Who Needs a Navy When You’ve Got a P-8 Poseidon?

The Navy (and the US military) have received yet another miracle of technology from industry.  Boeing and Northrop Grumman have now simulated (they didn’t actually do anything but simulation is good enough – reality is never an issue) teaming between a manned P-8A Poseidon and unmanned MQ-4C Triton.[1]
 

Boeing and Northrop Grumman successfully simulated teaming between a manned P-8A Poseidon and unmanned MQ-4C Triton … [1]
 
The P-8A cued the Triton transit to a specific area. After receiving the request, the Triton autonomously planned and executed a transit to the area, employed sensors per the tasking, processed findings onboard, and reported results back to the P-8A Poseidon.[1]

So, the unmanned Triton flew to a waypoint and sent telemetry back?  Truly, the stuff of miracle and legend.  I’ve never even heard of “waypoints” … well, except for back in the 1970’s when that was just a routine capability … but to do that in a simulation instead of for real like we’ve done for decades is just a stunning achievement.  How do they come up with this stuff?
 
What does this miraculous development mean for the US?
 

Jane Bishop, vice president and general manager, global surveillance division, Northrop Grumman: “MQ-4C Triton and P-8A are the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s maritime patrol and reconnaissance force, delivering complementary capabilities unmatched by any other platforms. … Our commitment to pushing the boundaries of advanced technology ensures that the U.S. and allied nations operators maintain an unparalleled edge against evolving maritime threats.”[1]

“Unparalleled edge” !!!!  No other country in the world has the ability to fly waypoints and transmit data.  We are light years more advanced than anyone else.
 
This highlights the wonders of the P-8 Poseidon. 

The P-8A Poseidon is the world’s most advanced multi-mission maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft that provides anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and search and rescue mission capabilities.[1]

So, …
 

• ASW
• ASuW
• ISR
• S&R

 

Why do we even need a Navy?  Half a dozen P-8s should suffice to win any war.

 
 

____________________________________

Just out of idle curiosity, is anyone getting tired of these constant announcements about miraculous technologies that have actually existed for decades?  To paraphrase:  Those that can, do. Those that can’t take old technologies and pretend they’re new.
 
I wonder how much we paid to simulate waypoints and data transmission?

____________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Boeing and Northrop Grumman Successfully Simulate P-8A Poseidon and MQ-4C Triton Teaming”, Staff, 6-Aug-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/08/boeing-and-northrop-grumman-successfully-simulate-p-8a-poseidon-and-mq-4c-triton-teaming/

Jump Over Justification

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued a report on the Navy’s unmanned systems acquisition efforts and they list various challenges the Navy faces in expanding the unmanned fleet.  For example,
 

• Inconsistent leadership and priorities impeded RAS [ed. robotic and autonomous systems] investments
• Domain- and platform-centric approaches impeded progress of RAS

 
That’s nice, however, the report entirely ignores the fundamental question, why do we even need unmanned assets?  Instead, they jump over the “why” and proceed immediately to address the “how”.  The Navy, and those who report on the Navy, has done this repeatedly and always to their detriment, if not regret.  Can you say “LCS”?  Can you say “Zumwalt”?  Can you … well, you get the idea.  I don’t need to cite the nearly endless list of acquisitions that ignored the why (the CONOPS, in other words) and focused on the how.
 
The report simply accepts the official Navy spiel about unmanned.
 

Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East prove that robotic and autonomous systems(RAS) are disrupting naval warfare and challenging traditional naval superiority. To provide more adaptable, distributed operations, the Navy intends to shift away from its World War II-era operating model, which was based on closely knit battle groups comprised of several traditional platforms, such as planes, ships, and submarines. [1]

Consider that statement.  Ukraine proves nothing about naval warfare except that a sufficiently inept navy can be injured by drones.  The Middle East proves nothing about naval warfare because there hasn’t been any naval drone warfare.
 
The statement then unquestioningly accepts the Navy’s idea that unmanned assets will somehow, in some unproven, magical manner be successful.  There has been absolutely no relevant, real world experience to justify drones and no exercises that do so.
 

According to Navy strategic documents, a hybrid fleet is necessary to enable this shift and would incorporate smaller, more numerous, and distributed capabilities—including RAS capabilities—as a complement to larger, more individually powerful, traditional capabilities.[1]

So, a hybrid fleet is “necessary”?  Based on what?  Not based on the real world and not based on exercises so … what?
 
I’ll repeat what I’ve said many times:  I have yet to see a viable CONOPS (the why) for unmanned assets.  The people reporting on the Navy need to question the Navy’s proclamations, not blindly accept them.  GAO needs to examine the why before they examine the how … and so do we.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1] Government Accountability Office, “GAO Report to Congress on the Navy’s Robotic Autonomous Systems”, 16-Jun-2026, GAO-26-109014,
https://news.usni.org/2026/06/16/gao-report-to-congress-on-the-navys-robotic-autonomous-systems

US Helo Crew Rescued By Drone!

An Apache helicopter crashed in the water off the coast of Oman and the military is telling us that the 2-man crew was rescued by an unmanned boat, a 24 ft Corsair.  That’s astounding!  An unmanned boat rescued downed aircrew who had been adrift for two hours.  Here’s the headline.[1]
 

In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat

 
The promise of unmanned is finally being fulfilled!
 
We have no details, only sensationalistic headlines but, presumably, the boat located the aircrew on its own, plotted a course, found the crew, lifted the crew into the boat, applied emergency first aid as needed, and returned the crew to safety.
 
Of course, unless the boat had capabilities I’ve never heard of, it didn’t locate the crew, lift the crew into the boat, or apply emergency first aid because unmanned boats can’t do any of that.  Don’t get me wrong.  Pulling up near the crew so that they could climb aboard, unaided, see to their own first aid (were there any emergency supplies on the boat?  I doubt it), and be transported out of the area is very helpful if no manned asset was available but to call this a rescue by an unmanned boat is akin to saying that a sling on a helicopter rescued a swimmer in the water.  The sling didn’t do anything.  It was just a tool.
 
