NSC Frigate Commonality

Do you remember the main selling point of the Constellation, as originally stated?  It was to use an existing (parent) ship design with absolutely minimal modifications so that commonality would be high, thereby keeping costs low and schedules short.  Instead, the Navy heaped on so many changes that commonality dropped from 85% to 15% at the time of cancellation.  We saw what happened to cost and schedule, as a result.
 
For the National Security Cutter (NSC) frigate, the Navy’s main goal is to get AMERICAN hulls in the water as quickly as possible without worrying about lethality or combat effectiveness.  Setting aside the absurdity of the lack of lethality and combat effectiveness, the only way hulls can hit the water quickly and cheaply is to maintain maximum commonality with the parent NSC design.  Of course, the greater the commonality, the less the firepower and lethality … but, I digress.
 
Unfortunately, we’ve already seen many changes to the parent design.  The forward superstructure is being modified, stern platforms added, weapons changed, electronic warfare added, sensors added, presumably a new combat software system, etc. and those are only the changes we know about and only the external, visible changes.  Each of the listed changes requires modifications to the internal structure, ducting, cabling, bulkheads, layout, runs, utilities, etc.  Changes have a cascading effect far beyond the main change.  Further, the NSC is not built to Navy standards so, presumably, like the Constellation, the Navy will make significant internal structural changes for increased survivability just as was done to Constellation.  My slightly educated guess is that the commonality is already down to around 50% and it’s only going to get worse as the design progresses.  The Navy will continue to make changes.  They can’t help themselves.  It’s who they are and what they do.
 
Affordable and fast production?  I think cheap has already left town and quick is buying a bus ticket out as we speak. 

Where’s the Lethality?

Having failed so many times, the Navy’s primary shipbuilding criteria is no longer lethality (if it ever was in modern times) but the [incorrectly] perceived need to get hulls – any hulls – in the water as quickly as possible to stop the criticisms and fend off Congressional anger.  As Naval News website notes about the new frigate program,
 

… speed [of production] is now the primary factor driving the program.[1]

Speed of production.  Not firepower, not stealth, not lethality, not operational usefulness or anything else one might think would be of importance … just the speed with which hulls can be put in the water.  Why not just buy combat canoes?  We can get them in the water quickly.
 
The new Frigate’s armament will consist of a 57mm main cannon and a RAM launcher with 21 Rolling Airframe Missiles.  A payload space will be constructed (so much for no changes to the parent design!) at the stern of the ship capable of carrying 16 Naval Strike Missiles, 48 Hellfires, or other containerized weapons or modules.[1]
 
50-65 ships will be built …  So, we’re committing to a large production run before the first design is even finalized.  Does sound identical to the LCS?
 
The horrifying concern is that this level of armament relegates this vessel to the level of a patrol boat (and not a particularly impressive one at that!) and yet it will make up something like a third of our combat fleet.  Absorb that for a moment.  A third of the combat fleet will be patrol boats.  Add in the Navy’s desire for all manner of unmanned vessels and we’re looking at half or more of the fleet being nearly devoid of serious combat capability. 
 
Sure, the Navy will talk about future upgrades but when has that ever actually happened?  Ask the LCS how those future module upgrades that we were promised are coming along.
 
If I were China, I’d bankroll this program for the United States just to ensure we field a fleet of non-lethal ships!
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “New U.S Navy Frigate: FF(X) Program Specs Revealed”, Ethan Gossrow, 16-Jan-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/01/new-u-s-navy-frigate-ffx-program-specs-revealed/

NSC Patrol Boat

I applauded the Navy’s decision to terminate the Constellation program and still do.  I also, initially, viewed the decision to build a NSC-frigate as a poor choice but one that had some slight potential to produce a useful vessel if certain constraints and discipline could be applied such as a rigorous CONOPS and an obsessive fixation on a single mission, presumably ASW.. 
 
Sadly, the program is already doomed. The vessel will, apparently, have almost no weapons or useful sensors and no mission focus, whatsoever.
 
The initial NSC “frigate” will have 1x 57mm gun and 1x RAM mount.[1]  That’s it for weapons.  Nothing else.  That’s not a frigate.  That’s barely even a patrol boat and is hideously oversized, overpriced, and overmanned for that level of firepower.
 
