2025 GAO Annual Weapon Assessments Tidbits

Following are some tidbits from the current June 2025 GAO annual weapon systems report.
 
 
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) – Radars are being produced and delivered while testing is ongoing.  This kind of concurrency is what’s behind so many development and production cost overruns and schedule delays as problems are uncovered during production and reworks have to be performed.  I simply don’t understand what’s so hard about grasping this concept but the Navy seems absolutely unable to get it.  In this case, it’s even worse because we’re producing the radars faster than the ships they’re intended for and the Navy is having to warehouse the radars until there’s a ship ready for them.  Why produce untested, undeveloped systems when we don’t even have a use for them?
 
 
Ford Class – GAO reports the unit cost for the four Ford class carriers as $16.3B.  Yikes!  CVN-79 is struggling with weapon elevator installation (what a stunning surprise!) which will delay delivery.  The Navy may defer ‘non-critical’ work like painting until post-delivery … yet another example of accepting an incomplete product.
 
 
F-18 IRST – Remember back in 2007 when the Navy came up with the bright idea of attaching an IRST sensor to the front of a fuel tank for the F-18?  A simple, if less than optimal approach, right?  Well, 8 years later and they’re still working at it and it’s still not ready.  From the GAO report,
 

… while the IRST pods demonstrated capability at tactically significant ranges during operational testing, the pods were extremely unreliable. …  only managed to achieve 14 hours mean time between operational mission failures—short of the 40 hours required.

The rest of the world has had functional IRST systems for decades.
 
 
Constellation – Remember how the Navy has been saying for a year or more that the design of the ship is over 90% complete?  Well, they’re now revised that down to 70% after GAO previously called them out for, essentially, fraudulent reporting.  The program is going backward!  Only the Navy could start with a 90% design and, after years, regress to 70% … and you have to believe even that number is probably less than honest.
 
Weight growth is also an issue.
 

In October 2024, the Navy reported 759 metric tons of weight growth from initial estimates—nearly a 13 percent increase …

 
Medium Landing Ship (LSM) – The LSM is the key to the Marine’s concept of forward, hidden bases of missile shooters but the Navy has yet to really embrace the idea of buying the ship.  Initial cost estimates from industry apparently shocked Navy officials and they’ve been forced to start over.
 

Program officials said the offers they received were hundreds of millions of dollars higher than budgeted.

That’s surprising given how accurate Navy cost estimates usually are.
 
 
Mk 54 Torpedo – The Mk 54 Mod 2 Advanced Lightweight Torpedo has run into cost and development issues.
 

Program officials stated that contractors’ estimated costs to complete system development and testing were significantly higher than expected.

 
MQ-25 Stingray UAV – The unmanned tanker has run into lots of problems.
 

The MQ-25 Stingray program continues to report cost and schedule challenges that have led to a funding shortfall of $291 million. The program’s decision to delay the low-rate initial production (LRIP) contract to September 2025, and its efforts to accelerate testing replacements for at least seven components with obsolescence and other issues, contributed to a significant increase in development costs since our last report.

Obsolescence????  How do you run into obsolescence problems for a brand new aircraft that hasn’t even been delivered yet?  You do it by having a program take forever to get fielded.  Development started in 2018 and here we are, seven years later with nothing to show for it.  So, yeah, you screw around for years and you wind up with obsolescence issues before you’ve fielded the first unit. 
 
FYI … first flight has not yet occurred … seven years later.  What’s happened to us?
 
You may recall that, in a first in recent times, the Navy opted to act as the program integrator instead of industry.  Well, they failed.
 

… the program’s software costs increased substantially since last year. Program officials attributed this increase to their 2021 decision to switch from a government-furnished ground control station to one provided by another contractor …

 
ORCA XLUUV – The unmanned submersible program is sinking.
 

It is now unclear whether the Navy will transition the XLUUV to a program of record because there are no clear requirements that the XLUUV can meet ...

This is what happens when you develop something without a CONOPS.
 
 
Ship to Shore Connector – This is a near duplicate replacement for the LCAC.  It should have been a simple and quick project.
 

… the program delayed its IOC date in each of our annual assessments since its originally scheduled IOC in August 2020—a total delay of more than 5 years.

Well, that’s not good but at least we aren’t building these things without having solved the problems … right?  Right?
 

As the program continues to delay key events in its schedule, it continues to construct and deliver craft—with 25 craft either under construction or delivered to date.

I was afraid of that.  So, each problem we encounter and each solution that’s implemented will require all the previously built and delivered craft to undergo rework.
 
 
Columbia SSBN – The price tag now sites at $10.5B each.  The delivery schedule has slipped by a full year and is likely to slip another year, according to the Navy.
 

The program attributed particularly slow periods of construction to out-of-sequence work that significantly disrupted planned construction events and led to large amounts of rework. According to program officials, the out-of-sequence work resulted from missing instructions in some design products that detail how to build the submarine.

Concurrency rears its head again.
 
 
Virginia SSN – The construction rate is woefully short of what we need.
 

The program’s 2024 construction rate fell to 1.15 submarines per year from 1.2 per year in 2023, short of the Navy’s goal of 1.5, according to program officials. …The Navy has a goal to deliver 2.3 submarines per year by the early 2030s.

A goal of 2.3 subs per year versus the current reality of 1.1?  Hmm … doesn’t seem like that’s going to happen.
 

Construction continues to cost more than planned.

Costs are higher than the Navy estimated?  The Navy has underestimated every project it’s ever embarked on.  At some point, don’t you have to admit that you’re incompetent to generate cost estimates and start applying something like a 100% fudge factor?  Before anyone tries to defend the Navy by saying that it’s very difficult to estimate costs, note that other agencies seem to routinely estimate Navy project costs pretty accurately.  Further note that ComNavOps also estimates Navy project costs pretty accurately (Constellation, for example;  you can check it in the archives).
 
 
T-AGOS Surveillance Ship – Scheduling and design issues, again.
 

… the program will likely miss its goal for fielding T-AGOS 25 in 2027 by several years.

Several years????  It’s essentially a commercial ship!
 
 
 
Conclusion
 
Who’s running these clown shows and why haven’t they been fired yet?  Wake up, Hegseth!  The GAO report is telling you, loud and clear, who to fire.  Quit screwing around and start firing people.

