Ford Update

The Navy has, essentially, stopped releasing any data or information on the Ford, even to DOT&E which has noted that the Navy is no longer providing EMALS (Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System) and AAG (Advanced Arresting Gear) performance and reliability data.

 

That leaves us to infer the state of the Ford so …  let’s do some inferring!

 

EMALS

 

How is EMALS coming along?  Well, you’ll recall that the last data we had from DOT&E, before the Navy stopped providing data – which should, itself, infer something negative about the system - , showed that the system was failing at a staggering rate.

 

Out of 747 shipboard launches performed with the EMALS, ten had suffered critical failures. The target reliability average was one critical failure per 4,166 launch cycles. The launch system is over 50 times less reliable than the target failure rate. Every time they try to launch the full complement of airplanes they will have a critical failure.

 

The landing system also fails every 70-75 times it is used. This is over 200 times less reliable than planned. General Atomics engineers made it impossible to repair the AAG landing failures without shutting down flight operations. The AAG power supply can’t be disconnected from the high-voltage supply while flights continue. (3)

 

Is the EMALs doing any better, now?

 

Ford’s EMALS experienced a crash over the summer [June 2020], prohibiting the carrier from performing flight operations for five days. (1)

 

… the ship’s Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) suffered a failure that prevented the carrier from launching planes for five days …

 

On June 2, the crew discovered a fault in the power handling system that connects the ship’s energy-generating turbines to the EMALS power system.

…

 

 “After several days of troubleshooting and assessing a fault in the launch system’s power handling elements, embarked EMALS experts and Ford’s crew restored the system to enable the safe fly-off of the air wing on Sunday morning, June 7… (2)

 

As we have previously noted, the interconnected nature of the catapults assures that if one goes down, they all go down and this was case in this incident.  It is also noteworthy that it required several days of troubleshooting to restore the system enough to fly off the air wing.  The wording seems to suggest that the restoration was a temporary fix although that is far from clear. 

 

It is also worth noting the presence of ‘embarked EMALS experts’ which would not normally be present during routine operations.  This has two implications:

 

• That the troubleshooting and repair was likely beyond the capabilities of the Navy crew.  This does not bode well for combat damage repair efforts.
• That the presence of embarked experts absolutely indicates that the EMALS is still not working correctly and reliably or else the experts would not need to be on the ship three years into its commissioning and during pre-deployment workups and trials which should be about training for naval operations rather than still struggling to get the EMALS system to perform at basic, contract-mandated levels of reliability.

 

The inference from the above is that EMALS is still woefully short of contract-mandated levels of performance and reliability.

 

AAG

 

Okay, what about the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system?

 

Capt. Josh Sager, the commanding officer of Carrier Air Wing 8 (CVW-8), said Nov. 17 that Ford had all three of its AAG wires operating with no issues for the preceding four to six days. (1)

 

Cummings [Commanding Officer Capt. J.J. Cummings] described the reliability for both the Dual Band Radar and AAG as getting better throughout every at-sea period. (1)

 

The fact that Capt. Sager thought it noteworthy enough to publicly state that the AAG had worked for ‘the preceding four to six days’ suggests that this level of performance is exceptional and should be noted.  Proudly noting that the landing gear worked for a few days in a row is extremely worrisome.  It suggests that this is not the norm.

 

That Capt. Cummings described the reliability of the AAG as ‘getting better throughout every at-sea period’ again strongly suggests that the AAG is a major problem, though slowly improving.

 

The inference, here, is that the AAG is still woefully short of contract-mandated reliability levels and is at a barely functional level. 

 

Overall, how is the Ford doing with launches and recoveries?

 

Since the beginning of 2020, Ford has conducted 5,000 launches and recoveries of aircraft – most of which the crew has done in the last eight months — and is slated to achieve 6,000 by the end of this calendar year, Cummings said. (1)

 

The question, of course, is not how many total launches and recoveries have been performed but how many have been done between catapult and arresting system failures.  What is the failure rate?  The evidence suggests that the failure rate is still far greater than specified and is likely to continue to be a problem for a few more years, at least.  This is extremely worrisome if the Ford should ever be called to combat.