My larger question is, given that we’re in a high intensity war in the area, shouldn’t we have manned assets blanketing the area, including dedicated search and rescue units?  For example, an SH-60 type helo traveling 170 mph could travel the length of the strait in a half hour or so, depending on the start and end point and could reach any specific point in less time than that, flying a straight line.  Was there no manned ship, boat, or helo anywhere in the strait?  To rescue downed aircrew, we pull out all the stops.  All the stops meant no manned assets?  We’re not talking about covering the entire Pacific Ocean.  The area around the strait is pretty small.  The Navy’s presence in the area seems abnormally sparse which may explain why we seem incapable of escorting ships through the strait.  Is this a war we’re serious about or not?  The Navy doesn’t seem all that serious about it and this is just one more example.
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat”, 9-Jun-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/us/drone-boat-rescue-us-pilots/2026/06/09/id/1259057/

Screaming, Here I Am!

As we know, the Navy, with absolutely no concept of operations (CONOPS) or any validation testing, is proceeding full speed ahead with the unmanned craze.  The plan, for a while, called for two unmanned surface vessels: a very small surveillance (ISR) vessel and a somewhat larger mini-missile barge.  Apparently, to no one’s surprise, the Navy’s thinking is changing again.  Here’s the latest plan, as best I can tell.
 

The U.S Navy is seeking a wide range of new medium and large USVs as part of its Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) program … [1]

Don’t you love how everything has to have ‘modular’ in it, now, whether it makes any sense or not?  ‘Modular’ shows that it’s high tech, innovative, and cutting edge.  It also shows that it’s stupid but, I digress …
 

The MASC program looks to deliver three distinct USV types to the U.S. Navy … [1]

Okay, what are the three (instead of the previous two, I guess) types?
 

Vessel one is the baseline Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) which the U.S. Navy says addresses “the need for a fast, high capacity, embarked payloads platform”. MASC will carry two 40-foot ISO containers that consume 75kW of power each. The baseline range with a payload of 25 metric tons is set at 2,500 nautical miles, all while maintaining 25 knots up to Sea State 4.[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel two is a High-Capacity MASC with double the payload of the baseline variant. It will carry four 40-foot ISO containers each drawing 45kW of power while maintaining a “high endurance, high capacity” capability. A configuration of four such containers would allow a High-Capacity MASC to carry four reloadable Mark 70 launchers for sixteen single-packed missiles like Tomahawks or Standard missiles, or sixty-four quad-packed missiles like the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM).[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel three is a single-payload USV, dubbed the Single Payload MASC, embarking a single 20-foot ISO container drawing 75kW of power. The documents explicitly state that the container should have no obstructions at the rear, likely for a towed array ASW capability or similar anti-submarine system like the Liberator concept, which Naval News recently covered. Liberator aims to pair heavyweight torpedo launchers to unmanned ships.[1] [emphasis added]

So, vessel types one and two will carry missiles inside 40 foot ISO containers with each container holding four large missiles or sixteen ESSM missiles in quad packs.  Let’s give some thought to the advantages and disadvantages of each vessel type.
 
Firepower. 
 
Vessel One type will carry two ISO containers with a total of 8 larger missiles and Vessel Two will carry up to four containers with 16 missiles.  Contrast that with a Burke’s 96 VLS cells or even a Constellation’s 32 cells.  The unmanned vessels carry very little firepower payload.  An individual unmanned vessel can’t successfully strike a target or defeat an attack.  To give some perspective, it would require 12 Type One vessels to equal a Burke and 6 Type Two vessels.  That’s not a very efficient or effective distribution of firepower given that each vessel adds to the complexities and difficulties of controlling, monitoring, maintaining, and refueling for the overall group.
 
In other words, these unmanned vessels are of no effective use individually and can only be useful in significant numbers which carries significant difficulties with it.
 
 
Communications / Stealth
 
As noted, each vessel must be controlled, monitored, positioned, maintained, refueled, and provided remote fire control data among other needs.  That’s a lot of time and effort on someone’s part and, more importantly, that’s a lot of communications going on.  While I’m sure we’ll attempt to use line-of-sight and various other low probability of detection communication methods, there’s no such thing as truly undetectable communications.  The only undetectable communications is no communications.  The more vessels we need to control (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more likely it is that we will be detected.  In essence, using unmanned vessels is the equivalent of continually screaming, here I am!  Come sink me!
 

Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

RF (radio frequency) control is not inherently stealthy and this suggests that the Navy is looking to build and operate these vessels to commercial standards.  That’s find as a peacetime business case but not as a combat operation.  It’s bad enough to not be stealthy on the modern battlefield but to literally broadcast your location is pure folly.
 
Endurance / Logistics
 
As a general statement, small vessels are slow and will need to be refueled frequently.  Yes, it is possible to design a long endurance, small vessel by giving up combat payload for more fuel and decreased weight but that almost seems counterproductive relative to the intended combat function of the vessel.  The more small, unmanned vessels we have to operate (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more refueling we’ll have to conduct.  Given that we don’t have stealthy oilers, that means even more chance of being detected.  In addition, those oilers will have to be protected and escorted which is an example of the ripple effect of disadvantages of small, unmanned vessels.
 

Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

 
Conclusion
 
All of this is not to say that there can’t be a valid, effective use for small unmanned ships but I have yet to see anyone articulate a viable CONOPS.  We’re pursuing the technology with no idea how to use them.  We’ve seen the disastrous consequences of that path, repeatedly, and yet, inexplicably, we’re doing it again.
 

 
__________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Sets Sights on Fleet-Wide Family of Unmanned Ships”, Carter Johnston, 29-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/u-s-navy-sets-sights-on-fleet-wide-family-of-unmanned-ships/

Five Tons of Unmanned Stupidity

I just read yet another article extolling the wonders of unmanned surface vessels for logistics and/or attack.[1][3]  This one was singing the praises of the Leidos Sea Specter slow, low profile boat which Leidos claims can carry a 2-5 ton payload for 1000-2200 nm at 8 kts in sea state 3.[2]   The manufacturer’s original concept was for this craft to be used as a logistics delivery platform.  A recent article suggested it could be used to attack Chinese carrier or surface groups using a containerized torpedo.

Let's consider a couple of important aspects to this concept.
 
Speed – This craft, like most unmanned craft, is appallingly slow;  it can’t get anywhere useful in any tactically relevant time frame.  While the manufacturer claims the craft can sail from Guam to any point in the first island chain on a single tank of gas, it would, as a relevant example, take 5+ days, best case, to make a 1000 nm journey.  This demonstrates the idiotic nature of a combat use for this craft.  Say a Chinese surface group was spotted transiting past an island, it would take around a week for the craft to carry its single containerized torpedo to that point.  Of course, the target group would be long gone.  People are making this stuff up without thinking it through.
 
