Scrap Two Carriers – Part IV - New Airfields in the Pacific

Continuing his series, guest author Carlton Meyer returns to discuss Pacific basing and war operations for land based naval air wings.  Enjoy !

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In previous blog posts, I suggested that operating eleven supercarriers has become so expensive that it left our Navy imbalanced, with too few aircraft and surface combatants. This could be corrected by downsizing to nine carriers (see, “Scrap Two Carriers! – Part 1”), which will probably occur anyway because of the flawed USS Ford program. I suggested this loss could be offset by establishing two shore-based overseas Carrier Air Wings (see, “Naval Air Wings, Scrap Two Carriers – Part 2”). These could be called Naval Air Wings (NAW) and absorb Marine Corps aviation assets to support Navy sea control missions from existing American airbases. There are several basing options for a NAW in the Mediterranean as explained in a past blog post (see, “A Naval Air Wing in the Med, Scrap Two Carriers – Part 3”). However, there is only one main useful airbase in the Central and South Pacific – Anderson Air Force Base on Guam.[3]

 

It will take at least four months for the US Navy to form a huge naval task force in the Pacific to confront China. Meanwhile, American airbases within range of Chinese fighters and short-range missiles will be destroyed within the first couple days. China’s primary concern is keeping sea lanes open for its commercial ships to Africa and the Middle East. The obvious strategy is to quickly dispatch a huge naval task force to seize Guam, which then turns south to clear threats in northern Australia, perhaps causing that nation to seek peace. This may seem ambitious, but the Japanese successfully conducted a similar campaign in 1942 that led to a disastrous Allied defeat known as the Battle of the Java Sea.[1]

 

The mission of a Pacific NAW is to combat a Chinese fleet. The US Navy can instantly create a Pacific NAW by redesignating Carrier Air Wing 5 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan that could absorb the two Marine Corps Fighter-Attack squadrons at that same base. However, Iwakuni is in the northern Pacific among substantial Japanese and US Air Force bases and airpower. Okinawa, Japan has two American airbases but those will be destroyed by Chinese airpower the first day of a war. Anderson airbase on Guam is an ideal location where some Navy aircraft are already based, but the US Air Force has plans to surge squadrons to that base during wartime. Australia is a close ally and has offered use of some airfields. The Philippines allows access to several of its airfields, but most are too close to China and that nation may declare neutrality in a war. Here is a proposed laydown for a Pacific NAW.

 

NAF Atsugi – Leave the Navy HSM squadron here to support the four destroyers and help guard Tokyo Bay/Yokosuka from submarine incursions. The Navy already has an HCS squadron on Guam with 14 MH-60S that becomes part of the NAW, so the HSC at Atsugi is disbanded. During a war, these helicopters will disperse to other bases to conduct vital search and rescue of downed pilots.

 

NAF Anderson Air Force Base – The HCS squadron is already based here. This is the ideal location for the NAW headquarters. The Air Force has no airborne radar or dedicated electronic warfare aircraft on Guam, so should not object to hosting the VAW and VAQ squadrons that only add nine aircraft to the base. The Air Force should be supportive after space at MCAS Iwakuni is offered to Air Force squadrons.

 

MCAS Kaneohe Bay - Most of the Pacific NAW should move from Iwakuni to Hawaii to keep aircraft and families far from the danger of Chinese air and missile attack. These relocations will be expensive, but remember that billions of dollars will be saved by scrapping two aircraft carriers. The two Marine and two Navy fighter-attack squadrons can be based here, where a VMM squadron and VMGR (KC-130 squadron) already exist to support the NAW. The Marines will need to move the other VMM squadron stateside to make room. If more space is needed, perhaps squadrons can operate from new facilities at Hickam airbase or the Coast Guard airfield at Barber’s Point. 

 

Billions more dollars can be used to establish several austere Naval Air Facilities (NAF) in the Pacific to where NAW fighter squadrons can deploy once the smoke clears from the first week of missile bombardment. There are several civilian airports in the region from which naval aircraft can operate. They’ll need dispersed and protected fuel storage since existing fuel tanks may be destroyed during a war and fuel resupply may take months. They’ll need stocked munitions bunkers and military airfield support equipment, and access to housing, food, and medical care. Facility staff may include just a dozen servicemen and two dozen local civilians, but will need a surge plan to accommodate up to 500 additional military personnel during training exercises or war. Housing may be provided by local hotels, military barracks, or warehouses and tentage.

