Reader AndyM had recently offered an absolutely masterful
summation of Marine Corps acquisition programs.
He is dead on. Indeed, this thought can be expanded to the entire Navy! Consider some recent Navy acquisition programs:
Granted, each has incorporated some technology improvements
but none have been clean sheet, unconstrained, new designs with future combat
in mind. This blog has proposed many
platforms that are designed with future combat requirements in mind and none
bear any resemblance to the Navy’s tired repeats. Future combat will require entirely new ways
of approaching stealth, armor, firepower, surveillance, sensors, ship design,
and doctrine/tactics. None of that has
been incorporated into recent acquisition programs.
Not only have these platforms remained almost unchanged,
unbelievably, some have been downgraded in order to keep them the same! For example, the new Burkes have had their
critical radars downsized in order to fit into the same platform. The future war requirements have changed but
the Navy has proudly demonstrated that the Burke will not change, by God! The Navy wants no part of a new ship when
they can keep making the same old one!
Where are the stealthy carriers with long range fighter air
wings? Where are the Visby-like stealth
ships? Where are the UAV carriers? Where are the pure passive platforms, ship
and aircraft? Where are the dedicated
ASW corvettes? And so on.
As AndyM observed, this pattern of repeats clearly
demonstrates an organization bereft of ideas which, in turn, denotes an
organization bereft of professional warriors capable of analyzing combat and
correctly predicting future needs. Even
the Marines didn’t analyze future combat in making their idiotic and useless
shift to being pointless missile shooters;
they analyzed future budget share and changed to preserve their slice of
the pie.
We must break the cycle of repeats whose main justification
is that they’re viewed as “safe” acquisition programs.
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Nothing says dead on ideas like just making a new repeat, LCAC, H-53 and LCU.[1]
He is dead on. Indeed, this thought can be expanded to the entire Navy! Consider some recent Navy acquisition programs:
- LCU-1700 – nearly an exact duplicate of the previous LCU class
- H-53 – in production since the 1960’s
- SSC (Ship to Shore Connector) – nearly an exact duplicate of the original LCAC
- Burke – rapidly approaching its centennial year of production
- Constellation (mini-Burke) – just a scaled down Burke
- Virginia – an upgraded Los Angeles class submarine
- F-18 Super Hornet – a little bigger regular Hornet
- Ford – a bigger repeat of the Nimitz with some [thus far] failed technological gimmicks thrown in
- E-2D – repeat of the E-2C with the next higher letter; 22 more versions to go before a new aircraft design is needed
- ACV – repeat of the AAV
This is symptomatic of a deeper root cause, which is that ever since the Cold War ended, we've no longer been maintaining rapid designing and fielding cycles. Almost all our equipment today was essentially designed during the Carter administration, 50 years ago.
ReplyDeleteOn the other hand, the problem is also that new developmental programs take so long to come to fruition, and have a good chance of never panning out. The Army has been using Abrams for the last 40 years because every single Abrams replacement program has failed miserably (although, to be fair, it also bears pointing out that tanks are one aspect where it's a lot easier to update them to remain relevant, because the changes are internal to the hullform - new armor arrays, new ammunition, new optics and systems).
I'm reminded of the time when the Army was trying to field the bleeding edge Cheyenne attack helicopter, and then eventually gave up on the program, because in the time and money they'd spent to put together 6 R&D airframes, they'd also bought 1100 Cobras that were actively serving in Vietnam.
"we've no longer been maintaining rapid designing and fielding cycles"
DeleteDuring WWII, designers quite rightly sacrificed bleeding edge advancement for rapid fielding. Today, the military has become infatuated with bleeding edge and have sacrificed rapid fielding. Our priorities are out of whack and must change.
"On the other hand, the problem is also that new developmental programs take so long to come to fruition, and have a good chance of never panning out. "
The answer is the same as above.
" tanks are one aspect where it's a lot easier to update them to remain relevant"
Is that true? If you were designing a new tank for future combat and were unconstrained by previous designs, would you produce a bigger, heavier Abrams or would your design be entirely different with, say, anti-drone sensors/weapons built in, a visible and IR stealth design, much reduced weight for transportability and poor surface movement, perhaps a scaled down rail gun, integrated active protection (as opposed to add-ons), a different power plant, 360 deg passive sensors, perhaps an integrated mini-drone for scouting and targeting, etc.? I'm 100% sure that an unconstrained new design wouldn't turn out to be an Abrams with a new paint job.