Iskander

The National Interest website has an interesting article on Russia’s Iskander missile.  The article describes the missile,
 

Russia’s Iskander system, particularly the Iskander-M variant, is equipped with two solid-propellant single-stage guided missiles, model 9M723K1, each capable of carrying a warhead weighing 1,543 pounds. These warheads can include high-explosive fragmentation, cluster, or even nuclear payloads. With an operational range of 249 to 311 miles, the Iskander-M can strike targets deep …
 
The missile’s hypersonic terminal speed, reaching Mach 6 or 7, and quasi-ballistic trajectory, which involves evasive maneuvers during flight, make it exceptionally difficult to intercept. …  Russia has introduced radar decoys that deploy during the missile’s final approach, generating false signatures to confuse air defense systems like the US-supplied Patriot missile battery. Additionally, the missile’s ability to perform unpredictable maneuvers at high altitudes complicates interception algorithms, reducing the effectiveness of even defenses. The Iskander’s mobile launch platform, which can independently target and fire within seconds, adds to its survivability, as it is challenging to locate and neutralize before launch.[1]

Impessive, on paper, without a doubt but this is not an invincible weapon.
 

This has been especially evident in attacks on Kyiv where, despite Ukraine’s success in intercepting some missiles, the upgraded Iskander-M has caused significant damage.[1]

It would be interesting to know the circumstances of the successful intercepts and the overall success rates.
 
It is also noteworthy that the reported successes of the Iskander tend to be mainly centered around attacks on cities rather than military targets.  It is possible that the Iskander may be more of a terror weapon, similar to Germany’s V-1 rockets in WWII, than an effective combat weapon.
 
It is also worth noting that Ukraine possesses only fragments of a comprehensive air defense system and in only limited numbers.  It may be that the Iskander successes are more the result of a lack of air defenses than the effectiveness of the missile, itself.  On the other hand, perhaps not.  What is the success rate of the Iskander when attacking targets defended by active air defenses such as Patriot?  We just don’t know.
 
 
Discussion
 
Several thoughts occur:
 
Where’s our version of something like this?  Which one of our missiles has capabilities of similar to this?  I’m not aware that we have a missile approaching this type of performance.  We have a lot of different types of missiles so maybe I’m missing something? 
 
How do we effectively defend against this type of missile?  Are we testing our defenses against a representative threat surrogate?  I know we’re not because there is no realistic threat surrogate.  Since we’re not testing, how do we know how our defenses will perform?
 
It’s clear that the Iskander is not unstoppable.  How stoppable it is in the face of an actual defense is unknown but there is no reason to throw up our hands in defeat, as so many do at the mere mention of hypersonic missiles.
 
This emphasizes the importance of deep surveillance to try to target the launchers prior to launch.  We have plenty of deep strike options.  What we lack is survivable, deep surveillance assets that would be unaffected by anti-communications efforts (jamming, etc.)
 
Intimately tied to deep surveillance is deep strike with an emphasis on rapid response.  We have plenty of deep strike options but they need to be linked with the deep surveillance and targeting so that when a target is found, a weapon can be on its way in moments to destroy the target before it can launch or move.
 
It is also important to apply deep interdiction to prevent resupply of enemy missiles from occurring.  There’s a limit to how much damage an initial salvo of enemy missiles can do.  The challenge is to prevent follow on missiles from reaching launch points.  This requires deep strike interdiction on the order of hundreds of miles inside enemy territory.  This is the kind of task that a carrier group or a Marine amphibious raid behind enemy lines might address.
 
The challenges are twofold: 
 
1. Develop our own version of such a missile, including a ship launched variant.
2. Develop realistic defenses that are be mobile and can move with our forces.
 
 
 
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[1]National Interest website, “Russia’s Iskander Missiles Are Giving Ukraine a Massive Headache”, Brandon Weichert, 24-Jun-2025,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-iskander-missiles-are-giving-ukraine-a-massive-headache

The Wrong Criteria

I continue to see the Navy’s fascination with unmanned craft despite them being completely divorced from any relevant Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  In the latest example, the Navy is diligently evaluating various unmanned vessels.
 

The commander [Rear Adm. Michael Mattis] of a US Navy task force [ed. Task Force 66] focused on employing unmanned systems said his team is making decisions about which can be “operationalized,” and which will be sidelined for further development.
 
The task force, which was established in May 2024, participated in Baltic Operations 2025 (BALTOPS), a reoccurring major international maritime exercise featuring the US and NATO countries. That exercise, which took place throughout June, played an integral role in helping the service evaluate various USVs on the commercial market.[1]

Well, that’s good, isn’t it?  The Navy is carefully evaluating various craft in order to make the best decisions, right?
 
Let me ask you this: what criteria are being used in the evaluation?  Different criteria will lead to different results.  What might be ideal for one task might be useless for another.
 
Of course, there’s only one criteria for any weapon system and that’s combat.  How will the item being evaluated contribute to high end combat?  If it can’t or won’t, then it has no value.
 
What is the Navy trying to accomplish with unmanned craft?
 

Mattis, whose office falls under the Navy’s three-star operational command, US 6th Fleet, described Task Force 66 as being focused on using low-cost systems, such as commercial-off-the-shelf USVs, to “impose costs on the adversary.”[1]

Ah … I see.  We’re going to “impose costs” on the enemy.  That’s great!  Just out of curiosity, I wonder what these mythical costs are that small, unmanned craft will impose?  It certainly won’t have anything to do with firepower since none of these craft have any firepower.  It won’t be near-invincibility causing the enemy to use vast amounts of their anti-ship missile inventory trying to kill them since none could survive anything more than a 0.50 cal bullet and the enemy would just use the unmanned craft as training aids for their ship’s crews to have target practice.  It won’t be sowing panic and confusion on the enemy’s command and control because I doubt the enemy will even care that much about them, assuming they don’t just laugh.
 
What are the “imposed costs”?
 
How are the unmanned craft being evaluated?
 

Mattis said the event included “red versus blue scrimmages” where sailors were tasked with participating in either side of an engagement featuring several unmanned surface vessels staging an attack on a warship.[1]

Wow, a free form, red versus blue scrimmage (I guess that’s what battles are called now?) !  That’s great for evaluating unmanned craft.  Although … the thought occurs to me, where/when would we expect a [Chinese] warship to present itself conveniently close to several small, unmanned craft, obligingly allowing the unmanned craft to approach, assemble for an attack, and then attack without hindrance?  How would these small unmanned craft get anywhere near a warship on alert?
 
We’re evaluating unmanned craft but we’re using the wrong criteria for the evaluation.  It’s as if we think the Chinese will behave like the oblivious Russian ships.
 
