This is Your Mine Countermeasures

The last Avenger class mine countermeasures (MCM) vessel, USS Devastator (MCM 6), has now been retired.[1]  Our surface MCM capability is now entirely in the hands of the Independence class LCS.  Yes, that LCS.  The ship and MCM module that has suffered years of delay, failure after failure, and no realistic operational testing.  That one.  That disaster.  No, this isn’t a Halloween horror story, although it should scare you to death.  This is our current naval MCM reality.
 
To briefly review, the LCS-MCM consists of a helo and an unmanned boat, each of which carry/tow various attachments as listed below.
 
MH-60S Seahawk mine warfare helicopters 

• AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) shallow water laser mine detection
• AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) suicide drones

 
Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV) tow boat 

• AN/AQS-20C forward/side scan mine detection sonar
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) acoustic and influence sweep

 
Now, how is that all working?  Go read the annual GAO and DOT&E weapon assessments and you’ll get the history and status of the LCS MCM module.  It’s not pretty.  In addition, Naval News website offers a fantastic summary of the Independence-MCM.  Here’s some excerpts. 

Embarked helicopters also operate with the AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), offering a safer method to counter-mine potential threats compared to traditional mechanical minesweeping with EOD divers.[1]

Safer?  Yes.
Effective?  No.
Efficient?  No.
Fast?  No. 

The sonars on the CUSVs are not a high enough resolution to identify specific threats. The lasers used on MH-60S helicopters require water that is not too turbid to operate in.[1]

So, the system only works in clear water and even then can’t reliably identify the threats?  Good … good. 

… when it comes to the unmanned systems used for mine countermeasures. Each mission takes roughly four hours of maintenance pre-mission followed by one-and-a-half hours of calibration of GPS and sonar to reach acceptable accuracy for MCM missions. The rough estimate is six hours of pre-mission preparation before mine countermeasures can begin. In real-world scenarios, that time may not exist.[1]

So, the equipment may not be effective but it’s slow.  Agonizingly slow.  That might be okay for clearing a fifty foot wide channel over the course of a month but that’s useless for combat operations. 

These concerns do not address the single points of failure in the LCS and MCM package, which make the package an extremely risk-prone platform for operations.
 
The platform lift on the LCS that moves equipment from the mission bay to the flight deck is a major operational point for equipping the MH-60S with ALMDS or AMNS. If the lift fails, the helicopter is combat ineffective. If the tow hook on a CUSV breaks, it is combat ineffective and must be towed back or recovered another way. If the Twin Boom Extensible Frame, used to lower CUSVs into the water, breaks, the entire MCM platform is inoperable and USVs cannot be launched for missions.[1]

As an example, 

One test of the MCM package on USS Tulsa (LCS 16), a ship that arrived in Bahrain in May for MCM operations, resulted in a runaway USV, according to one U.S. Navy official familiar with the testing. During that test, part of the tow bracket used to recover the mine countermeasures CUSV broke, leaving it unrecoverable.[1]

But wait, there’s more! 

The components of the LCS MCM mission module were not originally designed to be loaded into the 30,000 square feet of mission bay space and shortcomings have been encountered in balancing the space between 11 meter CUSVs, four or five 12-foot CONEX boxes, a lift system for the CUSVs, and an independent berthing box for the operators of the MCM suite.[2]
 
Due to these space constraints, modularity of this platform is no longer offered or being pursued by the U.S. Navy to switch between mission modules, a sharp turn from the original planning of the LCS.[2]
 
According to Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director of the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division, the 11 meter CUSV is currently limited by form factor, limiting the endurance of the platform and the weight of the cable for towed sonar depth. The current form factor of the CUSV is limiting the maximum performance that can be extracted from the AN/AQS-20C sonar suite.[2]
 
Another limiting factor, according to Captain Hattaway, is the range offered by the CUSV. Line of sight between the LCS mothership and the CUSV is required. In heavy sea states, effectiveness is limited. Bandwidth is taxed by the amount of information that needs to be shared back and forth to the operator and the sensor suites. The U.S. Navy is working on methods to extend the range of deployed CUSVs, including the use of Starshield, the U.S. military’s arm of the Starlink satellite internet platform.[2]

Conclusion
 
Really?  Isn’t the conclusion pretty obvious?
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Unproven Littoral Combat Ships are replacing retired MCM ships in Bahrain”, Carter Johnson, 26-Sep-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/09/combat-ineffective-littoral-combat-ships-are-replacing-mcm-ships-in-bahrain/
 
[2]Naval News website, “Update on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Carter Johnson, 4-Jan-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-mine-countermeasures-mission-package/

LCS Mine Countermeasures Module Ready? Not Really

The LCS modules have been under development for something on the order of two decades, now, and none are yet ready at anything approaching the original specifications or concepts.  In fact, the anti-submarine (ASW) module has been terminated.  The anti-surface (ASuW) module is a joke, having little capability and what there is, is a faint shadow of the original intent and specifications.  The mine countermeasures (MCM) module is ready in the sense that there are a group of individual components that kind of perform limited mine clearance.  Even those components are constrained in their performance, as a Naval News website article documents.[1]
 
For starters, the entire MCM module doesn’t fit in the LCS!
 

