Monday, April 4, 2022

A Naval Air Wing in the Med (Scrap Two Carriers – Part 3)

In a previous blog post (see, “ScrapTwo Carriers – Part 1” and “Naval Air Wings, Scrap Two Carriers – Part 2”), I suggested that operating supercarriers had become so expensive that it has left our Navy imbalanced, with too few aircraft and surface combatants. This could be corrected by downsizing to nine carriers, which will probably occur anyway because of the flawed USS Ford program. I suggested this loss could be offset by establishing two shore based overseas Carrier Air Wings (CAW)s; the confusing CVW is the official acronym. These could be called Naval Air Wings (NAW) and absorb Marine Corps aviation assets to support Navy sea control missions from existing American airbases.

 

During a conflict in the Persian Gulf, the US Navy will wisely keep its aircraft carriers out of that Gulf. It would also be wise to keep land-based NAW squadrons out of the region until the smoke clears. The United States has access to several first-class airfields in the region, but basing NAW squadrons in this region makes aircraft and military families vulnerable to surprise missile and commando attacks. The US Navy should establish aerial munitions and fuel bunkers at key airbases, but basing NAW squadrons in the Mediterranean is better. Squadrons in the Med can deploy to Persian Gulf airfields on a regular basis to participate in exercises. During a conflict, they can deploy to the Persian Gulf quickly and choose airfields depending on damage and the tactical and political situation.

 

Another reason not to base NAWs in the Persian Gulf is that region is dominated by the US Air Force with its large headquarters in Qatar commanding several deployed squadrons. A NAW there would become an Air Force CENTCOM supporting component. On the other hand, the Air Force has no fighter squadrons in the Med except two at Aviano in Northern Italy. It has no munitions stockpiled at other bases in the Med, no anti-ship or anti-submarine weaponry, and cannot supply or properly support deployed naval task forces. A final reason to choose the Med is a much friendlier political and cultural environment with quick access to turbulent Africa.

 

The US Navy has several options for basing a NAW in the Med where it already has large airbases. Despite this investment, the US Navy maintains more executive aircraft for Admirals based in the region than combat aircraft. Here is the current laydown:

 

Naval Air Station Sigonella (Sicily)

  • Executive Transport Department C-20As
  • Air Operations Department C-26As
  • P-8As (long-range patrol) on rotational deployment from CONUS

 

Naval Support Activity Naples (Italy) collocated at the Naples civilian airport

  • Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron HCS-28 det with two MH-60S
  • Air Operations Department C-26As

 

Naval Air Station Rota (Spain)

  • Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron HSM-79 det with two MH-60Rs

 

Naval Support Activity (Crete) collocated at a Greek airbase

  • None

 

US Air Force airbase Moron, Spain

  • USMC VMM squadron with MV-22s via CONUS rotations

 

The Navy/Marine Corps have four options to sustain NAW squadrons in the Med.

 

1. Accompanied tours – These are three-year tours with families that require schools and massive base support complexes. These are popular and allow unit stability, but are costly to support.

 

2. Unaccompanied tours - Personnel are deployed individually for a year leaving families stateside. This works well as a 13-month tour (six months overseas, a month of stateside leave, six months overseas), but the high turnover affects readiness.

 

3. Unit rotation - This is used by the Marines where three units rotate with seven-month deployments for foreign presence. This works well but requires three squadrons to maintain one overseas.

 

4. Foreign detachment – A squadron based stateside rotates personnel to maintain a forward detachment overseas with perhaps four aircraft. Personnel deploy for 3-6 months to the overseas det every couple of years, and the entire squadron deploys overseas every year for a month-long exercise.

 

Here is a notional basing plan for a NAW in the Med:

 

  • One Navy Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R (anti-sub/boat) Seahawks. There are already two aircraft at Rota to support the four destroyers based there and the Navy plans on adding more aircraft. Make this a full squadron perhaps placing a few with their sister MH-60s at Naples.
  • One Navy Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks. Two are already based at Naples so add more or place them with other Navy squadrons in the Med.
  • Two Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadrons with 14 FA-18E/Fs each.
  • One Navy Electronic Attack (VAQ) Squadron, with five EA-18G Growlers.
  • One Navy Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Squadron with four E-2D Hawkeyes

 

These four squadrons are the core of the NAW striking power and could be based at existing US Navy airfields in the middle of the Med, at NAS Sigonella, NSA Souda Bay, and NSA Naples. These squadrons will be manned via one-year unaccompanied tours. A couple billion dollars and several years may be needed to expand family services to allow some three-year accompanied tours.