You know what the Navy should do?  They should skip any kind of focus on a combat CONOPS and instead leap right over that and get into the technology of controlling, networking, and interfacing small, unmanned craft.  Well, …
 

Tangential to operating individual USVs, Mattis said TF-66 is working on controlling numerous autonomous vessels through a “single pane of glass,” referring to the notion of commanding multiple vehicles through a singular command-and-control station. And beyond controlling multiple American vessels, Mattis said his team is also working to integrate that capability with NATO allies.[1]

You can see from this that we’re caught up in the technology and ignoring the CONOPS.
 
At this point, you might be wondering what type of unmanned craft we’re talking about?
 

Mattis said the Navy was using at least 10 Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft USVs during BALTOPS.[1]

Here’s a photo of the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft.
 

Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft
This is what we're going to war with ?

I’m not sure where the “Global” comes from because the range of these tiny motorboats is probably once around the harbor.  “Reconnaissance”????  Whatever sensor they put on it will have a field of view of a few hundred yards.  Is that really reconnaissance?  How would something like this be of any possible use in a high end combat scenario?

 
Anyway … ignore everything I’ve just written.  Hail, unmanned!  Damn the logic, full technology speed ahead!
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Navy uses European exercise to help evaluate unmanned vessels”, Justin Katz, 23-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/navy-uses-european-exercise-to-help-evaluate-unmanned-vessels/

Chinese Ports in Latin America

Just a quick note documenting the expansion of Chinese influence.
 

Chinese companies are now involved in the construction or operation of 31 active ports in Latin America and the Caribbean — a significantly higher number than previously reported, according to new findings from the Center for Strategic and International Studies …
 
This includes ports built by companies such as CK Hutchison and state‑backed entities such as China Merchants Port.
 
U.S. analysts warn that key ports - especially Kingston, Jamaica, and Manzanillo and Veracruz, Mexico - present strategic vulnerabilities.[1]

Regarding Kingston, Jamaica,
 

The Chinese firm China Merchants Port Holdings is now in complete control of Kingston Freeport Terminal Limited (KFTL), the entity responsible for managing the Port of Kingston under a concession agreement made with Jamaica’s government. The agreement has a duration of 30 years.[2]

Regarding Mexico,
 

China is funding the expansion of the port of Veracruz Medico through China Harbour Engineering company. The expansion project will make Veracruz the second largest port in Mexico. In addition, the Port of Manzanillo is undergoing a $2.7 billion expansion project that will make it Latin America’s largest maritime gateway. Chinese companies like Hutchinson Whampoa have control over piers in several Mexican states, including Baja California, Colima, Michoacán, and Morelia.
 
In recent years, direct investment from Chinese companies into Mexico has experienced significant growth. This surge is evident in the figures, rising from $38m in 2011 to $386m in 2021. Notably, Chinese companies now represent the fastest-growing source of foreign investment in Mexico.[3]

Aside from the obvious concerns about China establishing control over ports and, eventually, shipping, Chinese influence on the political actions of cash and investment starved countries bodes ill for the US.  Again, China is not doing anything the US couldn’t have done.  We need to engage.  You can’t win a war if you don’t engage.
 
All of this demonstrates just one of the many ways that the Chinese are conducting their war of global domination:  control the ports and you control the global economy while simultaneously establishing strategic strongholds and gaining influence over the host countries.  We talk about all-domain warfare in our pathetic, limited understanding of the term while the Chinese are practicing true all-domain warfare, as we speak.
 
The US and the Western world need to recognize that a war is happening, now, and engage with urgency.  There is no reason that the US couldn’t have done what China did.  We were just too geopolitically lazy.  We’re losing the war.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Think Tank: China's Reach Goes to Latin American Ports”, Solange Reyner, 25-Jun-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/china-latin-america-caribbean/2025/06/24/id/1216332/
 
[2]Jamaicans.com website, “Chinese Company Takes Total Control Of Kingston Freeport Management Firm”, staff, 1-May-2020,
https://jamaicans.com/chinese-company-takes-total-control-of-kingston-freeport-management-firm/
 
[3]Jeff Newman Law website, “China funding port constructions in Mexico to shorten shipping routes to U.S. back door”, Jeff Newman, 23-Jan-2025
https://jeffnewmanlaw.com/china-funding-port-constructions-in-mexico-to-shorten-shipping-routes-to-the-u-s-back-door/

The Scale of War

ComNavOps has often stated that we’ve forgotten what war is and just how much of everything is required to wage it.  One glaring example is the shrinkage of our carrier air wings from a WWII high of 90+ combat aircraft to a Cold War level of 90+ total aircraft (including non-direct-combat helos, tankers, etc.) to the current level of around 35-40 direct-combat aircraft. 
 
The just concluded US strike by seven B-2 bombers on Iranian nuclear sites gives us a brief reminder of what’s required for a single strike.  The strike ultimately delivered 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOP) across two targets as well as dozens of missiles at other targets.[1]  However, many more assets were involved in the delivery than just the B-2s.
 

… involved more than 125 US aircraft, “dozens” of aerial refueling tankers, a guided missile submarine and firing approximately 75 precision guided weapons.[1]

All for a single strike against an essentially undefended target and with complete control of the sky.  The following gives us a reminder of the types of actions required to support a strike.
 

“As the Operation Midnight Hammer strike package entered Iranian airspace, the US employed several deception tactics, including decoys, as the fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft pushed out in front of the strike package at high altitude and high speed, sweeping in front of the package for enemy fighters and surface to air missile threats,” Caine [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs] explained.[1]

Recall WWII carrier raids which, later in the war, involved hundreds of aircraft per strike.
 
We need to remember the scale of war and begin planning and training accordingly.
 
 
 __________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “Operation Midnight Hammer: How the US conducted surprise strikes on Iran”, Ashley Roque, 22-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/operation-midnight-hammer-how-the-us-conducted-surprise-strikes-on-iran/

Israeli Air Defense

As you know, Israel has established its multi-tier Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 2/3 defense systems for defending against incoming rockets and missiles.  Official claims have put the success rate somewhere in the 90+% range. However, based on careful consideration of photos and reading between the lines of various attack news stories (mostly Iron Dome) over the years, ComNavOps places the success rate at something closer to 40%-50%.  Now, with the latest hostilities between Iran and Israel, we are accumulating a new, extensive set of data with seemingly much less public relations spin applied.
 
A Breaking Defense article states,
 

As of this report, the IDF said Iran had managed to launch at least 400 missiles in 17 salvos since Israel’s strike on Iran last week, in addition to 1,000 drones.
 