 

The evidence suggests that the Ford is not capable of reliable, sustained open ocean launch/recoveries, meaning that the ship has to stay within reach of land divert bases so as not to lose aircraft when EMALS and AAG failures occur.  Three years into commissioning, this is inexcusable and everyone associated with this program should be fired.

 

Weapon Elevators

 

So much for launch and recover.  What about those disastrous weapon elevators?

 

With the seventh of 11 weapons elevators slated for certification before the end of this calendar year, … the remaining four will be completed by the end of April 2021. Newport News Shipbuilding has 200 shipyard workers aboard the carrier to aid in finishing the elevators … (1)

 

How bad are these elevators that 200 specialist workers are working on them 24/7 and the best projection is that they’ll be ready by the middle of 2021?  What does this suggest for battle damage repair when the Ford doesn’t have 200 weapon elevator engineers on board?

 

 

 

Summary

 

Ford is in bad shape with major systems failing to meet specification.  The worst aspect of the Ford’s launch and recovery issues is that the design is fundamentally and irrevocably flawed from a maintenance perspective.  The individual catapults and arresting gear cannot be electrically isolated and worked on.  The entire carrier must be powered down to work on any single component.

 

The reliability concerns are exacerbated by the fact that the crew cannot readily electrically isolate EMALS components during flight operations due to the shared nature of the Energy Storage Groups and Power Conversion Subsystem inverters on board CVN 78. The process for electrically isolating equipment is time-consuming; spinning down the EMALS motor/generators takes 1.5 hours by itself. The inability to readily electrically isolate equipment precludes EMALS maintenance during flight operations. (4)

 

The reliability concerns are magnified by the current AAG design that does not allow electrical isolation of the Power Conditioning Subsystem equipment from high power buses, limiting corrective maintenance on below-deck equipment during flight operations. (4)

 

This issue will continue to plague Ford throughout its service life since it is not correctable.  This also renders the Ford highly suspect as a viable combat unit.  If this design flaw has been continued into the subsequent ships of the class, we are building a class of carriers that has very poor damage repair capability and can be rendered combat incapable by minor battle damage or even simple, routine electrical or mechanical failures.

 

Absent any information from the Navy, we are left to quite reasonably infer that the Ford is a floating pile of hot, steaming excrement.  If the Navy would have us believe otherwise then they need to resume releasing performance and reliability data to DOT&E and the public.  The clamp down on data pretty much tells us just how bad the situation is and is reminiscent of the Navy’s response to the epidemic of INSURV failures which led to the Navy classifying the results instead of fixing them.

 

 

 

______________________________

 

(1)USNI News website, “USS Gerald R. Ford Making Steady Progress Ahead of Deployment”, Mallory Shelbourne, 24-Nov-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/11/24/uss-gerald-r-ford-making-steady-progress-ahead-of-deployment

 

(2)USNI News website, “USS Gerald Ford EMALS Launching System Suffers Fault During Testing Period”, Sam LaGrone, 8-Jun-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/06/08/uss-gerald-ford-emals-launching-system-suffers-fault-during-testing-period

 

(3)Next Big Future website, “Ford Carrier is a Failure With Huge Radar, Elevator, Launch and Landing Problems”, Brian Wang, 31-Oct-2019,

https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2019/10/ford-carrier-is-a-failure-with-huge-radar-elevator-launch-and-landing-problems.html

 

(4)DOT&E FY 2019 Annual Report, 20-Dec-2019

Zumwalt Self-Defense System Problems

We all know the story of the Zumwalt debacle in which the Navy built a ship with a main weapon that, despite using an Army/NATO/world standard 155 mm caliber gun, was completely incompatible with any other artillery system and, when the unique munition for the Zumwalt gun failed in performance and demonstrated runaway costs, left the Zumwalt with no functional main weapon.  Well, it now appears that the Zumwalt’s firepower problems extend to its self-defense capability, as well.