Payload – The payload is very small with severe volumetric limitations which will reduce the effective payload substantially.  The cargo area is limited in volumetric size to a maximum payload storage area of 29’ x 4’ x 4’ which, essentially, means just small boxes as opposed to any sizable equipment.
After seeing the tiny cargo area in a manufacturer’s video, it is obvious that the claimed payload of 2-5 tons would only be for bricks stacked in the area with no space.  Any realistic cargo, with packaging and space will be far less.  One ton might be optimistic.
 
This is far too small a payload to be logistically significant for any but, perhaps, a lone coastwatcher on an island mountain.  For example, an infantry division in combat consumes some 1000 tons of various supplies per day and that’s probably unrealistically low!  An armored division uses some 600,000 gal (2000 tons) of fuel per day in combat and, again, that’s probably ridiculously optimistic.
 
If someone thinks we’re going to resupply Guam or some far flung, hidden Marine missile shooting outpost using these tiny boats, they’re sadly mistaken.
 

Leidos Sea Scepter

 
Conclusion
 
The only thing this craft can deliver is five tons of stupidity.  I understand why industry keeps producing these kinds of nonsense products … they make profits for the company because the military is so enamored with unmanned technology that they’ll buy anything, regardless of whether it has any viable use.  It is up to us to recognize stupidity because, clearly, the military can’t.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Marine Corps Trials Unmanned Logistics Concepts in the Indo-Pacific”, Carter Johnson, 25-Apr-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/u-s-marine-corps-trials-unmanned-logistics-concepts-in-the-indo-pacific/
 
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-xNZwlH8sM
 
[3]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Pairs Heavyweight Torpedo with USV in a New Program Effort”, Carter Johnson, 15-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/u-s-navy-pairs-heavyweight-torpedo-with-usv-in-a-new-program-effort/

The Wrong Criteria

I continue to see the Navy’s fascination with unmanned craft despite them being completely divorced from any relevant Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  In the latest example, the Navy is diligently evaluating various unmanned vessels.
 

The commander [Rear Adm. Michael Mattis] of a US Navy task force [ed. Task Force 66] focused on employing unmanned systems said his team is making decisions about which can be “operationalized,” and which will be sidelined for further development.
 
The task force, which was established in May 2024, participated in Baltic Operations 2025 (BALTOPS), a reoccurring major international maritime exercise featuring the US and NATO countries. That exercise, which took place throughout June, played an integral role in helping the service evaluate various USVs on the commercial market.[1]

Well, that’s good, isn’t it?  The Navy is carefully evaluating various craft in order to make the best decisions, right?
 
Let me ask you this: what criteria are being used in the evaluation?  Different criteria will lead to different results.  What might be ideal for one task might be useless for another.
 
Of course, there’s only one criteria for any weapon system and that’s combat.  How will the item being evaluated contribute to high end combat?  If it can’t or won’t, then it has no value.
 
What is the Navy trying to accomplish with unmanned craft?
 

Mattis, whose office falls under the Navy’s three-star operational command, US 6th Fleet, described Task Force 66 as being focused on using low-cost systems, such as commercial-off-the-shelf USVs, to “impose costs on the adversary.”[1]

Ah … I see.  We’re going to “impose costs” on the enemy.  That’s great!  Just out of curiosity, I wonder what these mythical costs are that small, unmanned craft will impose?  It certainly won’t have anything to do with firepower since none of these craft have any firepower.  It won’t be near-invincibility causing the enemy to use vast amounts of their anti-ship missile inventory trying to kill them since none could survive anything more than a 0.50 cal bullet and the enemy would just use the unmanned craft as training aids for their ship’s crews to have target practice.  It won’t be sowing panic and confusion on the enemy’s command and control because I doubt the enemy will even care that much about them, assuming they don’t just laugh.
 
What are the “imposed costs”?
 
How are the unmanned craft being evaluated?
 

Mattis said the event included “red versus blue scrimmages” where sailors were tasked with participating in either side of an engagement featuring several unmanned surface vessels staging an attack on a warship.[1]

Wow, a free form, red versus blue scrimmage (I guess that’s what battles are called now?) !  That’s great for evaluating unmanned craft.  Although … the thought occurs to me, where/when would we expect a [Chinese] warship to present itself conveniently close to several small, unmanned craft, obligingly allowing the unmanned craft to approach, assemble for an attack, and then attack without hindrance?  How would these small unmanned craft get anywhere near a warship on alert?
 
We’re evaluating unmanned craft but we’re using the wrong criteria for the evaluation.  It’s as if we think the Chinese will behave like the oblivious Russian ships.
 
You know what the Navy should do?  They should skip any kind of focus on a combat CONOPS and instead leap right over that and get into the technology of controlling, networking, and interfacing small, unmanned craft.  Well, …
 

Tangential to operating individual USVs, Mattis said TF-66 is working on controlling numerous autonomous vessels through a “single pane of glass,” referring to the notion of commanding multiple vehicles through a singular command-and-control station. And beyond controlling multiple American vessels, Mattis said his team is also working to integrate that capability with NATO allies.[1]

You can see from this that we’re caught up in the technology and ignoring the CONOPS.
 
At this point, you might be wondering what type of unmanned craft we’re talking about?
 

Mattis said the Navy was using at least 10 Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft USVs during BALTOPS.[1]

Here’s a photo of the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft.
 

Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft
This is what we're going to war with ?

I’m not sure where the “Global” comes from because the range of these tiny motorboats is probably once around the harbor.  “Reconnaissance”????  Whatever sensor they put on it will have a field of view of a few hundred yards.  Is that really reconnaissance?  How would something like this be of any possible use in a high end combat scenario?

 
Anyway … ignore everything I’ve just written.  Hail, unmanned!  Damn the logic, full technology speed ahead!
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “Navy uses European exercise to help evaluate unmanned vessels”, Justin Katz, 23-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/navy-uses-european-exercise-to-help-evaluate-unmanned-vessels/

Unmanned Nonsense

China is cranking out high end warships at an impressive rate … at least compared to our anemic shipbuilding effort.  That means they’re cranking out serious, high level firepower in various forms.  We, on the other hand, seem hell bent on ditching our high end firepower in favor of ever less lethal unmanned toys.  The latest idea I came across is Naval News website speculating about cancelling the Constellation program and replacing it with small, unmanned vessels.
 