 

Airfield support squadrons should be formed to deploy to each NAF during wartime to provide more security, rapid airfield repair, and miscellaneous base support. This is ideal for US Marines who have embraced the idea of establishing austere forward bases. Some could be specially organized reserve units who deploy to their assigned bases for two weeks of training each year. Here are excellent sites for NAFs in the Central Pacific, see the map linked below.[2] All are American territory or secured via long-term base access agreements with reliable allies:

 

• NAF Iwo Jima – Japanese military airfield
• NAF Saipan – civilian airport in the Marianas
• NAF Tinian - civilian airport in the Marianas
• NAF Rota - civilian airport in the Marianas
• NAF Agana - civilian airport on Guam that hosted a US Navy Air Station until 1995
• NAF Palau - civilian airport whose government welcomes new US military bases[4]

 

There are three excellent NAF locations much further from China and beyond the range of its intermediate range ballistic missiles. These may be used as transit points, staging areas, or for combat operations should a Chinese advance prove successful. These bases should have a large naval magazine to resupply the forward NAFs and aircraft carriers.

 

• NAF Darwin – Australian military airfield (already used by US Marines)
• NAF Bucholz – US Army airfield, Kwajalein (Marshall Islands)
• NAF Wake Island – US Air Force airfield (rarely used)

 

Should war with China become imminent, C-130s from Hawaii will fly Marine Corps airfield support squadrons to the NAFs and evacuate military families from Guam. Since Guam is a primary target for a Chinese missile barrage, NAW aircraft there will disperse to other NAFs. NAW fighters from Hawaii could deploy to NAFs, but it may be wise to deploy them only halfway, to Bucholz and Wake Island, until the initial missile barrage is over and maybe until the Chinese fleet deploys eastward. A Pacific NAW will present a major problem for the Chinese fleet and may be reinforced with more Navy and Marine Corps squadrons. Targeting NAFs with China’s limited number of expensive long-range missiles presents a problem. Currently, all can be directed at Anderson Air Force base, but including six NAFs makes the Chinese missile bombardment plan difficult. NAW fighters flying from NAFs may not stop the Chinese fleet, but will make operations bloody and complex during the first few months of a war.

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Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer whose writings appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Proceedings, and the Navy Times. He became irritated when some articles approved by editors never appeared after the Marine Commandant’s office and the CNO’s office began to preview publications and block articles they didn’t like. This explains why their articles have become bland. He began posting his ideas at www.G2mil.com in 2000.

 

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[1]“Battle of the Java Sea”; short video; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_oKLSVvRsQY

 

[2]Map of allied airbases in the western Pacific; http://www.g2mil.com/kadena1.jpg

 

[3]Fact Sheet about Anderson Air Force base, Guam; August 2021; https://www.andersen.af.mil/Portals/43/Documents/Base%20Fact%20Sheet%202021-Andersen%20AFB-20210805.pdf?ver=GU5mj9wrNr0fj_wiBBxOWQ%3d%3d

 

[4]“Palau: U.S. Welcome to build military bases”; Indo-Pacific Defense; February 22, 2021; https://ipdefenseforum.com/2021/02/palau-u-s-welcome-to-build-military-bases-amid-prcs-influence-push/

A Pacific Naval Air Wing (Scrap Two Carriers – Part 4)

In previous blog posts (see, “Scrap Two Carriers – Part 3”), I suggested that operating eleven supercarriers has become so expensive that it left our Navy imbalanced, with too few aircraft and surface combatants. This could be corrected by downsizing to nine carriers, which will probably occur anyway because of the flawed USS Ford program. I suggested this loss could be offset by establishing two shore-based overseas Carrier Air Wings. These could be called Naval Air Wings (NAW) and absorb Marine Corps aviation assets to support Navy sea control missions from existing American airbases.

 

To understand the value of a NAW in the Pacific, one must consider the US Navy’s strategy for war with China. It must be classified, but evidence suggests there is no strategy. Most admirals agree that sending a single carrier strike group toward the Chinese coast is foolish given its massive numbers of land-based fighters and anti-ship missiles. A huge task force of at least four carriers must first be assembled. How long will that take? Based on past crises and the current readiness of the fleet, at least four months will be required. Who will contain the Chinese Navy until then? The US Air Force will be busy defending Japan from air strikes. It has plans to surge airpower to its big airbase on Guam, but that will prove difficult after the airfield is hit with a hundred missiles after air defense systems shoot down just a dozen of them.

 

Chinese strategy is easy to predict. First, they will destroy the massive American military base complex on nearby Okinawa. Hundreds of short-range missiles will pummel airfields while several hundred Chinese fighters arrive to bomb and strafe the island as some 150 American and Japanese aircraft are destroyed in the first two days. This will leave some 30,000 American civilians and 20,000 military personnel stranded on Okinawa with a dwindling food supply who might face an amphibious invasion. This situation is dire and represents gross incompetence in the US military that I wrote about a few years ago. [1]

 

China will try to sink any US navy ships in the region before they flee eastward. Ships foolishly homeported at Sasebo, Japan will be sunk as that logistics base is wrecked. I also wrote an article about this a few years back. [2] The big prize is the supercarrier USS Ronald Reagan and its escorts based at Yokosuka, Japan where it remains pierside half the time and thus an easy target for a mass missile attack. The Chinese always know the exact position of this ship in Tokyo Bay and could time an attack to sink it in the port entrance! The US Navy keeps this carrier in ultra-expensive Yokosuka because, well, it’s had one there since the end of World War II. It is there as part of an outdated “forward presence” concept, even though it often deploys to the Persian Gulf. If war threatens, most US Navy ships in Japan will be ordered to sail eastward to safety, leaving thousands of family members in a war zone. The evacuation of Americans from Japan will become a military priority at the beginning of a war, tying up substantial assets.