The initial NSC “frigate” will NOT have a 5” gun, VLS, anti-ship missiles, strike missiles, ASW sonar, towed array, anti-submarine torpedoes, or CIWS.[2]  What it doesn’t have is far more impressive than what it does have.
 
Looking at the equipment list (or lack thereof) one can’t help but wonder, in stunned disbelief, what the purpose of the ship is?  What is the mission?  It barely qualifies as a patrol boat.  What is the Navy going to do with it?
 
It sounds like we’re just going to be building Coast Guard cutters and not even good ones.
 
I know the Navy is incapable of learning lessons but after decades of hitting themselves in the head with a hammer wouldn’t you think they’d at least stop just to make the pain go away?  I guess not.  They’ve just picked up a new hammer and immediately started whacking themselves in the head again. 
 
Enjoy the pain, Navy!  What a bunch of morons.  Good work, SecDef, SecNav, and CNO!

 
 
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[1]The War Zone website, “Navy’s New Frigate Will Not Have A Vertical Launch System For Missiles”, Joseph Trevithick & Howard Altman, 22-Dec-2025,
https://www.twz.com/sea/navys-new-frigate-will-not-have-vertical-launch-systems-for-missiles
 
[2]USNI News website, “SECNAV: New Frigate will be Based on National Security Cutter, First FF(X) to be Built at Ingalls”, Sam LaGrone, 19-Dec-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/12/19/secnav-new-frigate-will-be-based-on-national-security-cutter-first-ffx-to-be-built-at-ingalls

The Next Frigate Disaster

Now that the Constellation has failed miserably, the Navy has semi-formally stated that the next frigate will be a modified Coast Guard National Security Cutter (NSC, Legend class) and will be in the water by 2028.[1]  …  …  …   Sorry for the pause, there.  I had to retype that sentence several times because I kept making mistakes trying to type while laughing hysterically.  From vague concept to in the water in three years or less – that’s hilarious!
 

“We believe the future frigate can be in the water in 2028,” Jason Potter, the Navy’s acting acquisition executive, told attendees today at the Defense Forum here in Washington.[1]
 
[SecNav] Phelan also recently told attendees at a private dinner that the new frigate would be a modified National Security Cutter … [1]
 
Navy Secretary John Phelan said the new frigate would be based on an American design and stressed that any change orders would have to go through him.[1]

While such a timetable ought to be easily achievable, the recent record of Navy shipbuilding renders it a laughable fantasy.
 
Let’s set that aside and take a quick glance at the NSC and examine some potential issues.
 

National Security Cutter

Concurrency.  It’s not even a formal program, yet, and there’s already a potentially troubling bit of news, as indicated below.
 

He [Jason Potter] said the service was focused on using a design approach that separates finalizing the ship’s design from the construction of the lead ship … [1]

That’s a frightening statement because I don’t know what it means.  One of the Navy’s persistent, major problems with shipbuilding is concurrency which results in construction without a complete design.  In other words, unbelievably, the construction is treated as a separate issue from design.  Potter’s statement could be interpreted as saying that construction will NOT be linked to a requirement for a complete design (the “separation” he mentions).  If so, this would be simply repeating an approach that has failed every time it’s been used.  Did Potter just lay the groundwork for the failure of this program before it’s even become a formal program or did he mean something different and, if so, what did he mean?
 
Size.  The NSC, as it exists in Coast Guard service, measures 418ft long and 54ft in beam.  In comparison, the Constellation is 496ft x 65ft.  Thus, the NSC is 16% shorter and 17% narrower.  That’s a significant chunk of deck space and internal volume “gone”.  The Constellation was not exactly heavily armed to begin with and the reduced size of the NSC is, presumably, going to require significant reductions in the weapons fit compared to the Constellation.  If it comes with a commensurate reduction in cost, that might be okay but we’ve seen time and again that costs do not decrease in scale with capability decreases.  The Constellation was, itself, a third the capabilities of a Burke at 80%, or so, of the cost.  If the NSC “shrinks” at the same rate from the Constellation, we’ll have something on the order of 20% of the capabilities of a Burke at 60% of the cost.
 