With a price tag approaching $1.1 billion to $1.2 billion dollars each for the USS Constellation (FFG-62) frigate, Naval News asked RAND and CSIS if the Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV) and the DARPA No Manning Required Ship (NOMARS) can replace the troubled FFG-62 frigate program.
 
… can MUSVs and NOMARS substitute for the FFG-62 frigates in terms of missions, roles, weapons coverage, and functionalities?[1]

As repeatedly documented on this blog, the Constellation is a poor excuse for a WARship but it is still worlds better than any unmanned asset.
 
The key point in the Naval News article is the following.
 

While the U.S. Navy, Congress, and the Department of Defense debate over whether to continue the FFG-62 program with government cost-cutting and downsizing …[1]
 
Mark Cancian, retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel, and Senior Advisor to CSIS’s Defense and Security Department answered this question via email to Naval News in March 2025. Cancian wrote, “Yes, the [FFG-62] Constellation program is a mess, and the Navy is reviewing it, along with other troubled shipbuilding programs.[1]

To be honest, this is the first I’ve heard of the Constellation being directly considered for termination.  I know that all programs are being reassessed by the new administration but this is somewhat ominous given the Constellation program’s stunningly poor performance to date.
 
That aside, let’s examine the Naval News question – with its implied answer of yes – and see whether unmanned assets can replace the Constellation.
 
 
Mission
 
Most missions require manned interaction, interpretation, and decision making.  No unmanned asset can even begin to approach that level of automated action.  The recent example of an unmanned automobile backing over and dragging an injured person after an auto accident thoroughly demonstrates this point.  We are nowhere near Terminator level artificial intelligence.
 
Most missions, peace or war, require human presence and reasoning:  managed response to provocative moves – such as close approaches by another vessel, foreign exercises, port visits, boarding (VBSS), rescue and salvage, ASW, tactical improvisation, etc.
 
As the article points out,
 

[Unmanned assets] work better as remote sensors and shooters connected to the fleet.[1]

 
Weapons
 
Let’s start with the simplest comparison which is VLS cells since those are the main weapon of any warship.  The Constellation will have 32 Mark 41 VLS cells for Tomahawk cruise missiles, ESSM, and Standard SM-6 missiles.  In comparison, the MUSV, which is the patrol boat size ISR vessel as opposed to the LUSV which is the corvette size missile barge, has no weapons provision at all, at the moment, and is too small to fit VLS cells even if we wanted to.
 
In addition, the Constellation will carry 16 rack mounted, small anti-ship missiles, presumably the Naval Strike Missile (NSM).  The MUSV, given its small size, might be able to carry some kind of rack mounted anti-ship missile system such as the NSM.  That would likely be 4-8 missiles, depending on how many racks could fit on the boat.
 
Constellation also has a Mk110 57 mm gun.  The MUSV could not mount any comparable gun.
 
Finally, the Constellation has a RAM anti-air weapon which probably could be mounted on a MUSV.
 
NOMARS, as exemplified by the USX-1 Defiant unmanned vessel, is claimed to have the capacity for 4-6 VLS, however, this is just a wish, not a reality, at the moment.  Further, if defense weapons and sensors are added, such as SeaRAM or CIWS, the space available for larger, more offensive weapons such as VLS, markedly decreases.
 

USX-1 Defiant / NOMARS

Seizure
 
We’ve already seen that China and Iran will not hesitate to seize unmanned assets so there is no reason to believe they wouldn’t seize an MUSV or NOMARS vessel.  The article also notes,
 

In peacetime, international law considers uncrewed vessels as derelict and subject to salvage.[1]

Repair
 
The following statement from the article says it all.
 

In wartime, it would be difficult to repair or retrieve such a vessel with a mechanical breakdown.[1]

Conclusion
 
It is, frankly, disappointing that anyone would even momentarily ask whether small, unmanned vessels can replace a frigate.  The lack of weapons and absence of human judgment as well as obvious maintenance issues unequivocally dictates the conclusion that unmanned vessels cannot replace a manned frigate, however flawed that frigate might be.  Unmanned vessels are, potentially, suited for ISR and acting as a very small weapons barge (mini-arsenal ship) if someone can come up with a secure communications system and a viable CONOPS.
 
What no one in the military seems to understand is that our emphasis on unmanned toys is the equivalent of asking whether an infantryman, armed with a knife, can replace an Abrams tank.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Can Unmanned MUSVs and NOMARS Replace the Troubled FFG-62 Frigate Program?”, Peter Ong, 20-May-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/05/can-unmanned-musvs-and-nomars-replace-the-troubled-ffg-62-frigate-program/

Reaper Losses

ComNavOps has long stated that UAVs, especially the larger ones, are utterly ineffective, unsuited, and non-survivable over the battlefield and the Air Force has publicly agreed with that assessment.  Despite my statements, many (including the Navy) continue to believe that UAVs will provide omniscient awareness about our enemies.  Well, we’re finally starting to accumulate some real world data.  We know that Iran has downed multiple UAVs in the past [2] but now we have combat data from the Navy’s engagement with the Houthis in Yemen.  What does the data show?
 

Seven Reaper drones have been brought down by the Houthis since the beginning of March, with six of them occurring since March 15 and three of them over the past week, the official said. At least 15 Reapers have been brought down by the Houthis since October 2023 … [1]

Bing’s AI search engine reports (unsourced),
 

Houthi rebels in Yemen have downed seven US MQ-9 Reaper drones since March 31, 2025. Since November 2023, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for downing fourteen MQ-9 Reaper drones. Yemeni forces have shot down seven US MQ-9 Reaper drones this month and 22 since October 2023. Each MQ-9 is worth about $30 million, so that means the US has lost $660 million worth of drones over Yemen in about a year and a half.[1]

Other sources have similar or larger reported loss numbers.  The point is not the exact number of losses but the fact that this proves that larger UAVs are not survivable over the modern battlefield.  In this case, the conclusion is even more emphatic since the Houthis are far from a modern, top tier military force like the Chinese and because these losses are occurring in the face of supposed high intensity attacks on the Houthis – and yet they somehow manage to routinely shoot down our UAVs?  I guess our attacks aren’t very effective, are they?
 

