Showing posts with label LCS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label LCS. Show all posts

Sunday, March 29, 2026

What Could the LCS Do in the Middle East?

Currently, two of the three LCS supposedly based in the Middle East have been moved (evacuated?) to Singapore.[1]  The whereabouts of the third is unknown.  Why aren’t they in the Middle East, perhaps ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz?  Isn’t this kind of mission exactly what they were designed for?  As you recall, the original LCS concept was that they would boldly enter littoral (hence, the ship’s name) waters and neutralize mines, subs, surface, and land threats so that larger, more expensive ships could operate in the area with less risk.
 
So, why aren’t they there?  Well, we all know the answer.  The originally envisioned modules were just flights of fantasy and never materialized.  But, what if the original modules had become available as fully functioning equipment?  Would such LCSes be useful in the Middle East today?
 
Let’s briefly recall the intended functionality of the original modules.
 
MCM – The LCS was intended to stop well outside a minefield and use remote, unmanned assets to clear the area of mines.
 
ASuW - This was, perhaps, the key to the entire LCS concept.  The NLOS (not to be confused with the current Spike NLOS missile) system of loitering, smart, networked munitions would address all threats out to a range of 20+ miles.  By removing all visible threats, it would allow fellow LCSes to deal with mines and submarines.
 
ASW – The LCS was intended to basically stop and throw out an ASW barrier of remote vehicles that would track down and destroy enemy submarines while the LCS remained safely out of reach.
 
 
Thus, a mixed group of LCS would enter an area and the ASuW equipped vessels would eliminate all visible land and surface threats while ASW and MCM equipped vessels eliminated the subsurface threats.  Such a group in the strait, today, would eliminate all missile, rocket, artillery, and speed boat threats to shipping across the width of the strait and twenty miles inland.  UAVs would provide continuous surveillance with NLOS munitions on-call, moments away.  Hidden enemy launchers would be destroyed moments after they emerged from hiding.  The MCM-LCS would search for the rumored, but not yet confirmed, mines.
 
Highly effective, indeed!
 
Of course, the LCS modules were never realized (that’s why it’s called fantasy!) and the LCS proved useless as demonstrated by the Navy’s removal of the ships from the very mission they were designed for.  The concept was okay but it was dependent on non-existent technology coupled with unbelievably inept execution.
 
Since we don’t have fantasy modules but the conceptual need still exists, what do we have that could do the job?  Well, there’s always air power that could, for enormous cost and effort, provide the continuous surveillance and quick response strike that’s needed to deal with emergent threats.  We have Burkes with their single 5” gun that could provide persistent, on-call, fire support if some other asset can provide targeting.  We could land Army/Marines in various locations to search and destroy or provide counterbattery fire.using G/ATOR or similar systems.
 
We have the theoretical capability for ships to do counterbattery fire since the radars are fully capable, lacking only the software to do so.  Why hasn’t the Navy ever bothered to implement counterbattery capability?  Because it doesn’t put big, new, shiny hulls in the water which is how large budget slices are ensured.
 
 
The original LCS concept was valid and the need was legitimate but the actual design was based on non-existent technology and wishful thinking.  We didn’t need the LCS.  The need could have been met with existing assets by implementing counterbattery capability on Burkes, adding much more small UAV capability to ships, and incorporating air power and land forces.  The cost would have been minimal – free compared to what the LCS program has cost us.
 
That we didn’t take the approach of using existing assets simply highlights the Navy’s focus on budget over mission accomplishment.  The LCS gained the Navy large budget share as opposed to simple software modifications or buying some more small UAVs.
 
Until we stop viewing the Navy as a business organization trying to turn a profit (budget slice) and start viewing it as a tool for mission accomplishment, nothing will improve.
 
Where are the LCSes?  The past Navy CNOs need to be brought out of retirement and forced to take responsibility for their dereliction of duty.
 
 
 
_______________________________
 
[1]The War Zone website, “U.S. Navy Minesweepers Stationed In Middle East Are Now In Singapore”, Joseph Trevithick, 18-Mar-2026,
https://www.twz.com/sea/u-s-navy-minesweepers-stationed-in-middle-east-are-now-in-singapore

Wednesday, March 18, 2026

LCS Mine Countermeasures Assessment

Surprisingly, two of the Navy’s MCM configured LCS have been moved from the Middle East to a port in Malaysia despite the obvious possibility of Iranian mines in the Strait of Hormuz.  The ships were relocated about a week or so before the US strikes began.  If the Iranians do lay mines (there are no confirmed reports yet), we’ll desperately miss the LCS MCM capabilities … or will we?
 
From a Hunterbrooks website report, we learn that the LCS MCM capability is even more problematic and limited than we already knew.  The report provides information from a US Navy briefing.[1]
 
As you read it, bear in mind that the summarized information presented below is the Navy’s information, not mine.  If you want to dispute anything, you’ll have to take it up with the Navy.
 
By trying to be multi-mission, training time available for mine countermeasures is being significantly reduced to support ASuW, VBSS, and other missions.
 
The entire MCM package is pretty minimal and consists of just:

- 1x MH-60S Seahawk
  • Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)
  • mine neutralization system (underwater suicide drone)
- 2x Common Unmanned Surface Vehicles (CUSV) that can tow:
  • AN/AQS-20 side-scan and volume-search sonar
  • Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS)

Each CUSV/AQS-20 mission is consuming large amounts of prep time, significantly reducing the overall clearance rate of an already glacially slow process.
  • 4+ hrs pre-mission maintenance
  • 1.5 hrs post-launch sonar calibration
 That’s 5.5+ hrs of time before the mission even begins!
 

AQS-20 sonar has a habit of failing to record data which is not detectable until after the mission, during the post-mission analysis.
 

CUSV still has a tendency to “runaway”, out of control.
 

CUSV comms are unacceptably short range requiring the LCS to operate in or near the minefield.
 

Navy MCM doctrine requires a visual ID of mines and the camera fails even in relatively clear waters.
 

The single CUSV crane is a single point of failure and is prone to failure.

 

 
With the preceding in mind, are we really missing much if the LCS-MCM vessels aren’t in the Middle East?  No matter how you slice it, this is an epic embarrassment for the Navy.
 
 
_______________________________
 
[1]Hunterbrook website, “Demining Hormuz How The U.S. Navy Arrived At Worst-Case Scenario Unprepared”, Spendley & Johnston, 13-Mar-2026,
https://hntrbrk.com/demining-hormuz/

Friday, October 3, 2025

This is Your Mine Countermeasures

The last Avenger class mine countermeasures (MCM) vessel, USS Devastator (MCM 6), has now been retired.[1]  Our surface MCM capability is now entirely in the hands of the Independence class LCS.  Yes, that LCS.  The ship and MCM module that has suffered years of delay, failure after failure, and no realistic operational testing.  That one.  That disaster.  No, this isn’t a Halloween horror story, although it should scare you to death.  This is our current naval MCM reality.
 
To briefly review, the LCS-MCM consists of a helo and an unmanned boat, each of which carry/tow various attachments as listed below.
 
