Currently, two of the three LCS supposedly based in the
Middle East have been moved (evacuated?) to Singapore.[1] The whereabouts of the third is unknown. Why aren’t they in the Middle East, perhaps
ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz? Isn’t this kind of mission exactly what they
were designed for? As you recall, the
original LCS concept was that they would boldly enter littoral (hence, the ship’s
name) waters and neutralize mines, subs, surface, and land threats so that
larger, more expensive ships could operate in the area with less risk.
So, why aren’t they there?
Well, we all know the answer. The
originally envisioned modules were just flights of fantasy and never
materialized. But, what if the original
modules had become available as fully functioning equipment? Would such LCSes be useful in the Middle East
today?
Let’s briefly recall the intended functionality of the original
modules.
MCM – The LCS was intended to stop well outside a minefield
and use remote, unmanned assets to clear the area of mines.
ASuW - This
was, perhaps, the key to the entire LCS concept. The NLOS (not to be confused with the current
Spike NLOS missile) system of loitering, smart, networked munitions would
address all threats out to a range of 20+ miles. By removing all visible threats, it would
allow fellow LCSes to deal with mines and submarines.
ASW – The LCS was intended to basically stop and throw out
an ASW barrier of remote vehicles that would track down and destroy enemy
submarines while the LCS remained safely out of reach.
Thus, a mixed group of LCS would enter an area and the ASuW
equipped vessels would eliminate all visible land and surface threats while ASW
and MCM equipped vessels eliminated the subsurface threats. Such a group in the strait, today, would
eliminate all missile, rocket, artillery, and speed boat threats to shipping
across the width of the strait and twenty miles inland. UAVs would provide continuous surveillance
with NLOS munitions on-call, moments away.
Hidden enemy launchers would be destroyed moments after they emerged
from hiding. The MCM-LCS would search
for the rumored, but not yet confirmed, mines.
Highly effective, indeed!
Of course, the LCS modules were never realized (that’s why
it’s called fantasy!) and the LCS proved useless as demonstrated by the Navy’s
removal of the ships from the very mission they were designed for. The concept was okay but it was dependent on
non-existent technology coupled with unbelievably inept execution.
Since we don’t have fantasy modules but the conceptual need
still exists, what do we have that could do the job? Well, there’s always air power that could,
for enormous cost and effort, provide the continuous surveillance and quick
response strike that’s needed to deal with emergent threats. We have Burkes with their single 5” gun that
could provide persistent, on-call, fire support if some other asset can provide
targeting. We could land Army/Marines in
various locations to search and destroy or provide counterbattery fire.using
G/ATOR or similar systems.
We have the theoretical capability for ships to do
counterbattery fire since the radars are fully capable, lacking only the
software to do so. Why hasn’t the Navy
ever bothered to implement counterbattery capability? Because it doesn’t put big, new, shiny hulls
in the water which is how large budget slices are ensured.
The original LCS concept was valid and the need was
legitimate but the actual design was based on non-existent technology and
wishful thinking. We didn’t need the
LCS. The need could have been met with
existing assets by implementing counterbattery capability on Burkes, adding
much more small UAV capability to ships, and incorporating air power and land
forces. The cost would have been minimal
– free compared to what the LCS program has cost us.
That we didn’t take the approach of using existing assets
simply highlights the Navy’s focus on budget over mission accomplishment. The LCS gained the Navy large budget share as
opposed to simple software modifications or buying some more small UAVs.
Until we stop viewing the Navy as a business organization
trying to turn a profit (budget slice) and start viewing it as a tool for
mission accomplishment, nothing will improve.
Where are the LCSes?
The past Navy CNOs need to be brought out of retirement and forced to
take responsibility for their dereliction of duty.
_______________________________
https://www.twz.com/sea/u-s-navy-minesweepers-stationed-in-middle-east-are-now-in-singapore
I remember writing about the need for ship counterbattery radar two decades ago! Experts says the Aegis radar can do the job, it just needs a software package for that.
ReplyDeleteThe Zummies were the NGFS, one would think
Deletecounter battery would be an included function.
Maybe pull a Mark 1 fire control computer from
an Iowa ?
"one would think counter battery would be an included function."
DeleteAs far as I know, that was never an intended function of the Zumwalt. Remember, the Zumwalt was intended to provide very long range fires. I'm not even sure it could have provided very close fire support. It's guns were not capable of anti-ship (moving target) fire and it was not capable of area bombardment.
The Zumwalt never had a well thought out CONOPS. Even if everything about it had worked perfectly, it was a very limited platform.
Maybe it's an oversimplification but most radars allready could be used in a counterbattery role. It's just that the data adds to much information on the screens and as missiles and aircraft have been considered as the only real threats for decades so the data is probably filtered out. While a dedicated software package would be nice having the radar tracks of more than one source available (as it's most likely the case) and overlaying it on map should be enough to get a viable firing solution. It's been done in the past without radar and ground based artillery as far as I know still practises tracing/gun laying without radar support. So it should be possibile to compute a firing solution without a multimillion and possibly untested software package.