According to the 2019 DOT&E Annual Report (1), the Zumwalt is experiencing severe problems with the ship’s self-defense system – severe enough to render the system nearly useless. 

The Navy has discovered severe problems during the DDG 1000 SDTS [ed. Self Defense Test Ship] events that will adversely affect the operational effectiveness of the combat system if not corrected.  Consequently, the Navy has put the test program on hold and is currently working to identify the root cause of these problems. (1)

The report does not identify the specific problem(s), presumably for security reasons.  However, the magnitude of the problems can be gleaned from the status of the self-defense testing program,

The Navy conducted 4 of the 10 DDG 1000 tests planned for the Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) (3 of 6 planned developmental tests, and 1 of 4 planned integrated developmental and operational tests). The Navy canceled one integrated test event and one developmental test event because of unacceptably low performance predictions. (1)

The fact that testing could not proceed even by the Navy’s demonstrably lax standards is incredibly damning.  We also know that Navy performance predictions are always excessively exaggerated so if their own predictions were too low to justify continued testing, they must have been truly horrible.  We’ve seen the Navy routinely push poor performing systems along in order to avoid jeopardizing funding so, again, the fact that the Navy would cancel tests suggests staggeringly bad performance and very serious problems.

As I said, the report does not specify the problems so we are left to speculate.  Just for fun, let’s try to reason out the problem, shall we?

As the report describes, the system consists of several components (1):

• Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) – The command and control architecture unique to Zumwalt.
• Multi-Function Radar (SPY-3) – The new X-band radar going on DDG 1000-class guided-missile destroyers and the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78).
• Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) – The tracker and sensor data fusion and distribution system.
• Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 (SLQ-32B(V)6) – The passive electronic sensor used to detect and identify hostile radars.
• Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 1 with Joint Universal Weapon Link (JUWL) – The short-range missile interceptor used to defeat air threats at close-in ranges, and the system used for radar-missile communication and support.  Within the U.S. Navy, only the DDG 1000-class ships and the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) use ESSM with JUWL.
• Standard Missile 2 (SM-2 Block IIIAZ) with JUWL – The unique Zumwalt variant of SM-2 used to defeat air threats at longer ranges.
• MK 57 Vertical Launch System (VLS) - The DDG 1000-only vertical missile launcher variant.

So, presumably the problem lies with one or more of the components on that list.  Let’s consider the likelihood of each component being the problem (or part of it).

Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) – This is just the ship’s internal network and it’s been installed on various ships/classes for some time and has functioned without notable problems.  This seems very unlikely to be the problem.

Multi-Function Radar (MFR/SPY-3) – The radar is untested.

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) – This has been around for many years and has been installed on many platforms.  It is very unlikely to be the problem.

Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 (SLQ-32B(V)6) – This has been a separate developmental effort and has been reported to have some typical developmental problems but nothing all that severe.  The system has been in development for some time and its issues are well known and would not likely trigger surprise cancellation of the Zumwalt self-defense program.  In addition, it is independent of the active defenses.  This is almost certainly not the problem.

Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 1 with Joint Universal Weapon Link (JUWL) – ESSM has been around for some time, has been extensively test, by Navy standards, and has reportedly performed well.  It is highly unlikely that the missile, itself, is the problem.  However, the guidance data link appears to be brand new and untested.

Standard Missile 2 (SM-2 Block IIIAZ) with JUWL – SM-2 variants have been around for some time and have been extensively tested, at least by Navy standards.  It is unlikely that the SM-2 is the problem.  However, the guidance data link appears to be brand new and untested.

MK 57 Vertical Launch System (VLS) - The VLS has not been extensively tested but, other than failure to launch, would be unlikely to cause severe problems and a systematic failure to launch issue would, undoubtedly, have been noted and reported before now since it would be too big and obvious a problem not to be publicly noted and reported.  Further, a launch failure does not fall into the category of predictable performance problems which the report refers to.  Therefore, this is not the problem.