MH-60S Seahawk mine warfare helicopters 
  • AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) shallow water laser mine detection
  • AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) suicide drones
 
Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV) tow boat 
  • AN/AQS-20C forward/side scan mine detection sonar
  • Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) acoustic and influence sweep
 
Now, how is that all working?  Go read the annual GAO and DOT&E weapon assessments and you’ll get the history and status of the LCS MCM module.  It’s not pretty.  In addition, Naval News website offers a fantastic summary of the Independence-MCM.  Here’s some excerpts. 
Embarked helicopters also operate with the AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), offering a safer method to counter-mine potential threats compared to traditional mechanical minesweeping with EOD divers.[1]
Safer?  Yes.
Effective?  No.
Efficient?  No.
Fast?  No. 
The sonars on the CUSVs are not a high enough resolution to identify specific threats. The lasers used on MH-60S helicopters require water that is not too turbid to operate in.[1]
So, the system only works in clear water and even then can’t reliably identify the threats?  Good … good. 
… when it comes to the unmanned systems used for mine countermeasures. Each mission takes roughly four hours of maintenance pre-mission followed by one-and-a-half hours of calibration of GPS and sonar to reach acceptable accuracy for MCM missions. The rough estimate is six hours of pre-mission preparation before mine countermeasures can begin. In real-world scenarios, that time may not exist.[1]

So, the equipment may not be effective but it’s slow.  Agonizingly slow.  That might be okay for clearing a fifty foot wide channel over the course of a month but that’s useless for combat operations. 
These concerns do not address the single points of failure in the LCS and MCM package, which make the package an extremely risk-prone platform for operations.
 
The platform lift on the LCS that moves equipment from the mission bay to the flight deck is a major operational point for equipping the MH-60S with ALMDS or AMNS. If the lift fails, the helicopter is combat ineffective. If the tow hook on a CUSV breaks, it is combat ineffective and must be towed back or recovered another way. If the Twin Boom Extensible Frame, used to lower CUSVs into the water, breaks, the entire MCM platform is inoperable and USVs cannot be launched for missions.[1]

As an example, 
One test of the MCM package on USS Tulsa (LCS 16), a ship that arrived in Bahrain in May for MCM operations, resulted in a runaway USV, according to one U.S. Navy official familiar with the testing. During that test, part of the tow bracket used to recover the mine countermeasures CUSV broke, leaving it unrecoverable.[1]

But wait, there’s more! 
The components of the LCS MCM mission module were not originally designed to be loaded into the 30,000 square feet of mission bay space and shortcomings have been encountered in balancing the space between 11 meter CUSVs, four or five 12-foot CONEX boxes, a lift system for the CUSVs, and an independent berthing box for the operators of the MCM suite.[2]
 
Due to these space constraints, modularity of this platform is no longer offered or being pursued by the U.S. Navy to switch between mission modules, a sharp turn from the original planning of the LCS.[2]
 
According to Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director of the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division, the 11 meter CUSV is currently limited by form factor, limiting the endurance of the platform and the weight of the cable for towed sonar depth. The current form factor of the CUSV is limiting the maximum performance that can be extracted from the AN/AQS-20C sonar suite.[2]
 
Another limiting factor, according to Captain Hattaway, is the range offered by the CUSV. Line of sight between the LCS mothership and the CUSV is required. In heavy sea states, effectiveness is limited. Bandwidth is taxed by the amount of information that needs to be shared back and forth to the operator and the sensor suites. The U.S. Navy is working on methods to extend the range of deployed CUSVs, including the use of Starshield, the U.S. military’s arm of the Starlink satellite internet platform.[2]

Conclusion
 
Really?  Isn’t the conclusion pretty obvious?
 
 
 
____________________________________
 
[1]Naval News website, “Unproven Littoral Combat Ships are replacing retired MCM ships in Bahrain”, Carter Johnson, 26-Sep-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/09/combat-ineffective-littoral-combat-ships-are-replacing-mcm-ships-in-bahrain/
 
[2]Naval News website, “Update on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Carter Johnson, 4-Jan-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-mine-countermeasures-mission-package/

Thursday, August 14, 2025

Upgraded Littoral Perrys

Once upon a time, the US Navy faced a choice about how to deal with the fake ‘littoral’ issue (see, “LittoralWarfare – Is There Such a Thing?”):  either upgrade/modify the Perry class frigates or build an entire new class of ships, the LCS.  One required new hulls.  The other required only upgrades of existing hulls.  Of course, the Navy being the Navy, unhesitatingly opted to build new LCS hulls, thereby ensuring their continued shipbuilding budget slice.  In order to eliminate the possibility of anyone suggesting that Perrys could be upgraded for a fraction of the cost of new construction, the Navy neutered the Perrys by removing weapons (2003 timeframe) and stating publicly that it was not possible to upgrade the Perrys to use the new SM-2 missiles that were then coming.  In addition, the Navy wound up giving away Perrys in order to irretrievably remove them from possible service.
 
The USN had decommissioned 25 "FFG-7 Short" ships via "bargain basement sales to allies or outright retirement, after an average of only 18 years of service".[1]

Of course, as is so often the case, the Navy was quickly proven wrong as the Australian navy proceeded to upgrade their Perrys (the Adelaide class) to use the SM-2 and, in fact, added an 8-cell VLS in the bow of the ship.
 
Not only did Australia upgrade their Perrys and continue to operate them but so did quite a few other countries.  Let’s take a look at some of the upgrades performed by other countries after the US Navy stated that upgrades were not affordable or technically feasible.
 
 
Australia
 
The Australian Perrys (Adelaide class) received an extensive upgrade in the mid-2000’s.  The program cost around A$1.46B to upgrade four Perrys (A$365M ea).  Following is a partial list of the upgrades.[2]
 
  • Added 8-cell tactical length VLS in the bow for ESSM missiles
  • Upgraded to use SM-2MR Standard missiles
  • Switched to Eurotorp MU90 Impact torpedoes
  • Upgraded fire control from Mk92 Mod 2 to Mod 12
  • Replaced sonar with new Thompson (Thales) Spherion Medium Frequency Sonar
  • Upgraded Phalanx CIWS to Block IB
  • Added Link 16
  • Upgraded computers
  • Upgraded SPS-49 and SPS-55 radars
  • Added Radamec 2500 EOTS long-range passive TV & infrared surveillance
  • Added laser rangefinder.
  • Added multi-sensor Radar Integrated Automatic Detect and Track System (RIADT) for improved target detection, tracking, and engagement, particularly against low altitude targets in cluttered ocean or near-shore environments
  • Replaced SLQ-32 EW system with Elbit (EA-2118) and RAFAEL (C-Pearl)
  • Added ALBATROS towed sonar
  • Added two RAFAEL Mini-Typhoon 12.7mm remote weapon systems
  • Added additional decoy launchers
 
Adelaide Class Frigate with 8-Cell VLS and SM-2


 
Taiwan
 
  • Added 8x Hsiung Feng II/III SSM in two box launcher racks
  • Added 2x Bofors 40 mm/L70 guns
  • Added 2x Type 75 20 mm/75 guns
 
 
Spain
 
  • Replaced Phalanx CIWS with Meroka 20 mm CIWS
  • Replaced SLQ-32 with Nettunel Mk-3000 EW suite
  • Added RAN-12L/RAN-30 air search radar for low horizon scanning
 
 
Pakistan
 
  • overhaul of all four diesels
  • replacement of sea valves and air conditioning
  • new bridge and navigational suite
  • composite dome over the overhauled AN/SQS-56 sonar array
 
 
Following are some other countries that have operated Perrys although I could not readily find lists of upgrades:
 
Poland
Turkey
Bahrain
Egypt
Philippines
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that the Navy lied when they stated that the Perrys could not be upgraded.  They simply wanted to ensure that no viable option remained that could derail the – even then – controversial LCS program.
 