Delete"It's just that the data adds to much information on the screens"
DeleteYou may not understand how radar, fire control, and computers work. Counterbattery is simply a software modification to enable the radar data to be manipulated in such a way as to result in a target for the guns/missiles. Information on a screen has nothing to do with it.
"radar tracks of more than one source"
Radar doesn't require multiple sources unless you're using a special bi/multi-static system. There is no triangulation, if that's what you are describing. Modern radars provide precise locations (range, bearing, elevation).
"should be possibile to compute a firing solution without a multimillion and possibly untested software package."
It's certainly possible IF YOU HAPPEN TO HAVE AN OBSERVER IN THE EXACT SPOT THE ENEMY IS. This is old hat. Automated counterbattery eliminates the need for the observer and, thus, covers the entire area out to the range of the associated weapons.
I get the impression you need to study up on modern naval and radar technology and tactics. Feel free to make extensive use of the archives!
I would think Phalanx might provide some coverage for this given C-RAM does exactly this. Too bad the LPDs don't have any.
DeleteOne would think CIWS could provide some C-RAM type protection but I've never looked into it.
DeleteC-RAM (and CIWS) is very short range as opposed to the counterbattery fires we're discussing which are, on a relative basis, much longer range.
Counterbattery calculations are much, much complicated today by cheap (relatively) course correcting fuzes that enable even 'dumb' tube artillery rounds to adjust their trajectory. Simple ballistic calculations are not guaranteed as valid firing solutions. Further, the reality that most long range fires are now assigned to long range missiles (again, there are very few rockets that do not have inertial, or GPS guidance). It is not the 1980s anymore; an observer of some sort is almost required for counter battery work.
DeleteGAB
A carrier battle group can't get within a thousand kilometres of Iran. Even with counterbattery capabilities what's a piece of junk LCS going to do?
ReplyDeleteI understand you're venting frustration and that's fine but hopefully you recognize that carriers stand off from battle zones because they have aircraft. They don't need to approach danger closely. It's not that they can't. It's just tactically wiser not to. Recall the battle of Midway.
DeleteCounterbattery, if it was available, is key to controlling and mitigating threats. Counterbattery means the enemy only gets one shot and then they're dead. That's an equitable trade in combat!
a) carrier groups probably could approach much closer than they are. They must do so while taking appropriate countermeasures for each level of the "survivability onion." Namely, signature management to avoid long-range detection, maneuvers and decoys to avoid being accurately target, a variety of electronic and kinetic means to destroy incoming projectiles that will hit, and active damage control when hit anyway. Just spitballing, consider this enumeration to be non-exhaustive.
Delete2) a smaller, more attritable LCS is much less likely to be found, targeted, hit, and destroyed. With enough operational support, a forward LCS might draw Iranian fire and expose their batteries to other sensors and fires. A few repetitions and Iran learns that LCS isn't worth it.
3) warships are lost in war. The objective is not to preserve warships at any cost, because the perfect solution to that objective is to keep the warships at home; or better yet, buried in the ground in the form of iron ore, unbuilt. The objective is to exchange warships, blood, treasure, any asset you possess, for enemy assets, at a rate that achieves your objectives at an acceptable cost without allowing the enemy to do the same. We, the people of the United States, have suffered a misalignment in our understanding of exchange rates and acceptable costs. We have become accustomed to wars that cost nothing, comparatively, and forget that they achieve even less. War is costly. Maintaining dominance as a global super power is difficult. We must occasionally pay the piper.
Mistakenly posted this as a general reply at first.
"LCS is much less likely to be found, targeted, hit, and destroyed. With enough operational support, a forward LCS might draw Iranian fire and expose their batteries"
DeleteOf course, if the LCS was much less likely to be found and targeted then they'd be much less likely to draw fire! Almost a Catch-22 there!
"people of the United States, have suffered a misalignment in our understanding of exchange rates and acceptable costs"
This is one of the major lessons of the strikes on Iran. Imagine if "we the people", in WWII, had taken the same zero-tolerance approach to casualties and timelines greater than 1 week.
It's interesting- if the LCS and Zumwalts had panned out as originally intended, they'd actually be in their element off the coast of Iran today. Of course, if we had built 30+ Zumwalts and not restarted the Burkes, then what would we have left to do the AAW and CVBG escort duties? Flt I ships that are poorly maintained and falling apart? Would the Navy have already early-retired Burkes so that modernized versions didn't threaten their shiny new Zumwalt Flt IIs, IIIs etc, like the Spruances? With the Zums price tag, surely the Navy would've wanted to ditch the "legacy" platforms, and all the cruisers and some early Burkes would likely have already joined the Brownsville fraternity (sorority?). The neverending production of Burkes without a modern replacement is getting absurd, but in retrospect, it seems like there are actually alternate versions of shipbuilding history that could be worse!!
ReplyDelete(Note: I'm NOT supporting LCS, Zumwalt, OR 40 yrs of Burkes- just noting a 'what-if' where a programs success mightve been worse than its failure.)
"if we had built 30+ Zumwalts and not restarted the Burkes, then what would we have left to do the AAW and CVBG escort duties?"
