Network Lessons for Future Warfare

The Navy (and, to be fair, the entire military) has gone all-in on networking as the basis of our future combat capability.  We’re attempting to create vast regional (or worldwide!) networks of distributed sensors and weapons all tied together in a completely interchangeable, any-to-any linkage.  The Navy claims this will deliver omniscient awareness that will place us inside the enemy’s decision/action loop (OODA, for those of you who recall Col. Boyd’s work) and allow us to wreak havoc and destruction against a hapless, helpless, confused enemy.  While we aren’t at the end point with fully functioning network systems, yet, we do have more than enough existing pieces to get an accurate assessment of the viability of the concept.
 
To ever so briefly review, ComNavOps has mocked the concept as being utterly unrealistic and pure fantasy.
 
To ever so briefly review, history and real world events have mocked the concept as being utterly realistic with example after example of the failure of networks, sensors, and weapons.
 
Now, we have yet another real world example of the failure of networking and distributed sensing to examine.  You recall the recent friendly fire shootdown by the Navy of a F-18F Super Hornet on 22-Dec-2024 by the USS Gettysburg (CG-64)?  Reader ‘G2mil’ brought an interview to my attention that examines the incident and offers insight into the networking and sensor failures that led to the shootdown.[1]  The interview is available on YouTube and features retired Navy Capt. Kevin Eyer, a former Aegis cruiser captain, discussing the friendly fire incident with retired former Navy Commander and F-14 RIO, Ward Carroll.
 
Caution:  The interviewee, Capt. Eyer is not on active duty and made no claim to have inside authoritative information.  He did, however, imply that he has access to unofficial, inside information.  The Navy has not yet issued a formal report.  You can make your own assessment of the credibility of the Captain’s information.
 
 
Continuing …  I’ve extracted salient points from the interview and summarized them below.
 

• The IFF interrogation of the aircraft initially succeeded and the aircraft was identified as friendly.  However, the Gettysburg was in the act of recovering a helo of its own and during the recovery had to shut down all emissions.  Upon re-establishing sensor coverage, the aircraft was again queried but this time the IFF failed and the aircraft was not tagged as friendly.
• An electronic warfare (EW) operator identified the aircraft’s emissions as friendly and designated the aircraft as such.  However, the designation failed to register in the system due to a software bug that has been known since 2023.
• The EW operator followed up with a verbal designation of ‘friendly’ on the CIC communication net but, in the din, confusion, and stress of the CIC environment, the verbal statement failed to register with the TAO or anyone who might have intervened.  Verbal communications in stress situations always fail.
• The area wide Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network did correctly have the aircraft identified as friendly however the Gettysburg’s CEC was either down or failed to register the designation from the network.  Networks always fail.

 
 
Here’s a couple of interesting, related notes:
 

• USS Gettysburg ‘failed’ its pre-deployment workups with the ship and crew’s performance being notably short of meeting standards.  Despite this, the ship was allowed to proceed on deployment due to a lack of potential replacement ships.  You’ll recall that we’ve talked about the widespread use of waivers that inevitably lead to tragedy and are at the heart of nearly every incident.  We’ve also noted the Navy’s refusal to hold anyone or anything to established standards.  This ship should never have been allowed to deploy.  The entire point of pre-deployment workups is to certify that the ship/crew are proficient enough to deploy.  Gettysburg was not but deployed anyway.
• NavSea knew about the software bugs but pushed the Aegis software out into the fleet anyway.  This is literally criminal negligence and, in the civilian world, is the basis for criminal and civil trials and lawsuits all the time. 
  

 
 
Discussion
 
As with almost every incident, it was due to a number of supposedly unlikely factors all occurring together.  However, upon examination we see that some of the factors were well known and, thus, the incident was less of a freak confluence of unlikely factors and more of a known problem waiting to happen.  It was just a matter of time.
 
In this incident, we see that despite multiple ships and aircraft tracking the F-18, area wide networks sharing their data, an aircraft that was talking and squawking its identification, and the most advanced surveillance and fire control software in the world, we still managed to lose situational awareness and shoot down a friendly aircraft.  If we can’t keep track of a friendly aircraft with IFF flying a known safe flight path and with no enemy cyber or electronic hindrance, what hope does a regional (or worldwide!) network have in combat?
 
With these repeated demonstrations of ineffectiveness and unreliability, why are we basing our entire future warfare plans on this kind of network/software approach?  This network/data/software approach to warfare requires perfect performance to even begin to be useful in combat and when does perfection ever occur in combat?
 
We shoot down our own aircraft, collide with hulking merchant ships, are unable to verify attacks on us (USS Mason affair), and yet we choose to ignore those real world experiences in favor of fantasy level imaginings of future warfare.  How stupid are we?  The answer is … admiralty stupid!
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bo34Zwbte6c

USS Stark Lessons

We have often examined battles to glean lessons learned.  Along a slightly different line, let’s take a look, now, at a single incident, as opposed to a full battle.  The incident is the attack on the USS Stark which saw an Iraqi aircraft launch two Exocet missiles, both of which hit the Stark, one exploding and the other may not have exploded but did spew hundreds of gallons of flaming fuel.
 
The information that follows is taken mainly from the excellent book, Missile Inbound [1].
 
Here are some points of interest to keep in mind as you review the timeline presented further down the page:
 

• The electronic warfare (EW) SLQ-32 unit on the Stark was a passive-only signal detection device.  It could detect signals and identify them by comparing to a signals library.  The ultimate output of the SLQ-32 to the operator was a signal source/type and bearing.[1, p.67]  It did not provide range.
• The CIWS on the Stark was capable of detecting, tracking, and notifying the operator that it was tracking a target.[1, p.68]  The Stark’s CIWS was in ‘Standby’ mode at the time of the attack.
• Stark had both the SPS-55 and SPS-49 operating.  The SPS-49 operator was inexperienced and did not have the proper range setting on the radar and failed to see the attacking aircraft.  In fact, the Stark’s radar never detected the aircraft but were aware of the aircraft’s movements via data link from an AWACS.
• Ship was in Battle Condition III (BC III) which required a third of the crew to be on duty and all weapon stations manned.[1, p.69]

 
As a brief review, here is the timeline of the event.  I’ve used generic descriptions of a person’s position, listed in block parentheses [xxx], instead of names to avoid confusion.
 