Looking at the list of upgrades proves that we could have added racks of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, VLS cells, added more guns, and upgraded almost every weapon, sensor, and piece of equipment on the ship.  In short, we could have had a very powerful littoral combat ship worthy of the name that would have put the LCS to shame and all for a fraction of the cost of the LCS.  This is all the more disappointing when we note that many of the Perrys were retired after only 14 years or so of service.  We had serviceable ships, viable upgrades, acceptable costs, and we chose to scrap the entire Perry class and build the LCS … just a monumentally stupid decision.  And, of course, we are now early retiring the LCS which simply emphasizes and compounds the near-criminal stupidity of the Navy.
 

 
_____________________________
 
[1]Wikipedia, “Adelaid-class frigate”, retrieved 12-Apr-2025
 
[2]Defense Industry Daily website, “Australia’s Hazard(ous) Frigate Upgrades: Done at Last”,
https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-hazardous-frigate-upgrade-04586/

Thursday, January 9, 2025

LCS Mine Countermeasures Module Ready? Not Really

The LCS modules have been under development for something on the order of two decades, now, and none are yet ready at anything approaching the original specifications or concepts.  In fact, the anti-submarine (ASW) module has been terminated.  The anti-surface (ASuW) module is a joke, having little capability and what there is, is a faint shadow of the original intent and specifications.  The mine countermeasures (MCM) module is ready in the sense that there are a group of individual components that kind of perform limited mine clearance.  Even those components are constrained in their performance, as a Naval News website article documents.[1]
 
For starters, the entire MCM module doesn’t fit in the LCS!
 
The components of the LCS MCM mission module were not originally designed to be loaded into the 30,000 square feet of mission bay space and shortcomings have been encountered in balancing the space between 11 meter CUSVs, four or five 12-foot CONEX boxes, a lift system for the CUSVs, and an independent berthing box for the operators of the MCM suite.[1]

The unmanned tow vessel is also causing performance problems.
 
According to Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director of the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division, the 11 meter CUSV is currently limited by form factor, limiting the endurance of the platform and the weight of the cable for towed sonar depth. The current form factor of the CUSV is limiting the maximum performance that can be extracted from the AN/AQS-20C sonar suite.[1]

Communications are another issue.
 
Another limiting factor, according to Captain Hattaway, is the range offered by the CUSV. Line of sight between the LCS mothership and the CUSV is required. In heavy sea states, effectiveness is limited. Bandwidth is taxed by the amount of information that needs to be shared back and forth to the operator and the sensor suites.[1]

The original intent was to keep the host LCS well away from the actual minefield but the communication issues are causing the ship to operate near the minefield, nullifying the original intended benefit of unmanned operations.
 
The Navy is looking to incorporate some kind of UAV as a communications relay.
 
“We’re looking at having a UAV with a towed antenna, raising the elevation to hundreds of feet in the air that will allow us to increase the range of USVs …[1]

The MCM module is becoming a real ‘Rube Goldberg’ collection of increasingly ridiculous, mismatched, and constrained components attempting to meet a bare minimum capability.
 
A reminder … Even if all this works perfectly, it’s still a failure in that it’s predominantly a one-at-a-time hunting method which is operationally useless in a combat situation.  Yes, the Navy claims to have an influence sweep capability but, to the best of my knowledge, that has never been tested and certainly not realistically.  I have severe doubts that the sweeping method will work against modern smart mines.
 
Two decades or more of work and we have a cobbled together collection of misfit, limited capability MCM components.  Well done, Navy!  You’ve made us proud.
 
 
 
____________________________
 
[1]Naval News website, “Update On The U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Carter Johnston, 4-Jan-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-mine-countermeasures-mission-package/

Thursday, August 8, 2024

LCS Program Cost and Opportunity Cost

Austal (USA) just launched the final LCS, the USS Pierre (LCS 38).  Now would seem an especially appropriate time to assess the financial and opportunity cost of the program.  Did we get value for our taxpayer money (the program cost)?  Was there something else we could have better spent our taxpayer funds on (the opportunity cost)?  Let’s see.
 
A cursory review reveals that we acquired
 
16x Freedom class ships (5 retired)
 
19x Independence class ships (2 retired)
 
Total LCS Ships  = 35 (7 retired)
Total Active LCS Ships = 28
 
Note:  Depending on which plan you look at, the Navy intends to retire several more Freedom class vessels over the next few years.  Essentially, the entire Freedom class is being terminated as quickly as the Navy can.
 
What did this acquisition program cost? 
 
Ship
GAO reports R&D and acquisition costs = $20.5B [2]
Unit cost = $650M [2]
 
Module
GAO reports module R&D and acquisition costs = $7B[1]
Total modules = 40 [1]
Unit cost = $175M per module.[1]
 
Total Program Cost
Total cost module and ship = $27.5B
 
 
Discussion
 
Value – The LCS has almost no combat capability.  Hence, the value for the money is near zero.
 
Opportunity Cost – The opportunity cost = $27.5B.  What could we have done with $27.5B if we had not spent it on the LCS program?  Well, the alternative opportunities are nearly endless:  munitions, mines, a dedicated minesweeper, ASW destroyer/corvette, air wings, dry docks, etc.  At this point, it’s not even debatable that almost any alternative choice would have been a better use of the funds.  In other words, the opportunity cost-value far exceeded the actual cost-value.
 
Bear in mind that this is not a case of hindsight.  Almost everyone except the Navy pointed out massive problems with the program from day one:  concurrency, lack of CONOPS, a multitude of design issues, insufficient weight and stability margins, a badly flawed manning model, a badly flawed maintenance model, lack of armament, complete absence of modules, etc.  There was no hindsight involved or required.  The problems were painfully obvious and predictable.  In fact, the term ‘predictable’ implies a small degree of uncertainty.  Regarding the LCS problems, there was no uncertainty.  The problems were 100% certain to occur, as was pointed out by … well … everyone.
 
The LCS is the poster child for a program that should never have left the back-of-the-napkin stage.  It produced no value and a staggering $27.5B wasted opportunity cost.
 
