated type.  Note that the costs don’t agree with the individual component costs described above.  The costs listed here are likely to be more accurate.

It is worth noting that the modules have been under development since sometime around 2003/4.  Now, some 14 years later, not a single module exists in an operationally useful form.  Operational modules are not expected for another few to several years and then another few years will be required to actually manufacture the modules.  We are burning through LCS seaframe life spans without any modules to equip them.  It is possible, indeed likely, that some LCS vessels will retire without ever having had a functional, useful module equipped!

LCS module development has been an embarrassment of staggering proportions and the fiasco continues.

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(1)USNI News website, “Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Annual Report”, February 2018 Annual Report to Congress for the Littoral Combat Ship Mission Modules Program, 3-Apr-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/04/03/littoral-combat-ship-mission-package-annual-report

Full document:

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4429096-Mission-Package-RTC-February-2018.html#document/p9

LCS and Hellfire

Here’s an ever so tiny bit of good news related to the LCS.  The Navy has conducted the first test in a series intended to integrate the Hellfire (AGM-114L Longbow) missile into the anti-surface (ASuW) module (1).  Before you get too excited, the test firing was just a structural test to see whether the ship and its structures and fittings could stand the stress, heat, chemicals, etc. of a firing.  This was not a firing involving targets and integration into the ship’s combat control software.  Actual integration and fielding is probably a couple of years away, yet.  Still, it’s a first step to that end.

Hellfire, if it can be successfully integrated into the ship’s combat system, will give the LCS a credible small craft defense capability.  The missile has a millimeter wave radar seeker which gives it a fire and forget capability which will be useful in a swarm scenario.  Advertised range is around 4 miles which is just barely adequate against rocket armed swarm craft.

Let’s also bear in mind the limitations of the Hellfire-LCS.  This does not turn the LCS into a full fledged warship.  The missile has a warhead of around 20 lbs.  That’s not exactly a ship sinker!  Also, the 4 mile range is very short when it comes to dueling with enemy missile boats or frigates.  The LCS will be woefully outranged and “outgunned”.

What the Hellfire gives the LCS is a credible capability against small craft – nothing more.

For a bit of perspective, recall that the original ASuW module called for the NLOS missile which had a range of 25+ miles and was supposed to be capable of in-flight, networked, self-designation of targets and a 30 minute loiter capability over the battlefield, both land and sea.  When one compares that to the actual capabilities of the Hellfire, it is readily apparent just how much capability the ASuW module has lost.  The Hellfire is better than nothing but not by much.

Hellfire Missile

Aside from the challenge of integrating the missile with the ship’s combat system, the main challenge will likely be getting the vertically launched missile to tip over and acquire its target reliably.  Getting the missile’s seeker to quickly spot a small boat, partially obscured in wave clutter, from an initial 90 degree off-angle, is, I suspect, going to be difficult.  The missile seeker’s field of view is limited and the target, a small speedboat, will be moving fast.  If the seeker does not quickly locate the target, it will go dumb and miss.  Also, the initial vertical launch will use up fuel on a path 90 degrees to the target.  In other words, the missile will initially be using fuel but will not be moving towards the target.  That will reduce the missile’s effective range.  Whether that reduction in range is significant or not, I have no idea.  At a guess, I would think the vertical launch will knock a mile of the advertised range, bringing the missile’s effective range down to around 3 miles.  That’s just speculation on my part.

In summary, this is a tiny bit of good news for a program that rarely has any but it is not going to turn the LCS into a warship.

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(1)USNI News website, “VIDEO: Navy Tests Anti-Swarm Boat Missile on Littoral Combat Ship USS Detroit”, Sam LaGrone, 7-Mar-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/03/07/video-navy-tests-anti-swarm-boat-missile-on-littoral-combat-ship

War Is Unfair!

The Navy has taken LCS whining to new lows, calling combat test scenarios “unfair”.  Before we go any further, let’s just sit back and reminisce about all the wars that have been fair to both sides and in which both sides agreed to make the conditions fair if they inadvertently became unfair.  Yeah, it’s a pretty short list, isn’t it?  Nobody willingly enters into a fair war.  In fact, the entire aim of warfare is to create unfair conditions that offer overwhelming advantages.  Okay, let’s return to the point.