2050 hr – One of the two required fire controlmen was allowed to leave CIC, in violation of BC III, for a bathroom break and never returned before the missiles hit.
 
2055 hr – Stark establishes its first radar contact when an officer changes the radar range mode to the correct setting.
 
2102 hr – SLQ-32 operator detects the aircraft’s search radar emissions.
 
2104 hr – Aircraft is 39 nm from Stark.
 
2105 hr – At 32.5 nm, Mirage turns directly towards Stark but no one in CIC notices.
 
2107 hr – At 22.5 nm, F-1 Mirage launches first missile.
 
2108 hr – Stark CIC notices Mirage has changed course directly towards them and decides to issue standard radio warning to aircraft.  At 15.5 nm, Mirage launches second missile.  SLQ-32 detects a momentary radar fire control lock from what the CIC crew believes is the Mirage.  The signal reverts to routine search mode in a couple of seconds.
 
2109 hr – Crew is dispatched to arm the port and starboard chaff launchers and launchers are switched from ‘safe’ to ‘on’.  Lookout spots first missile but verbal warning is not relayed to CIC in time.  SLQ-32 operator reports second radar lock signal.  CIC officer orders the Mk92 STIR (fire control radar) to track the Mirage but is told that the Mirage is in the STIR blind zone.
 
2110 hr – First missile impacts.
 
2111 hr – Second missile impacts.
 
 
Discussion
 
The Stark incident has been reported and analyzed many times so I won’t belabor the more obvious points.  There are, however, a few points that are particularly pertinent.
 
1. Officers later testified that they never detected a ‘terminal homing’ signal from the Mirage.  This indicates a glaring lack of knowledge about the Mirage which had a track-while-scan radar and did not generate anything approximating a ‘terminal homing’ signal.  What the SLQ-32 operator momentarily noticed was likely the first missile’s seeker signal.  Had CIC recognized what the SLQ-32 actually detected, they would have had time to switch the CIWS into automatic mode.
 
This reveals that the crew was poorly trained.  They should have been well versed in both the capabilities of the SLQ-32 and the characteristics of all the aircraft in the region.  This is just elementary logic.  The failure to learn about the aircraft and weapons in the region would suggest that either the captain and crew were negligent in the extreme (fatally so) or were too busy with ancillary work to make time for the study of regional aircraft and weapons.  Indeed, the book points out that the crew's top priority leading up to the moment of attack was an upcoming high speed engineering test (OPPE).  Crews in a war zone should never have a higher priority than combat.  This is a failure of leadership at higher levels than the ship and crew.
 
2. The CIWS was never placed in automatic mode which would have allowed it to fire at the incoming missiles.  The officers testified that they left the CIWS in manual mode because they didn’t want to risk an accidental shoot down of the aircraft, believing it not to be a threat.  How they thought a CIWS with a range of some 1500 yds would shoot down an aircraft 15-20+ nm away was never explained.  Again, this demonstrates the officer's lack of familiarity with their own equipment.
 
The default mindset in a war zone should have been the opposite:  CIWS should always be in automatic mode in a war zone and switched to manual only when a verified friendly aircraft receives permission to approach.  If the price of saving a billion dollar ship is the occasional loss of a friendly pilot and aircraft due to the pilot’s stupidity, so be it.  I think such an approach would see a very rapid increase in pilot awareness and discipline – which is a good thing!
 
3. Allowing crew to leave their stations during BC III reveals the lackadaisical approach of the ship’s leadership and the absence of a combat mentality.  The ship’s captain, Capt. Glenn Brindel, testified that the absence of the fire controlman was a major contributing factor.  Regarding the inability of the STIR to track the Mirage due to the blind zone, Brindel said, 

[The CIC officer] did not know of the blind zone, Brindel said it was because [the fire controlman] had left the CIC for a head call without [the CIC officer’s] knowledge.  That fact, Brindel said, was key to the CIC’s inability to defend the ship.[1, p.80]

Brindel claimed not to know that leaving CIC without qualified replacement was a common practice by his crew.  If true, that speaks poorly about Brindel’s awareness of his crew’s behavior and his own failure to properly train his crew.
 
 
Lessons
 
Mindset.  The preceding points offer an overall lesson for us, today, about combat and combat mindsets.  Ultimately, the Stark tragedy can be traced back to the lack of a combat mindset by both the captain/crew and higher level fleet leadership.  No one in the entire chain of command was mentally prepared for combat.  They were lulled into complacency by the multitude of previous attacks that were directed against Iranian shipping.  In today’s world, where terrorism can strike anywhere and anytime, combat must be the default mindset.
 
Technology versus Knowledge.  Technology is not the answer to combat;  knowledge is.  Highly advanced equipment that is not fully understood (looking at you, Aegis) is worse than useless as it leads to incorrect assumptions (recall the training drone strike on the Tico cruiser), misinterpretations, and failure to grasp the reality of a situation.  Better to have simpler equipment that is completely understood.
 
__________________________
 
History keeps telling us exactly what we should be doing and we keep ignoring it.
 

__________________________

 
(1) Missile Inbound, Jeffrey Levinson and Randy Edwards, Naval Institute Press, 1997, ISBN 1-55750-517-9
 

2023 DOT&E Quick Hits

Following are some quick hits from the 2023 (released 2024) DOT&E annual report.  Again, I cannot stress the near-uselessness of the DOT&E reports since Dr. Gilmore left.  Nevertheless, consider these items:
 
 
CH-53K
 
The DOT&E report assess the CH-53K as not operationally suitable.
 

In the December 2022 IOT&E report, DOT&E determined that the CH-53K is not operationally suitable. The aircraft demonstrated acceptable results for all reliability and maintainability metrics.
 
