Our Navy For The China War

ComNavOps has discussed various aspects of what our naval force structure should be but it’s generally been in isolation rather than presented as a grand overview.  This has sometimes made it difficult for people who haven’t been following the blog closely to understand how the individual components relate and where they fit in the overall force structure.  I think it’s time to begin presenting the overall picture.  One way to do this is to examine the naval force structure we’ll need to fight China and win.  Of course, we lack an explicit military strategy which is what we really need to do a detailed analysis and presentation but we can still generate a pretty good picture just by looking at the typical types of naval operations that will be needed.
 
With that in mind, here are some of the naval operations that will be required in the China War and the specific force needed to meet those requirements.
 
Tomahawk Strikes – We will need massive, very long range, cruise missile strikes against Chinese bases, industrial facilities, etc.  The easiest and most survivable way to accomplish this is via submarine.  We need a moderate sized SSGN force.  The handful of Virginia Payload Module equipped Virginia class subs with their 40 cruise missiles is simply insufficient and inefficient compared to the 154 missiles carried by a single Ohio class SSGN.  It takes 4 Virginias to equal the missile load of a single Ohio SSGN.  Let’s recall that the Tomahawk strike on the Syrian airbase in response to the chemical weapon attack used 70+ missiles and was only a partial strike on a small, undefended base.  Any serious strike against any substantial, defended target is going to require hundreds of missiles.  Trying to mass and coordinate a dozen Virginias is much more difficult than using two or three Ohio SSGNs.  We simply must build more SSGNs.
 
We also need a new cruise missile.  The Tomahawk is old, slow, non-stealthy, and has limited capabilities.  The attrition rate among Tomahawks in a peer defended attack will be substantial which will require much greater numbers of missiles to achieve the desired result – numbers we don’t have in inventory.
 
Our surface ships will have to participate in Tomahawk strikes and the Burke is our only cruise missile shooter.  In order to get our Burkes into launch position, they will have to be escorted.  In a role reversal, the escorts will be carriers.  The carriers will provide the aircraft portion of a strong, layered defense in addition to the Burke’s own AAW capabilities.
 
Air Force Protection – The Air Force is going to be busy launching constant, very long range B-2/21 bomber strikes and will need protected air corridors to the extent possible.  Carriers will have to provide temporary, mobile, air superiority to create protected transit lanes.  This will require long range air superiority fighters with very large weapon loads.
 
Anti-Surface Superiority – The Navy will need to establish surface superiority – total domination, actually – to enable free movement of submarines, unhindered by enemy ASW forces, free movement of carrier forces, transport of supplies, at-sea fleet logistic support, etc.  Since carriers can’t be everywhere and will have higher priority tasks, this will require independent (independent of carrier support) surface groups tasked with eliminating Chinese surface forces and capable of operating, at least initially, with minimal or no air support.  These surface groups will need extensive organic small UAV capability for local situational awareness, a long range (200 miles or so), stealthy anti-ship cruise missile, and heavy naval guns for those close range, unanticipated naval encounters that are all too common in naval warfare.
 
ASW – Arguably, the most important aspect of our naval operations will be our submarine activities.  To do this successfully, we need to provide the maximum amount of ASW support.  We need to attack enemy subs and ASW assets at the source (factories, supplies, bases) and at sea, as they operate.  All of the source attacks will, of course, be on the Chinese mainland and all the operating attacks will be inside the first island chain.  We need to be able to penetrate the A2/AD zone, find those assets, and destroy them.  This leads back to a long range strike capability (Tomahawk or, ideally, a Tomahawk replacement) and the ability to operate near or inside the first island chain using surface groups.
 
Logistics Convoys – Resupply convoys from the US west coast will have to transit to Pearl Harbor and beyond and will require ASW/AAW escort.  A typical escort group should include small ASW corvettes and a single Burke AAW destroyer.
 
Air Superiority – The one absolute we count on, operationally, is that the Chinese will make a Taiwan invasion the initial action of any war.  Assuming we intend to contest that, a Guadalcanal-like battle will ensue with the Chinese invasion fleet on the west side of Taiwan and US naval forces on the east.  Carriers will provide the local air support over Taiwan and will attempt to establish air superiority over the island and the Chinese fleet – no easy task.  Again, this demands a pure air superiority fighter for our air wings.
 
Mine Warfare – The Chinese reportedly have hundreds of thousands of mines and we have no useful mine countermeasures capability.  Offensively, on our part, the Chinese are contained by the first island chain and should be bottled up by mining the relatively narrow passages out of the chain.  However, we have little to no useful mining capability as measured by the ability to lay thousands of mines in a very brief period of time.  A sub or airplane laying a couple dozen mines at a time is not combat-useful.
 
 
Conclusion
 
This is beginning to tell us what our fleet structure should look like and what kinds of weapons we need.  THIS … this is how you build a fleet – from an analysis of needs not a desire to pursue isolated technology for its own sake.
 
We can see what we need and now we need to look at our current force structure, see what’s useful, see what’s useless, see what’s missing, and recognize what we need to begin acquiring on an urgent basis.
 
So much of what we have, and are actively acquiring, has little or no use in a war with China.
 
Of note, what naval capabilities are conspicuous by their absence from the discussion?  That’s right … amphibious assaults and unmanned assets.  There is simply no strategic need for assaults and no tactical need for unmanned assets, at least at their current level of capability.
 
To summarize,
 
Not Needed: 

• amphibious ships
• F-35
• F-18
• Zumwalt
• Ford
• LCS
• unmanned assets

 
Needed: 

• new cruise missile
• Simpler, cheaper aircraft carriers
• new air superiority fighter
• SSGNs
• 8” gun ships / 16” battleships
• new electronic warfare aircraft, both air-to-air and air-to-ground optimized
• true destroyer
• Burke replacement
• mine countermeasure ships and equipment

 
There you have it … the naval force we should be procuring for the war with China.  It’s noteworthy that pretty much everything we currently have is not needed and everything we need is non-existent and, worse, we have no plans to develop/acquire any of the missing items.
 
So what is the Navy working to acquire?  Unmanned sail boats, a generic do-everything aircraft that will do nothing well, more Burkes, tiny cargo/landing vessels for the Marines, AI-powered everything, and more Fords.
 
I’ll put it as plainly as possible:  What we have, we don’t need and what we need, we don’t have.