The Navy apparently conducted some LCS anti-swarm testing in Aug and Sep of last year and it didn’t go well (1).  According to DOT&E’s Michael Gilmore and as reported by Bloomberg Business website, attacking swarm boats penetrated the LCS “keep out” zone in two of three tests.  The test conditions were not specified.

“In the exercise, the crew of the Coronado “expended a large quantity” of 57mm and 30mm ammunition “while contending with repeated network communications faults that disrupted” information flowing to gun systems and weapon elevation flaws that occurred more than a dozen times, disrupting firings, he [Gilmore] said.”

Breaking Defense website reports on the Navy whining (2).

“Yes, a Navy official told me, in the test some “enemy” boats got dangerously close to the USS Coronado and inflicted simulated “damage.” But the LCS still repelled the attack — and without its full complement of weapons: The long-range Hellfire missile has yet to be installed.”

““It just seems to me it was an unfair treatment,” the Navy official concluded.”

Note that the "repelled" part occurred after the swarm drones penetrated to lethal range.  Given that the LCS is not designed to take a hit and keep fighting, "repelling" the craft after they've sunk the LCS is a bit of a misleading claim for the Navy to make.

So, I guess the takeaway from this is that the LCS will only be used in combat that is fair.

Of course, this raises questions about what happens when the modular LCS is caught without the proper module for the combat at hand – say, when a MCM LCS is attacked by swarm boats.  Will the crew radio the Iranians and ask them to wait until the LCS can swap out its module for an ASuW one to make the combat fair?

I recall from my history that the Japanese turned back from attacking Pearl Harbor because surprise attacks weren’t fair.  Oh wait, that didn’t happen.

Professional warriors whining about fairness …  This is what our Navy has come to.

(1)Bloomberg Business Website, “New U.S Navy Ship Struggles in Test to Fend Off Attacking Boats”, Anthony Capaccio, Jan 29, 2016,

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-29/littoral-ship-struggles-in-u-s-test-to-fend-off-attacking-boats

(2)Breaking Defense, “LCS Test Vs. Fast Attack Boats ‘Unfair': Missile Missing, Navy Says”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Jan 29, 2016,

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/01/lcs-test-vs-fast-attack-boats-unfair-missile-missing-navy-says/

LCS and Netfires NLOS

I’ve stated repeatedly that the LCS’ major failing was the absence of a well developed Concept of Operations (CONOPS) prior to committing to the program.  This lead to pointless capabilities like excessive speed which had no tactical purpose, unfeasible concepts like module swapping in a tactical timeframe, missing capabilities like the lack of air defense, and cost overruns due to attempts to include all manner of capabilities because there was no CONOPS to evaluate usefulness against.

That said, what is the single biggest complaint voiced about the LCS?  It would probably have to be the lack of armament.  That brings us to the Netfires NLOS (Non Line Of Sight) weapon system.  The failure of that system lead directly to the lack of armament complaint.

Let’s take a moment to briefly review what NLOS was intended to be.  NLOS was a family of vertically launched missiles including a Precision Attack Missile (PAM) and a Loitering Attack Missile (LAM).  The 117 lb missile had a range of around 20-25 miles.  Missiles were to be equipped with IR, GPS/Inertial, and semi-active laser homing.  The system was to have networked the missiles, in flight, to provide autonomous target recognition and allocation, real time targeting updates, and damage assessment imaging.  The missiles were to be launched, arrive over the target area, autonomously identify and allocate targets, and attack.  Supposedly, the missile had a multi-target warhead with both shaped-charge capability and blast fragmentation.

For the LCS, the system was envisioned to provide both a land attack capability and anti-surface capability (the anti-swarm mission).