The components of the LCS MCM mission module were not originally designed to be loaded into the 30,000 square feet of mission bay space and shortcomings have been encountered in balancing the space between 11 meter CUSVs, four or five 12-foot CONEX boxes, a lift system for the CUSVs, and an independent berthing box for the operators of the MCM suite.[1]

The unmanned tow vessel is also causing performance problems.
 

According to Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director of the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division, the 11 meter CUSV is currently limited by form factor, limiting the endurance of the platform and the weight of the cable for towed sonar depth. The current form factor of the CUSV is limiting the maximum performance that can be extracted from the AN/AQS-20C sonar suite.[1]

Communications are another issue.
 

Another limiting factor, according to Captain Hattaway, is the range offered by the CUSV. Line of sight between the LCS mothership and the CUSV is required. In heavy sea states, effectiveness is limited. Bandwidth is taxed by the amount of information that needs to be shared back and forth to the operator and the sensor suites.[1]

The original intent was to keep the host LCS well away from the actual minefield but the communication issues are causing the ship to operate near the minefield, nullifying the original intended benefit of unmanned operations.
 
The Navy is looking to incorporate some kind of UAV as a communications relay.
 

“We’re looking at having a UAV with a towed antenna, raising the elevation to hundreds of feet in the air that will allow us to increase the range of USVs …[1]

The MCM module is becoming a real ‘Rube Goldberg’ collection of increasingly ridiculous, mismatched, and constrained components attempting to meet a bare minimum capability.
 
A reminder … Even if all this works perfectly, it’s still a failure in that it’s predominantly a one-at-a-time hunting method which is operationally useless in a combat situation.  Yes, the Navy claims to have an influence sweep capability but, to the best of my knowledge, that has never been tested and certainly not realistically.  I have severe doubts that the sweeping method will work against modern smart mines.
 
Two decades or more of work and we have a cobbled together collection of misfit, limited capability MCM components.  Well done, Navy!  You’ve made us proud.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Update On The U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Carter Johnston, 4-Jan-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-mine-countermeasures-mission-package/

LCS MCM Status Update

As you know, the poor LCS has been sailing for many years without any functional, useful modules.  The modules were supposed to have been:
 

ASuW (anti-surface warfare) – The module has been watered down to near nothingness.  I think, now, it consists of a guy on the bow with a 9 mm handgun.

 

ASW (anti-submarine warfare) – The module was cancelled and ASW has been terminated as an LCS mission.

 

MCM (mine countermeasures) – The module has been in development since just after the Revolutionary War.

 
Well now, after a dozen or so LCS have been retired or scheduled for retirement, the Navy has finally declared initial operating capability (IOC) for the LCS MCM module.  Let’s update ourselves on the MCM module.
 
The mission module components keep changing as they fail, one after the other, so it’s difficult to keep up with the current status but, as best I can glean, the main components of the MCM module are:
 
MH-60 Helicopter

Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)

Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)

 
Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV)

Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS)

AN/AQS-20C mine-hunting sonar

 
 
The helo tows or operates the ALMDS and AMNS while the USV tows the UISS and sonar.
 
Knifefish and other (too many to list) individual components have been tested over the years and have fallen by the wayside.
 
It’s been quite a wait for the MCM module, hasn’t it?  And the wait isn’t quite over.  The first LCS was launched in 2006 and the modules began development prior to that so the MCM module has been in development for an unbelievable 17+ years … and still isn’t quite complete! 

Moton [Rear Adm. Casey Moton, program executive officer for unmanned and small combatants] said the Navy planned to deploy the first LCS with the mine countermeasure package in fiscal 2025.[1]

Deployment in 2025, assuming that isn’t further delayed, would put the development at 19+ years.
 
The Navy’s next task is to congratulate themselves and hand out medals all around.  When asked about the development effort, Moton had this to say, 

“Overall we’ve proceeded well throughout it.”[2] 

Well done, indeed, Adm. Moton!  A mere 17+ years to develop the MCM module is a praise-worthy accomplishment, without a doubt!
 
Well, at least the MCM module is here, now, and we know it works because it’s been tested against simulated mines rather than real ones. 

For the IOT&E testing, Moton said Cincinnati’s crew operated the mission package “against a simulated minefield to achieve required mission objectives, including maintenance, pre and post-mission system prep, post-mission data analysis, in-mission command and control and launch and recovery.”[2] 

Does ‘simulated’ mean an inert mine body or does it mean a virtual, non-existent mine as so many of our exercises use today? 

“We completed approximately 230 hours of MCM USV mine hunt operations, over 33 missions from the host LCS as well as from a shore-based command center to fully asses [sic] the sonar’s performance. We executed a total of 12 airborne sorties, with fielded ALMDS and AMNS systems demonstrating the full integration with the MCM mission package,” Moton said.[2] 

We demonstrated 16 full launch and recovery iterations in the MCM mission package IOT&E.”[2] 

Twelve airborne sorties?!  Wow!  That’s testing the crap out of the system, all right!  That many sorties must have thoroughly tested the system in day, night, shallow water, deep water, good weather, bad weather, warm water, cold water, fast currents, high sea states, and against all types of [simulated] mines, and each test must have been conducted many times over to establish statistical validity.  The Navy managed to test all those conditions and establish statistical relevancy in only 12 sorties!  And against ‘simulated’ mines at that!  I’m impressed!  There is no chance this system won’t work flawlessly in the real world.
 