  
 
_______________________________ 
[1]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2023, GAO-23-106059, p.149
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Apr 2018, GAO-18-360SP, p.92

Thursday, May 2, 2024

LCS and Speed

Recent posts have seen some speculation on what the LCS speed was intended for.  As many pointed out, speed is not a useful feature in and around mines.  So, what was the LCS speed intended to do?  Why was it such a major design requirement?  One could make a good argument that speed was the number one design requirement … but why?
 
I have no idea.
 
Well, that was a short post.
 
Actually, the purpose of the post is to, yet again, emphasize the purpose and importance of a concept of operations (CONOPS) prior to committing to a finalized design and, ultimately, production.
 
The Navy has publicly acknowledged that it never developed a CONOPS for the LCS.  Thus, we have no idea what purpose the LCS speed was to have served.
 
The best speculation I’ve seen is that the speed was intended to move the ship as quickly as possible between the operational/combat area and the nearest module swapping port which, logically, would be quite a long distance from the combat area.  Of course, the Navy abandoned the module swapping concept fairly early on thus rendering the speed feature moot.
 
In addition, the intra-theater speed concept was highly questionable to begin with.  The LCS had short range to begin with and the DOT&E reports and trials quickly reported that the range capability was nowhere near the design spec and they significantly downgraded the range.  Further, high speed consumes fuel at a prodigious rate, further reducing the effective range.  An LCS that made a sustained, high speed, long distance dash from a module swapping port to an operational area would have a useful loiter time in the operational area of just a few hours or days, having consumed its fuel in the dash to get there.  That’s not a combat-useful feature.  A well thought out CONOPS would have revealed that prior to final design and production … assuming that was even the reason for the speed requirement.  This is why you do CONOPS.
 
The LCS provides an object lesson in the need for a CONOPS.
 
CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS!
 

Monday, April 29, 2024

LCS Mine Countermeasures Miracle

The Navy, in a miracle of technological speed, has managed to deliver the first full mine countermeasures (MCM) module to an LCS although the first planned deployment is still a year or so away. 
The U.S. Navy embarked the first Mine Countermeasures Mission Package (MCM MP) aboard USS Canberra (LCS 30), April 18, service officials announced. With the MCM mission package now onboard LCS 30, the Navy is looking forward to the first MCM Mission Package deployment in Fiscal Year 2025.[1]
How long has the MCM module been in development?  Well, the first Independence ship was laid down in 2006 so MCM module development must have been well underway by that time.  So, it’s been 18+ years.  That’s a remarkable pace of development!  Well done, Navy!
 
I know … you’re wondering the same thing I am.  Are we sure the Navy didn’t cut corners in order to deliver the MCM module this quickly?  Well, here’s our answer: 
The MCM mission package achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on March 31, 2023, following rigorous initial operational testing and evaluation (IOT&E) of the full mission package … [1]
Okay, I see that the module was rigorously tested and the Navy is famous for its rigorous test standards so that alleviates my concern.  The module is truly ready to go  …  although it’s odd that it would require another year or so to reach a state of deployment.  I assumed the crew would be ready to go as soon as the module was installed.  What has the crew been doing for the last 18 years if not training for MCM operations?
 
Well, moving on …
 
Who’s leading this miraculous effort? 
PEO [ed. Program Executive Office] Unmanned and Small Combatants leads the Navy’s efforts to provide littoral combat ships with mission-tailored capability to Combatant Commanders to provide assured access against littoral threats, leveraging unmanned naval capabilities for enhanced operational effectiveness.[1]
Bingo!  I just filled my mindless platitude, buzzword bingo card with that sentence!  Again we see - as we so often do - that creative writing is more important in the Navy than actual testing or combat effectiveness.
 
By the way, someone be sure to let me know when we’ve actually demonstrated that ‘unmanned’ is leveraging anything except the budget from Congress.
 
On a related note, many of you are probably trying to recall what an LCS was.  I don’t blame you.  It hasn’t been in the news much, lately.  I had to look it up because the only LCS I could recall was a very short-lived, insignificant ship class that I thought was abandoned and early retired several years ago.  For those of you who would like a reminder, here’s the Navy’s description of the LCS: 
Littoral Combat Ships are fast, optimally-manned, mission-tailored surface combatants that operate in near-shore and open-ocean environments, winning against 21st-century coastal threats.[1]
Just a few thoughts about that …
 
“optimally-manned” ?  Every report I’ve ever states that the ships are woefully undermanned and, in fact, the manning has been increased a few times yet they remain undermanned and incapable of conducting on-board maintenance.
 
“mission-tailored”???  How can the ship be mission-tailored when there are no functional mission modules and, in fact, the ASW module has been abandoned?
 
“operate in near-shore and open-ocean environments”  What else is there?  Isn’t that just a wordier way of saying, ‘it’s a boat’?
 
 
____________________________
 
[1]Naval News website, “First Mine Warfare USV Embarked On US Navy LCS”, Staff, 26-Apr-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/04/first-mine-warfare-usv-embarked-on-us-navy-lcs/

Thursday, September 21, 2023

LCS Organization Update

As you know, the LCS program has been in a state of disarray – to put it politely and mildly! – for quite some time.  LCS vessels – the Freedom variant, in particular – are being slated for retirement almost as fast as they’re being built.  Further, the Navy has cancelled the anti-submarine (ASW) module and eliminated that function from the LCS mission (to the extent the LCS has a mission!).
 
You may recall that the Navy had organized the LCS into two groups, one on each coast, with four ships dedicated to each mission (ASW, ASuW, MCM).  Each group of four were to consist of one dedicated training ship and three deployable ships.  Thus, in total, there were to be six dedicated ASW ships, six dedicated ASuW ships, and six MCM ships.
 
The elimination of the ASW mission and the [very] early retirement of a dozen or more LCS has thrown that organization out the window.  Now, the 2023 GAO annual report offers some partial clarity on the new plan for task organization of the LCS.
 
.. 24 MCM packages will support 15 MCM-assigned LCS and nine will deploy from shore and other ships. Ten SUW packages will support eight SUW-assigned LCS and two MCM-assigned LCS.[1]
 
This raises some interesting points:
 
- It appears that the Navy will have only 15 MCM vessels as the total fleet mine countermeasures capability as the current Avengers and MH-53E helos retire shortly.  That’s a pitifully small number against the hundreds of thousands of mines in the Chinese (and NKorean, Iranian, and Russian) inventory.
 
- It appears that the Navy will have only 8 dedicated ASuW LCS which is surprising since anti-swarm was, arguably, the main function of the LCS.
 
- There is some confusion about the meaning of the statement that two of the ASuW packages will support two MCM LCS.  Does this mean the Navy will attempt to double up on modules on two ships?  Given the critical weight limits, that seems not to be feasible.  Perhaps it means that those two LCS will be ‘swappers’ even though the Navy officially abandoned the module swapping concept?
 
- It appears that the Navy will be left with 25 active LCS out of the original 38 that have been built with 5 already retired and around a dozen more slated for retirement over the next two years.
 
 
 
A program in disarray has become even more confused!
 