So, what did that little analysis leave us with?  The only candidates for problems are the SPY-3 radar and the JUWL guidance link.  Either could be a likely source of predictable failure. 

As you may recall, the Zumwalt was originally supposed to have the Dual Band Radar (DBR) which consists of the SPY-4 (S band) volume search radar and the SPY-3 (X band) horizon search radar.  The SPY-4 was deleted from the Zumwalt design as a cost saving measure.  As a result, the SPY-3 was to be reprogrammed to selectively perform volume search or (and?) its intended horizon search function.  The functionality was to be operator selectable.

It seems quite plausible that the intended modifications to perform volume search have proven to be problematic.  The volume search was not intended, not designed into the SPY-3, and has had an extremely abbreviated development and testing schedule.  It is reasonable to believe that now that Zumwalt is undergoing actual combat system tests, the previously untested radar is demonstrating poor performance.

The other problem candidate, the Joint Universal Weapon Link, is also a plausible trouble source.  Again, it is unique and untested.  However, weapon guidance links are relatively straightforward communication technologies and relatively easy to correct, one would think.  So, this is certainly a possible problem point but seems much less likely than the SPY-3.

The other potentially problematic aspect to the JUWL is the mechanism of transmission.  Assuming the SPY-3 is being used to transmit the JUWL guidance commands, it is possible that the demands of the simultaneous dual guidance/tracking functions are not working together correctly.  If so, this again leads us back to a flawed SPY-3.

Therefore, the logical conclusion is that the Zumwalt is experiencing severe problems with the SPY-3 radar.

Ominously, the SPY-3 is also installed on the Ford which has not yet tested its combat systems.  More problems to come for the Ford?

Zumwalt SPY-3/4

If all of the above speculation is correct, there is even worse news.  The Navy has been testing the SPY-3 on the Self Defense Test Ship (SDTS) but is planning to remove the SPY-3.  From the DOT&E report,

The Navy plans to remove the SPY-3 radar and TSCE computer equipment on the SDTS at the end of 2QFY20. (1)

Whatever problems the SPY-3 has, the Navy’s best hope of solving them lies with exercising the SDTS with the SPY-3 installed.  Removing it may greatly hinder or totally prevent diagnosis and correction of the problem(s).  Removing the SPY-3 does not seem prudent or wise but when has the Navy ever been accused of wisdom?

The poor Zumwalt program can’t seem to catch a break, can it?  Aside from the complete failure of its main weapon system, it’s had problems with power generation/distribution (which was supposed to be a strength of the design), ship handling concerns in certain seas, and now its self-defense system is useless.  Think about it, though – is it really bad breaks or is it just a very bad design concept showing its inherent and utterly predictable problems and failures?

We’ll be keeping an eye on this one.

_________________________________

(1)Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, “FY2019 Annual Report”, 20-Dec-2019, p.159-60

Dual Band Radar Review

Before it passes into a mere historical footnote, let’s take a closer look at the once vaunted Dual Band Radar (DBR) that was to equip the Ford and Zumwalt classes.  The DBR combines an X-Band and S-Band radar in array panels versus the old style rotating radars. 

Let’s take a moment and recall what the old, mechanical, rotating radars were.  There were two main ones:

• SPS-40/49 - Two dimensional (bearing and range), long range (256 nm), air search, L-band (851-942 MHz)

• SPS-48 – Three dimensional (bearing, range, and height), long range (250 nm), air search, 7.5 – 15 rpm, mechanically rotated, electronically steered beams for elevation, 4500 lb, E & F-band (2-4 GHz)

There were also additional radars for navigation, air traffic control, fire control illumination, etc.