Sixteen launch and recovery iterations?!  Under all the conditions just mentioned?  Again … wow!
 
Well, obviously, I’m mocking the Navy’s LCS-MCM effort.  Specifically, I’m mocking 

• the protracted 17+ year developmental effort
• the pathetically inadequate testing
• the utterly lacking statistically valid test protocols and repetitions
• the ignoring of the many real world, operational conditions that ought to have been tested (you had 17+ years, for crying out loud!)
• the use of ‘simulated’ mines as proof of performance
• the Navy’s delusional, self-congratulatory attitude to what can only be classified as a fiasco of historic proportions 

If I was the Navy, I wouldn’t have even declared IOC – and, seriously, does anyone believe it’s a real IOC as opposed to a pencil-whipped, public relations stunt?  Instead, I would have left it alone and hoped no one noticed the humiliating, embarrassment the MCM module is.  Heck, in a few years the LCS will all be gone via early retirement and the MCM module status will just be a forgotten footnote in history.  Declaring IOC just brings the entire, painful, humiliating episode to the front for everyone to mock.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Defense News website, “US Navy declares its mine countermeasures suite ready for operations”, Megan Eckstein, 11-May-2023,
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/05/11/us-navy-declares-its-mine-countermeasures-suite-ready-for-operations/
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy Talks Details on LCS Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Mallory Shelbourne, 12-May-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/05/12/navy-talks-details-on-lcs-mine-countermeaures-mission-package

Stunning LCS News!

I don’t know how this slipped by me but here’s some stunning LCS news.

 

The Navy has officially abandoned the LCS ASW module!

 

Apparently related to this (in the Navy’s mind), in FY23,

 

… the Navy plans to decommission 9 Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships,…

 

Explaining the LCS decommissionings, Navy deputy assistant secretary for budget Rear Adm. John Gumbleton cited the service’s decision to abandon the anti-submarine warfare mission package for the LCS class because the Constellation-class frigate will have that capability.

 

“And the ASW variant – mission module – huge challenges, not going to work.”[1]

 

There it is.  The Navy is officially acknowledging that the ASW module is a failure. 

 

How many times did ComNavOps and others describe the unsolvable problems associated with the LCS and ASW?  Ignoring us – and reality - , how much time and money has the Navy wasted on this?  Someone absolutely has to be court-martialed over this.  This is far beyond a simple mistake.  This is fraud, negligence, incompetence, and waste on a criminal scale.  Navy officials lied about this program for years.  Someone must pay.

 

If CNO Gilday had an ounce of integrity, he’d resign  …  but he doesn’t.

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “FY 23 Budget: Navy Wants to Shed 24 Ships for $3.6B in Savings Over Next Five Years”, Mallory Shelbourne, 28-Mar-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/03/28/fy-23-budget-navy-wants-to-shed-24-ships-for-3-6b-in-savings-over-next-five-years

Knifefish

General Dynamics Mission Systems (GD) has opened a new Knifefish UUV (unmanned underwater vehicle) manufacturing facility at its Taunton, Massachusetts site.(1)

 

As a reminder, Knifefish is intended to be part of the LCS mine countermeasures (MCM) module and will be used to search for buried or bottom mines.  Suspect mine locations and data are recorded to the UUV’s onboard data storage module for later upload to the host LCS for analysis.  More recently, a data transmission capability has been added to try to streamline the data transfer process. 

 

Knifefish UUV

Knifefish is a 21” diameter, torpedo shaped UUV with a length of around 19 ft and a weight of 1700 lb.  It uses a low frequency, broadband, synthetic aperture sonar.  Knifefish is capable of operating for around 16 hrs (3) which, depending on the distance to and from the area of operation allows for perhaps 10-12 hrs of actual search operations.  Its operational speed is a maximum of 4.5 kts(4).

 

GD is currently building five systems, with each system consisting of two UUVs, launch and recovery equipment, and control equipment.(1)  The Navy is planning to procure 48 Knifefish UUVs with two allocated to each of 24 MCM modules the Navy hopes to buy.

 

We’ve often discussed the need to produce weapons and systems quickly during a time of war.  So, what’s the production rate of the Knifefish?

 

The facility, approximately 8,000 square feet in size, will be capable of producing one system per month after receiving long-lead-time materials, said Craig Regnier, the manufacturing operations manager at the Taunton plant. (2)

 

One system per month?  I hope we have a very slow war!

 

Unfortunately, Knifefish epitomizes the problem with the LCS MCM module.  Knifefish is not a one-step mine disposal system as you might expect.  Instead, Knifefish is just the first step in a multi-step process that requires a great deal of time. The major problem is that detection is not even remotely a real-time operation.  The Knifefish UUV runs its scan pattern (at 4.5 kts!) and is then recovered aboard the LCS where the data is then analyzed.  Carlo Zaffanella, vice president and general manager of the GDMS Maritime and Strategic Systems business noted this problem and identified it as something he wants to improve.

 

The next step is finding ways to make UUVs operationally more useful. A top focus here, he said, is the ability to analyze data while the UUV is still in the water, for something closer to real-time threat identification.