MQ-9 Reaper

How is it possible that the Houthis can manage to operate radars and SAM launchers while supposedly being overwhelmed by US military attacks?  We can’t stop the Houthis from doing this but we think we’ll take on the Chinese?

 
I don’t have a target list for this anti-Houthi campaign but, clearly, we’re not hitting the right targets.  Our UAVs are being shot down and drones/missiles are getting close enough to our carrier to make it take evasive action.  Against a tenth tier military force with no air force, aren’t we supposed to own the air?  A mosquito shouldn’t be able to fly from Yemen without a missile heading up its backside.
 
All of this is screaming at us that we need to re-evaluate our ideas about how to fight China.
 
 
_____________________________

 
Fun fact:
 
The U.S. Air Force has about 280 Reapers in its inventory, each costing about $28 million, according to the Congressional Research Service.[1]
 
Cost aside, these losses are starting to cut into the military’s inventory of Reapers and we can be sure that we are not seeing all the operational losses from around the rest of the world.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]ABC News website, “Houthis shoot down growing number of US drones”, Luis Martinez, 23-Apr-2025,
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/houthis-shoot-growing-number-us-drones/story?id=121099082
 
[2]As one example, on 20-Jun-2019, Iran shot down an RQ-4A Global Hawk BAMS-D with a Khordad SAM. 

Beckoning Beacon

Over the last several years ComNavOps has, quite rightly and wisely, criticized and mocked the Navy’s many absurd, ill-considered, individual plans and acquisitions.  It’s time, now, to look at the Navy’s overall fleet concept and see how it holds up to analysis.  Of course, given the failure and poor performance of the many individual elements, it’s probably not too hard to anticipate the result of this analysis but we’ll go through the exercise anyway in the hopes that it can offer some guidance about what not to do.
 
When I talk about the Navy’s overall plan, I’m referring to the Navy’s vision of the ideal task force.  Again, we’ve discussed the individual components but let’s bring them together, now.
 
HVU (High Value Unit).  The ideal task force will have a HVU(s) which could be a carrier(s), amphibious ships, or vitally important cargo ships surrounded by escorts. 
 
Escorts.  The escorts are envisioned to be a few (2-3?) Burke class destroyers for AAW and control of unmanned assets.  The Burkes will be in constant two-way communication with the unmanned assets as well as the other Burkes and HVUs.
 
The unmanned assets will consist of:
 
LUSV (Large Unmanned Surface Vessel).  Sailing near the Burkes will be these small (by ship standards and large relative only to the smaller unmanned vessels), missile-carrying, unmanned vessels operationally tethered to and controlled by a Burke.  Essentially, these are unmanned, mini-arsenal ships whose purpose is to supplement the missile magazines of the Burkes.  They have no weapons or sensors, themselves, and are wholly dependent on the Burkes for control.  These vessels will be in constant communication with the controlling Burkes who will provide them with remote operation and fire control solutions.
 
MUSV (Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel).  Forming an outer ring around the Burkes will be these small, sensor vessels operationally tethered to and controlled by a Burke.  Their function is to provide detection and situational awareness for the task force.  They will have no significant weapons or fire control.  Essentially, these are very large floating sensor barges.  These vessels will be in constant two-way communication with the controlling Burkes, continuously broadcasting high bandwidth, large volume data streams for analysis by the computers and analysts on the Burkes as well as receiving operational remote control.
 
UAV.  Ranging out beyond the task force ships, these small UAVs will conduct surveillance.  An example would be the MQ-8B/C Fire Scout.  These UAVs will be in constant communication with the controlling ship for remote operational control and continuously streaming transmission of sensor data.
 
USV.  Farthest out from the task force will be these tiny, free roaming, unmanned surface vessels that will operate way out in front of the task force, detecting and tracking enemy submarines and providing situational awareness.  Sea Hunter and the tiny sailboats we’ve seen are examples of these assets.  These USVs will be in constant communication with the controlling ship for remote operational control and will continuously stream sensor data back to the controlling ship.
 
P-8/Triton (BAMS – Broad Area Maritime Surveillance).  When available, the P-8 Poseidon/Triton combination, the pairing being referred to as BAMS, will provide overwatch and far distant surveillance, situational awareness, and, in their spare time, anti-submarine detection and prosecution.
 
 
Discussion
 
There you have it – the ideal Navy task force.  Of course, I’ve ignored a multitude of problems which would render the individual components ineffective but, setting that aside, did you notice the one, overriding characteristic of every element of the task force?  That’s right, it’s the requirement for constant, high bandwidth, streaming communications between the various elements.  We don’t have Terminator level AI yet so constant control communications are required.  None of the unmanned assets have any significant degree of on-board computer analysis so all data must be streamed back to the control vessel for analysis, interpretation, and decision making.
 
What we’ve just described is, in reality, a large task force sized, floating electromagnetic beacon continuously shouting, “Here I am!”, while some enemy surveillance technician tasked with finding the American running dogs smiles and says, “Well, that was easy.”.
 
Having handed the enemy our exact location, the only remaining unknown is the exact amount of time it will take for final ship of the task force to be sunk.
 
One of the constants of warfare throughout the ages has been EMCON.  This is beyond elementary.  You stay silent while, hopefully, tracking the enemy who is oblivious to your presence.  This allows you to choose the time and conditions of battle, - an enormous advantage!  The ideal task force not only violates the very concept of EMCON, it is directly the opposite.  It is a continuous electromagnetic beacon, pinpointing your location for the enemy. 
 
To believe that the degree of required communication can escape notice by the enemy is simply delusional.  If anyone has conducted a wargame about this (I doubt they have or they would have recoiled in horror at the idiocy of the concept), I’d love to see how they hand-waved away the free detection advantage for the enemy … and I’m sure their wrists were sore from all the waving!
 
What about the special case of a carrier as the HVU?  Wouldn’t this change things?
 
Carrier.  Of course, if the HVU is a carrier, this changes things a bit but, disappointingly, not all that much.  A carrier’s air wing will add another layer to the task force’s defense, which is good, but it comes at the price of additional communications.  The E-2 must communicate with the aircraft it controls and must transmit its sensor data to the ships of the task force.  The individual aircraft must communicate with the E-2 and the carrier for air traffic control.  The carrier must communicate with the aircraft.  And, of course, the Ford class EMALS is just the world’s largest electromagnetic beacon all by itself!
 