If the LCS had actually achieved this capability, we’d be having a somewhat different discussion about the LCS.  Yes, the LCS would still have the same inherent flaws but at least the armament complaint would have been largely alleviated for the ship’s intended role.  The LCS would still not be a frigate with long range anti-ship missiles but, to be fair, that was never envisioned as the LCS’ role.  And, yes, the modular concept would still be a weakness in that a LCS that was not equipped with the ASuW module would be helpless against a swarm.

The NLOS was certainly the key to the ASuW module and, arguably, key to the LCS’ success overall.

So, aside from historical enlightenment and amusement, what do we learn from this?

Among other lessons, we learn the folly of committing to a production run of a warship whose main weapon is experimental at the time of commitment.  Most experimental weapons never pan out and, in this particular case, the Army had already declared the NLOS a failure and cancelled the program.  I wonder why the Navy thought this would succeed?

The point of this post is two-fold:  to provide some historical perspective on the LCS’ armament issue and to try to recognize and understand the Navy’s failure.

It’s not just that the NLOS failed.  As I said, weapon programs fail all the time.  The real issue is the Navy mindset that chose to ignore the history of failure of weapons development, in general, and the Army’s pronouncement of failure for this system, in particular, and, instead, chose to believe that this would be the program that would defy the odds.  Any reasonable person would have opted to stop the LCS acquisition program at the point that the NLOS was cancelled and wait until a suitable alternative could have been procured or developed.  Of course, the truly reasonable person wouldn’t have even begun an acquisition program where the main weapon didn’t actually exist – but, I digress.

The Navy’s ability to ignore reality is legend but at some point you’d like to see some recognition of reality especially as the Navy pursues lasers, railguns, BMD, Fords, LX(R)’s, UCLASS/UCAV, etc.  If the Navy doesn’t start to do a better job of recognizing reality, I’ll be writing for the next 30 years!

LCS Hellfire

As we all know, the current plan to beef up the anemic ASuW capability of the LCS is to incorporate the AGM-114L Longbow (Apache helo) Hellfire missile.  The Hellfire replaces the Griffon missile that the Navy briefly considered.  Here’s a few Hellfire specs.

Range:            500 yds – 5 miles (likely less with a sea level vertical launch)

Seeker:          millimeter wave radar

Speed:           Mach 1.3

Warhead:       20 lb, high explosive anti-tank (HEAT)

The missile’s active radar seeker gives it a fire-and-forget capability which, in turn, gives it the ability to engage multiple targets in a short time frame.  This is ideal for the small boat swarm scenario.  Hellfire is proven, lethal to small boats, and cheap enough ($100K+ per missile) to justify using for the intended purpose.

On the other hand, the Hellfire’s target set is extremely limited.  The target is strictly small boats that must close to a few miles or less to attack.  Presumably, this means small boats armed with RPGs and machine guns.  Larger missile carrying boats and fast attack craft (FAC) armed with small anti-ship missiles far outrange the LCS’ Hellfire and, thus, are not an applicable target set.

Still, assuming the Hellfire launch system does not wind up taking up too much deck space or internal ship’s volume, the missile is easily justified despite its limited target set.

The other question is whether the Hellfire will become part of the core seaframe capability or will be present only as part of the ASuW module.  Again, assuming the space and weight requirement is minimal, the missiles ought to be part of the seaframe although this is somewhat at odds with the Navy’s original intention of modular outfitting.  Of course, even the Navy has essentially admitted that the modular concept won’t work for the LCS.

Hellfire Missile

All in all, the Hellfire represents a good choice for the intended target set and can’t help but improve the LCS’ overall capability, at least to some small extent.  A small step in the right direction for the LCS!

The Ship That Couldn't Shoot Straight

The Navy has announced that the Coronado (LCS-4) has completed live fire tests of its major gun systems, the Mk110 57mm, and the Mk46 30mm.  I apologize for using the word “major” to describe a machine gun and a 2.2” gun but for the LCS, they’re considered major.  As usual, the Navy describes the tests as stunningly successful.  Given the Navy’s egregious PR spin efforts in the past, I’m not even going to bother offering a link to an announcement.  If you want to read made up rainbows and sunshine that badly, you can easily find it on the Internet.