 

The US Navy maintains Carrier Air Wing 5 in Japan for the USS Ronald Reagan, with jets based at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan and helicopters at NAF Atsugi. Both airfields are within range of short-range Chinese missiles and land-based fighters so most aircraft will be quickly destroyed unless embarked on the Reagan as it flees eastward. Basing two dozen US Navy ships in Japan is costly and mindless. US military bases in Asia have mostly remained unmoved since the end of the Vietnam war, with the exception of closing bases in the Philippines and downsizing in Guam in the 1990s. Nothing has been done to address growing Chinese power in the region. The only major project is an insane effort to build a new $20 billion dollar airbase for the Marines on Okinawa that will be smashed by Chinese airpower on day one! I’ve written about that too. [3]

 

This strategic overview may shock those who have not followed the dramatic rise of Chinese military power, nor read my articles linked below. China now has more ships than the US Navy and will have twice as many by 2040. Moreover, China can quickly mass all of its air and naval power in the Western Pacific, where the USA maintains just 10% of its force, while the rest is on the other side of the globe! Even if time allowed for a build-up airpower in the Pacific, the USA has very few airfields in the Pacific with stockpiles of munitions.

 

This situation is familiar to students of World War II history. Japanese aircraft from Formosa quickly destroyed most US Army Air Corps aircraft forward-deployed to the Philippines nine hours after the Americans were alerted to the attack on Pearl Harbor. US Navy bases there were smashed as ships fled south to the Dutch East Indies. The US Navy had three carriers in Hawaii that were not ready to confront the Japanese Navy. Japan quickly established airbases in the Dutch East Indies where the Japanese hunted down and sunk two dozen Allied warships in a disaster known as the “The Battle of the Java Sea.”

 

The US Navy doesn’t need to close bases in Japan, which are really Japanese bases anyway. But the three amphibs at Sasebo should move to Hawaii and the minesweepers to Yokosuka or Guam. Sasebo can remain operational but a long-term plan is needed to move its logistical support facilities somewhere in the Central Pacific or Australia. Yokosuka should remain as a logistics and support base in hopes that Japanese and American Air Forces can provide protection. However, the huge USS Ronald Reagan and its families should move to the United States. A squadron with four destroyers can remain to assure Japan of American support. Most Marine Corps aircraft should move off Okinawa where they now sit as easy targets.

 

The airbase at MCAS Iwakuni should remain as Carrier Air Wing 5 instantly becomes the Pacific NAW, absorbing the two Marine Corps attack squadrons based there. Savings from scrapping two aircraft carriers will free billions of dollars each year to ready two dozen existing airfields in the Central Pacific for wartime use with stocked munitions bunkers, support equipment, and fuel stores so this NAW can disperse to operate outside the range of most Chinese missiles and all land-based fighter aircraft. Most Chinese missiles are cheap short-range missiles whose range roughly matches that of land base fighters. Planning to operate airbases within this range is foolish, although operating Forward Arming and Refueling points may be possible. See the missile range chart linked below. [4]

 

This NAW would be key to US Navy strategy during the first months of war with China. It would engage Chinese naval power venturing out for long range attacks or amphibious operations. The Navy and Marine Corps may fly additional squadrons to operate from these bases until Navy submarines and American bombers weakened the Chinese and a huge American fleet arrives. Details on NAW basing options will be presented in the next blog post.

 

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[1] “Downsize Kadena”; Carlton Meyer; G2mil; 2012; http://www.g2mil.com/kadena.htm

 

[2] “Vacate Sasebo”; Carlton Meyer; G2mil; 2012; http://www.g2mil.com/sasebo.htm

 

[3] “The Okinawa Solution”; Carlton Meyer; G2mil; 2012; http://www.g2mil.com/okinawa-solution.htm

 

[4] Chart of Chinese missile capabilities; The Missile Threat; CSIS; https://i2.wp.com/missilethreat.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Chinaregionalmap.jpg?ssl=1

A Naval Air Wing in the Med (Scrap Two Carriers – Part 3)

In a previous blog post (see, “ScrapTwo Carriers – Part 1” and “Naval Air Wings, Scrap Two Carriers – Part 2”), I suggested that operating supercarriers had become so expensive that it has left our Navy imbalanced, with too few aircraft and surface combatants. This could be corrected by downsizing to nine carriers, which will probably occur anyway because of the flawed USS Ford program. I suggested this loss could be offset by establishing two shore based overseas Carrier Air Wings (CAW)s; the confusing CVW is the official acronym. These could be called Naval Air Wings (NAW) and absorb Marine Corps aviation assets to support Navy sea control missions from existing American airbases.