 
 
__________________________________
 
[1]U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2023, GAO-23-106059, p.148

Friday, June 23, 2023

This is NOT How You Prepare for War

The Independence variant LCS-18, USS Charleston, just completed a 26 month overseas deployment.  That’s incredible!  More than two years at the tip of the spear.  They must have done lots of realistic exercises and live fire events to demonstrate their readiness and maintain the honed edge of readiness. 
… the ship successfully launched a Rolling Airframe Missile (SeaRAM) during an at-sea, live-fire exercise … [1]
While deployed, Charleston was embarked with the Naval Strike Missile …  “We do have a typical load-out that we maintain throughout the deployment,” Knuth [Cmdr. Matthew Knuth, gold crew commanding officer] said of the NSM. “That said, we did not do any live fire testing of the missile.”[1]
Let’s add up the live fire testing of the various weapon systems over the 26 month period.  This involves high level math and large numbers so, don’t worry, I’ll do it for you.
 
1 RAM + 0 NSM = 1 launch
 
That’s the raw data.  Let’s do some analysis and calculate the average weapon firings per year.
 
1 launch / 2.2 years = 0.4 launches per year
 
There’s your Navy.  Prepared for anything and, why not?  They did enough live fire exercises to be supremely proficient at combat launches and utterly confident that their equipment and systems would work under any of the 1 or 0 conditions that were tested.
 
The LCS, as you know, operates with a 2-crew, Blue-Gold, manning system wherein the crews rotate on and off the ship.  Just out of curiosity, I wonder which of the two crews got to do the 1 RAM launch?  The other crew, of course, would have spent two years with the ship and never fired a weapon.  How’s that for readiness and training?!
 
At the end of the 26 month deployment, this ship and its crews were the epitome of trained maritime warriors based on all the live fire exercises they did.
 
Idle thought:  Did anyone even look inside the NSM canisters to see if there were actually missiles there?  They didn’t do any test launches so one can’t help but wonder …  German soldiers have trained with broomsticks instead of rifles so is it really that much of a stretch to wonder if we really have missiles on board the LCS?  Just saying …
 
On a seemingly unrelated note … WWII US torpedoes …  Am I the only one who can see the parallels?
 
 
____________________________
 
[1]USNI News website, “Littoral Combat Ship USS Charleston Completes 26-Month Deployment to Western Pacific”, Gidget Fuentes, 21-Jun-2023,

Monday, May 29, 2023

LCS MCM Status Update

As you know, the poor LCS has been sailing for many years without any functional, useful modules.  The modules were supposed to have been:
 
ASuW (anti-surface warfare) – The module has been watered down to near nothingness.  I think, now, it consists of a guy on the bow with a 9 mm handgun.
 
ASW (anti-submarine warfare) – The module was cancelled and ASW has been terminated as an LCS mission.
 
MCM (mine countermeasures) – The module has been in development since just after the Revolutionary War.
 
Well now, after a dozen or so LCS have been retired or scheduled for retirement, the Navy has finally declared initial operating capability (IOC) for the LCS MCM module.  Let’s update ourselves on the MCM module.
 
The mission module components keep changing as they fail, one after the other, so it’s difficult to keep up with the current status but, as best I can glean, the main components of the MCM module are:
 
MH-60 Helicopter
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)
Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)
 
Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV)
Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS)
AN/AQS-20C mine-hunting sonar
 
 
The helo tows or operates the ALMDS and AMNS while the USV tows the UISS and sonar.
 
Knifefish and other (too many to list) individual components have been tested over the years and have fallen by the wayside.
 
It’s been quite a wait for the MCM module, hasn’t it?  And the wait isn’t quite over.  The first LCS was launched in 2006 and the modules began development prior to that so the MCM module has been in development for an unbelievable 17+ years … and still isn’t quite complete! 
Moton [Rear Adm. Casey Moton, program executive officer for unmanned and small combatants] said the Navy planned to deploy the first LCS with the mine countermeasure package in fiscal 2025.[1]
Deployment in 2025, assuming that isn’t further delayed, would put the development at 19+ years.
 
The Navy’s next task is to congratulate themselves and hand out medals all around.  When asked about the development effort, Moton had this to say, 
“Overall we’ve proceeded well throughout it.”[2] 
Well done, indeed, Adm. Moton!  A mere 17+ years to develop the MCM module is a praise-worthy accomplishment, without a doubt!
 
Well, at least the MCM module is here, now, and we know it works because it’s been tested against simulated mines rather than real ones. 
For the IOT&E testing, Moton said Cincinnati’s crew operated the mission package “against a simulated minefield to achieve required mission objectives, including maintenance, pre and post-mission system prep, post-mission data analysis, in-mission command and control and launch and recovery.”[2] 
Does ‘simulated’ mean an inert mine body or does it mean a virtual, non-existent mine as so many of our exercises use today? 
“We completed approximately 230 hours of MCM USV mine hunt operations, over 33 missions from the host LCS as well as from a shore-based command center to fully asses [sic] the sonar’s performance. We executed a total of 12 airborne sorties, with fielded ALMDS and AMNS systems demonstrating the full integration with the MCM mission package,” Moton said.[2] 
We demonstrated 16 full launch and recovery iterations in the MCM mission package IOT&E.”[2] 
Twelve airborne sorties?!  Wow!  That’s testing the crap out of the system, all right!  That many sorties must have thoroughly tested the system in day, night, shallow water, deep water, good weather, bad weather, warm water, cold water, fast currents, high sea states, and against all types of [simulated] mines, and each test must have been conducted many times over to establish statistical validity.  The Navy managed to test all those conditions and establish statistical relevancy in only 12 sorties!  And against ‘simulated’ mines at that!  I’m impressed!  There is no chance this system won’t work flawlessly in the real world.
 
Sixteen launch and recovery iterations?!  Under all the conditions just mentioned?  Again … wow!
 
Well, obviously, I’m mocking the Navy’s LCS-MCM effort.  Specifically, I’m mocking 
  • the protracted 17+ year developmental effort
  • the pathetically inadequate testing
  • the utterly lacking statistically valid test protocols and repetitions
  • the ignoring of the many real world, operational conditions that ought to have been tested (you had 17+ years, for crying out loud!)
  • the use of ‘simulated’ mines as proof of performance
  • the Navy’s delusional, self-congratulatory attitude to what can only be classified as a fiasco of historic proportions 
If I was the Navy, I wouldn’t have even declared IOC – and, seriously, does anyone believe it’s a real IOC as opposed to a pencil-whipped, public relations stunt?  Instead, I would have left it alone and hoped no one noticed the humiliating, embarrassment the MCM module is.  Heck, in a few years the LCS will all be gone via early retirement and the MCM module status will just be a forgotten footnote in history.  Declaring IOC just brings the entire, painful, humiliating episode to the front for everyone to mock.
 