So, why is this event of interest?  A couple of reasons, actually.

First, this is a rare sign of progress for the LCS-2 version which has, thus far, failed to deploy and failed to demonstrate any useful progress towards becoming  a functioning warship.  Again, I apologize, this time for using the word “warship” in conjunction with the LCS.  We’re stuck with these ships so it would be nice to see them at least achieve whatever functionality they’re capable of.

Second, and more important, you’ll recall that the LCS-1 version’s 57mm gun was found to be inaccurate at much above 10 kts due to the ship’s vibration.  The question is whether the -2 version suffers from the same problem.  On the one hand, you’d think not simply due to the fact that the two ships have nothing in common as far as the shape of their hulls or the way the move through the water.  On the other hand, both ships have been built extremely light with all signs pointing to woefully insufficient structural reinforcement in both classes.  The -2 version suffered cracking of structural members during heavy weather testing and has had restrictions placed on its operating envelope.

A 57mm gun is nothing to write home about.  You’ll recall that the Zumwalt program rejected the gun and switched to a smaller 30mm gun for close in protection – a fairly stunning commentary on the 57mm.  Still, the 57mm is what the LCS has so it would be nice if it could shoot straight.  The Navy certainly won’t tell us if the -2 version has gun problems so ComNavOps will keep an eye on the DOT&E reports.

Here’s hoping that the -2 version will begin to actually do something and that its gun will shoot straight!

LCS Module Update

GAO’s 2015 annual weapons assessment report contains some interesting tidbits about the LCS modules (1).

ASW Module

Regarding the ASW module,

“Program officials report that currently the [ASW] mission package is 5 tons too heavy to fit within the parameters reserved for the packages.”

This is probably the most mature and useful module if only because the Navy abandoned every aspect of the original module and is now using proven, existing components:  a Thales variable depth sonar, a multi-function towed array, and a standard Navy helo.  The challenge is whether they can get the components to integrate in an effective manner.  Of course, the LCS can never be an effective ASW platform due to inherent structural problems that impact ASW performance:  the vessel is not quieted and optimized for ASW and the ship’s self-noise from the water jets not only precludes a hull mounted sonar but makes the ship an acoustic beacon for miles around.  Add to that the lack of an onboard ASW weapon and you have an extremely mediocre ASW platform.  Further, the inability to operate two helos (yes, some reports credit the LCS-2 version with the ability to operate two but that is questionable due to flight deck structural weaknesses) severely limits the extent of available helo ASW coverage. 

The Navy is currently contracting with three companies for ideas on how to reduce weight in the ASW module without removing a key component.  You know the process when things go through contracts and studies.  It will be years, yet, before we see a functioning ASW module.

MCM Module

Regarding the MCM module,

“The Navy has accepted five MCM packages without demonstrating that they meet interim—or threshold—requirements and plans to accept one more in fiscal 2015.”

As we know from various reports, the MCM module has proven particularly troublesome with most, or all, of the module components failing to meet their performance criteria.  Thus, the Navy’s continued purchases of MCM modules is puzzling, to say the least.  I guess it’s analogous to buying F-35s that are not ready.

Further, the Navy just announced that the MCM module would not reach its scheduled IOC in September due to across the board reliability issues discovered during testing.

“… LCS Mission Modules Program Manager Capt. Casey Moton said Thursday at a Mine Warfare Association lunch that across-the-board reliability problems in the two start-to-finish mine clearance runs in the technical evaluation led the program to extend the evaluation for several months rather than move prematurely to IOT&E.”

Independence, LCS-2, has been testing the MCM module for how long, now?  Since the mid-70’s, it seems like.  Despite all that work, the module reliability is still unacceptable.  How bad must the reliability be, to be unacceptable to the Navy?!  They’ve accepted barely built ships and F-35’s that have no combat capability.  For them to balk, it must be really bad!

It appears that IOC will be pushed back another year or so.