However, the demonstrated low aircraft availability does not support sustained operations.  Additionally, the low probability of success of the automatic blade fold system will result in mission aborts and extended deck cycles that could hamper amphibious operations. The aircraft demonstrated its sortie generation rate requirement.  Unexpected main and tail rotor blade erosion damage was observed on aircraft operating in the desert environment during IOT&E. Extended time was needed to repair blade erosion damage because of the lack of a structural repair manual. Battle damage assessment and repair also requires a structural repair manual that has yet to be delivered.[1, p.161]

CMV-22B COD
 

As reported in the combined FOT&E and LFT&E report of June 2022, DOT&E found that CMV-22B was not operationally suitable due to failures of many subsystems … [1, p.164]

The miraculous V-22 is less than miraculous?
 
 
F-18 Software
 

The Navy stopped SCS [Software Configuration Set] H16 operational testing during 4QFY22 due to severe software deficiencies, but still fielded the system to the operational fleet in FY23 without completing the DOT&E-approved FOT&E test plan.[1, p.195]

So, severe deficiencies identified in testing but the Navy fielded the system anyway?  I don’t see any way that can go wrong.
 
 
Constellation
 
From the DOT&E operational effectiveness assessment, 

Unclassified risks to operational effectiveness include that the FFG 62 design does not have a tracker illuminator system, which is typically installed on other Aegis platforms, and that the design crew size will be highly reliant on currently unproven system automation and human system interfaces. The Navy acknowledges the risk of the current crewing strategy for FFG 62 … [1, p.201]

Independence LCS-MCM
 
Here’s the operational suitability assessment of the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) that is the actual sweep portion of the MCM module as opposed to the one-at-a-time hunting systems.  Doesn’t look good. 

UISS is not operationally suitable, as documented in the UISS IOT&E report dated June 2022. UISS’s reliability and availability do not support sustained mine sweeping operations.[1, p.207]

MQ-25 Stingray Unmanned Tanker
 
How’s that tanker coming along? 

DOT&E has not approved any operational test plans for MQ-25.[1, p.217]

Not even testing, yet???

SEWIP 

…preliminary data indicate SEWIP Block 2 fails to meet its reliability and operational availability requirements.[1, p.242]

John Lewis Class Replenishment Oiler 

USNS John Lewis could not support scheduled test events on five occasions due to equipment failures.[1, p.245]

Discussion
 
A few common themes jump out from the DOT&E report.
 
While it is perfectly normal for every new project to encounter problems, many of the systems being reported on are far from being new and the degree of problems encountered is not acceptable.
 
The number of scheduled test events that were cancelled due to equipment failure – often not of the test item, itself! – is disappointing especially when one considers that the tests were scheduled and the equipment presumably underwent meticulous tweaking prior to the test period.  The failures paint a picture of a Navy that is physically failing and is incapable of performing rapid, on-site repairs.  This speaks worlds – and poorly - to the specter of battle damage and our ability to ‘stay in the fight’ when damaged.
 
As noted many times in the past, the Navy lacks suitable, enemy-representative, target drones for realistic testing.  To paraphrase, ‘millions for new construction, not a penny for testing!’  The Navy’s priorities are beyond badly screwed up.

Stop Talking, Start Doing

 
This from SecDef Pete Hegseth during an interview with Shannon Bream,
 

“We won World War II with seven four star generals, Shannon. We have 44 today … Has it created better outcomes or not? We’re challenging a lot of assumptions at the Pentagon to streamline what we do so that we get as many resources as possible to the warfighter.”[1]

So, stop talking, Pete, and start firing people.  Arithmetic says, 44-7 = 37.  I’m waiting to see 37 generals fired.  Otherwise, it’s all just talk and you’re no different from your predecessors. 
 
Stop talking and start doing.  What are you waiting for?  Don’t disappoint me.
 
 
 
… and then do the Navy.
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]Daily Caller website, “‘The Status Quo Hasn’t Worked’: Hegseth Breaks Down Why Pentagon Needs Major Shake Up”, Hailey Gomez, 23-Feb-2025,
https://dailycaller.com/2025/02/23/pete-hegseth-pentagon-trump-administration/
 

CNO Franchetti Fired

In a not entirely unexpected, and very welcome move, SecDef Hegseth has fired CNO Franchetti.  During her tenure, she accomplished nothing, perpetuated the problems she inherited, and solved no existing problems (see, "CNO Franchetti - Another Failed CNO in the Making").  She had a notably undistinguished resume for the position and, I suspect, was a DEI hire.
 

Good riddance.
 
Of course, it remains to be seen who the replacement will be and whether they’ll be any better.  Still, this is a possible first step towards fixing the Navy.  Well done, SecDef.

Asymmetric Warfare Against the Chinese

A reader recently offered his opinion that the US has no hope of achieving victory in a war with China due to China’s overwhelming superiority in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  I’m not going to cite the reader’s comment as I have no wish to embarrass him.  Besides, his view is shared, to varying degrees, by many people so he’s hardly unique.  Is he correct?  Is America doomed?  Let’s examine this view.
 
For starters, the reader’s assumption of China’s overwhelming superiority is incorrect, in many ways, but for the sake of this discussion, let’s stipulate that he’s exactly right – that China does, indeed, have overwhelming superiority of technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  It would seem, then, that the US, indeed, has no hope of victory.  After all, those are the main determinants of victory in any war, right?
 
Or are they?
 
Let’s start where we always do … history.  Let’s look at some recent examples.
 
Vietnam – The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Afghanistan (US) - The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Afghanistan (Soviet Union) - The Soviet Union enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
 
Korea - The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in technology, numbers (at least until the Chinese entered the war), and industrial capacity and yet could only achieve a stalemate.
 
Without a doubt, technology, numbers and industrial capacity are important, especially in a conventional war, but, clearly, history proves that there are other, more important, factors that can overcome technology, numbers, and industrial capacity.  What are those factors? 
 
 

• Will – First and foremost is will.  Determination.  The absolute unwavering desire for victory and nothing less.
• Victory Conditions – One sure way to lose a war is to enter into it without a clear idea of the end state (total victory, one assumes).  The US has violated this requirement repeatedly since WWII.  Indeed, a very strong case can be made that the US has not had a clear idea of victory conditions in any conflict it’s entered since WWII.
• Commitment – Hand in hand with will is the willingness to do whatever is required to win.  This means not allowing the enemy sanctuary across some border, not holding back out of fear of collateral damage or casualties, not scrubbing target lists to see which ones will play well on the public relations stage, and not giving a damn what the rest of the world thinks.  If you’re serious enough to enter a war, the only ‘good’ outcome is total victory as quickly as possible using whatever means necessary.
• Training - Training can overcome a lot of other disadvantages.  A properly trained man with a knife can beat a man with a machine gun.  We have hollow forces, currently; China's level of training is unknown.  We need to be trained to the peak of effectiveness. 
  