 
 
_____________________________
 
[1]Defense News website, “US Navy declares its mine countermeasures suite ready for operations”, Megan Eckstein, 11-May-2023,
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/05/11/us-navy-declares-its-mine-countermeasures-suite-ready-for-operations/
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy Talks Details on LCS Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Mallory Shelbourne, 12-May-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/05/12/navy-talks-details-on-lcs-mine-countermeaures-mission-package

Thursday, January 5, 2023

LCS and Ford Self-Defense Untested

The LCS program problems are many and, generally, well known.  Still, there are aspects that are surprising even for this troubled program.  One such issue is the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) anti-air defense weapon for the Freedom class LCS.  The issue is that the RAM system has not been tested on the Freedom class and the Navy has decided not to conduct any tests.

 

Both LCS seaframes have limited anti-ship missile self-defense capability.  The Navy has not fully tested these combat systems and the Navy does not plan to conduct further air warfare operational testing of Freedom seaframes 1 through 15 in their current combat system  configuration. The Navy has accepted the risk of continued operation with a combat system that is not operationally tested. (1, p.190)

 

No tests – that’s worse than the WWII torpedo fiasco!

 

This may also partially explain why the Navy is trying to retire the first fifteen or so Freedom class LCS.

 

The DOT&E testing also mentions a vital issue that ComNavOps has harped on and that is performance of radars and missiles in the face of debris-filled skies during attempted intercepts.  To briefly summarize the problem, many people feel that ships can simply vomit forth dozens of missiles, simultaneously, at any single target.  The reality, however, is that only two missiles at a time can be effectively utilized because the explosions from the initial intercepts will fill the skies with radar-reflecting debris and hot (IR) sources and subsequent intercepts will be blinded.  DOT&E notes this problem in one of their LCS recommendations:

 

Correct the SSDS scheduling function to preclude interference with the RAM infrared guidance capability stemming from prior intercepts and warhead detonations. [emphasis added] (1, p.209)

 

The refusal by the Navy to conduct tests of the anti-air system is also seen in the USS Ford self-defense testing.  Significant problems were found with the ‘Slick’ 32 electronic warfare (EW) system, the SPY-3 radar, and the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).

 

The Navy conducted developmental and operational tests on the Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) that revealed combat system deficiencies and limitations associated with the SLQ-32(V)6 electronic warfare system, the SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR), and the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). These deficiencies and limitations reduce the overall self-defense capability of the ship. The Navy has conducted only one of the four planned CVN 78 SDTS operational test events and has not resourced [funded] the remaining testing. [emphasis added] (2, p.123)

 

In June 2019, the Navy conducted one of the four planned CVN 78 operational tests planned for FY19 on the SDTS.  However, the remaining three tests are unlikely to be conducted in accordance with the DOT&E-approved CVN 78 data collection plan, the DOT&E-approved Capstone Enterprise Air Warfare Ship Self-Defense TEMP, and the DOT&E-approved SSDS TEMP. The Navy canceled one test event because they did not incorporate software changes required to conduct the test on the SDTS and the event was not resourced [funded]. The Navy delayed another test event due to poor SLQ-32(V)6 performance in developmental testing. The final, most challenging test event planned for 2QFY20 is not currently funded. The Navy may have to cancel the remaining delayed/unfunded events if they are not conducted before the MFR is removed from the SDTS; this removal is currently planned for the end of 2QFY20. If the Navy does not conduct all of the remaining events, testing will not be adequate to assess the operational effectiveness of the CVN 78 combat system. 

 

So, the Navy’s solution to finding problems is to stop testing.  Yeah, that sounds about right.

This is telling us that the Navy knows the ship self-defense systems have serious problems but, for reasons unknown, refuses to further test the systems.  Presumably, the reason is that the Navy knows that the system problems are serious and, at the moment, unsolvable, and further testing would only reveal more problems that the Navy already knows about.  In other words, from the Navy’s perspective, why spend money testing when you already know the results will be bad?  I have no problem with this scenario if the Navy is working to correct the problems.  Unfortunately, there is no evidence of that they are doing so.  In fact, the total cessation of funding suggests that the Navy is simply going to accept the problems and make no effort to fix them.

 

In addition to halting physical tests, the Navy has also halted its modeling efforts which were supposed to have taken the place of physical testing.

 

The Navy’s refusal to conduct anti-air tests also highlights the recent post about Intellectual Property rights and the problems the Navy has encountered in trying to acquire them (see, “The Navy and Intellectual Property”).  In an irresponsible attempt to cut costs, the Navy is attempting to shift from physical testing to modeling and simulation (M&S) but, in order to do so, they must have detailed design and engineering data and companies are frequently refusing to provide that.


The Navy has neither resourced nor conducted any air warfare test events against anti-ship cruise missile surrogates planned as part of the DOT&E-approved Enterprise Air Warfare Ship Self-Defense Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) or the LCS TEMP. The Navy’s Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems halted all work to develop a Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA) M&S [Modeling and Simulation] suite of the combat systems in FY15 and has not yet restarted the effort. [emphasis added] (2, p.141)

 

DOT&E noted in its 2017 annual report that the Navy has halted funding for attempts to model the LCS combat system due to system component data rights being unavailable:

 

The Navy halted all work to develop a PRA M&S suite of LCS combat systems in FY15 because some combat system element models (e.g., radars) were not available. (1, p.190)

 

DOT&E noted in its 2019 annual report that the Navy has halted funding for attempts to model the Ford combat system due to system component data rights being unavailable:

 

The Navy has not resourced [funded] combat system testing on the lead ship or the modeling and simulation (M&S) required to support evaluation of the ship’s Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA) requirement. (2, p.124)

 

 

Conclusion

 

The decision to drop physical testing in favor of modeling is purely a budget driven attempt to save money.  However, moving to a modeling approach to testing has run into the issue of intellectual property rights.  The Navy’s conflict with industry about intellectual property rights is complex and challenging.  Both sides have very valid concerns.  The Navy needs the data rights in order to conduct modeling and simulation but industry, quite rightly, has no desire to give away its hard-earned competitive advantages which is exactly what would happen.  Of course, if the Navy would show an ounce of wisdom, they’d return to actual performance testing and the data rights issue would be largely moot.

 

The result of all this is that Navy leadership is knowingly sending combat systems to the fleet untested.  That’s an obvious recipe for disaster when combat comes.  This violates the trust of the sailors under their command and constitutes dereliction of duty.

  

 

 

________________________________ 

(1)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2017 Annual Report

(2)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2019 Annual Report


Monday, January 2, 2023

What Happened To Streetfighter?

Let’s start the new year with a post that may ruffle a few feathers and contradict some dearly held beliefs..

 

The LCS is an abject failure.  Even its staunchest supporters have been reduced to talking not about what LCS is but what it might have been.  Yes, the LCS failed but, oh, Streetfighter!  The Mighty Streetfighter!  If only the LCS had remained true to the Streetfighter concept, what a magnificent combat vessel we would have had!

 

Streetfighter … it has assumed the status of myth and legend;  capable of total domination of the seas and able to defeat vast fleets of the most powerful ships.  It would have ensured world peace, solved global hunger, and established democracy throughout the known universe!   …  And now we have the LCS.  What happened?  Where did Streetfighter go?  Why was its self-evident superiority not developed? 

 

Streetfighter?

Let’s take a look and see if we can figure out what happened.