So, what has this analysis taught us?  It has demonstrated that we are violating the oldest principle of warfare by not concealing our location.  We need to be structuring the fleet to operate with the least amount of communication possible – none, being the ideal condition. 
 
Every asset we design and procure that requires communication is a step along the path to defeat.  The path to victory is silence (and firepower!).  During the Cold War, we practiced EMCON operations (we learned how to launch an entire carrier strike without transmitting!).  Unfortunately, the situation has gotten worse since every new piece of electronics seems to require even more power and communications. 
 

• We need to reverse this trend. 
  
• We need to restore the requirement that every piece of equipment (I’m looking at you, EMALS) be shielded and EMCON-capable.
• We need to halt the rush down the unmanned path.
• We need to realistically exercise our communications in a combat setting and see how bad the problem is.
• We need to begin designing equipment with minimal communications as a mandatory requirement.
• We need to rethink our command and control concept and eliminate the top down control bias.
• We need start thinking in terms of combat operations rather than technological fixation.

 
In combat, you talk, you die.  Stop talking!

Low-Manned Surface Vessel

There has been a good deal of discussion in the naval observer camp lately about some form of supplemental weapons vessel;  an arsenal ship/barge, as it was called in earlier times.  The vessel, by whatever name, would act as a supplemental magazine for manned ships thereby allowing … well … I’m not really sure what it allows.  Let’s take a look at the latest country to latch onto the fad and see what’s good about their design and concept and what isn’t.
 
The Royal Netherlands Navy is going to acquire two-low manned surface vessels which are euphemistically and optimistically referred to as ‘The Rapidly Increased Firepower Capability’ (TRIFIC, ‘terrific’? one assumes they’ll be called in a tortured acronym that some staffer probably received a promotion for coming up with) and, in some articles, Modular Integrated Capability for ACDF and North Sea (MICAN) and Multifunctional Support Ship (pick a name and stick with it!).
 
The vessel is 170-200 ft long and is based on a commercial offshore supply vessel.  It will carry up to 4 containers on the aft deck.
 

TRIFIC Low-manned Surface Vessel

 
From various articles, here’s a list of some of the claimed capabilities of the vessel:
 

• increase front-line firepower
• support surveillance efforts
• containerized weapon packages
• electronic warfare (EW) packages combining both intercept and jamming functionality
• operate as an ‘offboard’ magazine for RNLN air defence and command frigates (ADCFs)
• fire support/precision strike for the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps
• provide additional long-range surface-to-air missile capacity for the four De Zeven Provinciën-class ADCFs
• employ long-range precision-guided munitions against coastal targets in support of amphibious operations
• provide protection for infrastructure in the North Sea
• deploy the Harop long-range loitering munition
• precision strike capability against critical targets such as headquarters, artillery or rocket installations, and supply areas
• EW suite to collect information on radar emitters, jam threat radars, and disrupt control links associated with hostile drones
• deploy underwater vehicles/sensors to support surveillance and protection of North Sea infrastructures
• deploy above-water sensors to record the activities of suspicious ships for evidence 

 
Looking at that list, this vessel is a true miracle.  The only capability it doesn’t seem to have is the ability to operate an air wing while submerged.  Perhaps that’s coming?
 
What is the rationale for the vessel? 

The requirement for additional long-range anti-air missiles has been shaped by operational analysis which has determined that a massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles or swarming drones could rapidly exhaust existing ACDF [air defence and command frigates] magazine capacity. According to Tuinman [Dutch state secretary for defense Gijs Tuinman], the concept of ‘distributed operations’ developed by the RNLN will see a De Zeven Provinciën-class frigate operating in close company with a multifunction support vessel with additional missiles housed in containers on the aft deck.[1]

Will a couple of containers of missiles (2?  maybe 4 missiles per container?) make the difference to a frigate facing “a massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles or swarming drones”?  Of course not!  A massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles or swarming drones is not a winnable scenario for a single frigate … not even close.  To believe that a few extra missile containers will enable a frigate to defeat “a massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles or swarming drones” is pure fantasy.
 
We’ve already demonstrated that a ship – any ship – will be lucky to get off a single two-missile salvo against any incoming missile and a frigate has a basic radar, not even a Aegis type sophisticated radar.  As we’ve noted, having a million defensive missiles available is of no use whatsoever.  You can only launch two missiles per engagement and responding to “a massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles” is simply not possible.
 
Making the scenario even less likely is that the launch commands and missile guidance will be provided by the accompanying frigate.  How is a frigate that is under attack by “a massive and simultaneous attack with anti-ship missiles” going to have the time or resources to provide external missile targeting and guidance control? 
 
Even worse, a frigate that is controlling a remote vessel has to have constant communication between the control ship and the low-manned support vessel.  This means the ship’s location is being constantly broadcast.  Is this a good idea in combat?
 
The cost of this vessel is also concerning.  The budget for the multifunction support vessels is between €250 million and €1 billion. This covers procurement costs, a risk reserve, and operating costs through to 2039.[1]  It’s a certainty that the cost is going to be much closer to the high end of that enormous range than the low end.
 
The practical operating aspects of this vessel have clearly not been thought through.  This is an example of latching onto a fad because you have no grasp of the realities of combat.
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Netherlands Firms Up Plans For Multifunction Support Vessels”, Richard Scott, 27-Sep-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/netherlands-firms-up-plans-for-multifunction-support-vessels/

Damn the Facts – Full Speed Ahead

Remember the recent announcement about diesel engines operating unattended for 30 straight days and how smugly proud the Navy and manufacturer were?  Except, it turned out that the engines didn’t run continuously.  They were allowed to stop as frequently as they needed as long as no human intervened.
 
Well, we have more of the same as NavSea proudly bragged about its unmanned vessels
 

… Capt. Searles [Capt. Scot Searles, Programme Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems] explained how USVs performed under the supervision of crews during the Integrated Battle Problem (IBP) 23.2 multi-domain unmanned capabilities exercise under U.S. Pacific Fleet’s Experimentation Plan. During the exercise, which concluded in January 2024, four USVs – Mariner, Ranger, Seahawk, and Sea Hunter – traveled a combined 46,651 nautical miles to make port visits to Pearl Harbor, Papua New Guinea, Yokosuka (Japan), and Sydney (Australia).[1]

So, unmanned vessels managed to sail to various ports, as opposed to actual combat operations under realistic conditions.  Still, nearly 47,000 nm unattended … impressive?
 