• Brutality – Part of the commitment to war is the commitment to the brutality of war.  The US has been far too squeamish about war since WWII and, thus, unable to wage war efficiently, meaning brutally effective.  I recall a small uproar of protest amongst the population during Desert Storm when it was revealed that the US bulldozed trenches and buried Iraqi soldiers alive.  Killing is killing.  It’s not our job to gently cradle enemy soldiers while we wait for them to die of old age.  Our job is to kill as efficiently as possible.
• Simplicity - Simplicity trumps complexity in battle.  Complex equipment that won’t function in the stress of combat, can’t be maintained, and can’t be repaired is of no use.
• Decentralization – A decentralized command and control structure can only help during war.  It reduces confusion and eliminates a vulnerable center of gravity.

 
 
In every example conflict cited above, the loser violated one or more (generally all!) of the factors just described.
 
So, can the US win a war with China even with the stipulation that China possesses superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity?  Of course we can!  However, it requires unwavering determination, crystal clear victory conditions, and total commitment. 
 
There is yet another factor that can offset superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and that is unconventional strategy and tactics.  Ukraine has amply demonstrated this with their unmanned assets, among other developments.  The Chinese used human wave attacks.  The North Vietnamese / Viet Cong used all manner of unconventional tactics.  The Taliban used IEDs and hid amongst the civilian population.  And so on.
 
Some people refer to this as asymmetric warfare and often use it as an excuse as to why a seemingly superior country lost to an inferior one.  Is asymmetric warfare some kind of magic solution?  Let’s consider it.
 
Let's start by dispensing with the silly notion that asymmetric war is somehow a different kind of war. It's not. War is war. Asymmetric simply means the enemy used different tactics than you did and, more often than not, asymmetric is used to try to explain away how you managed to lose to an inferior force.
 
So, recognizing that war is war, we now note that technology is not only NOT a guarantee of victory, it is often a detriment. For example, Germany's focus on ever more exquisite tanks to the detriment of just plain good tanks produced in large quantities cost them valuable time and resources. Thus, Vietnam and Afghanistan are not some kind of special war for whom the constants of war do not apply. They are war and the enemy conducted their war better than we did.
 
As an aside, readers, you might benefit from reviewing Vietnam, Korea, Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and more and try to identify which factors were truly deciding in the outcomes. You'll be surprised.  Ours is not the only way to wage war and, arguably, might be the least effective, depending on circumstances! Figure out why.
 
During a discussion of asymmetric war, and in response to the examples of Vietnam and Afghanistan and others, an anonymous reader made the comment,
 
"Afghanistan and Vietnam were asymmetrical, counterinsurgency operations, so are not analogies to what we would face with China."
 
Again, sticking with our stipulation of China possessing superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity, and keeping in mind the other factors that impact victory, what does that suggest for a US strategy? A student of warfare, might look to history and postulate that the US could and should fight exactly the kind of asymmetric war that the reader dismissed as not being applicable! Perhaps the US should identify asymmetric operations and tactics that would enable it to succeed despite being hopelessly outclassed by the Chinese in every conceivable way?
 
How could the US do this? What kinds of asymmetric tactics could the US use that might succeed? Well, for example, instead of attempting a toe-to-toe slugfest of army against army, perhaps the US should emphasize the use of small, special forces units to destroy Chinese oil and gas pipelines in Russia (*gasp* we can't put troops inside Russia! that would violate international law! ... well, that's why they call it asymmetric; you'll recall that the NVietnamese used Laos and the Taliban didn’t hesitate to cross into Pakistan?) thereby imposing a total sea AND LAND blockade of a critical resource.
 
Another example might be that instead of going toe-to-toe with the magnificent, all-powerful, Chinese navy, perhaps we could emphasize our still formidable advantage in submarines to destroy their fleet and systematically launch cruise missile attacks on every Chinese port, airfield, and base on the Chinese mainland - basically, guerilla warfare using sub-launched cruise missiles! Done correctly, this kind of attack would be almost undetectable and unstoppable.
 
And so on.
 
Asymmetric is not a special category of war that transcends the constants of war.  It is merely a set of tactics and operations that your/our military doesn’t normally use.  If we think China truly has superiority of technology, numbers, and industry then perhaps we should be looking at implementing asymmetric tactics ourselves.  If we took this approach, it would, of course, require a different force structure, doctrine, and tactics and would require intense training to become proficient … none of which we’re doing.
 
China is beatable.  What we need to do is decide how we want to go about it and start getting serious about equipping and training for it.

Perception Is Reality

An anonymous reader (please, people, include a username at the end your comments so I can offer proper credit!) offered an interesting thought regarding lessons that could be learned from the Royal Navy (RN).  He observed,
 

… once naval forces stop generating usefulness and relevance to the countries [sic] population.... you soon stop having a navy big enough to matter..[1]

I understand this to mean that he believes that a citizenry will direct their resources (taxes and popular opinion) to those endeavors and organizations that it sees the greatest benefit from.  This is not terribly surprising, it’s just basic human nature and quite reasonable.  In this specific case, the population of the UK sees value in ‘things’ other than the RN or, at least, the RN ranks fairly low on the priority list in the minds of the citizens.
 
Most of the readers of this blog, almost by definition, would see a great value in a navy for their country, whatever country that is.  You wouldn’t be reading the blog if you didn’t, right?  So, how is it that the citizenry of the UK sees so little value in the RN?  Does the Royal Navy really offer no value to the people?
 
There are two factors at play, here.
 
1. True value
2. Perceived value
 
Among other purposes, a navy, any navy, ensures the security of its country’s shipping, provides persistent surveillance, presence, and confrontation against unfriendly encroachments, and stands as a ready force against enemy attack.  This ensures unhindered trade and enhanced economic fortune for the population.  This is the true value.
 
How could any population not see that as valuable and gladly provide resources for the establishment and maintenance of a naval force?
 