ASuW Module

The Navy has dropped the plan to use the incredibly short ranged and lightweight Griffon missile in favor of the Hellfire missile.  While there is nothing wrong with the Hellfire, it is still a lightweight, short range missile.  Wiki lists the range as 550 yds out to 5 miles.  It is doubtful that range holds for a surface, vertical launch.  The effective range will likely be more like 3-4 miles.  Also, note the minimum range.  If a target gets inside 550 yds the LCS will have to engage with guns which have, thus far, proven problematic.  The 30 mm guns have had a succession of maintenance and performance issues and the 57mm gun is inaccurate above 10 kts or so due to ship vibration.  Further, the guns are optically aimed and are not linked to radar in the ship’s fire control system.

USNI News has some disturbing news even about the Hellfire missile testing. (2)

“The program office began tests on a research vessel at the end of February against ‘high-speed maneuvering targets out off the Virginia Capes.’  That testing wrapped up in June, and based on the results, the office has to do ‘some tweaking – it’s really that level, tweaking – to the missile seeker and such.”

When you factor in the military’s ridiculously positive spin on testing – every test is an unqualified success, no matter how bad (remember the fabulously successful F-35B tests on the Wasp that actually barely achieved 50% availability? – you get the sense that the Hellfire has some serious issues integrating into a vertical launch system.  “Tweaking”, with the slight negative connotation it has, must indicate that the missile failed badly!  Getting a missile that is designed to launch horizontally to launch vertically, tip over, and acquire its target, is not a trivial feat without mid-course guidance.

The missile will have to undergo another set of tests several months down the road.

Here is GAO’s summary assessment in their typically bland style.

“The systems that comprise the Navy's mission packages have yet to work successfully together to achieve results. For example, none of the mission packages for any increment have achieved interim requirements on the Independence variant, or meet its threshold requirements for either seaframe.”

Remember, also, that the IOCs that the Navy is trying so desperately to achieve are not for the desired modules but for very stripped down versions that simply allow the Navy to field a bare minimum (many would say less than minimum) capability as a PR event.  The desired modules that the Navy sold the LCS program on are many years down the road or, more likely, will never be achieved.  Go back and read the original module descriptions to see just how much the modules have been dumbed down in the quest to get something, anything, fielded.  We’ve largely forgotten the grandiose promises made and have come to believe that the current, anemic versions of the modules are what was always intended.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  As a group, the modules are an utter and colossal failure.

Perhaps the most important point in the report, though, is this one,

“The Navy continues to procure LCS seaframes, even though the sub-systems necessary to meet full mission package requirements have not yet been fully developed, demonstrated, and integrated with either seaframe class.”

The LCS’s value and effectiveness, whether you support it or not, is predicated on the performance of its modules just as a carrier’s value is based wholly on its air wing.  An LCS without an effective module is just an overgrown Coast Guard cutter, if even that.  GAO points out that the Navy is proceeding full speed with seaframe acquisition in the absence of any useful and effective module.  The only module that even theoretically exists is the ASuW module and, let’s be real, an ASuW module that consists of a couple of machine guns and a RHIB is hardly useful or effective.

Worse is the Navy’s laser like focus on seaframes.  While the modules languish, seaframe construction continues unabated.  It would be nice if the Navy put the same effort into the modules as the seaframes and it would be even nicer if the Navy would recognize the importance of the modules.  No module, no useful LCS.  If the Navy isn’t careful, half the LCS seaframes will reach their end of life without ever seeing a useful module.  What a waste that would be (assuming you don’t consider the LCS to already be a waste!).

(1)Government Accountability Office, “Defense Acquisitions – Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs”, Mar 2015, GAO-15-342SP

(2)USNI, “LCS Anti-Sub Warfare Package Too Heavy; 3 Contracts Issued For Weight Reduction Study”, Megan Eckstein, July 30, 2015

http://news.usni.org/2015/07/30/lcs-anti-sub-warfare-package-too-heavy-3-contracts-issued-for-weight-reduction-study

DOTE Report - LCS

Continuing our look at the 2012 DOT&E report (1), we move on to everyone’s favorite, the LCS.  Lots to talk about!  Here's the link to the report.