 

“Clearly, you would like to get to where more of that analysis were possible in real time, or at least as close to real time as you can make it,” Zaffanella told reporters. “If we could get the devices to provide not just essentially a map of what’s out there but perhaps detects or even tracks and say, ‘This is really what you want to be concerned about in real time,’ then the operational utility will go up.” (1)

 

So … even the manufacturer recognizes that the UUV has only limited utility and yet the Navy still wants it.  Hmm …

 

The overall LCS MCM process involves multiple initial scans by various methods, followed by confirmation scans, followed by individual mine disposal.  The mine clearance rate is something on the order of 1 per hour or less which is far from being combat-useful.  For leisurely, peacetime clearance operations that can span weeks or months, that process might be fine but for combat operations that clearance rate is a non-starter.

 

Setting that aside, do you find the following as disturbing as I did?

 

Capt. Gus Weekes, the Navy’s LCS mission modules program manager, said he had watched GD staff launch a Knifefish at the waterfront in Quincy earlier in the week. During the testing, he said the UUV experienced a failure but praised the company for its ability to recover the drone despite the issue. (2)

 

So, let me get this straight.  At a planned PR showcase event, where the UUV undoubtedly was exquisitely fine-tuned for the event, the UUV fails and the Navy program manager praises it?  Shouldn’t this raise some red flags?  Shouldn’t this prompt suspicion and criticism instead of praise?

 

Unfortunately, the current trend is that the Navy routinely accepts delivery of damaged and incomplete ships and equipment.  Now, we’re extending that trend to praising malfunctioning MCM components.  Shouldn’t the Navy have slammed the brakes on the program instead of praising it?  This is how you get EMALS and AGS and LCS failures – by not questioning and holding manufacturers accountable.  I’d have suspended all contracts and payments and demanded proof of success before resuming production.

 

This is yet another system whose effectiveness and value seem exceedingly questionable.  Time after time, the Navy rides questionable systems right down the drain until they’re total failures instead of cutting their losses and terminating questionable systems early on.  This is how we wound up with the LCS, Zumwalt, and so many other useless systems.

 

Even if Knifefish worked perfectly, it’s not suitable or effective for combat mine clearance operations.  It’s time to cut the cord on this one.

 

 

 

_______________________________________

 

(1)Defense News website, “General Dynamics opens new unmanned underwater vehicle manufacturing center”, Megan Eckstein, 16-Aug-2021,

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/navy-league/2021/08/16/general-dynamics-opens-new-unmanned-underwater-vehicle-manufacturing-center/

 

(2)Breaking Defense website, “GD Mission Systems Launches Knifefish Production Facility ”, Justin Katz, 17-Aug-2021,

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/gd-mission-systems-launches-knifefish-production-facility/

 

(3)https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/knifefish-unmanned-undersea-vehicle-uuv/

 

(4)https://auvac.org/files/uploads/platform_pdf/bluefin-21-product-sheet.pdf

LCS Scorecard

The LCS production run is nearing an end and the ships have been in service for over a decade so let’s take a moment and see how the promise of the LCS has panned out.

 

 

 

LCS Attribute	Result	Comment
Speed	fail	Arguably the number one design attribute of the LCS, the speed has been steadily reduced to a pedestrian 35-37 kts despite so much being sacrificed at the altar of speed.
Module Swapping	fail	This was abandoned when stability and other issues were found to preclude rapid swapping.  The LCS is now a single function, non-swappable vessel.
Minimal Manning	fail	The original minimal core crew of around 40 has ballooned up to 50-60 and now two crews per ship put the total core crew at well over one hundred.  Add in the module crew, helo detachment personnel, and shore maintenance crew and the manning figure is around 200+ per ship.
Deployment	fail	The rotating crew concept was supposed to enable extended forward deployments but the reality is that very few deployments of any kind have occurred.  Most LCS have remained pier side on a nearly permanent basis.
Affordability	fail	The LCS was originally targeted at $200M each which then increased to $220M and then on up to $750M or so before steadying out around $500M-$600M without modules.
Modules	fail	After nearly two decades of development, no LCS has yet deployed with an effective module of any type despite each module having been dumbed down to nearly ineffective levels.
Numbers	fail	The initial plan called for 55 LCS.  The number was steadily reduced and currently stands at 35 vessels built, under construction, or on order.  The first four LCS have already been retired, leaving a current total of 31 and several of those have been designated non-deployable training vessels.

 

 

 

The LCS is the very epitome of a failed program.  Not a single promised capability has materialized and most capabilities have been significantly dumbed down.  The original concept has been completely abandoned and the entire LCS fleet has been reorganized multiple times along with total revamping of the crew training program.  Speed, range, and endurance have been downgraded.  The modules, which are the main weapon of the LCS, have failed completely and have been continually revised downward.  The ASW module was completely abandoned and re-conceptualized when the original concept was deemed a mistake.  The ASM and MCM modules are struggling with performance and weight issues.  The ASuW module has been hugely downgraded and has still not been fielded in any useful, combat-effective form.  The Freedom class variant is plagued by a systematic propulsion design flaw severe enough to cause the Navy to halt ship deliveries.  Most LCS that have put to sea have suffered major propulsion plant failures and many have suffered multiple failures.  The first four LCS have already been retired.  And the list goes on …

 

The promise of the LCS has utterly failed to materialize.  This is the very definition of abject failure.