 

During a conflict in the Persian Gulf, the US Navy will wisely keep its aircraft carriers out of that Gulf. It would also be wise to keep land-based NAW squadrons out of the region until the smoke clears. The United States has access to several first-class airfields in the region, but basing NAW squadrons in this region makes aircraft and military families vulnerable to surprise missile and commando attacks. The US Navy should establish aerial munitions and fuel bunkers at key airbases, but basing NAW squadrons in the Mediterranean is better. Squadrons in the Med can deploy to Persian Gulf airfields on a regular basis to participate in exercises. During a conflict, they can deploy to the Persian Gulf quickly and choose airfields depending on damage and the tactical and political situation.

 

Another reason not to base NAWs in the Persian Gulf is that region is dominated by the US Air Force with its large headquarters in Qatar commanding several deployed squadrons. A NAW there would become an Air Force CENTCOM supporting component. On the other hand, the Air Force has no fighter squadrons in the Med except two at Aviano in Northern Italy. It has no munitions stockpiled at other bases in the Med, no anti-ship or anti-submarine weaponry, and cannot supply or properly support deployed naval task forces. A final reason to choose the Med is a much friendlier political and cultural environment with quick access to turbulent Africa.

 

The US Navy has several options for basing a NAW in the Med where it already has large airbases. Despite this investment, the US Navy maintains more executive aircraft for Admirals based in the region than combat aircraft. Here is the current laydown:

 

Naval Air Station Sigonella (Sicily)

• Executive Transport Department C-20As
• Air Operations Department C-26As
• P-8As (long-range patrol) on rotational deployment from CONUS

 

Naval Support Activity Naples (Italy) collocated at the Naples civilian airport

• Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron HCS-28 det with two MH-60S
• Air Operations Department C-26As

 

Naval Air Station Rota (Spain)

• Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron HSM-79 det with two MH-60Rs

 

Naval Support Activity (Crete) collocated at a Greek airbase

• None

 

US Air Force airbase Moron, Spain

• USMC VMM squadron with MV-22s via CONUS rotations

 

The Navy/Marine Corps have four options to sustain NAW squadrons in the Med.

 

1. Accompanied tours – These are three-year tours with families that require schools and massive base support complexes. These are popular and allow unit stability, but are costly to support.

 

2. Unaccompanied tours - Personnel are deployed individually for a year leaving families stateside. This works well as a 13-month tour (six months overseas, a month of stateside leave, six months overseas), but the high turnover affects readiness.

 

3. Unit rotation - This is used by the Marines where three units rotate with seven-month deployments for foreign presence. This works well but requires three squadrons to maintain one overseas.

 

4. Foreign detachment – A squadron based stateside rotates personnel to maintain a forward detachment overseas with perhaps four aircraft. Personnel deploy for 3-6 months to the overseas det every couple of years, and the entire squadron deploys overseas every year for a month-long exercise.

 

Here is a notional basing plan for a NAW in the Med:

 

• One Navy Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R (anti-sub/boat) Seahawks. There are already two aircraft at Rota to support the four destroyers based there and the Navy plans on adding more aircraft. Make this a full squadron perhaps placing a few with their sister MH-60s at Naples.
• One Navy Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks. Two are already based at Naples so add more or place them with other Navy squadrons in the Med.
• Two Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadrons with 14 FA-18E/Fs each.
• One Navy Electronic Attack (VAQ) Squadron, with five EA-18G Growlers.
• One Navy Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Squadron with four E-2D Hawkeyes

 

These four squadrons are the core of the NAW striking power and could be based at existing US Navy airfields in the middle of the Med, at NAS Sigonella, NSA Souda Bay, and NSA Naples. These squadrons will be manned via one-year unaccompanied tours. A couple billion dollars and several years may be needed to expand family services to allow some three-year accompanied tours.

 

• One CONUS based Marine VMGR Aerial Refueler Squadron with 15 KC-130Js tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps four will be in theater moving among airfields to support the NAW with more during wartime. Aircraft can deploy for six months bouncing around between airfields.
• One CONUS based Marine Fleet Logistics Support (VMM) Squadron of 12 MV-22 Ospreys tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps three will be in theater to support the NAW with more during wartime. The Marines already maintain a VMM squadron at Moron, Spain near the Med coast to support the Africa Command via rotational deployments among three squadrons. These aircraft should become part of a NAW.
• Two Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadrons with 16 F-35Bs each. These squadrons would be based stateside and maintain a forward det of four aircraft in the Med region. The entire squadron will deploy for a month-long exercise each year. There are lots of basing options that may change yearly. Maintaining a F-35 det with the Marine VMM squadron at Moron, Spain is simple, or any NAW base in the Med. The Marines have maintained a few fighter aircraft at the American airfield in Djibouti near the strategic Red Sea, so that may be a good location for a squadron/det.