 

Here’s a timeline to help keep track and make sense of the various events that led from the origin of Streetfighter to the LCS we have today … or was it the reverse?

 

 

 

Streetfighter / LCS Development Timeline

 

1987

SC-21 (Surface Combatant for the 21st Century) predecessor studies begin

Jan

1991

End of the Cold War

 

1992

DD-21 / SC-21 officially begins

 

1993

Navy begins to focus on small combatant ships (approx. time period)

 

1995

LCS foundational design wargames (Joint Multi-Warfare Analytical Game) take place in mid-1990’s

Nov

1999

Cebrowski and Hughes publish “Rebalancing the Fleet” which is the first mention of Streetfighter

Jul

2001

Cebrowski unveils Streetfighter ship in Wall Street Journal article by Greg Jaffe

Oct

2001

Cebrowski appointed to head Office of Force Transformation by SedDef Donald Rumsfeld

Late

2001

DD-21 terminated

Apr

2003

Lockheed Martin shows initial LCS concept offering

 

2003

Adm. Clark declares LCS his number one budget priority

May

2004

Initial LCS construction contracts awarded

Jun

2005

LCS Freedom laid

Nov

2005

Cebrowski died

 

 

 

As we see from the timeline, the end of the Cold War, in 1991, left the Navy with a fleet of large combatants and no peer enemy.  Faced with potentially declining budgets, the Navy opted to create a new enemy which it dubbed ‘littoral’.  Despite having absolutely no evidence that ‘littoral’ required anything new or unique, the Navy latched onto it as a rationale for continued funding (see, “Littoral Warfare – Is There Such A Thing?”).  The solution to defeating the littoral bogeyman was the LCS, according to the Navy.  Well, wait ... what about Streetfighter?  Wasn’t it the answer to the littoral challenge?

 

Here’s where we start to see the myths surrounding Streetfighter.

 

One of the [many] misconceptions surrounding Streetfighter was that it preceded the LCS.  In fact, as we see in the timeline, the LCS originated with a series of wargames in the mid-1990’s (see, “LCS Conceptual Origin”).  The first mention of Streetfighter does not occur until 1999, some four or five years later.

 

Whether Cebrowski/Hughes got their inspiration for Streetfighter from the LCS origin games or whether they developed their concept independently is unknown.  I can find no reference to Cebrowski having participated in or referencing the LCS origins.

 

In fact, I can find no actual link between Streetfighter and LCS.  There is no document stating that one flowed from, or morphed into, the other.  As best I can tell, the two concepts never overlapped.  Possibly there was informal, undocumented cross pollination but, if so, there’s no evidence of it. 

 

Again, the timeline demonstrates that the LCS concept arose prior to Streetfighter as evidenced by the mid-1990’s design wargames.  Streetfighter first appeared several years after the original LCS design beginnings.  Thus, all the questions and moanings about the LCS failing to ‘stick’ to the original Streetfighter concept appear to be after-the-fact fantasies and reversed fantasies, at that! 

 

To sum up, the Navy’s official response to the end of the Cold War was, initially, the DD-21/SC-21 program which began in 1992.  However, within a few years, small combatant studies and wargames had begun and the SC-21 program was on the road to termination.  The LCS concept took hold and quickly began to metamorphose into the directionless, do-everything-but-do-it-poorly fantasy ship that we have today.  Streetfighter appears to have been a very brief, parallel but not overlapping, side road on the LCS development path.

 

Now, let’s take a closer look at Cebrowski and Hughes article, “Rebalancing the Fleet”, that first mentions the word ‘Streetfighter’.

 

“Rebalancing the Fleet”

 

Cebrowski and Hughes published their landmark piece describing a future fleet structure that incorporated small combatants dubbed Streetfighters, in Nov-1999.

 

While the piece discussed several important, noteworthy issues such as the cost-risk relationship, it failed to offer any details and relied heavily on non-existent technologies and unproven concepts for its envisioned success.  The article was more of a marketing brochure than a substantive technical analysis.  For example,

 

Foremost, Streetfighter will be able to clear out the clutter and sort friend from foe.[1]

 

That’s a great marketing campaign slogan but offers no actual, technical insight or methodologies for its claimed ability to “clear out the clutter and sort friend from foe”.

 

Another myth about Streetfighter is that it was a single, specific ship.  However, in the ‘Rebalancing the Fleet’ article, Streetfighter is described as a family of ‘capabilities’, not a ship.

 

The Economy B force is a family of capabilities—often referred to as the "Streetfighter Concept"—that, in conjunction with power-projection forces, will enable the U.S. Navy to operate anytime, anywhere … [1]

 

Indeed, Cebrowski/Hughes never actually described what Streetfighter was beyond generalities.  There are suggestions of vessels in the 300-1200 ton range with no specifics.  There was no description of size, speed, weapons fit, sensors, etc.  This has led every subsequent naval analyst to assign their own vision to Streetfighter, just as happened to the LCS.

 

The reality is that ‘Streetfighter’ seems to have originally been a reference to a concept of a family of smaller vessels acting as a group.  It was described as a ‘family of capabilities’, not as a type of ship.

 

 

 

A noteworthy follow up piece by Hughes addresses Streetfighter concerns that were raised at the time.

 

“22 Questions for Streetfighter”

 

Hughes, himself, offers criticisms of the Streetfighter concept although he does so in what he believes are positive statements.  For example,

 

One of the first things learned by a task analysis of coastal operations is that low-flying aircraft, not big ships or submarines, are the alternative to streetfighters.[2]

 

Thus, Hughes, himself, offers a far more cost effective and combat effective alternative to Streetfighter in the form of aircraft!

 

In attempting to extol the virtues of Streetfighter, Hughes falls back on the common claim that the enemy will be paralyzed with fear at the thought of a single vessel roaming undetected no matter how individually incapable that vessel might be.

 

… if there is a flock of small ships, each powerfully armed yet hard to detect, then the enemy will live in continuing fear over whether he has found them all.

 

An enemy probably also will see deviltry and cunning in a squadron of streetfighters.[2]

 

This is, again, great as a marketing slogan but woefully short on combat reality.

 

Regarding Streetfighter’s self-defense,

 

A 300-ton streetfighter would depend on stealth characteristics, soft kill, numbers, and the ability to lose itself "in the clutter." It could carry light antiair weapons such as Stingers. The design philosophy should be that visual detection of it will predominate, no present missile guidance system will detect and home on it, and added safely comes from confronting an enemy with a swarm of targets.[2]

 

Even a larger 1200 ton Streetfighter was recognized as having inherent defensive problems,

 

A larger version of 1,200 tons might carry not only soft kill systems but also deployable decoys and Rolling Airframe missile (RAM) or the equivalent, while accepting that low observability and active defense are conflicting characteristics.[2]

 

As Hughes recognizes, you can’t defend without broadcasting (radar) your position and if you broadcast your position, you die since you have no credible defense.