DeleteYou offer a thought provoking scenario. Of course, had the Zumwalt and LCS become fully functional, as intended, we wouldn't have needed as many Burkes for AAW and CV escort. We need large numbers of Burkes, today, because we lack other ships, not because Burkes are the best choice. Burkes are actually ill-suited as general purpose escorts and are less than optimized for AAW. They also have almost no ground fire support capability, cannot conduct MCM, and are far too expensive to risk in ASW - all tasks that the Zumwalt and LCS would excel at (assuming your alternate scenario where they were built fully functional, as intended)!
So, one could make the argument that your alternate history might have been better. Consider further: had the Zumwalt and LCS been successful, perhaps the Navy wouldn't have become so gun shy and clung to the "safety" of the Burke design. Maybe we'd have produced the other members of the family of ships that were supposed to accompany the DDG(X) such as the CG(X). You might want to read the Wiki "SC-21" topic and check out the family of ships that were supposed to have been part of the overall program. It makes fascinating reading about the family of ships!
The initial concept for the Zumwalt was "just" a stealth Spruance, with the main idea being to repeat a sucessful general purpose ASW destroyer with technological advancements and stealth for greater survivability. Unfortunate that the focus was loat, eapecially with the naval gunfire debacle.
Delete"The initial concept for the Zumwalt was "just" a stealth Spruance"
DeleteI'm sorry but that's not even remotely correct. The Zumwalt derived from the DD-21/SC-21 which was an attempt to placate Congress and the Marines regarding their anger over the Navy's abandonment of the naval fire support role. The DD-21/SC-21 and, subsequently, the Zumwalt was intended as a land attack ship. The DD-21 is often referred to as the "land attack destroyer".
While the Zumwalt has a theoretical ASW capability in that it has a sonar, the ship is in no realistic way ASW capable. The sonar is intended for mine detection and shallow water submarine detection. The ship lacks ASW torpedoes and may or may not carry VL-ASROC which is, itself, a nearly useless ASW weapon being far too short range. Finally, no sane commander would risk the $8B vessel playing tag with a submarine.
Regarding AAW, the slashed the original 32-ship requirement to zero, citing the Zumwalt's inability to counter aerial threats. The ship has NO close in AAW weapons and serious shortcomings in its AAW missile guidance. I've posted on this. The CG(X) was intended as the AAW vessel.
Zumwalt was always intended to be a land attack vessel though even that role seems not to have been well thought out (unable to perform area bombardment, for example).
While I wouldn't necessarily call the Spruance class destroyers cheap per se, Spruance cost 83 million in 1972 dollars, which works out as 675 million dollars in 2025. Which is still a fair bit more affordable than the almost 2 billion dollar Burkes we have in service. And it's not that much more expensive, relatively speaking, than ASW LCS. I am willing to spend twice the money for a significantly more capable ship!
DeleteSide note, all 6 FRCs appeared in Singapore today too. My unbacked hope is we see all these ships getting some added gear to fight right now. LCS surface warfare module weapons should have always been standard with the MCM module being interchangeable with VBSS boats and team for surface warfare. Among other things.
ReplyDeleteI wrote several articles long ago that the US Navy needed a least a dozen Ambassador MK III missile boats. These fast corvettes were being produced in Mississippi for export with the last one costing just $240 million in 2009 with a crew of 36 and no big explosive missiles inside. This compared to the current Burke destroyers costing $3 billion with a crew of 300. Navy officers dismissed this idea saying they were too small and could not deploy with carrier groups. The big reason is they were less profitable for the military industry. These would be perfect to send into the Strait right now to shoot up Iranian boats and slug it out with shore batteries.
ReplyDeleteType Missile boat
Displacement 600 tons [3]
Length 63 m (206 ft 8 in) [4]
Beam 10 m (32 ft 10 in)
Draft 2 m (6 ft 7 in)
Installed power 4× MTU diesels,[5] 30,000 hp (22 MW)
Propulsion 4 shafts[6]
Speed 41 knots (76 km/h)[7]
Range 2,000 nmi (3,700 km; 2,300 mi) at 15 knots (28 km/h; 17 mph)
Endurance 8 days at sea
Complement 36 (8 officers, 10 chief petty officers, and 18 ratings), 38[8]
Sensors &
processing systems
Thales MRR-3D NG G band multi-role radar
Thales Scout (I/J band) Maritime Surveillance Radar
Thales STING-EO Mk2 fire control Radar
Link ASN 150, LinkYE, Link 14 and Link 11 data links
IFF
TACTICOS Combat Management System with Model 033-2T/066-2T Tracking Pedestals.
Electronic warfare
& decoys
4 × chaff/IR Decoy launchers
ESM/ECM
Armament
8 × RGM-84 Boeing Harpoon SSM Block 1G in 2 quad canister launchers
1 × OTO Melara Mk 75 76 mm/62 Super Rapid DP gun
1 × Mk 31 Mod 3 RIM-116 RAM (21 missiles)
1 × Raytheon Mk 15 Mod 21 Phalanx (Block 1B) 20 mm Phalanx CIWS
2 × deck-mounted 7.62 mm M60 machine guns[1]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lEiknOU90s