As mentioned in previous posts, the Navy is showing a disturbing tendency to defer live shock and survivability testing in favor of simulations. 

“DOT&E also agreed to defer the Shock Trials from LCS 3 and 4 to LCS 5 and 6, resulting in a one‑year delay. With significant seaframe and system design changes expected, LCS 5 and 6 will be most representative of the respective

class for purposes of Shock Trials. LCS 5 and 6 will also be the first ships to include shock-qualified equipment.”

 

Did you catch that last sentence?  The one about LCS 5 and 6 being the first to include shock-qualified equipment?  That’s why the Navy has refused to conduct shock tests before now.  They knew the ships would not only fail the tests but would suffer damage from the tests!

What’s most interesting about DOT&E’s statement is not that shock testing will be deferred but that LCS 5 and 6 will be most representative of the class.  This is saying that not only are LCS 1 and 2 considered non-representative, one-offs, which we knew, but that LCS 3 and 4 are also non-representative, one-offs that are different from LCS 1 and 2 as well as the remainder of the class.  We now have four LCSs that are considered non-standard.  This gives us four ships that are going to provide maintenance and training challenges down the road due to their uniqueness.  If this doesn’t demonstrate the pitfalls of concurrency, I don’t know what does. 

After trying for years to counter the critic’s attacks on the lack of survivability of the LCS, the Navy has apparently changed course and is now defining their own set of survivability characteristics for just the LCS.  They call them Vulnerability Levels.  Here is a portion of the DOT&E’s comments on this.

“The Navy revised the survivability requirements for LCS 3 and beyond to describe the ships’ survivability requirements in terms of class-specific LCS Vulnerability Levels: 

-- LCS Vulnerability Level I – Operate emergency and damage control systems/equipment to provide for an orderly abandon ship.”

 

The report goes on to describe additional levels of Vulnerability.  You’ll recall that the Navy has maintained the fiction that the LCS is built to Level 1+.  First of all, there is no such thing as “1+”.  That’s something the Navy made up.  Secondly, I’ve read the Survivability Level definitions and the LCS doesn’t even meet Level 1, let alone a mythical 1+.  Third, even Level 1 is non-combat.  Fourth, the Navy has been out and out lying.  The Level 1 Survivability requirements (I’ll do a post on this, soon) explicitly require EMP and shock hardening along with other measures and, as stated in the paragraphs above, none of the LCSs prior to LCS 5 and 6 have even had shock-qualified equipment.  I’m also pretty doubtful that much, if any, of the equipment is EMP hardened.  So, again, there’s no way the LCS can be considered Level 1, let alone 1+.  I’m also quite sure that while LCS 5 and 6 may have some shock hardened equipment they’ll have nowhere near enough for the ship to be qualified as shock hardened, hence the new Vulnerability Levels.

DOT&E goes on to sum up the survivability issue,

“LCS is not expected to be survivable in that it is not expected to maintain mission capability after taking a significant hit in a hostile combat environment.”

 

Instead of simply admitting that the LCS was designed as a non-combat vessel, as regards survivability, the Navy has continually tried to twist and spin the facts.  Having failed at that they’re now simply making up their own definitions that they feel will sound better to the public.  Good work, Navy.

Strangely, there is actually a valid rationale for building a non-survivable small combat vessel (the missile armed “gunboat”).  To be fair, I think this was part of the Navy’s original thinking and rationale for the LCS.  It was to be a small, cheap, “throwaway” littoral combat vessel for which survivability would not be a concern.  Of course, the “small” and “cheap” parts of the rationale died early in the program and left the Navy with a near billion dollar vessel that had been designed as a throwaway but they couldn’t publicly admit that without looking like idiots.

Moving on, the Navy is looking at aluminum vulnerabilities.  Huh?!  Hasn’t the Navy built aluminum ships for years and found out the hard way that aluminum is a poor and dangerous substitute for steel?  Don’t we already know that aluminum is not combat worthy?  And yet, DOT&E reports,

“The Navy is planning surrogate tests to address knowledge gaps related to the vulnerability of an aluminum ship structure to weapon-induced blast and fire damage. “

 

Knowledge gaps?!  Aluminum is useless as a combat material.  There, I’ve filled in the gaps.