 

Basing NAW aircraft at these locations in the Med will require political approval. This should not be a problem because it adds perhaps only 400 more personnel at each base and more spending in the local community. The US Navy already spends billions of dollars to maintain bases in the Med with over 10,000 personnel, but almost zero airpower exists aboard them! There are other basing options that should be evaluated. The US Air Force has excellent airfields in Romania, Turkey, and Jordan that host aircraft for training exercises. There is also a British airbase on Cyprus and the Italians are buying F-35s so basing with them is possible. Training at these bases and establishing bunkers with naval munitions at these airfields is a good idea.

 

Career sailors will be pleased to serve ashore with a NAW to break from endless shipboard deployments. Improving these bases will cost a few billion dollars, but this will be less than half the cost of a new supercarrier and provide a year around presence at a fraction of the annual operating cost of a supercarrier. Deployed naval task forces will be pleased with the land-based air support available in the region with whom they will train. Additional aircraft from the NAW can be embarked aboard CVNs and LHD/LHAs if needed. Finally, if war erupts in the Persian Gulf, it takes weeks for a second aircraft carrier to arrive in theater, and months for a third to arrive. A NAW from the Med can arrive in a week.

 

Click here for a map of base locations.

Naval Air Wings (Scrap Two Carriers – Part 2)

Once again, we are honored to have a guest post from Carlton Meyer.  You may know him as username ‘G2mil’ and the author of many outstanding articles posted on his website at www.g2mil.com.  Today’s post is the companion piece to his recent post, “Scrap Two Carriers”.  In today’s writing, he proposes an alternate use for the carrier air wings freed up by scrapping two carriers.  Enjoy!  

 

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In a past blog post, “Scrap Two Carriers” I argued the US Navy’s fleet has become imbalanced and Admirals should scrap two supercarriers to free manpower and aircraft for the remaining nine carrier strike groups. This would also free billions of dollars each year for other Navy programs. I noted this will probably occur anyway because of the flawed Ford class carrier program. I suggested that two Carrier Air Wings (CAWs) could conduct sea control missions from existing American airbases overseas. This idea was considered in the past, calling them Navy Tactical Support Wings, a term still used for the Navy Reserve air wing. My proposal would incorporate Marine Corps squadrons and call land-based CAWs-- Naval Air Wings (NAW).

 

During World War II, most naval missions were flown from land bases, not from aircraft carriers. Since then, the US Navy has mostly refused to operate fighter squadrons from land bases, even though it has airbases at key sea control locations like in Sicily and Crete. NAWs will not require an ultra-expensive supercarrier, not require frequent resupply at sea, nor escort ships. On the other hand, large long-range precision guided missiles can blow big holes in fixed runways. However, such missiles cost at least $5 million to construct and require months to produce. If airfields are properly supported by rapid runway repair teams, they can fill a big hole in an hour and top it with gravel for emergency use. When a few hours can be spared, the team can top it off with quick dry concrete that can cure in four hours.

 

The composition of US Navy CAWs is always changing. The US Navy is short of needed aircraft, which explains today’s F-35C squadrons with just ten aircraft. This is the Navy's goal for future CAWs:

 

• Two Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadrons with 14 FA-18E/Fs each. Several aircraft are often tasked as refuelers.
• One Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadron with ten F-35Cs.
• One Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadron with ten F-35Cs.
• One Electronic Attack (VAQ) Squadron, with five EA-18G Growlers.
• One Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Squadron, with four E-2D Hawkeyes
• One Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks
• One Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R Seahawks, 3–5 are typically based on other ships of the carrier strike group.
• A Fleet Logistics Support (VRC) Squadron Detachment of two CVM-22 Ospreys.

 

My proposed land-based NAW would consist of:

 

• Two Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadrons with 14 FA-18E/Fs each.
• Two Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadrons with 16 F-35Bs each.
• One CONUS based Marine VMGR Aerial Refueler Squadron with 15 KC-130Js tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps four will be in theater to support the NAW with more during wartime.
• One Navy Electronic Attack (VAQ) Squadron, with five EA-18G Growlers.
• One Navy Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Squadron with four E-2D Hawkeyes
• One Navy Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks based at several locations or aboard surface ships in the region.
• One Navy Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R Seahawks based at several locations or aboard surface combatants in the region.
• A CONUS based Marine Fleet Logistics Support (VMM) Squadron of 12 MV-22 Ospreys tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps three will be in theater to support the NAW with more during wartime.