By comparison, the DBR consists of several flat panel arrays of two types:

• SPY-3 – X-band (8-12 GHz), low altitude targeting and horizon search, target illumination and datalink for SM-2 and ESSM (2)

• SPY-4 Volume Search Radar (VSR) – S-band, 3-face, long range search/track and cueing for the SPY-3 (2)

There is a great deal of overlap between the two systems, as described by Raytheon,

“Many search and track functions, such as cued acquisition and precision track (providing high update rate, fire control quality data) can be allocated to either or both frequencies, automatically or through command and control direction.” (2)

This provides a measure of redundancy and resilience to damage in combat.  Along the same lines, the presence of two overlapping radars allows the degrading effects of weather to be minimized by being able to switch between them as conditions warrant (2).

The system uses a total of six array faces, three for each band.  Each of the arrays covers 120 deg with three of them combining to provide 360 deg coverage.

The total DBR system is reported to cost $500M (1).

The DBR was originally intended to outfit the Zumwalt and Ford classes but will now only be installed on the first Ford carrier (3).  For Zumwalt, the SPY-4 has been deleted as a cost savings measure.  Deletion of the SPY-4 from the Zumwalt DBR will reportedly save $180M (1).

The Navy concluded, correctly, that a carrier just doesn’t need a radar system this capable since the carrier has no long range AAW missiles and would be unlikely to radiate in combat, depending instead on shared data pictures provided by Aegis escorts and E-2 Hawkeye aircraft.  This was acknowledged by RAdm. Thomas Moore, PEO Carriers, in an article presented by Defense News website,

“… analysis showed the carrier didn't need all the system's capabilities.” (3)

Related side note:  wouldn’t it have been nice (and logical) to perform the analysis prior to designing the carrier?  But, I digress …

DBR was slated to replace several different legacy radar systems that performed air traffic control, air search, navigation, and fire-control, etc.  This offers a potentially significant increase in efficiency and reduction in maintenance and personnel.  However, by combining the functions of several legacy radars into one system, a single point of multiple failures is created.  A single failure can potentially cost the ship its detection, tracking, targeting, navigation, air traffic control, and fire control functions.  That’s a steep price to pay for a single failure.  This is a case where efficiency is trumped by separation and redundancy, the foundations of survivability.  In other words, combat resilience trumps cost effectiveness.  This is yet another example of how trying to run a combat organization like a business is a flawed concept.

Another key aspect of the DBR system, just as with Aegis, is complexity and maintainability.  Aegis suffered from a fleet wide degradation serious enough to cause the Navy to form one of its infamous Admiral chaired panels.  I have seen no public documentation regarding the results of that remediation effort.  I do not know what state the Aegis system is in, today.  Having seen no grand pronouncements of success, I have to assume that the system still suffers from systemic degradation. 

DBR will be even more complex and common sense suggests that it, too, will suffer from maintenance and reliability problems.  Even worse, DBR is almost a one-of-a-kind system.  The Navy is highly unlikely to incur the cost of setting up technician schools and creating a technician training program adequate to maintain the system.  Similarly, the spare parts logistical train necessary to support the system is unlikely to be adequately established.  We saw exactly this phenomenon play out with the nearly one-of-a-kind Enterprise/Long Beach radar systems which suffered from a lack of trained technicians and support and were, in relatively short order, abandoned.

It is a near certainty that the Ford’s radar system will never work as intended and will, in relatively short order, be abandoned and replaced.

On a closely related side note, the complexity and support issues lead, inexorably, to the question, is it better to have a bleeding edge radar system that can’t be maintained and never achieves its intended performance or to have a more basic system (like a mechanical, rotating system) that is utterly reliable, can be maintained at sea, and provides its maximum performance at all times?

In any event, there are lessons to be learned from the DBR program. 

• Carriers don’t need highly capable radar systems since they don’t have highly capable weapons that require highly capable radars

• Carriers don’t radiate in combat;  instead, they rely on data links from other aircraft and ships so, again, they don’t need sophisticated radars

• Performance analyses must be performed prior to ship design

• One of a kind systems are not sustainable

• Cost and operational efficiency do not trump combat effectiveness

The DBR is fated to pass into the footnotes of history but we would do well to learn its lessons before it does.