Well, that brings us to the perceived value.  There’s an old saying:  perception is reality.  That means that whatever someone believes to be real is what’s real to them.  If you believe that your navy isn’t doing anything worthwhile then that’s your reality regardless of the true reality.
 
Where does perception come from, if not from reality?  How is someone’s perception formed?  Well, it comes from many sources: one’s own experiences, media news sources (you can instantly see, here, the danger posed by a biased media that presents an altered reality as true reality, but, I digress), social networks, etc.  If those various sources are not constantly presenting and explaining the true value of a navy then the perception quickly becomes that the navy has no value.
 
I can’t address the UK situation specifically but I can note that the US Navy makes almost no effort to talk to the citizenry and present its accomplishments and value in terms that the average person can understand and relate to.  Instead, the Navy resorts to blocking the media, circling the wagons, hiding behind bogus classification labels, misleading Congress and, generally, looking down at the general population. 
 
The Navy’s actions off Yemen involving missile attacks and defense should be made into near-movie type adventures to be presented to the public.  The exploits of our fearless sailors, fighting off relentless missile attacks so that Americans can get their oil and goods should be the stuff of growing legend.  It almost doesn’t matter how precisely true the accounts are.  That’s not the point.  The point is to present the Navy’s value to the public.
 
Once upon a time, moviegoers were routinely treated to newsreel highlights of our armed forces.  We need to bring back the updated version of that on TV, streaming channels, social media, podcasts, influencers, etc.  We need to continuously show the public the value of the Navy.  If we do that, the Navy won’t have to beg Congress for ships, the people will do it for them.  If we do that, the recruiting problem will solve itself.
 
On the other hand, if we persist in hiding information, the people will have no idea what the value of the Navy is and the people’s attention and resources will be directed elsewhere … which is exactly what’s been happening for years, now.
 
On a related note, if the US is providing the security for global shipping, then what true value does the RN offer?  Why should the UK citizenry pay for a navy when the US is providing their security for free?  One could see this as a powerful argument for the US to stop providing global security which would, in turn force other countries to increase their naval forces to fill the gap and result in an increase in their true (and perceived?) value.  Thus, one could make the argument, it is in the UK’s best interest for the US to stop providing international shipping security.  Interesting perspective, huh?
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2024/12/open-post.html?showComment=1735387686167#c4809056757800113041

MEU/ARG Issues

With the demise of informative DOT&E annual reports, we are left having to scratch around for breadcrumbs of information about the state of our military.  One such crumb is a Breaking Defense website article, undoubtedly intended as a praise-packed, puff piece, about the 2024 deployment of the 15^th MEU.  On the face of it, the deployment was a non-stop cascade of puppy dogs and kittens sliding down double rainbows and landing in pots of gold.  However, a careful reading between the lines reveals some surprising systemic problems that degraded the unit’s readiness and combat capability.  Let’s look closer.
 

Starting in January and spanning through most of 2024, the 15th MEU and Amphibious Squadron-5 completed nine major exercises; visited 11 foreign countries; responded to a typhoon that hit the Philippines; and completed 80 operations over the course of 10 months.

As an aside, why are we still doing 10 month deployments?  Does anyone remember the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP - 2014) of several years past that was going to optimize the deployment/training/maintenance cycle to ensure readiness and prevent extended deployments?  Yeah, that lasted about a day (see, “Deployments and OFRP”).
 
The deployment did not get off to a good start, losing one of its three amphibious ships, USS Boxer, almost immediately.
 

Just days after it initially deployed in April, the Boxer (LHD-4) was forced back to San Diego to fix a variety of maintenance issues.[1]

Even later in the deployment when Boxer eventually rejoined the ARG, ship maintenance issues continued.
 

But he [Capt. James Robinson, ARG commodore] did concede there was at least one “OAI” — an acronym short for “operations, activities and investments” — that was missed due to the ship’s maintenance problems.[1]

Ships were not the only equipment failures.  The ACV proved challenging, as well.
 

… MEU deployed with 12 ACVs in tow, and, he said, “it’s almost underwhelming to say that we learned a lot.”

There were challenges in understanding how to maintain the vehicles while deployed and concerns about corrosion prevention.[1]

This suggests that the Marine’s training with the ACV was significantly inadequate despite a decade or more of use and supposed thorough testing.  Corrosion prevention?  Seriously?  Aren’t these things designed to be immersed in salt water and be exposed to a salt-air environment for months on end?  How could corrosion possibly still be a problem and an unexpected problem, at that?
 

ACV - No one thought it would get wet or warm?

Another disturbing note was this,
 

The MEU also had to coordinate sending beach survey teams ahead of the ACVs to check that conditions were safe.[1]

The ACV is supposed to be able to handle less than perfect weather and physical conditions.  If not, if it can only be used in perfect conditions and hospitable locations then we have a nearly useless piece of equipment.  Combine this note with the history of ACV accidents and one can’t help but conclude that the vehicle is far less safe and effective than advertised.
 

At one point, even the water temperatures were cause for a concern. Dynan [Col. Sean Dynan, 15th MEU commanding officer] recalled that the waters in the Philippines were particularly hot, and there were questions about whether the vehicle’s cooling systems would cope.
 
“That was somewhat of a surprise,” he added.[1]

After all this time, water temperature effects were a surprise?  Really?  No one thought to test the vehicle in warm water?  The ACV’s first RFI dates back to 2011 and in the intervening 13 years no one thought to test the vehicle in warm water despite knowing that the Pacific would be a major area of employment?  What kind of geniuses were working on this program?
 
The ACV was not the only piece of equipment to experience challenges.
 

The MEU’s training and deployment also coincided with the Pentagon’s three-month-long grounding of the V-22 Osprey fleet, including the Marine Corps’ MV-22 variant.
 
… restrictions and intermittent V-22 Osprey groundings …
 
Due to where the MEU was operating, Dynan said the restrictions the Pentagon left in place after the Osprey fleets returned to flight didn’t affect operations. But the missed training time did mean that his flight crews had to work fast to regain qualifications and proficiency once the grounding was lifted in April.[1]

The MV-22 continues to be a problematic piece of equipment, useful only in very specific and restricted scenarios.  In any truly objective assessment, the MV-22 would have to be declared a very marginal success or an outright failure.
 