On a positive note, progress may have been made on the hull cracking issue.

“The Navy made production changes to reduce cracking on LCS 3; cracking has not been observed to date.”

 

Of course, LCS 3 hasn’t been in operation long enough to draw any real conclusion.  We’ll keep an eye on this.

Moving to weapons, the LCS’ much vaunted Mk 110, 57 mm gun, is having problems.  Aside from not being radar controlled (most of you probably assumed it was, didn’t you? – it’s not – it’s EO controlled), the gun is having reliability, performance, and operator training issues.  For instance, DOT&E reports,

“Ship operations at high speeds cause vibrations that make accurate use of the 57 mm gun very difficult.”

 

Ouch!  The high speed that was so critical to the LCS turns out to negate its 57 mm gun’s effectiveness.  Well, that’s ironic!

The weapon problems aren’t limited to the 57 mm.



30 mm Gun - Does Anything Work on the LCS?



“The 30 mm guns and associated combat system exhibit reliability problems. The Navy established a Failure Review Board to identify and correct deficiencies in 30 mm gun performance.”

 

It’s sounding like the surface warfare module doesn’t work at all, despite being dumbed way down from the original concept.

It gets worse.

“Performance deficiencies with COMBATSS-21 and TRS-3D affect tracking and

engagement of contacts.”

 

The combat control system which ties the sensors and weapons together is also having problems.  Oh yeah, this is the ship I want to ride into combat on!

What about the mine warfare (MCM) module which is reportedly the most advanced module?

“Testing of the MH-60S Block 2 AMCM System revealed significant shortfalls in performance.

- The MH-60S helicopter with the AQS-20A sonar is not operationally effective or suitable because the helicopter is underpowered and cannot safely tow the sonar under the variety of conditions necessary. The Navy cancelled the MH-60S helicopter mission to tow the AQS-20A and OASIS.



- As observed during the OA and developmental testing, the AQS-20A does not meet some Navy requirements.  Contact depth localization errors exceeded Navy limits in all AQS-20A operating modes. False contacts also exceeded Navy limits in two of three search modes.  The Navy has implemented modified tactics intended to mitigate these deficiencies; however, those tactics limit platform-level productivity (Area Coverage Rate Sustained).

- The analysis of test data collected during Phase A of the OA of the MH-60S and ALMDS is still in progress. Preliminary evaluation of data collected during the OA suggests that the ALMDS does not meet Navy requirements for False Classification Density or reliability. DOT&E expects to issue a formal test report

in 2QFY13. “

 

It appears that the MCM module is not as ready as the Navy publicly claims.

So, what do we make of all this? 

For starters, what the Navy says publicly differs greatly from the facts and data collected by DOT&E.  At best, the Navy is spinning the LCS news beyond belief and, more realistically, is just lying.  Anyone who has heard any of Undersecretary Work’s impassioned speeches defending the LCS and demonizing critics will recognize which side of the spin/lie line the Navy is on.

Beyond that, it’s become crystal clear that the Navy attempted to jump several levels of technology development and, predictably, failed utterly.  Little about the LCS works as designed.  The Navy is scrambling to find a mission for the ship.  Despite this, the Navy is moving as rapidly as possible towards replacing a third of the combat fleet with this non-functional ship.  That takes irresponsibility to an unprecedented level.  We are knowingly giving up huge amounts of future combat power.  That’s right.  The total combat fleet size is going to remain at around 180 (more likely, it’s going to decrease but we’ll set that aside for the moment) but the numbers of the LCS are going to go from a few today to 55 out of 180.  Those are the Navy’s numbers and plans, not mine.  Those are the facts.  The LCS is going to seriously gut the Navy’s combat power for the future.



Sleep well, my readers, knowing that your safety and freedom are protected by the mighty LCS!

(1) Director – Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2012, Annual Report