 

Hughes does offer one brilliant and prescient observation,

 

The biggest danger is that streetfighter will be conceived as a junior variation of the projection navy: the same habitability standards, spacious bridge, electronically comprehensive combat information center, offices, and paperwork; a galley with cooks and mess cooks; defenses that are supposed to defeat every attack; stocks for months at sea; standard damage-control teams and procedures; and a guarantee for each young captain that one grounding or failed inspection will send him packing.[2]

 

Indeed, this is exactly what happened to the LCS!

 

 

 

Analysis

 

 

‘Wired’ website offers interesting thoughts about the lack of CONOPS, which doomed the LCS.

 

The confusion over the LCS' roles has gone on so long it has created a bizarre feedback loop, with the Navy, its shipbuilders, the Pentagon and America's regional commanders each developing plans and technologies for the LCS based on conflicting assumptions. The result is a warship theoretically capable of almost anything, and increasingly optimized for nothing.[3]

 

This vagueness and lack of a concept of operations also extended to Streetfighter.

 

For all Cebrowski's and Hughes' passion about small-ship theory, and Clark's and Rumsfeld's determination to build the diminutive vessels, no one had clearly defined exactly what a small warship should look like, and what it should and shouldn't do. On at least one key point – expendability – the strategists and the mainstream Navy were totally at odds.[3]

 

This fundamental flaw – the lack of a viable CONOPS - continues to this day and not just for the LCS but for any conceptual small combatant.  I have yet to hear any viable CONOPS for any small combatant in US service.  Supporters of small combatants are wildly enthusiastic about the ships, themselves (meaning, the weapons, speed, stealth, and other physical characteristics), but totally ignore the fundamental question of how the ship will be used. 

 

This was the problem with Streetfighter. 

 

This was the problem with the LCS. 

 

This is the problem with any small combatant.

 

We’ve thoroughly discussed the problems that arise from the lack of a CONOPS when a ship is designed.  Well, here’s someone else’s discussion of the problem as it relates to the LCS.

 

The only thing everyone agreed on was that the LCS would sail close to shore. But no one specified how close "close" really was. One mile? Twenty-five miles?

 

As theorists, Hughes and Cebrowski never had to be specific. Rumsfeld, for his part, was notorious for ignoring the nitty-gritty details of running the military. Clark tried his best to keep his boss happy and grow the fleet.

 

"As a result, the Navy’s leadership was forced to test out arguments for the new ship on the fly," [DepSecDef] Work recalled. "Sometimes the LCS was labeled transformational because of its high speed ... other times it was because the ship was designed to defeat 'asymmetric' littoral threats." On still other occasions, the Navy chose to emphasize LCS' supposed "transformational impact on the American shipbuilding industry."

 

"The constantly changing rationale for the new ship helped to confuse both the Navy’s internal and external audiences," Work concluded.

 

In short, the circumstances of the LCS' genesis were a perfect recipe for a shipbuilding fiasco.[3]

 

And the utterly predictable result occurred.

 

The [LCS] plan was, in a word, ambitious – which was not what Cebrowski and Hughes had in mind when they argued for the Navy to add smaller, simpler, cheaper ships. In the course of just four years, the Navy fought, embraced, and then completely corrupted the small-ship philosophy. Instead of compact, brute-simple coastal brawlers, it would get over-inflated, gas-guzzling, gutless ships dependent on ultrahigh-tech gizmos.

 

In the absence of clear missions and realistic capabilities, LCS became everything to everyone, as long as no one thought too hard about anything.[3]

 

More generally, the following illustrates a (the?) fundamental flaw in all the ‘streetfighter’, small combatant type ship designs and force structures.  It makes the assumption that large ships are unable to function in a littoral scenario – an assumption that is utterly unsupported by any evidence and, in fact, a great deal of evidence exists to support the exact opposite conclusion!  For example, the destroyers at Normandy that sailed right up to shore to do battle with German shore batteries conclusively proved that large, ocean-going ships had no problems operating and fighting successfully in shallow waters.

 

In the late 1990s, the Navy realized it had a problem. Its 9,000-ton cruisers and destroyers, inherited from the Cold War, were great for open-ocean warfare against the Soviets. But the same ships were considered too vulnerable to safely operate in the shallow, crowded, chaotic coastal waters – aka, the "littorals" – that were fast becoming the next naval battleground.

 

Here, dangers might include gun-armed speedboats, missile-firing fast-attack craft, small submarines and sea mines, plus antiship missiles and aircraft launched from land.

 

The preceding assumption, that large, ocean-going ships can’t function and survive in shallow waters is valid only if one cedes all offensive operation to the opponent … which is exactly what we’ve done;  witness Iran’s constant harassment (to include mining of merchant ships – an act of war or piracy or both).  If, on the other hand, one retains the right of offensive action, any large, ocean-going combatant can wipe away littoral threats with no effort.

 

 

Conclusion

 

It seems clear that the common belief that Streetfighter preceded the LCS is incorrect.  The corollary belief that LCS ‘abandoned’ the Streetfighter design is also false as there is no evidence that the LCS ever had any formal connection with Streetfighter.  Further, Streetfighter was never a Navy program of record and, therefore, there was never any official embrace of Streetfighter other than, perhaps, some informal and undocumented hope that Cebrowski’s appointment by Rumsfeld to head his pet Office of Force Transformation might result in some degree of incorporation of the Streetfighter concept into the LCS.  By that time, however, the LCS was already pretty well set, at least in concept.

 

Most importantly, Streetfighter appears to have never been given any definitive form in the way of specifications.  In fact, I can find no Cebrowski-Hughes artist’s concept drawing of what the Streetfighter vessel might have looked like.  The lack of any formal description has given rise to endless versions proposed by subsequent naval commentators but none have the slightest connection to Cebrowski and Hughes’ concept which, indeed, never actually specified an actual vessel – only a ‘family of capabilities’.

 

Thus, all the romanticism about Streetfighter is just that:  romantic notions that were never actually espoused by Cebrowski and Hughes.

 

All subsequent Streetfighter discussion has been pure, individual speculation with no attached CONOPS – just a vague array of marketing slogans by people who are more enamored of ship weapons than any useful description of how a Streetfighter would actually function.  If you want to begin to get an understanding of just how flawed the small combatant concept is, read the post, “Undisputed and Unaccepted”, which discusses some of the flaws in Hughes small combatant concept as described in his fleet tactics book.


 

We can blame the LCS for a host of failings but failing to follow the design of Streetfighter is not one of them.

 

 

 

 

 

Disclaimer:  Information from the beginnings of the LCS and Streetfighter are hard to find.  If someone can produce information I haven’t found, I’ll gladly consider it and modify my conclusions, if appropriate.

 


________________________________

 

[1]USNI Proceedings, “Rebalancing the Fleet”, Vice Admiral A. K. Cebrowski, USN, and Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.), Volume 125/11/1,161, Nov-1999

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1999/november/rebalancing-fleet

 

[2]USNI Proceedings, “22 Questions for Streetfighter”, Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.), Vol. 126/2/1,164, Feb-2000

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2000/february/22-questions-streetfighter

 

[3]https://www.wired.com/2011/08/future-warship-ran-aground/