Zumwalt and LCS - Main Batteries

What do the Zumwalt and LCS programs have in common?  Well, lots of things – all bad!  However, for the purpose of this post, the thing they have in common is that despite having commissioned ships in the class, neither has their main batteries installed and functioning yet.

Zumwalt

• 1 built and commissioned Oct 2016
• 1 built (tentative commissioning date Jan 2019)
• 1 building

As you know, the Zumwalt was literally designed around the Advanced Gun System (AGS) that was intended to rain precision firepower at ranges of 70+ miles.  As you also know, the Navy has cancelled the only munition the AGS was capable of firing, the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), due to runaway costs and failure to meet range requirements.

A functional AGS does not exist.  The Zumwalt have no functional main battery despite being a commissioned warship.  We spent $24B to build a class with no main battery.  That’s some major league incompetence!

LCS

• 5 Freedom class commissioned
• 9 Freedom class built or building

• 7 Independence class commissioned
• 8 Independence class built or building

As you know, the LCS’ main battery is the modules – those swappable permanent modules that contain one of the LCS’ three main functions: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), or Mine Countermeasures (MCM).  Without one of the main battery modules, the LCS is just a patrol boat and not a very good one at that.

-          There is no functional MCM module.

-          There is no functional ASW module.

-          There is no useful ASuW module - it has been scaled back to the point of uselessness.

The first LCS, USS Freedom, was commissioned in 2008.  It is now ten years later with 29 LCS commissioned, built, or building and still no useful, functional, main battery.  A decade after commissioning and still no modules.  Wow, that’s some major league incompetence!

That is two major classes of surface warfare vessels and the two most recent classes to be built that have now been commissioned with no main battery.

That bears repeating.

The Navy’s two newest classes of surface vessel have been commissioned with no main battery.

How does this happen?  How does the Navy accept and commission a ship that has no main battery?  How has no one been fired?  How has no one been charged with fraud?  Has anyone’s promotion at least been delayed by a couple of months?

Okay, aside from simple complaining, what can we learn from this?

Well, the Zumwalt and LCS have another point in common regarding their main batteries – neither battery actually existed in a functional form when the Navy committed to building the ships.  The Navy assumed they could develop the batteries while the ships were building.  This is the concurrency that we’ve railed against and has been proven, repeatedly, to be a failure as a procurement method.  Concurrency has failed every time it’s been attempted and yet the Navy is still married to the concept.

It’s one thing to begin construction of a ship when the deck buffing machine is still under development but it’s insanity to begin construction of a ship when its main battery doesn’t exist.  Even the “fitted for but not with” philosophy, as bad as it is, is better than building with concurrency in the main battery.

I don’t know what it takes for the Navy to learn lessons.  Apparently, it takes more than the utter failure of two major ship classes (and the F-35, EMALS, AAG, Advanced Weapons Elevators, etc.)!

Their Lips Move

What’s the old joke?  How can you tell when the Navy is lying?  Answer - Their lips move.

If they’re speaking (or writing), they’re lying.  It’s become that simple.

The latest example is a Department of Defense Inspector General (IG) report (1) that states that the Navy fraudulently declared Initial Operational Capability for three mine countermeasures (MCM) components of the LCS MCM mission module.  The MCM components the IG reviewed are

• AN/ASQ‑235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)
• Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)
• Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) Block I

Here’s the blunt statement of finding by the IG.

The Navy declared IOC for the three MCM mission package systems reviewed prior to demonstrating that the systems were effective and suitable for their intended operational uses.

Here’s what out and out fraud sounds like,

We [IG] determined that N95 declared IOC for the COBRA Block I to avoid requesting a sixth change to the IOC date that would further delay the delivery …

Note:  N95 is Major General David W. Coffman, USMC, Director, Expeditionary Warfare (N95)

The DOD-IG is not alone in criticizing the MCM’s ALMDS and AMNS components.  A June 2016 DOT&E (Director Operational Testing & Evaluation) report states,

… the MH-60S helicopter with the current ALMDS and AMNS units would not be operationally effective or suitable to conduct mine countermeasure operations.

“Not operationally effective or suitable”?????  That’s saying it’s useless.

What does all this mean?

As a result, the Navy has delivered units that have known performance problems to the fleet …

Since declaring IOC, the Navy has delivered two ALMDS, one AMNS, and one COBRA Block I units to the fleet with known performance problems …

So, despite all the problems, the Navy is knowingly and intentionally fielding flawed equipment.  This violates the trust of the nation and the trust of the sailors in the fleet.  CNO Richardson needs to be relieved for loss of confidence in his ability to command.

_____________________________________

(1)Department of Defense, Inspector General, “Acquisition of the Navy’s Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Report No. DODIG-2018-140, 25-Jul-2018

LCS Hellfire Update

The Navy seems to be committed to mounting the AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire missile on the LCS for use against small craft.  Hellfire had previously been tested in March 2017 for launch capability and the Navy was working on problems with tip over – trying to get the missile to tip over from the vertical launch to horizontal flight and pick up the target.  That issue has apparently been solved, at least enough to allow further testing. 