The drones do not appear to have penetrated Israel’s defenses, but more than 20 of the ballistic missiles have, killing more than two dozen people.[1]

As of Monday morning, Israel reported 24 dead and 500 injured which gives an indication of the degree of penetration of Iranian missiles through the Israeli defenses.
 
So, what does all this tell us about the effectiveness of the Israeli defense system?  The numbers we have suggest a success rate of 95%, on the face of it, however, my understanding is that many missiles are not even engaged due to being assessed as not a threat.  Iranian missiles are not exactly renowned for accuracy.  Thus, if 400 missiles have been fired at Israel, only a fraction of them were actual threats and had to be engaged.  Here, now, is where we have no basis, whatsoever, to further judge effectiveness.  However, for the sake of illustration, if only, say, 30% of the Iranian missiles were actual threats then the defensive success rate would drop to something on the order of 80%.  You can plug in whatever numbers you wish and calculate resulting defensive success rates, if you’re so inclined.
 
The takeaway from this is that the state of the art Israeli defense system, matched against some pretty low capability Iranian missiles, still allowed, perhaps, something on the order of 20% of attacking missiles to get through.  What does this mean to us?  Well, consider what will happen when Aegis faces modern, highly capable Chinese missiles.  What will the defensive success rate of our ships be?  Who can say, but this is just another data point that leads ComNavOps to conclude that Aegis will be nowhere near as effective as we hope.  This, in turn, strongly suggests that we need to mount many more short range and close in weapons on our ships.  Combine this with the analyses we’ve done about engagement windows and it paints a pretty bleak picture – one that Navy leadership is ignoring instead of preparing for.
 
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1] Breaking Defense website, “Left of boom: Israeli strikes concentrate on Iranian missile threat”, Seth J. Frantzman, 18-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/left-of-boom-israeli-strikes-concentrate-on-iranian-missile-threat/

DOT&E Reductions and a New Director

As you know, ComNavOps is not yet an enthusiastic supporter of SecDef Hegseth.  He says the right things but his actions, thus far, have been lacking and only sporadically beneficial.  He hasn’t done anything horribly wrong but he’s also not implemented the kind of wholesale changes needed.  Changes around the periphery are not going to improve the Department of Defense.
 
We now get notice of what is possibly his first blatant mistake:  cutting the Director, Operation Test & Evaluation (DOT&E).  If you’ve followed the blog for any length of time, you know that ComNavOps has been a big fan of DOT&E’s work, believing that they are the only force keeping the Navy (and military, in general) from committing wholesale, blatant fraud when it comes to weapon system testing.  Indeed, the Navy (and military, in general) has been highly critical of DOT&E which tells me that DOT&E is on the right path.
 
Now, SecDef Hegseth is proposing cuts to DOT&E.
 

In a bid to save what he estimated as $300 million per year, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has laid out a plan to reshape the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation by eliminating positions and layoff contractors supporting the team.[1]

Is saving $300M per year – and almost free sum of money by Pentagon standards – really worth possibly impeding the only Pentagon related organization that seems to function well?
 
A memo from Hegseth stated,
 

“A comprehensive internal review has identified redundant, non-essential, non-statutory functions within ODOT&E that do not support operational agility or resource efficiency, affecting our ability to rapidly and effectively deploy the best systems to the warfighter.”[1]

This sounds suspiciously like buzzword bingo, the affliction of the Pentagon.  I hope this is not happening to SecDef Hegseth.
 
In a fairly major change included with the manning cuts announcement, SecDef is also assigning a new acting Director.
 

Hegseth said he has appointed Carroll Quade to perform the duties of the Director of DOT&E. Quade is currently serving as the Navy’s deputy for Test and Evaluation for the Navy.[1]

I have no problem with this as the last few Directors were significant steps back from Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, who set the standard for DOT&E.  Recent Directors have virtually eliminated public oversight and information under the excuse of secrecy.  While truly classified information should not be made public, if you expect public support – in the form of taxes – you must provide some degree of feedback and information to the public.
 
To be fair, I have no knowledge about the inner workings of DOT&E.  Perhaps the group had become bureaucratically bloated and needs trimming.  However, note that the group only has 94 people (82 civilians, 12 military members).  SecDef proposes reducing that staffing to 30 civilians, 15 military personnel, and one senior leader.  Given that the group is responsible for testing every US military weapon, sensor, and system, this seems like a foolhardy reduction.
 
I fear that SecDef Hegseth is in over his head and is making changes almost randomly.  Time will tell.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Hegseth reshaping Pentagon’s weapons testing oversight office, cutting staff positions”, Ashley Roque, 28-May-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/hegseth-reshaping-pentagons-weapons-testing-oversight-office-cutting-staff-positions/

China Defeats US in Trade Deal

News has just come out that Trump has reached a trade deal with China and, at first glance, it appears to be a strategic defeat for the US.
 
Note:  We’re not going to discuss the political or financial aspects of the deal, only the military implications.
 
With regard to the military, the two key elements of the deal are:
 
1. US will continue to receive magnets and rare earths
2. US will continue to accept Chinese students
 
The magnets and rare earths aspect only furthers our vulnerability to this strategically vital resource.  China has never met a treaty or deal that it wasn’t willing to break (UNCLOS tribunal, for example) when it suited them so why would we think that China won’t threaten to cut off our supply the next time some disagreement or crisis arises?  We are continuing our dependency on our enemy.  That’s insane.  It would be far better to quit, cold turkey, and initiate a crash program to produce our own materials.
 
If this deal were just a stopgap while we frantically established our own strategic materials supply, I might be able to accept it but I see no evidence that we’re engaged in any massively accelerated program to do so.  Human nature, being what it is, we’ll just continue to depend on China without really addressing our vulnerability in any useful time frame.
 
We should be waiving every permit and review requirement in order to establish our supply as quickly as possible.  If necessary, we should be subsidizing construction and production;  after all, it’s a strategic necessity!
 
Every Chinese student we educate is both a technological spy and a future scientific asset to be used against us.  We are educating our enemy and giving them a look at cutting edge university research.  That’s insane.
 
From a military perspective, I can’t understand what Trump was thinking.  If I’m China, I’m extremely happy with the deal.

The Military is not a Business

ComNavOps continues to see examples of the military-as-as-business mindset and this is horribly wrong.  The military is not a business.  It’s not subject to business case studies.  Because it’s not a business, there are [many] times when it will be run inefficiently and that must be accepted.  For example, a business study of ship manning would point to the minimum number of sailors necessary to operate the ship.  Combat, however, demands excess crew for damage control, casualties, etc.  Inefficient but necessary.
 