Totally agree.
ReplyDeleteBeyond that, what’s to say…?
For all the ACV's flaws as a repeat of the AAV, at some point, the replacement for a metal box is just another metal box. It bears noting that the ACV entrants were all chosen from existing COTS designs as a risk mitigation measure, after the failure of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.
ReplyDeleteWe can observe that the Chinese, too, are under similar constraints, given that the PLAN Marines are apparently doing a joint buy of the PLA Ground Forces' new 8x8 APC, instead of a clean sheet sucessor to the ZBD-05 and ZTD-05 (or even a technology refresh).
"the replacement for a metal box is just another metal box."
DeleteSo, you're suggesting that the replacement for the wood and fabric WWI Sopwith Camel is an endless string of wood and fabric aircrafts? The replacement for sailing warships was more sailing warships? Come on, now. If you were designing a clean sheet amphibious landing craft, unconstrained by anything that came before, are you sure you'd wind up with the ACV? I wouldn't!
"ACV entrants were all chosen from existing COTS designs as a risk mitigation measure"
This is what our military acquisition efforts have largely become: safe choices whose main feature is avoidance of programmatic risk. The Constellation is a mini-Burke. The Burke Flt III is a near identical copy of the previous Burke. And so on.
There's nothing wrong with wringing the most you can out of a design and building a few subsequent iterations that incorporate the lessons from the previous. The "D" model of the P-51 Mustang was the improved version of the "A", for example. But, at some point, you have to advance to a new design. Jet engines instead of radial, missiles instead of guns (but don't totally abandon guns!), back slanted wings instead of straight, stealth, radar instead of eyeballs, etc.
China's new amphibious assault vehicle features unmanned turret. Likely, it is still under development as it has not shown in last September's military parade. China then emphasized all displayed were then active duty equipment.
Deletehttps://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/china-tests-new-family-of-amphibious-infantry-fighting-vehicles-to-replace-the-type-05
You've managed to highlight what's collegially called bureaucratic inertia.
ReplyDeleteIt's more than that. It's fear. Fear of yet another programmatic failure. Thus, the desire to build something that is already not a failure instead of building what we really need. The Burke Flt III is not what we really need, it's what's safe because we're already building them. Sure, the Flt III is obsolete and unsuited for future naval combat but we can build it without too much fear of program failure.
DeleteWe have a lot of what I think of as "Irish Elk" evolution going on. Other species fade away and what's left grows and has lost its resilience for swings in their environment. Big deck amphibs with a well deck that can only launch 2 LCAC, 1 LCU, and associated ACVs at close range. We can't even nest smaller connectors side by side usefully as the ramp into the well is only in the well's centerline now for LCAC ramp width. I really look at the LCU replacement as a miss as we could work with the Army MSVL team to design a version that fits a well deck, ideally 4 per well and still keep the LCACs load so we are doubling the load per well should we displace the LCACs for another platform.
ReplyDeleteThink about that from an operational risk/attrition perspective. Are four landing craft per transport vessel really a combat resilient load? Do we really think we won't suffer casualties to landing craft in an opposed landing? Or, just simple mechanical failure? Also, consider the concentration of troops in each landing craft when we lose one. Is it really wise to concentrate that many troops in one large target? We've forgotten the combat lessons of WWII.
DeleteConcentration of troops in one large target. Agree, go back to using APA's for troop landing, larger number of smaller landing craft with smaller number of troops embarked. Use the large deck amphibs for heavy equipment. One of the ships I served on was LKA 113 (Charleston), which was an assault cargo ship. Normal connectors were 4 LCM(8) and several LCVP. You could usually off load the entire vehicle cargo at anchor in less than a day. Off loading personel only should go way quicker. I would think it would not be that hard to come up with a new fast attack transport design.
DeleteThe last time the Navy tried something completely different, we ended up with not one, but two LCSs. It's the culture that has to change.
ReplyDeleteOur acquisition programs either overreach and fail (LCS, Zumwalt, etc.) or underreach and gain us nothing (Burke Flt III, Constellation, E-2D, etc.).
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