USNI News website reports that the Navy conducted a live fire test in which four Hellfires were vertically launched from the USS Milwaukee, LCS-5, cued from ship’s radar and “other systems”, and hit small craft targets.  Thus, the test appears to have been an integrated launch using the ship’s combat control system.  The conditions of the test and the results are unknown although the Navy released footage showing one missile hitting a target.  Whether the other missiles hit is unknown.  The targets appeared to be moving although speed and range were not stated and it is unknown whether the targets were maneuvering.  The website article contains a brief video of the launch, if you’re interested. (1)

Just to refresh, here’s a few specs on the Longbow Hellfire, which is the Apache helicopter version of the missile.

Weight     100 lbs

Length     64 in

Diameter   7 in

Seeker     millimeter wave radar

Warhead    20 lbs

Range      ~4 miles with a minimum safe range of 546 yds

Hellfire missiles have a variety of warhead types (fragmentation, shaped charge, etc.) and it is unknown which type or types will be used by the LCS.

LCS Hellfire Launch

Range is less than for helo launched missiles due to the vertical launch.

The LCS launcher appears to be an adaptation of the Army M299 launcher in an embedded box mounted in the former NLOS weapon pit.  The launcher can hold 24 missiles. (2)

Recall the lineage of this LCS weapon. 

1. The original surface to surface missile for the LCS was to have been the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) networked munition

2. After cancellation of NLOS, the Navy looked to develop a custom replacement missile but dropped this project.

3. The Griffin missile was announced in 2011 as the next replacement but was also dropped.

Note that the Navy has still not officially committed to the Hellfire.  The project is considered developmental and is due to wrap up in 2019-20 at which point a decision will be made about deploying the system.

Successful integration of the Longbow Hellfire missile into the LCS will finally provide a credible anti-swarm capability.  Of course, the range is too short and the warhead too small to be a serious threat to corvette or larger size ships.  Thus, the Hellfire will offer a substantial improvement over the current, well … nothing, but still falls woefully short of the original anti-surface and land attack requirement of the ASuW module.

______________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “USS Milwaukee Launches Hellfires in LCS Surface-to-Surface Missile Module Test”, Megan Eckstein, 16-May-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/05/16/uss-milwaukee-fires-lcs-surface-surface-missile-module-developmental-test

(2)Navy Recognition, “Q & A with the U.S. Navy on Lockheed Martin Hellfire missiles for Littoral Combat Ships”, 17-Jul-2014,

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/naval-technology/1900-q-a-a-with-the-us-navy-on-lockheed-martin-hellfire-missiles-for-littoral-combat-ships.html

MH-53E and Mine Countermeasures

Following developments in the area of mine countermeasures (MCM) is challenging, to say the least.  Equipment seems to come and go on an almost daily basis.  A new piece of equipment is tested, proclaimed the future of MCM, and then dropped with the entire process occurring, seemingly, overnight.  The LCS MCM module development has epitomized this.

As we consider future MCM developments, it is helpful to understand the current and legacy systems.  To that end, let’s take a look at the current (soon to be legacy) MCM workhorse, the MH-53E helo.

A major portion of our current MCM capability is aviation based from the MH-53E helicopter.  The MH-53E was produced in the early 1980’s and is suffering age-related maintenance problems, spare parts shortages, and extensive maintenance times.  These helos, of which there are only 28 in inventory, are aging rapidly and there are no plans to provide direct replacements for them.  Instead, the Navy has decided to transition their MCM capabilities to the LCS.

“…current plans involve transitioning the MH-53E airborne mine countermeasures capability to the Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package …” ⁽¹⁾

The sundown path for the MH-53E is now tied to the LCS MCM reaching full operational capability which is tentatively scheduled for 2025.

MH-53E

The MH-53E helos are organized into two active squadrons, HM-14 (10 helos) and HM-15 (13 Helos), and a Fleet Replacement Squadron, HM-12 (5 helos).

Here’s a few specifications with a comparison to the SH-60 series Seahawk just for some perspective.

                                                              MH-53E    SH-60B

Length, ft                     100     65

Empty Weight, lbs            33000  15000

Internal Payload, lbs        30000   6700

External Payload, lbs        36000    N/A

Unrefueled Endurance, hrs        5   3.5?

MH-53E Powerplant  3 × General Electric T64-GE-416/416A C, 4,380 shp each

SH-60B Powerplant  2 × General Electric T700-GE-401C, 1,890 shp each

As the specs demonstrate, the MH-53E is massively larger, more powerful, and with longer endurance.  In other words, ideal for the aerial MCM role.  The SH-60, as has been well documented, was found to be underpowered for safe MCM equipment towing, in what is one of the most bewildering blunders of the LCS module program.