It seems that the higher up the officer, the more likely they are to approach the military as a business case.  I guess this is because so many officers pursue degrees in business related studies.  By the time an officer gets to flag rank, they’re damn near accountants instead of professional warriors!
 
The military is a combat case, not a business case.  Understand it.  Accept it.  Embrace it.
 
Here’s yet another example.  This one is from a retired admiral, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, arguing for restructuring the submarine Navy as a service provider.
 
Note:  The phrase ‘as a service’ refers to a business model where a product or service is offered on a subscription basis rather than being owned outright by the customer.
 
He points out, correctly but with zero understanding of the real issue, that the submarine fleet is overworked.
 

The U.S. submarine industrial base that builds and sustains our existing fleet is not keeping pace with operational demands. Combatant Commanders’ requests for submarine capability in theater go unfulfilled.[1]

He then sets out to offer a business solution instead of recognizing the real problem is the Combatant Commander’s incessant and unjustified requests for submarines when, in reality, the submarines need to be undergoing maintenance and intensive combat training not answering useless requests from the Combatant Commanders so that they can increase the public perception of the importance of their little fiefdom.
 
Trussler suggests a ‘service’ model for submarines.
 

The “as-a-service” model—already proven in air and space—could offer a solution by using conventionally powered submarines to improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet. The goal is not to replace nuclear-powered SSNs but to ensure they remain focused on their most critical missions while using diesel-electric submarines for two key roles:
 
Providing platforms for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of new undersea technologies. This would reduce the risk and cost of fielding new capabilities by thoroughly testing their performance and tactical applicability before pulling an SSN offline for months of installation, testing at sea, and removal.
 
Expanding training opportunities. U.S.-trained civilian crews operating conventionally powered submarines could act as adversary forces in exercises, helping undersea, surface, and air forces refine their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills. These platforms could also support personnel training and qualification pipelines, ensuring crews receive adequate at-sea experience before deploying on SSNs.[1]

And, of course, he makes the usual bogus claim that this will free up nuclear subs for more important tasks.
 

… by freeing SSNs for high-end missions.[1]

We’ve already debunked this mythical claim (see, “Free Up Ships for More Important Duties”).
 
He then goes on to make a cost comparison claim (without any reference or link and the claim is highly suspect).
 

According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates, operating a Virginia-class SSN costs approximately $1.6 million per operational day. In contrast, a conventionally powered diesel-electric submarine can operate at a significantly lower daily cost—approximately 40% less than an SSN.[1]

He also proposes operating these non-nuclear subs with civilian crews.
 

By offloading lower-risk missions to commercially operated submarines with Navy-trained civilian crews, uniformed personnel can stay focused on high-end warfighting while maintaining operational proficiency.[1]

 
Discussion
 
There are several questionable aspects to this entire concept of submarines as a service.
 
For starters, no references are provided for any of the claims made in the article which makes verification and understanding of the claims difficult or impossible.  As an example, the claimed operating cost for a Virginia class submarine of $1.6M per day seems unbelievable under any reasonable assumptions.  Nuclear subs have no daily fuel costs so that pretty much leaves the crew salaries as the major operating cost.  Salaries for a crew of 135 would be something on the order of $55,000 per day.  Food would be, what, several hundred dollars a day?  So, where does the rest of the $1.6M per day come from?  My guess would be that someone is piling occasional maintenance and overhaul/refit costs onto the operating cost and perhaps other not-really-operational costs like nuclear fuel/reactor disposal costs, base facility costs, etc.  Without an itemized breakdown, I have no idea but $1.6M seems ridiculous.  This is one of those cases where you can make the number anything you want by manipulating what you choose to include or exclude in the category of operating costs.
 
Another example of unsubstantiated claims is,
 

… improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet.[1]

There is absolutely no documentation or logic to support the idea that operating a few non-nuclear subs will increase fleet readiness, improve lethality, or increase SSN availability.  Logic would suggest there is no relationship, at all, between a few non-nuclear subs and the SSN fleet.
 
Civilian submarine crews are a suspect idea.  How do we handle secrecy and security with civilians?  We don’t even share our submarine technology with our military allies so it’s hard to imagine sharing it with a civilian crew regardless of how many non-disclosure agreements you make them sign.
 
How does the chain of command work with civilians?
 
The entire premise that non-nuclear subs would free up SSNs for more important tasks is completely bogus.  Aside from having previously demonstrated that there are no ‘more important’ tasks sitting around for lack of a sub, the harsh reality is that we have more than enough subs already.  Heck, we’ve got a dozen or more subs sitting idle, pierside, just waiting for their turn at maintenance.  As an example, the Los Angeles class submarine, USS Boise, has been waiting, idle, for over eight years for maintenance.  If we think we need more subs, the solution is to our idled fleet back in service.
 
Another fallacy is that non-nuclear subs can be used to test equipment and develop tactics for nuclear subs.  They’re two different beasts.  They operate differently.  They have different noise levels, different speeds, different endurance, different dive depths, different sizes, different maneuverability, and so on.  Sure, if you want to test a new coffee maker, a non-nuclear sub is fine but if you want to test, say, a new sonar, you need the platform it will actually be installed on to get realistic and applicable results.  We already do far too much simulation testing and we’ve seen the flaws in that when we sent weapons to Ukraine and most failed or had significant flaws.
 
Having said all that, there’s nothing wrong with buying a foreign non-nuclear sub for adversary training but to embark on an entire new type of submarine because Combatant Commanders whine is stupidity on a plate.
 
We need to stop approaching the military as a business case and start viewing it as the often intentionally inefficient warfighting organization it is.
 
 

Reporting for Duty!

 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Submarines “As-a-Service” Will Get More Players on the Field Today”, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, 7-Jun-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/06/submarines-as-a-service-will-get-more-players-on-the-field-today/

Strategic Petroleum Reserve

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is a reserve inventory of crude oil intended for use in the event of war or extreme emergencies.  Oil is stored in 62 salt caverns at four sites along the Gulf of Mexico and holds a total of 714 million barrels of crude oil.  In the event of war, the reserve could be used not only for direct military oil needs but also to supply defense industries.  To give an idea of the practical impact of the SPR, as of Jan 2022, the SPR represented around 1450 days of total U.S. petroleum net imports at the usage rates at that time.[1]
 
As an emergency supply, the importance of maintaining the supply at full capacity is self-evident.  Unfortunately, President Biden drew down the storage levels for political gain in violation of the intent of the reserve.  From Wikipedia,
 

On March 31, 2022, President Joe Biden announced that his administration would release 1 million barrels of oil per day from the reserve for the next 180 days …   The 2022 release became the largest ever SPR sale and lowered the SPR to its lowest levels in 40 years.  …  The Biden administration continued to release reserves in 2023, selling off 45% of the SPR by September 2023.[2]

Again from Wikipedia,
 

As of March 7, 2025, the inventory was 395.3 million barrels … [ed. 55% of capacity]).[2]

The SPR is a military safety net in the event of war and should not be manipulated for political purposes.  Even using it to mitigate occasional gasoline shortages, as other Presidents have done in the past, is wrong.
 