_______________________________

(1)USNI News website, “PEO Carriers: CVN-79 Will Have a New Radar, Save $180M Compared to Dual Band Radar”, Megan Eckstein, March 17, 2015,

https://news.usni.org/2015/03/17/peo-carriers-cvn-79-will-have-a-new-radar-save-180m-compared-to-dual-band-radar

(2)Raytheon website, What We Do > Products > Dual Band Radar,

http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/dbr/

(3)Defense News website, “Dual Band Radar Swapped Out In New Carriers”, Christopher P. Cavas, 17-Mar-2015,

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/03/17/navy-aircraft-carrier-ford-kennedy-dual-band-radar-dbr-easr-raytheon-huntington-ingalls-newport-news-lockheed-aegis-shipbuilding/24924511/

Dual Band Radar

I’ve had this post in the works for a bit and a comment by “Nick” prompted me to post it.  Thanks “Nick”!

The Navy has been developing an active array Dual Band Radar (DBR) for some time, now.  The radar operates over two distinct bands utilizing a single software suite and control interface.

AN/SPY-3 X-band – provides horizon search and detection of low altitude targets and offers illumination and data unlink/downlink for Standard and ESSM missiles.  The radar was originally intended to have three array faces.

VSR S-band (SPY-4?) – provides volume search and tracking.  The radar was originally intended to have three array faces.

The two bands can operate in multiple modes and are intended to fill the roles of separate radars for air traffic control, target illumination, tracking, surface search, and navigation, thus eliminating multiple legacy radar units.

The radar system is intended to operate with minimal operator input.  In theory, this would eliminate operate mistakes or ineffective actions due to human threat assessment and response. 

You’ll recall that the radar was intended to be installed in the Zumwalt and Ford classes.  As it happened, the S-band half of the system was removed from the design of the Zumwalt class as a cost reduction move.  Now, the Navy reports that the DBR will only be installed on the Ford and future ships of the class will receive a new, as yet unspecified radar.  Navy spokesmen have suggested that the termination of the system is based on “economics and need”.

ComNavOps has long questioned the need for a cutting edge radar system for a carrier that has no area air defense missile system and is constantly surrounded by Aegis cruisers and destroyers.  Apparently, the Navy now agrees.

I have not seen any cost figures for the DBR but given the hype the system has received from the Navy, to terminate its production must indicate that the system is very expensive.  One Navy spokesman stated that the system was on the order of $500M and that selection of an alternate system for subsequent Fords would produce savings of $180M (1).  As an aside, simple arithmetic suggests, then, that the replacement radar would cost on the order of $320M.  Hopefully, this won’t be an F-22/35 case where the cheaper replacement turns out to actually be more expensive.

The Navy has suggested that the DBR replacement radar will be a simpler, off-the-shelf system that will be fitted to multiple ship classes.  If so, this is a step in the right direction.  ComNavOps has long advocated simpler systems that meet only the class requirements and no more – in other words, no Aegis on patrol boats, to engage in a bit of hyperbole for the sake of dramatic impact.  A carrier has no need for a world class DBR so why give it one?  All that would do is add cost.  While the decision to eliminate the DBR from the Ford class is a good one, the original decision to include it is an example of very poor decision making, devoid of tactical usefulness and ignorant of cost considerations.  This is just one of many reasons why the Ford cost has escalated to $13B and additional construction and costs are being deferred to post-delivery in order to get around the Congressionally imposed cost cap.

The Ford DBR will, therefore, be a one-off radar system.  You’ll recall what happened to the Enterprise’s original radar system?  We’ll undoubtedly see the DBR removed from Ford sometime down the line.

(1) http://news.usni.org/2015/03/17/peo-carriers-cvn-79-will-have-a-new-radar-save-180m-compared-to-dual-band-radar