MH-53E MCM capabilities and systems include the following:

Influence Sweep Systems

• AN/SPU-1W (Magnetic orange Pipe)
• Mk-104 Acoustic Sweep System
• Mk-105 Magnetic Sweep System
• Mk-103 Mechanical Sweep System (Mk-17 cutters)

Neutralization System

• AN/ASQ-232 SEAFOX Airborne Mine Neutralization System

Mine Hunting

• AN/AQS-24 Side Scan Sonar with Laser detection/ID capability

Future Upgrades include:

• AQS-24B – Technical refresh of the Q-24A which addresses obsolescence and reliability issues and adds High Speed Synthetic Aperture Sonar (HSSAS) side scan arrays
• AQS-24C – Provides expanded volume search capability to B-variant through the addition of iPUMA sonar to the tail of the towed body

Vertical website offers a nice, basic writeup on the MH-53E. ⁽⁵⁾

One of the notable issues related to transitioning from aviation centric MCM to ship MCM is the loss of speed.  Helos operate much faster than the unmanned underwater vehicles planned for the LCS MCM module.  Even if it works, the LCS clearance rate will be very slow – too slow for combat clearance.

For example, the AQS-24B side scan sonar can be helo-towed at 18 kts and still be effective, according to manufacturer, Northrop Grumman. ⁽²⁾   By comparison, the sonar-equipped, mine detecting, Knifefish UUV for the LCS has a speed of 4.5 kts.⁽³⁾  Even that speed is misleading because the Knifefish has to wait to return to its host vessel to upload its data which must then be analyzed to actually “detect” a mine.  That process takes significant additional time.  The Navy is attempting to adapt the AQS-24 towed sonar to an unmanned surface vessel to address the speed issue.

Here’s a telling quote,

"We're funding these new systems that, when you look behind the curtain, are not as capable as the systems that they are replacing," said Bob O'Donnell, a retired Navy captain who directed the service's program office for mine warfare in the years following the first Gulf War. "Even if the new systems meet all their operational targets, they won't be as good as the ships and helicopters we've had in service for decades." ⁽⁴⁾

Clearly, the MH-53E MCM helos have capabilities that have yet to be duplicated by the LCS MCM module.  It is unclear how the planned 6-10 or so LCS MCM vessels, each individually less capable than current equipment, will replace 12 Avenger ships and 28 MH-53E helos.

Mk105 Magnetic Minesweeping Sled

Potentially, the new CH-53K in a dedicated MCM version offers the ability to replace the MH-53E although I have heard of no such plan by the Navy.

The larger question that looms over any discussion of MCM is whether mine countermeasures should be aviation focused or surface/subsurface.  The Navy has opted for the surface/subsurface path by going all-in on the LCS and unmanned surface/subsurface vehicles and by retiring the MH-53E without replacement.  However, it is not at all clear to me that this is a wise path.

As always, a combination of assets and capabilities is probably the best approach but allowing the MH-53E to retire without replacement is knowingly accepting a significant decrease in MCM capabilities.

_________________________________________

(1)US Navy N98 / Mine Warfare Association, “The Future of Airborne Mine Countermeasures”, 3-Nov-2015,

http://www.minwara.org/wp-content/uploads/The-FutureofAirborneMineCountermeasures.pdf

(2)Northrop Grumman website, retrieved 1-Apr-2018,

http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/ANAQS24/Pages/default.aspx

(3)http://auvac.org/uploads/platform_pdf/Bluefin-21-Product-Sheet.pdf

(4)The Virginian-Pilot website, “A Hidden Danger”, Mike Hixenbaugh and Jason Paladino, Sept. 25, 2016, 

http://pilotonline.com/app/media/content/pilotonline/2016/mine-sweeping/why-navy-relies-on-old-ships-helicopters/

(5)Vertical website, “Clearing The Way”, 22-Aug-2012,

https://www.verticalmag.com/features/21428-clearing-the-way-html/

LCS Module Update

The original LCS program called for 55 LCS and 62 (if I recall correctly) mission modules.  As the program was whittled down, the number and type of modules was left in limbo.  Now that the LCS program is down to around 32 ships, here’s the latest on the number of modules that will be procured, courtesy of a USNI summary of a government report (1).

• 10 SUW
• 10 ASW
• 24 MCM

This gives a total of 44 deployable mission modules.  Here’s a more detailed breakdown of where/how the modules will be assigned and used:

• 24 modules (8 SUW, 8 ASW, 8 MCM) to outfit the focused mission LCS ships that make up the LCS divisions of 3 deployable ships and l training ship

• 3 modules (1 SUW, l ASW, l MCM) in Mayport, FL to ensure high operational
  availability (Ao) of the training systems for the training ships in the LCS divisions
  and to provide spare systems for each focused mission area

• 4 modules (1 SUW, l ASW, 2 MCM) in San Diego, CA to outfit the test ships (LCS l-4) and provide additional spare capacity for training ships and deployers

• 4 modules (4 MCM) to outfit LCS 29-32 to mitigate warfighting capability needs across the MCM mission area

• 9 MCM modules for use on other Vessels of Opportunity (VOOs) to meet the warfighting capability requirements and account for MCM maintenance cycles

There are a few interesting observations from this.

Note the 9 MCM modules that are for “Vessels of Opportunity”.  The Navy doesn’t actually need or want these modules and has no ships to use them but are required by law to procure 24 MCM modules.  From the article,

“An overall total of 24 MCM [modules] are required to comply with Section 1046 of the FY 2018 NDAA which prohibits the retirement of legacy MCM forces until the Navy has identified replacement capability and procured a quantity of such systems to meet combatant MCM operational requirements that are currently being met by legacy forces.”

Thus, the actual total of “wanted” modules is 35 for the 32 LCS seaframes.  This is the final, official nail in the coffin of swappable modules. 