The Trump administration is refilling the reserve at the maximum rate the facilities can accept which is around 3 million barrels per month.  At that rate, it will take quite a while to completely refill the reserve – I calculate 120 months.  If correct, this is staggeringly slow and emphasizes why the reserve should never be tapped for anything other than a war or major disaster.
 
Redstate website has an interesting article on the status of the SPR.[3]  Energy Secretary Chris Wright said,
 

We are refilling the Reserve now and we will continue to refill the Reserve the whole time I'm in office.[3]

Discussing Biden’s actions, Wright noted,
 

You know, that was just such an irreponsible action to drain that reserve so quickly for electoral reasons, and in fact it was drained so fast, it did some damage to the facilities. So right now we can only fill two of the four major salt caverns that we have. So, we're doing repair work on the other two, we're slowly filling the other two … [3]

So, not only was the Biden action irresponsible, it apparently caused structural damage of some sort.  Even when the damage is repaired, given the apparent refill rate, we will be years refilling Biden’s drawdowns.
 
____________________________ 
 
 
Note:  For anyone who might be tempted to argue that the President can draw from the SPR for non-emergency reasons because it’s been done before, here is the relevant law governing drawdowns from the SPR.  Nothing in the law allows the President to draw from the SPR just because gas prices have increased a bit before an election.
 
 
42 U.S. Code § 6234 - Strategic Petroleum Reserve

(f)(1)The drawdown and distribution of petroleum products from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is authorized only under section 6241 of this title, and drawdown and distribution of petroleum products for purposes other than those described in section 6241 of this title shall be prohibited.
 
42 U.S. Code § 6241 - Drawdown and sale of petroleum products
 
(1)Drawdown and sale of petroleum products from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve may not be made unless the President has found drawdown and sale are required by a severe energy supply interruption or by obligations of the United States under the international energy program.
 
(2)For purposes of this section, in addition to the circumstances set forth in section 6202(8) of this title, a severe energy supply interruption shall be deemed to exist if the President determines that—
 
(A)an emergency situation exists and there is a significant reduction in supply which is of significant scope and duration;
 
(B)a severe increase in the price of petroleum products has resulted from such emergency situation; and
 
(C)such price increase is likely to cause a major adverse impact on the national economy.
 
 

_____________________________

 
[1]https://www.energy.gov/ceser/spr-quick-facts
 
[2]Wikipedia, “Strategic Petroleum Reserve (United_States)”,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Petroleum_Reserve_(United_States)
 
[3]Redstate website, “Energy Secretary Chris Wright on Strategic Petroleum Reserve: 'We're Filling It Right Now'”, Ward Clark, 28-Apr-2025,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2025/04/28/energy-secretary-chris-wright-on-strategic-petroleum-reserve-were-filling-it-right-now-n2188445

Unmanned Nonsense

China is cranking out high end warships at an impressive rate … at least compared to our anemic shipbuilding effort.  That means they’re cranking out serious, high level firepower in various forms.  We, on the other hand, seem hell bent on ditching our high end firepower in favor of ever less lethal unmanned toys.  The latest idea I came across is Naval News website speculating about cancelling the Constellation program and replacing it with small, unmanned vessels.
 

With a price tag approaching $1.1 billion to $1.2 billion dollars each for the USS Constellation (FFG-62) frigate, Naval News asked RAND and CSIS if the Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV) and the DARPA No Manning Required Ship (NOMARS) can replace the troubled FFG-62 frigate program.
 
… can MUSVs and NOMARS substitute for the FFG-62 frigates in terms of missions, roles, weapons coverage, and functionalities?[1]

As repeatedly documented on this blog, the Constellation is a poor excuse for a WARship but it is still worlds better than any unmanned asset.
 
The key point in the Naval News article is the following.
 

While the U.S. Navy, Congress, and the Department of Defense debate over whether to continue the FFG-62 program with government cost-cutting and downsizing …[1]
 
Mark Cancian, retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel, and Senior Advisor to CSIS’s Defense and Security Department answered this question via email to Naval News in March 2025. Cancian wrote, “Yes, the [FFG-62] Constellation program is a mess, and the Navy is reviewing it, along with other troubled shipbuilding programs.[1]

To be honest, this is the first I’ve heard of the Constellation being directly considered for termination.  I know that all programs are being reassessed by the new administration but this is somewhat ominous given the Constellation program’s stunningly poor performance to date.
 
That aside, let’s examine the Naval News question – with its implied answer of yes – and see whether unmanned assets can replace the Constellation.
 
 
Mission
 
Most missions require manned interaction, interpretation, and decision making.  No unmanned asset can even begin to approach that level of automated action.  The recent example of an unmanned automobile backing over and dragging an injured person after an auto accident thoroughly demonstrates this point.  We are nowhere near Terminator level artificial intelligence.
 
Most missions, peace or war, require human presence and reasoning:  managed response to provocative moves – such as close approaches by another vessel, foreign exercises, port visits, boarding (VBSS), rescue and salvage, ASW, tactical improvisation, etc.
 
As the article points out,
 

[Unmanned assets] work better as remote sensors and shooters connected to the fleet.[1]

 
Weapons
 
Let’s start with the simplest comparison which is VLS cells since those are the main weapon of any warship.  The Constellation will have 32 Mark 41 VLS cells for Tomahawk cruise missiles, ESSM, and Standard SM-6 missiles.  In comparison, the MUSV, which is the patrol boat size ISR vessel as opposed to the LUSV which is the corvette size missile barge, has no weapons provision at all, at the moment, and is too small to fit VLS cells even if we wanted to.
 
In addition, the Constellation will carry 16 rack mounted, small anti-ship missiles, presumably the Naval Strike Missile (NSM).  The MUSV, given its small size, might be able to carry some kind of rack mounted anti-ship missile system such as the NSM.  That would likely be 4-8 missiles, depending on how many racks could fit on the boat.
 