 

The Marines should support this idea because Marine Aviation lacks a clear purpose in peer wars where amphibious operations will not be viable until the latter stage of a conflict. Marine Air lacks vital electronic warfare aircraft that Navy EA-18Gs provide, and lacks the long-range aerial radar that Navy E-2Ds provide. The Marines recently focused on support for expeditionary airfields during major wars. Supporting forward airfields for dispersed land based naval aircraft as part of NAWs fits perfectly. NAWs also can also support small dispersed units of Marines ashore. Finally, NAW staff will include many Marine Corps personnel and command should rotate between Navy and Marine aviators.

 

The Marines have provided squadrons to support US Navy carrier deployment for decades and currently provide four, hence the purchase of F-35C (Navy CTOL version) for four Marine VMFA squadrons. NAWs would each include two squadrons of F-35B (VSTOL) that can easily operate from shorter runways or those damaged from missile attacks. Modifying two CAWs into land-based NAWs with four Marine VMFA squadrons frees four Navy VFA squadrons to fill the gaps in other CAWs, or provides half the aircraft needed to form another CAW should the USS Ford finally become ready for a real deployment.

The basic mission of a NAW is sea control. This will involve support of CAW operations wherever possible with both combat aircraft and logistics support. A CAW may embark extra aircraft from a NAW or even an entire squadron. It may choose to swap types of aircraft depending on the threat and mission. The NAW can also supplement or swap aircraft with an LHA/LHD deployed in the region during smaller conflicts. Perhaps moving some helicopters ashore and adding F-35Bs, or the opposite.

 

NAW aircraft will be based at small Naval Air Facilities that will include medical and maintenance capabilities, thus ideal places to offload damaged CAW aircraft and sailors and acquire replacements. A CAW in combat with China may lose a dozen aircraft in a day! NAWs can instantly provide replacements. On the other hand, a heavily damaged carrier may need to transit stateside for months of repairs so her aircraft can continue to fight ashore as part of a NAW. In the early days of a war with China, cautious Admirals may keep their carriers “east of Guam” and out of range of Chinese submarines, long-range ballistic missiles, and bomber launched cruise missiles. Some of this reluctance is because our Navy will lack escorts for ships that supply underway carrier strike groups.

 

NAW and USAF airbases in WestPac may have been pummeled with strikes that continue every few days, but their airfields remain usable. The NAW in WestPac has fought varied engagements with the loss of many aircraft. Admirals may choose to use their supercarriers as home bases far from threats, deploying their squadrons forward to NAW airbases for days at a time to fight, then returning to their carrier for rest and replenishment. CAW aircraft may use battered NAW bases or forward Marine expeditionary bases as FAARPs (forward arming and air refueling points) to fly more sorties before returning to their carrier. These bases could also recover damaged aircraft or those low on fuel that can’t reach their carriers.

 

NAWs do not require the establishment of new airfields. The US military has dozens of airbases at key locations around the world for sea control.  NAWs will simply utilize existing airfields to conduct sea control missions and support CAW and Marine Corps operations in theater, although they could utilize wartime expeditionary airfields the Marines are keen to establish. One can criticize the lack of mobility of a NAW compared to a CAW, but it provides the same capabilities without a $15 billion Ford class carrier, without the worry that a carrier might be sunk, without the need for escort ships, and with a half of the support manpower. NAWs will require a few billion dollars to improve and expand existing airbases, but this costs far less than ships needed for a carrier strike group, without the massive annual operating costs for ship fuel and maintenance.

 

Moreover, overseas presence requires the rotation of three CONUS based aircraft carriers with their three CAWs to match what a single overseas based NAW provides! One can argue that naval aircraft can quickly deploy to overseas bases during wartime as needed, but it takes years to establish support facilities in the form of munitions stockpiles, ground support equipment, and aircraft spare parts blocks. Permanent overseas squadrons with regular peacetime interaction with allied forces will ensure better wartime cooperation. A major war will result in a rapid consumption of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and precision strike munitions that the Navy’s supply system cannot quickly replenish. CAW aircraft would soon draw upon the munition stockpiles at NAW bases ashore.

 

The Marine Corps traditionally publishes a very detailed “Marine Aviation Plan” each year, yet the last one was in 2019[1], probably because changes underway makes it difficult to plan.    The Marines tout the value of its forward-deployed MEUs, yet these require support from less than half the squadrons in Marine Aviation. Public literature indicates the Marines are unable to articulate a role for the remainder. The Department of Navy needs to find a role for Marine Air, and NAWs are part of the solution. Ideas for the exact basing of two NAWs will be addressed in a future blog post.