Well, it’s not quite what you think.  It turns out there was LOTS of human intervention.
 

IBP 23.2 has allowed the USN to identify 157 distinct human interventions – I.e., crew stopping the USV – due to on vessel issues. That is equivalent to one intervention every 28 hours. However, of those interventions over two thirds were related to issues with Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) C4I systems (reloading crypto or losing crypto synchronization) or were done for operator convenience (take control of the system to go faster or slower than autonomous navigation). Of the remaining 48 human interventions, only 17 interventions were done for sensing and perception issues, and of those only 9 related to concerns with maneuvering decisions from the autonomous system.[1][emphasis added]

The Navy’s conclusion?  Everything’s wonderful according to Capt. Searles.
 

“This all puts the meantime between human interventions for autonomy at once every 4 days but under good weather conditions (I.e., not chasing false contacts) it is more like once every 12 days,” Capt. Searles concluded.
 
“As such, autonomy reliability requires interventions only once every 12 days and HM&E only once every 17 days, so we are very pleased with performance of systems but also happy that we are finding limits and getting those limits addressed.”[1]

So … the Navy discounts most interventions in order to contrive more favorable statistics and then further twists the data by conditioning it on ‘good weather conditions’.  That seems fair.  I mean, most combat occurs only in good weather, right?  And the oceans are famous for good weather so what could go wrong?
 
It doesn’t really matter why an intervention took place;  it only matters that it did.  The fact is that a human intervention was required once every 28 hours by the Navy’s own accounting … and I’m betting that it occurred more often than that but was deemed insignificant and wasn’t reported.  Regardless, human intervention every 28 hours is not exactly the dream of unattended operation for weeks and months on end, is it?  In fact, what this exercise proved is that unmanned operations are not yet feasible.
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “SAS 2024: NAVSEA’s Unmanned Maritime Systems Update”, Alix Valenti, 15-Apr-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sea-air-space-2024/2024/04/sas-2024-navseas-unmanned-maritime-systems-update/

Second Unmanned Squadron

The Navy plans to establish a second unmanned squadron this May.[1]  Why not?  The first has demonstrated absolutely no combat capability or enhancements to other asset’s combat capabilities so, sure, let’s get more.  This is a hot, steaming platter of stupid served on fine china to make it look appealing instead of putting it in the pile with the dog’s contribution to the lawn’s fertilization.
 
Adm. Samuel Paparo made the announcement and then, rather than describe any actual combat capabilities, immediately dropped into Secret Squirrel mode, saying,  

“A “principle element within warfare is the element of operational security. So, our most exquisite capabilities, if I’m doing my job, you won’t [know] about it.”[1]

Exquisite capabilities???  Someone’s been taking PowerPoint lessons for creative writers at their local community college. 
 
Remember when the Navy trumpeted the increase in air wing size which turned out to be one aircraft?  I’m betting these exquisite capabilities are on the same scale as that.
 
Paparo goes on to note that unmanned craft have participated in Integrated Battle Problems (IBP). 

… IBPs have seen unmanned vessels log thousands of miles at sea over a period of several months.”[1]

That’s nice.  Now, have any of those miles accomplished any useful purpose or demonstrated any actual useful combat capability?
 
Here’s more unmanned news: 

Separately, on Tuesday, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl told reporters his service would soon test a new unmanned drone designed to stealthily carry two Naval Strike Missiles to Marines ashore without attracting attention.[1]

A drone that can transport two missiles?  That’ll bring the Chinese navy to its knees!  The general neglected to describe how this drone – or any drone – can get within sailing range of a Marine unit deep inside enemy territory.  The host ship will, apparently, be invisible and undetectable by Chinese sensors.  Of course, that being the case, why do we need drones?
 
The degree of fantasy being applied to unmanned operations is staggering as is the corresponding absence of firepower.
 
 
 
_________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “US Pacific Fleet to stand up second unmanned surface vessel squadron this year”, Justin Katz, 14-Feb-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/us-pacific-fleet-to-stand-up-second-unmanned-surface-vessel-squadron-this-year/

Surface Drone Swarm

Russia just lost another landing ship to a Ukrainian drone swarm.[1]  The mind simply boggles at the degree of ineptitude being exhibited by the Russians.  Let’s use this incident to examine the use of surface drone swarms.
 
Let’s start by looking at the drones Ukraine is using and see how deadly they really are.
 
 
Magura V5
 
The commonly reported Ukrainian drone craft is the Magura V5.  There have been different versions produced so the specs vary, depending on the source and the referenced variant.  The drone is a relatively small craft (5.5 m long) with a low silhouette which would make them difficult to spot visually, however, at speed they leave a very visible wake.  Their shape is not notably radar stealthy although they are smooth and relatively free of protrusions so they may be somewhat radar stealthy.  Propulsion is said to be an electric motor or hybrid (gas-electric?) of some sort.  Presumably, the craft are readily visible in the infrared and should be easily detectable at the horizon, some 12 miles distant or so, depending on the height of the EO/IR sensor.  Range is variously reported to be 250-500 miles.  Control is via optical sensor and satellite (Starlink?) communication.  Drone weight is 1000 kg (2200 lb) with a payload variously reported as 300-400 lbs explosive.  Cruising speed is 20 mph with a terminal burst speed about twice that.
 

Magura V5 Drone

Magura V5 Drone

Acoustically, an electric motor running at high speed and a craft sailing at high speed should generate significant noise and be readily detectable at 10-25 miles, using passive sonar.  I would imagine the sound would be similar to that of a torpedo at speed.
 
I would assume that, like all weapons with a range, the reported range is much greater than the effective operational range.  Thus, the operational range is likely 50-100 miles but that’s just informed speculation on my part.  It does, however, greatly impact the overall effectiveness of the drone since it impacts the launch distance from the target.
 
This is a surface running torpedo, for all intents and purposes.  Like a torpedo, it can be deadly if not treated appropriately.  Unlike a torpedo which can be decoyed but cannot be destroyed, these drones are easily destroyed with appropriate weapons.
 