Constellation also has a Mk110 57 mm gun.  The MUSV could not mount any comparable gun.
 
Finally, the Constellation has a RAM anti-air weapon which probably could be mounted on a MUSV.
 
NOMARS, as exemplified by the USX-1 Defiant unmanned vessel, is claimed to have the capacity for 4-6 VLS, however, this is just a wish, not a reality, at the moment.  Further, if defense weapons and sensors are added, such as SeaRAM or CIWS, the space available for larger, more offensive weapons such as VLS, markedly decreases.
 

USX-1 Defiant / NOMARS

Seizure
 
We’ve already seen that China and Iran will not hesitate to seize unmanned assets so there is no reason to believe they wouldn’t seize an MUSV or NOMARS vessel.  The article also notes,
 

In peacetime, international law considers uncrewed vessels as derelict and subject to salvage.[1]

Repair
 
The following statement from the article says it all.
 

In wartime, it would be difficult to repair or retrieve such a vessel with a mechanical breakdown.[1]

Conclusion
 
It is, frankly, disappointing that anyone would even momentarily ask whether small, unmanned vessels can replace a frigate.  The lack of weapons and absence of human judgment as well as obvious maintenance issues unequivocally dictates the conclusion that unmanned vessels cannot replace a manned frigate, however flawed that frigate might be.  Unmanned vessels are, potentially, suited for ISR and acting as a very small weapons barge (mini-arsenal ship) if someone can come up with a secure communications system and a viable CONOPS.
 
What no one in the military seems to understand is that our emphasis on unmanned toys is the equivalent of asking whether an infantryman, armed with a knife, can replace an Abrams tank.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Can Unmanned MUSVs and NOMARS Replace the Troubled FFG-62 Frigate Program?”, Peter Ong, 20-May-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/05/can-unmanned-musvs-and-nomars-replace-the-troubled-ffg-62-frigate-program/

Changing the Calculus

You’ve probably heard, by now, about the Navy’s AIM-174B air-to-air missile.  It’s a Standard SM-6 surface to air missile adapted to be air launched from F-18 Hornets.  The key characteristic of this missile, in this role, is its 200-300 mile range.  There is no exact published spec on the range, yet, but the ship launched version has a range of 150 – 290 miles, depending on the flight profile.  Various reports suggest that the air launched range is 300+ miles. 
 
Other performance characteristics of note include a weight of around 1,900 pounds, a length of more than 15 feet, a speed of up to Mach 3.5, and an impressive 140-pound blast-fragmentation warhead. In comparison, the Sidewinder has a 20 lb warhead and the AMRAAM has a 44 lb warhead.
 
Of course, this performance comes at a staggering cost of $4.3M per missile.[1]
 

AIM-174B

This missile is intended to be the very long range air to air missile (VLRAAM) that’s been missing from the inventory and is an answer to the very long range Chinese and Russian air to air missiles.  The Chinese have the PL-15 which is reported to have a range of 120-190 miles and a speed of Mach 5, the PL-17 which is reported to have a range of 250-310 miles and a speed of Mach 6, and the PL-21 which has a reported range of 190+ miles.  The Russians have the AA-13 (R-37) Arrow which has a reported range of up to 250 miles and a speed of Mach 6.  A similar, though shorter ranged US missile is the AIM-260, currently under development.  It is reported to have a range of 120 miles and a speed of Mach 5.

 
This category of very long range, very fast missile is a severe problem for high value units such as tankers and E-2 Hawkeyes.  We’ve discussed the impact of this missile and noted that it could force our Hawkeyes, in particular, to operate so far back from the aerial battle as to lose awareness and control which is, of course, the doctrinal key to US aerial combat.  This would, for example, cede aerial supremacy to the Chinese over Taiwan in the event of an invasion.  Our carrier aircraft would be unable to operate effectively in the area with each aircraft forced to operate independently instead of with the benefit of an all-seeing controller.  It would also force each aircraft to radiate instead of remaining emissions silent and allowing the E-2 to detect and designate targets.  The negative impact of Chinese very long range air to air missiles (VLRAAM) cannot be overstated.
 
 
Targeting
 
This is, as always, the crucial and limiting factor.  A 300+ mile missile is useless if we can’t generate targeting at that range.  No fighter radar is going to see modern enemy fighters at anything approaching that range and certainly not enemy stealth fighters.  My best semi-informed guess is that a fighter won’t see an enemy stealth fighter until 20 miles or less.
 
In a match up between the Navy’s F-18, the only plane currently designated to carry the AIM-174B, and an enemy stealth fighter, the enemy is going to get first detection every time.
 
A large radar plane (AWACS or E-2 Hawkeye) might be able to see enemy fighters at somewhat longer ranges but, still, nothing approaching 300+ miles.  So, where do we get targeting for these missiles?  There are a few viable options.
 

• The F-35 (or the occasional F-22 from Guam?) might have the stealth to get close enough to provide targeting against HVUs (though not enemy stealth fighters).  HVUs are not stealthy and are relatively easily detected.  Note: this is one reason I’ve called for stealthy ‘Hawkeyes’, possibly based on the B-21 (see, “B-21 Hawkeye”), to thwart enemy attacks against our HVUs.
• A B-2/21 equipped with passive sensors could be used to provide targeting although it is questionable whether it would be worth the risk.
• Taiwan ground assets might well be able to provide targeting, particularly using passive EO and IR sensors.  It would be almost impossible for the Chinese to completely eliminate this kind of small, non-radiating, hard to find asset.

 
The reverse case of the Chinese providing targeting for their VLRAAMs is interesting.  They would have their own stealth aircraft to provide targeting, land based over- the-horizon radars, and suicide aircraft.  The latter is concerning.  The Chinese do not have the same view of the value of the individual pilot that we do and the idea of sending throwaway fighter aircraft on semi-suicide runs straight at our HVUs, either to shoot them directly or to provide targeting for remote VLRAAM shooters, is viable and concerning.  From the Chinese perspective, if they can trade a handful of second tier fighters to kill a US HVU, that would be a win for them.  The Russians essentially had this as the cornerstone of their anti-carrier strategy during the Cold War.  They were doctrinally willing to sacrifice many Tu-95 Bear search aircraft to provide detection and targeting for their naval aviation bomber regiments.
 
 
Taiwan Scenario
 
The problem with any contemplation of a Taiwan-centered war with China is that it presents a massive advantage for China due to physical proximity.  The skies over Taiwan can safely be assumed to be packed with Chinese aircraft and only occasionally challenged by US sorties from Guam, if it remains operational or carrier aircraft.  The advantage becomes all the greater for Chinese aviation through their uncontested use of AEW and EW aircraft supporting the aerial fight from a safe distance.  Until now, we simply didn’t have a VLRAAM of our own to threaten Chinese AEW and EW aircraft.
 