Further, setting aside the 9 MCM modules that will be set aside on the Island of Misfit Weapons and discounting the MCM modules that are dedicated to the training ships, the total operationally deployable LCS mine countermeasure modules is 8 plus, potentially, 4 for LCS 29-32.

Let’s say that again because it’s incredibly important.  The total LCS MCM capability is 8 ships with an ultimate potential of 12.  That’s our total future U.S. military mine countermeasures capabiity.  We’re replacing 14 Avenger class minesweepers and two squadrons of MH-53E MCM helos (total inventory is 28 helos) with 8-12 LCS.

Does anyone really believe that’s adequate?  China, Russia, Iran, and NKorea each have hundreds of thousands of mines and we think 8-12 LCS are adequate to deal with that threat?  There goes any hope of conducting an amphibious assault.  On a larger scale, our Navy is going to be paralyzed by mine threats it can’t deal with.

I trust I’ve made my point about the inadequacy of our MCM force?

Moving on …

ASuW Module.  This module is currently a joke and consists of a couple of 30 mm machine guns and a helo.  The anticipated Longbow Hellfire missile which will provide some actual, though short ranged, firepower is scheduled for operation in 2019-20. 

Hellfire testing to date has demonstrated 83% success rate (1, full doc p.6) from 24 tests.  That’s surprisingly low given the scripted, simplistic, “designed to succeed” nature of such tests.  Real world performance is likely to be half that.

Current projected module purchase cost for the 30 mm guns, Hellfire, and RHIBs is $23.1M per module (1, full doc p.6).  The helo costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

The ASuW performance is underwhelming, to say the least.  The Navy has established two levels of performance for the Key Performance Parameters (KPP):  a minimum threshold and a better, desired objective.  The ASuW module, even with the Hellfire missiles, will only barely meet the threshold requirements and will not even be remotely near the objective requirements.  The Navy’s graphic depiction of the actual and projected performance versus threshold and objective is so bad that they didn’t even include scales with actual values (1, full doc p.7).  Further, you know that the Navy’s projected performance is overly optimistic so the performance versus threshold/objective will be even worse than depicted.

ASW Module.  This module currently consists of,

• Continuously Active Variable Depth Sonar (VDS)
• Multi-Function Towed Array (MFTA)
• Light Weight Tow Torpedo Defense (LWT)
• MH-60R Helo
• MQ-8 UAV

There is no realistic scheduled operational date for the module although the Navy is suggesting sometime around 2020-21.  As always, that will be delayed.

Current projected module purchase cost for the VDS, MFTA, and LWT is $19.8M per module (1, full doc p.14).  The helo/UAV costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

As with the ASuW module, the performance when compared to the KPP threshold and objective requirements is barely adequate.  Further, the DOT&E testing demonstrates that the Navy’s reporting on performance results is “optimistic”, to put it politely.

The MFTA is the only individual component that has achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC).  Overall module IOC is scheduled for late 2019.  It is certain that will slip.

MCM Module.  This module uses a cobbled together collection of components that seem to change daily.  Current components include,

• Knifefish UUV for buried or bottom mine detection
• AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) for near surface (top 30 ft) mine detection
• AQS-20 Sonar for suspended mine (volume) detection
• ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) – acoustic and magnetic
• DVS-1 Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) for beach and surf zone mine detection
• MH-60S helo
• MQ-8 Firescout
• EX64 Archerfish neutralizer

Additional components are being developed such as an unmanned surface tow drone for sonar and sweep components and the Barracuda system for near surface mine neutralization.

The various capabilities are expected to trickle in over the next several years.

The various module subsystems are not meeting their performance requirements and many are not even close (1, full doc p.22-23).

Current projected module purchase cost for the various non-helo components is $87M per module (1, full doc p.22).  The helo/UAV costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

The Annual Report lists module development costs as totaling $2.6B (1, full doc p.28).  Of course, those costs will increase well beyond that before all development is complete!

The report lists total anticipated module procurement costs, including the separate “common” category as (1, full doc p.29),

Module  Qty    Tot Cost   Mod Cost

ASuW     10      $319M     $ 32M

ASW      10      $267M     $ 27M

MCM      24      $2.5B     $100M

Common   44      $576M     $ 13M

Total    44      $3.6B     $ 82M

The key column is the Mod Cost  which is the unit cost for each module of the indicated type.  Note that the costs don’t agree with the individual component costs described above.  The costs listed here are likely to be more accurate.

It is worth noting that the modules have been under development since sometime around 2003/4.  Now, some 14 years later, not a single module exists in an operationally useful form.  Operational modules are not expected for another few to several years and then another few years will be required to actually manufacture the modules.  We are burning through LCS seaframe life spans without any modules to equip them.  It is possible, indeed likely, that some LCS vessels will retire without ever having had a functional, useful module equipped!

LCS module development has been an embarrassment of staggering proportions and the fiasco continues.

_____________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Annual Report”, February 2018 Annual Report to Congress for the Littoral Combat Ship Mission Modules Program, 3-Apr-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/04/03/littoral-combat-ship-mission-package-annual-report

Full document:

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4429096-Mission-Package-RTC-February-2018.html#document/p9