 

  • One CONUS based Marine VMGR Aerial Refueler Squadron with 15 KC-130Js tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps four will be in theater moving among airfields to support the NAW with more during wartime. Aircraft can deploy for six months bouncing around between airfields.
  • One CONUS based Marine Fleet Logistics Support (VMM) Squadron of 12 MV-22 Ospreys tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps three will be in theater to support the NAW with more during wartime. The Marines already maintain a VMM squadron at Moron, Spain near the Med coast to support the Africa Command via rotational deployments among three squadrons. These aircraft should become part of a NAW.
  • Two Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadrons with 16 F-35Bs each. These squadrons would be based stateside and maintain a forward det of four aircraft in the Med region. The entire squadron will deploy for a month-long exercise each year. There are lots of basing options that may change yearly. Maintaining a F-35 det with the Marine VMM squadron at Moron, Spain is simple, or any NAW base in the Med. The Marines have maintained a few fighter aircraft at the American airfield in Djibouti near the strategic Red Sea, so that may be a good location for a squadron/det.

 

Basing NAW aircraft at these locations in the Med will require political approval. This should not be a problem because it adds perhaps only 400 more personnel at each base and more spending in the local community. The US Navy already spends billions of dollars to maintain bases in the Med with over 10,000 personnel, but almost zero airpower exists aboard them! There are other basing options that should be evaluated. The US Air Force has excellent airfields in Romania, Turkey, and Jordan that host aircraft for training exercises. There is also a British airbase on Cyprus and the Italians are buying F-35s so basing with them is possible. Training at these bases and establishing bunkers with naval munitions at these airfields is a good idea.

 

Career sailors will be pleased to serve ashore with a NAW to break from endless shipboard deployments. Improving these bases will cost a few billion dollars, but this will be less than half the cost of a new supercarrier and provide a year around presence at a fraction of the annual operating cost of a supercarrier. Deployed naval task forces will be pleased with the land-based air support available in the region with whom they will train. Additional aircraft from the NAW can be embarked aboard CVNs and LHD/LHAs if needed. Finally, if war erupts in the Persian Gulf, it takes weeks for a second aircraft carrier to arrive in theater, and months for a third to arrive. A NAW from the Med can arrive in a week.

 

Click here for a map of base locations.


22 comments:

  1. Why should we deploy any air power, let alone naval air power in Europe?

    Russia is the only threat and they are not a global super power; why is it that the American tax payer is expected to shell out money to defend a continent that is more populous than us (450 million souls) and as wealthy as us? More to the point, they dominant Russia even in military power.

    The USA became a superpower by being very calculating and frugal with: its finances, its economy, and particularly with its military commitments.

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    1. This NAW is not for Europe. It is based along the southern edge to support operations in North Africa and the Middle East year around at half the cost of a carrier air wing since the Marines will provide half the aircraft. Operating from land bases will cost far less than half of the procurement and sustainment cost of a new supercarrier.

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    2. @G2mil: "...NAW is not for Europe..."

      Still not seeing this; we are asking the taxpayer to write a blank check to the tune of billions with no end in sight, no clearly defined threat, so we can execute military adventures in North Africa and SW Asia to what end?

      The concept is viable if the issue is replacing a carrier in the Mediterranean, but there is no consideration of alternatives, or even if we need alternatives. I am not impressed that these units are needed in a grand strategic sense. And I am less impressed that these units will provide more air power than the USAF can. The distance from Sigonella to Tel Aviv is over 1035nm!

      I am looking at our $30 Trillion-dollar public debt, a failed state in Mexico with no end of illegal immigration, drugs, and violence flowing across our southern border; our education system in failure, our heavy industry on life support, and I see little point in ‘defending’ Saudi Arabia or other regimes given that they refuse to even talk to the President, and were the greatest source of terrorists (911, etc.). And this is a distraction to the larger threat in the east. We are spending money we do not have, to position ourselves for fights we do not have to fight, and not addressing vital domestic threats, or are clearly defined threats.

      GAB

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  2. "The USA became a superpower by being very calculating and frugal with: its finances, its economy, and particularly with its military commitments."

    The approach advocated in the OP and the two prior posts on the topic are well thought out--better thought out, it would appear, than many of the recent USN and USMC proposals and actions. I may not agree with everything proposed, but there is definitely food for thought there.