 

 

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Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer whose writings appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Proceedings, and the Navy Times. He became irritated when some articles approved by editors never appeared after the Marine Commandant’s office and the CNO’s office began to preview publications and block articles they didn’t like. This explains why their articles have become bland. He began posting his ideas at www.G2mil.com in 2000.

 

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[1]https://www.aviation.marines.mil/portals/11/2019%20avplan.pdf

Navy Strike Doctrine

We’ve had a lot of discussions about the role of the carrier.  ComNavOps has stated that strike (land attack) is no longer a carrier mission.  There remains, however, a substantial number of observers who still cling to the outdated concept of carrier strike operations.

 

Why is carrier strike – meaning, manned aircraft – no longer a mission?  Modern, peer defenses, consisting of both defending aircraft and land based surface to air (SAM) missiles along with extensive and sophisticated sensors have rendered aircraft strikes far too risky.

 

The preferred alternative is, of course, cruise missiles as suggested by the following missile characteristics.

 

Cost – Tomahawk cruise missiles cost around $2M compared to aircraft which cost $80M-$100M each.  In addition, aircraft operate on a daily basis and flight hour costs are on the order of $15K-$30K per flight hour, day after day.  That makes for an incredibly expensive weapon delivery system.  In contrast, a cruise missile has no operating or maintenance costs to speak of.  Finally, the cost of training and ‘maintaining’ a pilot is enormous whereas, again, the cruise missile has no pilot cost.

 

Expendability – Cruise missiles are, by design and by cost, expendable.  Aircraft, by design and cost, are not.  Modern peer defenses guarantee that strike aircraft will suffer significant attrition and the cost to replace the airframe and produce a new pilot is staggering.  Worse, the time required to produce new airframes and pilots is prohibitive during a war.

 

Stealth – The US Navy currently has no stealth strike aircraft.  That aside, cruise missiles have significantly greater stealth than even a stealth aircraft due to their much smaller size, smaller cross sectional area, smaller profile (regardless of angle), smaller engine exhaust (IR signature), and ability to fly a sea skimming terminal approach.  And, of course, new cruise missiles have stealth shaping.

 

Numbers – The current US Navy Tomahawk cruise missile inventory is somewhere in the vicinity of 3000-5000.  The Navy currently has 9 air wings with around 44 F-18 Hornets in each for a total of 396 potential strike aircraft.  Of course, in actual operations only a fraction of those would be available as aircraft are needed for carrier defense, various CAPs, tankers, and escorts.

 

Missiles can be massed in very large numbers against a target.  Strike aircraft are severely limited in number although each aircraft can carry 2-4 missiles or several bombs.  Weight limits, weight distributions, external fuel tanks, range considerations, self-defense requirements, etc. limit the number of missiles that can realistically be carried.

 

Weather – While carrier aircraft can operate in bad weather, to a degree, there are significant limits.  Missiles, in contrast are virtually unaffected by weather.

 

Range – Cruise missiles have a range of around 1000 miles.  Aircraft have an effective combat range of 200-300 miles although various types of standoff missiles would add to that range.  For example, the air launched Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) has a range of somewhere around 300 miles which, when added to the aircraft’s range, puts the total strike range at around 500-600 miles.  The extended range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER) has a range of 500 miles or so which, combined with the aircraft’s range, gives a total strike range of 700-800 miles.  Other weapons such as the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) have much lesser ranges.  JSOW has a high altitude release range of 70 miles.

 

 

The benefit, such as it is, of air launched, standoff attack missiles is negated by very long range SAM defenses and enemy aircraft which can, and will, contest the launch points.  The effort required to conduct an airborne, standoff strike (aircraft, fighter escorts, tankers, EW escorts, BARCAP, etc. also negates the benefits.  In short, it requires a far more massive effort to conduct an airborne, standoff strike than to conduct a simple ship-launched, cruise missile strike and the benefits are few especially when weighed against the inevitable aircraft losses.

 

So, is ComNavOps alone in his assessment?  After all, a lot of people are still unwilling to give up their comforting paradigm of carrier strike.  Well, it would seem that the Navy has also concluded that cruise missiles are the preferred strike asset as evidenced by the strike history of the last few decades.  The table below is adapted from Wikipedia.(1)

 

 

 

Operation	Date	No. of Missiles
Gulf War	1991	288
Iraq disarmament	Jan 1993	46
Iraq disarmament	Jun 1993	23
Operation Deliberate Force	Sep 1995	13
Iraq disarmament	Sep 1996	44
Operation Infinite Reach	Aug 1998	79
Operation Desert Fox	Dec 1998	325
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia	1999	218
Operation Enduring Freedom	2001	50
Invasion of Iraq	2003	802
Dobley airstrike	Mar 2008	2
Al-Qaeda training camp in Yemen	Dec 2009	2
Libya	Mar 2011	124
Military intervention against ISIL	Sep 2014	47
Attack on suspected radar sites in Yemen	Oct 2016	5
Shayrat airbase strike	Apr 2017	59
Damascus/Homs chem weapons strike	Apr 2018	66

 

 

 

 

There have been manned aircraft strikes during that time but those have been relatively few and only in low threat scenarios such as the infamous ‘truck plinking’ during the ISIS campaign.