CONOPS.  The discussion of capabilities leads us into the next troublesome issue and that is … of course you know what it is … CONOPS!  SecNav has apparently already chosen a ship to build, established a timetable, and is talking about design and construction processes but …  …  where is the CONOPS?  The Constellation never had one so they won’t be reusing that.  What is this frigate supposed to do?  What is its focus?  Its mission?  It’s going to have fewer capabilities than the Constellation, presumably, so it really needs to have a tight mission focus to ensure that it can be effective in whatever its role will be.  Otherwise, we’re going to wind up with a mini-mini-Burke.  Mini²-Burke?  I’m already sensing a ship that will attempt to do a very small amount of everything and will do absolutely nothing even slightly well.  To paraphrase … Jack of no trades, adequate of none?
 
Change Orders.  As noted above, SecNav has, apparently, identified change orders as a problem in shipbuilding, claiming that change orders will have to go through him.  If, by that, he means he won’t be approving any, that’s great.  On the other hand, if he simply means he’ll rubber stamp the change orders than we just have a sound bite with no actual improvement in the shipbuilding process.  As a reminder, all waivers for ship construction and trials must go through the CNO, personally.  The problem is that no CNO has ever met a waiver he didn’t approve so what’s the point of the approval process?  Will SecNav just become an automatic approval for change orders?  The mere fact that he even states that change orders must go through him implies that he will approve some/all.  This is the wrong approach.  He should have flatly stated that once the design is set there will be no change orders … period!  But … he didn’t.  Again, this is establishing the groundwork for failure, already.
 
Structure.  It is unknown whether the NSC meets Navy structural standards as regards strength, compartmentation, weight margins, etc.  The NSC is reportedly built to 80-90% military standards but what is lacking and how critical it is, is unknown.  As you recall, the Constellation program got in trouble trying to modify the FREMM to USN construction and survivability standards.  Will history repeat itself, here?
 
Testing.  The NSC has a near mythical reputation among naval observers who have constantly called for the Navy to adopt/adapt the NSC to naval use.  The reality, however, is that the NSC, like every ship, has problems that may render it unsuitable for naval service without extensive redesign and modifications (bye, bye budget!).  The Jan 2016 GAO report [2] noted,
 

The U.S. Navy, the Coast Guard’s independent test agent, completed initial testing for the National Security Cutter (NSC) in April 2014 and rated the NSC as operationally effective and suitable. Still, testing revealed 10 major deficiencies (some are shown in figure). Initial testing is an event designed to verify performance of critical systems to ensure assets are capable of meeting mission requirements. The event tests critical operational issues and key performance parameters. The NSC fully met 12 of 19 key performance parameters. Tests of one key performance parameter, as well as other critical systems, were deferred to follow-on testing. The Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy disagree on the NSC’s requirements for cutter boat operations. Without clear requirements the Navy and Coast Guard will not have a basis for determining actions to resolve any performance issues. Coast Guard officials acknowledged that clarifying these requirements would be beneficial.[2]
 
According to Coast Guard documentation, it may choose not to correct all deficiencies due to the cost of changes.[2]
 
During operations, the NSC has experienced performance issues that were not identified during initial testing, and the Coast Guard has planned design changes to some of the cutters’ equipment [ed. from an accompanying diagram, problem equipment includes CIWS, CIWS ammo hoist, engines, generators, boat, boat crane, 57mm gun, 57mm gun ammo hoist, TRS 3D radar, Nulka decoy launcher, and midships boat davit] …  However, the Coast Guard has not yet found the causes for problems affecting the NSC’s propulsion systems. As a result of these and other equipment failures, the NSC has been operating in a degraded condition in some mission areas. DHS has no plans for additional acquisition review boards for the NSC, which would provide oversight going forward.[2]

 
Discussion
 
The failure of the Constellation program presents an opportunity for the Navy to course-correct.  Assuming the NSC platform can be successfully adapted to meet naval combat and survivability standards at an affordable cost – no sure thing – the platform offers the ability to construct a small, focused vessel for the ASW frigate mission.    Instead of a bloated, overpriced, under armed, and unfocused ship with no defined purpose, the Navy has the chance to design a small, focused, affordable ASW-centric ship.  What the NSC does not offer is the ability to be a mini-Burke like the Constellation.  Whether the Navy will be wise enough to recognize this limitation and the opportunity it presents is an open question with an all too likely failed answer but time will tell.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy wants new frigate in 2028, says service’s acquisition head”, Justin Katz, 10-Dec-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/12/navy-wants-new-frigate-in-2028-says-services-acquisition-head/
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER, Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed”, Jan 2016, GAO-16-148,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674924.pdf