 
Discussion
 
As noted, we have no hard data to work with and must, instead, attempt to read between the lines and look for patterns.  Doing so reveals that the MEU/AGR have serious equipment and maintenance problems and that testing and training has been woefully inadequate.  This is true for both the Navy and Marines.  I suppose it’s good that the Marines have declared themselves out of the amphibious assault business (so why are they floating around on endless deployments?) because they seem to utterly lack the ability to execute a successful assault.
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “One deployment, three ships and a whole lot of challenges”, Justin Katz, 5-Feb-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/one-deployment-three-ships-and-a-whole-lot-of-challenges/

The Best Defense is a Good Offense

We’ve had repeated discussions about the defense of Guam (or any forward base) and everyone except the military seems to recognize that requires a layered defense which includes ships, planes, missiles, mines, etc.
 
However, there’s another layer to defense that never gets mentioned and that is offense. 
 
The best defense is a good offense.
 
This means that if you can destroy the source of attacks before they even launch, there’s nothing to defend and your defense is perfect.  Rather than shoot down missiles, find and destroyer the launchers (shoot archers not arrows).  Rather than try to intercept aircraft, destroy the aircraft’s bases.  Rather than search for submarines, destroy them pierside and destroy their shore support facilities.  And so on.
 
Offense is the first, best, defensive layer.
 
We just noted that the military is making little or no serious effort to build up Guam’s defenses and, indeed, may be reducing those defenses in response to environmental concerns (see, “BaseDefense is a Joke”).  As bad as that is, there has not even been the slightest thought given to incorporating an offensive layer into Guam’s defense.  The Air Force is not planning to conduct strikes against Chinese ballistic missile launch sites, airbases, or naval ports.  The Navy has no plans to launch cruise missiles at Chinese airbases and naval ports.  The Navy has no plan to attack Chinese submarines in their home ports or destroy their support facilities.
 
Some might attempt to make the argument, purely on faith, that the military does have plans but they just haven’t made them public.  That might seem like a reasonable proposition, on the face of it, but in our society there’s no such thing as a secret.  Further, if we did have such plans, we’d be practicing them and there have been no such exercises conducted … ever.  Recall the WWII War Plan Orange?  We had plans for fighting Japan and we conducted practice exercises in the form of Fleet Problems for years prior to the start of war.  There were no secrets even back then.  Besides, at least in a general sense, you’d like your potential enemy to know that you have plans to defeat them and that you’re diligently practicing so … no need to be overly concerned about secrecy.
 
The obvious conclusion is that we have no offensive plans to support Guam’s defensive efforts.  This must change.  We desperately need to get serious about the war with China and start planning, practicing, and engaging  …  offensively.

USAID Leadership Gutted

ComNavOps has often decried the use of the military in humanitarian and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts, believing those should not be military missions as they detract from combat training and cause unproductive wear and tear on equipment and personnel.  Instead, ComNavOps has proposed funding and equipping an organization like the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to deal with HA/DR and to provide the forward ‘presence’ and ‘deterrence’ that so many want the military to do.
 
Here is a portion of the USAID mission statement from the organization’s web page,
 

… the U.S. Agency for International Development leads the U.S. Government's international development and disaster assistance through partnerships and investments that save lives, reduce poverty, strengthen democratic governance, and help people emerge from humanitarian crises and progress beyond assistance.

A seeming perfect fit for HA/DR, presence, and deterrence, right?  Without going into a lengthy documentation trail, suffice it to say that USAID had become a left-leaning, political tool that was ineffective at its job.
 
The Trump administration has just announced that it has placed 60 senior USAID bureaucrats on indefinite leave, presumably as a prelude to termination.
 

A memo from acting USAID administrator Jason Gray says, "We have identified several actions within USAID that appear to be designed to circumvent the president’s executive orders and the mandate from the American people.“[1]
 
The decision appears to affect nearly every career staffer who holds a top leadership role at the agency, at least in Washington — around 60 officials, the current and former officials said.[1]
 
This action effectively shuts down most of USAID's $22.6 billion in program support.[1]

This is an excellent first step towards refocusing USAID on its core mission.
 
How often do we justify programs and platforms as being good because they will ‘free up’ other units for more important work?  Well, USAID, taking on the HA/DR, presence, and deterrence missions can free up military units and resources to concentrate on their core mission of warfighting.  Perfect, right?  Exactly what everyone calls for, right?
 

There's your disaster relief, done efficiently

Buy USAID a couple of small to medium size cargo ships, load them with disaster relief supplies, and crew them with civilian mariners and there’s your disaster relief effort for free, relative to military costs. 
 
Get the military out of HA/DR and give it to USAID or some similar organization.
 
 
Note:  The FY2025 USAID budget is $42.8B.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Trump Suspends As Many As 60 Senior Bureaucrats for Trying to Evade His Executive Orders”, streiff, 28-Jan-2025,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2025/01/28/trump-suspends-as-many-as-60-senior-bureaucrats-for-trying-to-evade-his-executive-orders-n2184896

Red Sea Weapon Expenditure

The War Zone website has an article offering the first glimpse into weapon expenditures in the Red Sea against the Houthis.  As stated by head of Naval Surface Forces, Vice Adm. Brendan McLane, here are the weapon expenditures:
 

• 120 SM-2 missiles
• 80 SM-6 missiles
• 20 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) and SM-3 missiles (combined, for some unknown reason)
• 160 rounds from five-inch guns

 
Total = 220 missiles
Total = 160 shells
 
CIWS was not mentioned although at least one example of CIWS use has been documented and acknowledged by the Navy.
 
Against this expenditure, the Admiral claims “more than 400” targets were engaged.
 
 
Elementary arithmetic shows that if the Navy’s 380 total munitions fired destroyed “more than 400 targets”, that’s a kill ratio (pK) of greater than 1.0 !!!!!  In other words, every Navy munition killed its target and many killed more than one target.  That’s amazing.  That’s incredible.  That’s unbelievable.  No, seriously, that’s not believable.  In fact, it’s blatantly wrong.
 