 

You might also recall that not too long ago, the Navy had stated that the F-35 would be last manned naval aircraft – further recognition that manned aircraft strikes were no longer viable – and, more recently, the Navy attempted, but failed, to develop unmanned strike UAVs (that eventually ‘devolved’ into the unmanned tanker).  Clearly, the Navy has moved on from carrier strikes.

 

The implication of the Navy’s recognition that cruise missiles are the preferred strike asset is that the carrier air wing should be shifting its composition from strike to air superiority.  We need to drop any aircraft that is a ‘strikefighter’ and switch to pure air superiority.  The immediate import of this line of reasoning is that the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft, which the Navy is working on now, needs to be a pure air superiority fighter and not a strikefighter.  Disturbingly, the Navy is already referring to the NGAD as the F/A-XX strikefighter so that train is already headed off the tracks.

 

Carrier aircraft strike has gone the way of the battleship in terms of being the primary strike method.  We need to complete the transition to carrier air superiority by modifying our doctrine and operational practices and adjust our air wing composition accordingly.  Carriers and their air wings remain just as vitally important as ever but their mission has changed.  Just as the battleship proponents clung to their outmoded paradigm, so too will the carrier strike proponents cling to theirs but the change is inevitable.

 

 

 

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(1)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomahawk_(missile)#United_States_Navy

The Future Carrier Air Wing

The Navy is only marginally interested in the F-35 and, to their credit, they have never really gotten on board with that aircraft.  All indications are that they have been forced to accept the ones they’re purchasing.  Current plans call for only one squadron of F-35 aircraft per air wing.  It appears that the Navy is viewing the F-35 as a stopgap while they await the next generation fighter.  If true, this is a rare case of wisdom being demonstrated by the Navy.

 

ComNavOps has repeatedly stated that the primary mission of the carrier, today, is to escort Tomahawk shooters and Air Force bombers and to establish localized air superiority in support of other operations (see, “Aircraft Carrier – What Future?”).  Thus, the main function of the air wing is aerial combat and the main asset should be a very long range air superiority fighter. 

 

Long range strike is no longer a carrier mission because it can be better performed by cruise missiles.  Of course, this calls for a stealthy, supersonic, Tomahawk replacement but that’s another topic.  Carrier strike should be limited to short range, lower threat scenarios.

 

So, with that understanding of what the carrier’s proper role is, we can now begin to visualize the proper, future air wing as shown in the table below.

 

 

Type	No. of Squadrons	Squadron Size	Total Aircraft
Fighters	5	12	60
Strike	1	14	14
EW	1	10	10
Tanker	1	10	10
AEW	1	4	4
ASW	1	10	10
Total Air Wing =			108

 

 

 

The air wing is heavy on fighters since that is its role.  The strike aircraft are there for those occasions when a small, low threat strike opportunity arises.  Of course, the air wing composition could be adjusted, as needed, to fit the mission, and would likely consist of all fighters (72) most of the time.  Thus, a proper carrier group of four carriers could muster a fighter complement of 240-288 aircraft which compares favorably to WWII assemblies and is a vast improvement over today’s air wings of 40 or less semi-fighters for a 4-carrier group strength of around 140 semi-fighters.

 

It is also noteworthy that the proposed air wing has no helos.  The only use for a helo on a carrier is for the very rare search and rescue (SAR) of a downed pilot and SAR helos can come from the escort ships or a dedicated ASW/helo carrier (more on that below).

 

As noted, the WWII air wing of 90+ combat aircraft dwarfs today’s air wings of 40 or less combat aircraft and even surpasses the proposed air wing of 72 combat aircraft that we just discussed.  One of the problems is that the number of non-combat aircraft has increased from zero in WWII to near half the air wing, today.  Of course, when I say non-combat I mean non-direct combat.  Electronic warfare, AEW, and the like are vital supporters and enablers of the combat aircraft but the fact is that they take up precious space on the carrier.  What can be done about this?

 

Beefing up the air superiority numbers on a carrier cries out for transferring some of the non-combat aircraft to a dedicated ASW/helo carrier.  This would be a smaller carrier dedicated to ASW and helo operations.  This carrier would accompany the fleet carriers or any group that needed additional, intensive, ASW support.  It could also form the basis of an ASW hunter-killer group.

 

There you have it.  The future air wing composition is easily seen, as is the design of the future fighter.  It remains simply to build them (see, “How To Build A Better Aircraft”).