Conversely, Chinese VLRAAM missiles would be used to push US AEW, EW, and tanker aircraft back, thereby relinquishing control of the air battle.
 
For many decades, US military operations have assumed aerial supremacy.  Chinese VLRAAMs have upended that assumption.  Now, however, the AIM-174B offers the ability to regain control of the aerial battle or, at least, force an even contest (which is not how you want to fight but it’s better than fighting from a disadvantaged position!).
 
 
Summary
 
The AIM-174B VLRAAM offers the possibility of establishing aerial supremacy (or, at least, equality) in the Taiwan scenario.  The key, as always, is targeting.  As usual, the US military has focused on the weapon and ignored the sensor/targeting issue.  We should be working just as hard at solving the targeting issue.
 
We also need to be working on tactics for the Taiwan scenario and I guarantee that we have not addressed this in any realistic fashion.  We need to figure out how best to deploy the AIM-174B and how best to take advantage of the opportunities it creates.  Will this allow our F-18s to fight with a reasonable chance of success or is the F-18 simply outclassed by Chinese aircraft?  Are there tactics that can make the F-18 effective?  This, by the way, is why I’ve repeatedly called for a new, very long range, stealthy, air supremacy carrier fighter and end this idiotic combination strike-fighter nonsense that produces an aircraft that is neither a good strike asset nor a good fighter.
 
We can win the Taiwan aerial battle but it means focusing on what’s important and letting go of our paradigms.  We need new approaches, new tactics, and new aircraft optimized for the Chinese war.  The AIM-174B is one piece of the puzzle but we can’t stop there, as we are almost certain to do.  We need to develop the accompanying tactics and fighter aircraft that will take advantage of the AIM-174B.  And no, we can’t simply stand off and lob these missiles into the skies over Taiwan.  The missiles are far too expensive, complex, and time-consuming to produce to ever have that kind of inventory.
 
We’ve taken the first step.  Now, we need to finish the job.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/05/aim-174b-is-navys-new-air-launched-missile-a-hypersonic-killer/

Memorial Day

Enjoy your Memorial weekend and please remember those who gave their lives in the service of our country.

Leadership and the CNO

Everyone thinks they’re an interior decorator and you see the results almost every time you visit someone’s home.  They’re generally pretty poorly decorated.
 
Similarly, everyone thinks they’re a leader or know what makes a good leader … but they aren’t and don’t.
 
Breaking Defense has an article on the Navy’s vacancy at the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) position which attempts to point out the problems with a vacancy for CNO.[1]  Consider the following statement
 

“It’s not good,” Wills [Steven Wills, naval historian and associate at the Center for Maritime Strategy] said flatly, “to be operating without a CNO.”[1]

Think about that for a moment.  How has having a CNO worked out for the Navy these last several decades?  The Navy’s CNOs have guided the Navy straight into the toilet.  I’m not going to bother listing all the problems.  You read this blog so you know what they are.  If that’s what having a CNO gets us, maybe we’re better off without a CNO?
 
We have an acting CNO, Adm. James Kilby, Vice CNO.
 
Wouldn’t that be a great opportunity for Kilby to give us an on-the-job audition?  After all, he was/is the VCNO so he should be more than capable of stepping in and showing outstanding leadership, right?  Here’s what Breaking Defense and Mr. Wills think,
 

But even with Kilby in place, Wills and others said major strategic or programmatic decisions will likely be postponed with no empowered, confirmed CNO to back them up.[1]

Why would decisions need to be postponed?  If they’re good decisions, they should be implemented immediately and decisively.  Why hesitate?  If they’re not good decisions then you shouldn’t be in the position.
 
Take bold, decisive action until someone stops you.  Don’t cower in fear that someone might disagree.  Don’t wait for approval from above.  You’re the highest ranking Naval officer there is.  Act like it.
 
Here’s yet another person who doesn’t understand what leadership is.
 

Even the best acting leaders are reluctant to make tough calls on hard issues,” Erik Raven, former under secretary of the Navy, told Breaking Defense.[1]

If you’re reluctant to make tough calls then you shouldn’t be in that position.  Step aside and let someone else take over the acting CNO job.
 
Congress doesn’t understand leadership or how bad the Navy’s CNOs have been, either.
 

Sen. Tim Kaine, the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services seapower subcommittee, told Breaking Defense he was “nervous” about the lack of a CNO.[1]

Nervous about the lack of a CNO????  Given their record, I’d be more nervous about having a CNO!  Heck, paralysis would be better than the incompetence we’ve seen from our CNOs.
 
Here’s a few sentences that should tell us everything we need to know about Navy leadership and officer ranks.
 

To cope with the strain of doing two jobs at once, the acting service chief must delegate tasks to subordinate officers, who then do the same as they become overburdened with new responsibilities. Those officers also become reluctant to act when asked to make decisions that are historically above their paygrade.[1]

Isn’t the entire idea of the Navy (or any military combat structure) that you’re always ready to step into the next highest job, at a moment’s notice?  Sure, you may lack experience and maybe you’ll make a mistake but hesitation shouldn’t be one of your problems.  If you’re a professional warrior, you’ve been studying naval warfare your entire career.  You should know what needs to be done.  If not, you’re a failure and in the wrong line of work.
 
There’s nothing magic about being CNO … as our string of abject failures confirm.  CNOs have no special knowledge or capabilities.  They’re just the guys who played politics better than the rest.
 
Consider this damning statement,
 

“When Adm. Franchetti was the vice chief, and acting as CNO, she was hesitant to roll out a plan for the Navy under her term of leadership,” Wills added.[1]

Shouldn’t that have told us what kind of CNO she’d be?  ComNavOps predicted her pathetic failure almost on day one because ComNavOps understands what leadership is and can recognize the glaring lack of leadership qualities in others.
 
Where’s the next Halsey?  Where’s Nimitz?  Where’s Willis ‘Ching’ Lee?  Instead, we get Franchetti and Kilby.
 
I’m not worried about the absence of a CNO;  I’m worried about having a CNO … another stinking, steaming pile of CNO since no one around the Navy seems to understand what real leadership is.
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “What a historic absence of its top officer means for the Navy”, y   Justin Katz and Valerie Insinna, 23-May-2025,
http://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/what-a-historic-absence-of-its-top-officer-means-for-the-navy/