The admiral continues his unbelievable statements with,
 

“We’ve done the analysis with what we used to shoot in World War II, and we’re at about two rounds per incoming missile,” McLane said.[1]

We didn’t engage missiles in WWII so I have no idea what he’s talking about.  Aerial targets in WWII required thousands of rounds per hit so, again, I have no idea what he’s referring to.
 
Further, the good admiral undoubtedly is not including 5” shells in his statement of analysis as 5” guns have a near-zero chance of hitting a missile.  So, subtracting out the 5” shells, that means the Navy’s 220 missiles destroyed more than 400 targets for a pK of 1.8 or almost two targets destroyed by each defensive missile fired.  That’s just totally absurd, of course.
 
Setting all that aside, the admiral claims that two ‘rounds’ (which I assume to mean missiles) were used per engagement which would conform to the Navy’s standard ‘shoot, shoot, look’ tactic.  That means that the 220 missiles could have engaged only a maximum of 110 targets not more than 400.  That also assumes that every engagement worked and that would so greatly fly in the face of all historical defensive missile performance as to be flat out unbelievable.  The pK’s throughout history have been uniformly in the 0.01-0.25 range not 1.0-2.0.
 
Now, to be fair, the admiral wasn’t offering a detailed engagement analysis;  he was just providing weapon expenditures and likely threw out a ballpark number of targets just to provide context.  I don’t think he was lying or even being intentionally misleading.
 
I can readily imagine that some of the 400 targets were engaged by aircraft whose weapons (Sidewinders, presumably) weren’t included in the Navy’s ship weapons expenditure although that would mean that even fewer targets were actually engaged by ship missiles and that would significantly lower the pK.
 
We know that 5” guns are notoriously inaccurate (recall the Vincennes incident where some one hundred rounds were fired with zero hits) so the 160 shells fired were probably directed at just a few targets.
 
Clearly, this scant bit of information the admiral provided is not useful in analyzing weapon performance, only total expenditure and even that has gaps in the information since Sidewinders, CIWS, and RAM, among others, were not mentioned.  While the presumed pathetically poor quality and performance of the attacking missiles would result in better pK’s than historically found, I’m certain that the pK is nowhere near 1.0 and, indeed, the admiral’s own claim of two rounds per engagement disproves the apparent pK.  Unfortunately, until the Navy provides some detailed performance data, we can only speculate.
 
The only valid conclusion from the admiral’s statements is that we are on the wrong side of the cost curve … big time!  We’re using $2M-$4M missiles (two at a time!) to shoot down thousand dollar drones and cheap missiles.
 
This simply reinforces the common sense conclusion that you deal with attacks not by defending but by destroying the source of the attacks.  Perhaps the new administration will take a different view of the Red Sea actions than the previous administration.  We’ll have to wait and see and, in the meantime, we’ll continue to bleed money, deplete our missile inventories, and risk our ships while waiting for the inevitable leaker that gets through.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]The War Zone website, “Navy Just Revealed Tally Of Surface-To-Air Missiles Fired In Ongoing Red Sea Fight”, Geoff Ziezulewicz, 14-Jan-2025,
https://www.twz.com/news-features/navy-just-disclosed-how-many-of-each-of-its-surface-to-air-missiles-it-fired-during-red-sea-fight

2025 Shipbuilding Plan

China is building warships faster than we can keep track of them with dozens of new ships every year.  How is the US Navy doing, by comparison?  Let's take a look at the Navy's most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan and, more importantly, the five year portion of that plan (everything beyond five years is just made up guesses).

 
New Construction
 
According to the Navy’s most recent 2025 30 Year shipbuilding plan [1], over the next five years the Navy plans to build 33 combat ships (average 6.6 per year) which break down as follows:
 
Carriers CVN           0
Burke DDG            10
Constellation FFG   7
Virginia SSN            9
San Antonio LPD    3
Columbia SSBN      4
 
In comparison, China went from around 190 to 250 (+60) in the four years 2020-2023 inclusive for an average of 15 new ships per year which is twice the build rate of the US.
 
In addition, the Navy plans to build 24 assorted auxiliaries and logistics vessels.
 
 
Retirements
 
Balanced against the build plans, the Navy plans to decommission 64 ships as indicated below and broken down by year.
 
2025 19
2026 17
2027 12
2028   7
2029   9
 
2025 CG 4, SSN 3, LCS 2, LSD 1, other 9
2026 CVN 1, CG 3, LCS 1, SSN 3, SSGN 2, LSD 2, other 5
2027 CG 2, SSN 1, SSBN 1, other 8
2028 DDG 2, SSN 1, SSGN 2, SSBN 1, LSD 1
2029 DDG 3, SSN 1, LSD 1, LHD 1, other 3
 
Total retirements by type:
 
CVN     1
CG       9
DDG    5
SSN     9
SSGN  4
SSBN  2
LCS     3
LSD     5
LHD     1
other  25
 
 
Discussion
 
We see, then, that in the five year plan (beyond five years is just pure made up guesses), the Navy is planning to retire 39 combat ships and 25 auxiliaries while building 33 combat ships and 24 auxiliaries for a net decrease of 6 combat ships and 1 auxiliary … while we’re supposedly gearing up for a near term war with China.  What’s wrong with this picture?
 
Other notable findings:
 

• The entire MCM force will be retired
• All SSGNs will be retired
• Nimitz class retirements will begin
• Burke class retirements will begin
• No new carriers are scheduled in the period
• No Burke/Tico replacement is planned

 
The MCM capability is of major concern.  The entire current MCM force of Avenger class ships and MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters will be retired with only a half dozen or so Independence variant LCS-MCM to take over mine countermeasures for the entire world.  Worse, the LCS MCM module is not yet functional and is entirely ineffective.  For all practical purposes, we no longer have any mine countermeasure capability.
 
The SSGN is far and away our most stealthy and effective land attack naval asset and will be retired without direct replacement.  The Virginia class, even with the VPM, simply cannot equal the SSGN in effectiveness and operational usefulness.
 