    I guess where I come down, and where the GAB quote applies, is that whatever we do must be determined in the context of a grand strategy and must contribute in some meaningful way to the execution of that grand strategy. I do not see much evidence that such a grand strategy is in place, and until that occurs I am not sure that we can adequately assess the usefulness of the approach recommended in the OP, or for that matter any other approach.

    I think there could be strategic approaches for which this approach would make sense, and others for which it would not, and I think we need to know where we are trying to go before we start debating details of how to get there.

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  3. The 6th fleet has the Task Force 67 framework in place which includes:
    TG-67-1 Sigonella (VP Squadron)
    TG-67-2 Rota (VP)
    TG-67-3 Souda Bay (VP)
    TG-67-4 Souda Bay (EP Squadron)
    TG-67-8 Souda Bay (CROF - Consolidated Reconnaissance Operations Facility)

    Infrastructure is always important, so to sum it up:

    Sigonella is the only base with a permanent rotational VP squadron, the Rota operates mostly as a transit base. In the past Rota housed an EP Squadron, todays EP-dets are mostly based out of Souda Bay (which form time to time hosts VP-dets).

    Naples could tecnically host a helicopter Squadron but the base is not large as it is (40.880135, 14.288535), there is no possibility of expanding this base. As it is a civilian airport it's already congested as it is. Maybe the Grazzanise Air Base some kilometers north (41.064239, 14.091936) could house a helicopter squadron (it already houses an italian helicopter squadron and a NATO communications battalion), but it would need a serious investment as infrastructure is lacking.

    Sigonella as it seems will get at least the MV-22s from Moron. At the moment Sigonella is used mostly for transits, cargo, COD, helo and tilrotor operations, ISR and VP mission. The activity on the italian side of the base ha picked up in the last years. While the base could host fighter operations it would need an expansion.

    Souda Bay houses greek fighters and VP/EP-dets. I don't know if there is enough space to house additional fighters in the long term and it's runways are shared with the civilian airport.

    Probably it would be for the best to deploy a land based NAW in Spain in Rota and Moron, as these are already US bases with all the needed services.

    There could be 2 alternatives, which are not US bases and probably are lacking many of the services US servicemen would have in other locations. The are Solenzara in Corsica and Decimomannu in Sardinia. Both are large training bases with nearly empty most of the year (Decimomanno is getting a LIFT role with 12-18 trainers), large training areas, bombing ranges and so on.

    Foward deploying a NAW in the MED could be done, but in the end you'll need the infrastructure to do it...

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  4. Im at a loss as to why we should put aircraft meant for carrier use ashore. Regional land based air is solidly an AF task. Choosing bases to avoid being part of Centcom is just political maneuvering, although Im all for rolling back of the COCOMS. Whether we need consistent forces, including naval air in the PG or not is open to debate, but having relatively short legged naval air wings in the Med, as basically a prepositioned force, seems superflous. If needed, the airwings could arrive aboard carriers from the American east coast in about 10-12 days, with their maintenance, support, ordnance, and everything else needed for combat. Im just not seeing any rationale for trying to step into Air Force missions, with short legged naval air, unoptimized for ground basing, except to eliminate aircraft carriers....

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    1. Due to soaring construction costs and the failed Ford program, the Navy will end up with fewer carriers. The political/industrial powers make reform impossible at this time evidenced by a complete dismissal of serious problems with the USS Ford design. Military waste and inefficiency result in fat profits.

      NAWs are an option to help secure the seas at a much lower cost. A NAW squadron may embark aboard a deployed carrier to augment its striking power, or a submarine threat may not exist so most helicopters are offloaded at a NAW base and fighter aircraft added. Admirals recognize the value of instantly deploying a carrier strike group when needed, but that is rarely possible, 30 days is optimistic with today's crew shortages and single parent crewmen.

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    2. I ser your reasoning, but I feel like we should be finding ways to fix/halt the Ford debacle, so as to not price ourselves out of the carrier business. I don't think we should be accepting of a shrinking carrier fleet, or advocating it. I appreciate all the thought and effort put into what you've conceived here, but it just seems to be an attempt to make the best of a bad situation. Sadly we may be forced into that situation, but we shouldnt accept it just yet!!