The lack of a Burke/Tico replacement is a major weakness.  We’ll be losing VLS (strike and AAW) capacity from the fleet while replacing them, numerically, with small, unmanned vessels with a fraction of the VLS.  The Burke Flt III is obsolete even before the first joins the fleet and is emphatically not the solution to future naval warfare due to the lack of stealth, armor, firepower, weight/stability margins, combat resilience, effective damage control, and a sub-optimal radar system.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, ” Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2025”, Mar 2024

MQ-8 Fire Scout Status

Remember when the Navy was claiming that the unmanned helicopter, the MQ-8 Fire Scout, was going to revolutionize naval warfare, providing area wide surveillance, total situational awareness, target detection and tracking, fire control for remote weapons, anti-surface capability, mine countermeasures, and … well … total battlefield dominance?  Let’s check in and see how that’s coming along.
 

The Future of Naval Warfare ... bye, bye

For starters, the Navy has all but abandoned the Fire Scout.

 

The current inventory is 36 aircraft with no additional procurement planned.[1]
 
President’s Budget 2023 included a significant divestment within the MQ-8 program, resulting in the removal of all MQ-8B AVs [ed. AV = Air Vehicle] from inventory and reduction of the MQ-8C AV active operational inventory. Currently there are 11 aircraft dedicated to operational employment with 3 allocated to test and training, an increase of 1 from last year’s Annual Report. Projections for FY24 will increase the operational employment number to 15. The remainder are in a preservation status and are planned to be used for maintenance parts as necessary to support the pool of operational aircraft.[1]

Budget documents from 2024 indicate that the Fire Scout is being phased out completely.
 

Operational employment of the MQ-8C will end in Q4 FY2024 and sundown will be completed by Q4 FY2026.[2]

Instead of having hundreds of Fire Scouts roaming the battlefield and dominating our enemies, as promised, the Navy is down to around a dozen, which are being phased out, and appears to have lost interest in the platform.
 
With the near abandonment of the Fire Scout as context, there are, nominally, three variations (increments, as the Navy terms it) of Fire Scout in the works:
 

• Endurance Baseline Increment – imaging EO/IR sensor and laser range finder and designator
• SUW Increment – maritime search radar
• Mine Countermeasure Increment – COBRA near shore mine detection

 
How is testing coming along?  DOT&E states,
 

The Navy has yet to complete land-based testing necessary to characterize radar performance against maritime targets.[1]

Conclusion
 
It seems that the Navy has all but abandoned the Fire Scout, presumably having realized that it has no effective use case in combat.  Of course, ComNavOps has been saying this since the first MQ-8 appeared.  Nice of the Navy to finally catch up.
 
Like the LCS, Zumwalt, and others, the Fire Scout platform has gone from being the future of naval warfare to an afterthought in a remarkably short period of time.
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2023 Annual Report, Jan 2024,
 
[2]Flight Global website, “US Navy’s MQ-8C Fire Scouts fly into retirement just two years after entering operational service”, Jan Tegler, 29-May-2024,
https://www.flightglobal.com/helicopters/us-navys-mq-8c-fire-scouts-fly-into-retirement-just-two-years-after-entering-operational-service/158500.article

Destroyer Modernization

ComNavOps loves to report good news out of the Navy but seldom has the opportunity.  Here is a possible positive development regarding modernization of Burke Flt IIA destroyers.
 
A handful of ships have been designated for modernization under the Navy’s Destroyer Modernization 2.0 program.  Upgrades involve installation of :
 

• SEWIP Block III SLQ-32(V)7
• SPY-6 V4 air and missile defense radar
• Baseline 10 Aegis Weapon System.
• 350t high efficiency super capability chiller that provides the extra cooling needed when adding both the SLQ and SPY array to the legacy hulls

 
The initial set of destroyers chosen for modernization are:
 

• USS Pinckney (DDG-91)
• USS James E. Williams (DDG-95)
• USS Chung Hoon (DDG-93)
• USS Halsey (DDG-97)

 
These ships will receive upgrades incrementally rather than in a single availability.  The intent is for these ships to act as lessons learned prior to implementing fleet wide upgrades beginning in 2029.
 

In the first modernization period, destroyers will receive the AN/SLQ-32(V)7 SEWIP Block III. According to Moore, these vessels will serve in the fleet “for some time” before returning for a second depot modernization period to receive a modified AN/SPY-6 air and missile defense radar.[1]

The Navy has also announced that USS Sterett (DDG-104) will be the first ship to receive the entire upgrade set in a single availability sometime in the next five years.
 
The Navy’s explanation for the modernization effort is,
 

“The bottom line here, the real takeaway that I want you to take here, is that we are bridging the gap between our legacy destroyers and the Flight III by delivering decisive combat power to the Flight IIA DDGs,” said Moore [DDG 2.0 modernization program manager Capt. Tim Moore].
 
The $17 billion modernization program aims to bring the fleet’s Flight IIA destroyers up to “Flight III-like capabilities” … [1]

Somewhat puzzlingly, the Navy has also identified some ships to receive only fragmentary upgrades.
 

… the Navy has also identified USS Kidd (DDG-100) to be the first of a “handful of ships” to receive only a SEWIP Block III upgrade and no SPY-6 back fit.[1]

Why the Navy wouldn’t fully upgrade these ships is unknown.  It is also unknown whether they would be included in the eventual fleet wide upgrade effort.
 
It is good that ships are being modernized rather than retired early, as the Navy is so often prone to do.  The question, now, is whether the Navy will follow through on this plan.  One of the concerns is the extended time period for this modernization.  Given that the main effort will not begin until 2029, will it still be a modernization?  In other words, will current equipment still constitute a modernization four-plus years from now?  One can easily envision the Navy, some four to ten years from now, telling Congress that the modernization is no longer adequate and the ships are too worn out to be financially worth upgrading and, therefore, they want new ships, instead.  Why do I think this?  Because that’s exactly what they’ve done in the past, repeatedly.
 
Despite the obvious dangers and doubts, I’ll view this as good news until the Navy proves otherwise.  Now, if they’d just drop the idiotic unmanned vessel nonsense and focus on firepower, I’d have some real positive news to write about!
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Navy Identifies First Destroyer to Receive Full Set of DDG MOD 2.0 Upgrades”, Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, 16-Jan-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/01/16/navy-identifies-first-destroyer-to-receive-full-set-of-ddg-mod-2-0-upgrades