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    3. "...deploying a carrier strike group when needed..."
      "...30 days is optimistic with today's crew shortages and single parent crewmen."
      This is a great reason for ending senseless "deployments" and keeping the fleet home til its truly needed. That would increase the availibility of multiple BGs on relatively short notice. And while I sympathize with single parents, military ones especially- thats one, not an acceptable excuse for ships to be unavailable for combat, (and doubt that is actually a real issue) and two, probably a good reason to look at discharging people who are unable to fulfill their duties whenever theyre needed. Heartless, maybe. But the military exists to fight. Period. Anything that detracts from that should be eliminated. So if thats a real issue, it needs to be corrected. Yesterday.

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  5. Question: what happens to those places if Spain or Italy or whoever decide not to allow bases anymore?

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    1. That's always in issue, although these bases have existed for decades with little political problems. Securing a long-term basing agreement should be pursued before committing billion of dollars for new construction.

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    2. A good point...and even with strong basing agreements, in a conflict, a host nation wanting to remain neutral or avoid amy repercussions could nix bases being used for operations, overflights, etc... The only guaranteed base of operations is at sea.

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  6. The one good thing about carriers is that you can send them wherever there is a problem. A large basing effort in Europe/the Med is great if Europe/the Med is where the problem is. But if it's somewhere else, not so good.

    That's one reason for my comment about defining strategy first and then making detailed decisions. The only strategic thinking that seems to be going on in the military right now is how to get a bigger budget.

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  7. "Basing NAW aircraft at these locations in the Med will require political approval. This should not be a problem because it adds perhaps only 400 more personnel at each base and more spending in the local community."

    There are roughly 30 crew per aircraft in a carrier air wing. Being land-based, the ratio might be a little smaller. So, you're likely looking at 1,400, give or take some, for a deployment in the Mediterranean. Neither the Navy or Marines travel light.

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  8. Recent defense budget proposal submitted by the administration has firmly put China as the top threat. In contrast to Trump's 2018 report, Russia has been downgraded.

    Unlike the European front, Navy is the key force in confronting China. Forget about large scale battle, thanks or angry on nuke. Nevertheless, Navy plays far more important role than Army and Marine.

    One key is combat aircrafts which link to carriers. Unlike European allies, many Asian allies (such as Philippine and Korea) lack determination to confront China as they want to do businesses, airports on their soils might not be as useful as carriers.

    Therefore, Pentagon should strengthen carrier groups' combat capabilities than reduce them.

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  9. I suspect the Air Force would invoke the Key West agreement to oppose this--though I like the concept.

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  10. I like this general idea.

    I see the shore-basing of naval aircraft as similar to Midway Island or Henderson Field during WW2. Supplements to carrier air, not replacing it.

    I also see this as a complement to Air Force assets. Different aircraft and different missions, but the two branches working together.

    However, I'm less excited about this in the Mediterranean. I just don't see a significant threat there.

    I'd much rather see shore-based Navy air assets at places like Okinawa, Subic Bay, Cam Rhan Bay, Singapore, maybe Indonesia, Guam or Iwo Jima.

    Put the resources where the potential problems are.

    Lutefisk

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  11. "I suspect the Air Force would invoke the Key West agreement to oppose this--though I like the concept."

    I'm pretty sure the Key West Agreement is between the Army and the Air Force and does not involve the Navy or Marines. Which is why the Marines still have their own air capability even though the Army doesn't.

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    1. Oops. Just checked Wiki. Apparently the Navy WAS involved. So it goes to the details, which I'm uncertain of. The Air Force clearly got strategic bombers and most transport. The Navy and Marines got "Naval Combat". So I guess the question would be whether land-based sea control would be "naval combat". My guess is that it is, but I'm not a lawyer.

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    2. That agreement kept the USN/USMC from being forced down the path which proved so deleterious to the RN--having your aircraft controlled by the Air Force. An adjunct was that the USAF gets to own the land-based force--with some exceptions. Like I said, I like the concept, but past experience is that the AF will fight something like this to the last ditch.

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    3. "past experience is that the AF will fight something like this to the last ditch."

      A good example is that even though the Air Force doesn't really want to do close air support and keeps trying to scrap all the A-10's, they fight like the dickens if anyone else wants to take over that responsibility.

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    4. Navy P-8s operate from land bases with anti-ship missiles. Navy HAL (Huey attack) squadrons operated ashore in Vietnam. Navy EA-18G aircraft were just sent to an Air Force base in Germany.

      https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2980498/6-navy-growler-aircraft-headed-to-germany-to-support-deterrence-mission/

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