Now, let’s look at the Russian landing ship.
 
 
Ropuch Amphibious Ship
 
The Ropucha class landing ship is a medium size (369 ft long, 4080 tons displacement), lightly armed LST with either 2x 57mm dual guns (Ropucha I) or 1x 76mm gun and 2x AK-630 30mm CIWS (Ropucha II).  Either way, that’s not a lot of armament!
 
The ship has multiple fire control, search, and navigation radars.  I assume it has EO/IR sensors but that’s speculation.
 
Crew size is around 90.
 
 
Now, let’s consider some of the relevant operational factors.
 
 
Operational Factors
 
Launch Site.  The drone can be launched from shore or from a host vessel.  Either way, the drones must be close enough to the target to be within the range of the drone.  It’s not as if the drone can be safely launched from a thousand miles away.  One would think that a host vessel, meaning, potentially, any unidentified vessel within 500 miles, would be easily spotted and sunk before it could launch the drones.
 
Alternatively, if launched from shore, the launch operation would require trucks and handling equipment given the overall drone weight of a ton or more.  This is not something that one tucks into a backpack.  It’s a fairly major operation to transport, handle, and launch the craft.  One would think that surveillance of the likely launch areas and access roads would be effective in spotting and preventing launches.
 
Detection.  As noted, there are multiple modes of detection including visual, infrared, acoustic, and radar.  A semi-alert defender should have no trouble detecting the drones at a distance.  The use of swarms of multiple drones further increases the chance of detection.
 
Satellites.  Satellites (reportedly Starlink) are, apparently, being used to control the drones.  I assume Russia is attempting to disrupt the satellite communications although given the demonstrated degree of incompetence, this may not be true.  Satellite vulnerabilities include physical destruction in space, local signal disruption, cyber attacks at various points of the satellite system (ground control, master communications, local receivers, etc.).  If Starlink involvement is confirmed, Russia would be within their rights to conduct physical sabotage of Starlink facilities even in the US.
 
If Russia is attempting any of these actions, they appear to be having little or no success.
 
Targeting.  Targeting information is likely being gathered via satellites and UAVs, probably from Ukrainian-allied countries like the US.  Again, if confirmed, Russia could conduct attacks on the targeting assets with minimal risk of escalation.  The last several years have demonstrated that the US is highly unlikely to respond beyond speeches and warnings that are never acted on.
 
Lethality.  The drones reportedly carry around three hundred pounds of explosive which is a reasonably substantial amount of explosive.  However, it should be noted that the explosive is a non-penetrating effect as compared to a shell, bomb, or missile.  This lessons the extent of damage relative to the nominal weight of explosive since a significant amount of the explosive force is directed away from the ship.  A similar phenomenon occurred in the attack on the USS Cole.
 
Proximity.  The Ukrainian drones benefit greatly from the unique geography of this situation.  The operating area is a fairly small, constrained area as opposed to the open ocean that the US Navy would operate in during a war with China.  Of course, if the Navy opted to do something stupid, like operate near land with inadequately armed and sensored ships, as the Russians are doing, then the result could well be similar.
 
Damage Control.  The Russians appear to have had very little success in applying damage control to ships that have been struck.  Obviously, hard data on this is difficult to come by.
 
 
 
Analysis
 
To sum up the preceding, the drones are potentially damaging with a few hundred pounds of explosive but they are also small, highly vulnerable to destruction, and easily detected.  So, why are they having some success? 
 
Note:  We hear about the successes but we do not hear about the failures, if any, and I assume there are many.  For example, it could be that only one in a hundred drones succeed.  While that wouldn’t change the overall end result, it would certainly change the assessment of the efficiency of the drones.
 
There is simply no getting around the staggering degree of Russian ineptitude.  They are sending ill-equipped ships, unescorted, into known dangerous waters with, apparently, no aviation surveillance support such as helos or UAVs.  A handful of small, simple escorts with suitable sensors and weapons would end the drone threat.  Even submarines ought to be able to provide detection of drones, interdiction of host ships, if any (most hints suggest shore launches), and covert surveillance of possible shore launch sites..  Russia supposedly has seven Kilo class subs in the Black Sea and their sonars should be able to detect drones and provide early warning.
 
The operational stupidity is compounded by the lack of long range interdiction of the launch points and ships/trucks that are used to transport and launch the drones.  Russia should have air, land, and sea patrols dedicated to finding and destroying the transport/launch vehicles or ships.
 
If we consider the kill chain concept, there are several links in the chain where the Russians could take effective action to disrupt the chain (production facilities, storage facilities, transport, launch event, local detection, and local destruction).  Bafflingly, the Russians seem to be unwilling or unable to break the chain at any of those points.
 
In the hints we get from videos, the Russians appear unable to kill many (any?) drones with the weapons they do have.  This speaks volumes about the overhyped claims of Russian weapon performance (as we’ve seen throughout history and covering ALL Russian weapon systems) and/or the woeful state of Russian training.
 
Compounding all this is the Russian’s unwillingness to seek out and destroy targeting platforms.  The Russians could, simply, declare suitably large exclusion zones and then destroy any foreign (US) aircraft in the area.  Similar actions could be taken against satellite surveillance if, indeed, that is a source of targeting information.
 
As with all other aspects of this war, Russia is conducting the drone defense operations in the most inept manner imaginable. 
 
The Ukraine success is due almost exclusively to Russian ineptitude rather than any inherent capabilities of the drones which, as we’ve discussed, are not particularly formidable on paper.
 
 
Conclusion
 
So many naval observers want to jump on the drone bandwagon because of Ukraine’s handful of successful attacks but is this enthusiasm justified? 
 
An objective analysis suggests that drones are not a threat to an alert, suitably equipped defender who counters the threat with intelligent operations, doctrine and tactics.  The ineptitude of the Russians cannot be ignored and, therefore, trying to derive universal lessons from this is an exercise in futility if not downright misleading.
 
Like any threat, if one fails to treat the threat with the respect it deserves, it can be lethal.  The US needs to be aware of drone threats and train and equip to counter them but they are not, inherently, a serious threat.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Russia Loses Large Landing Ship to Ukrainian Drone Swarm”, streiff, 14-Feb-2024,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/02/14/russia-loses-large-landing-ship-to-ukrainian-drone-swarm-n2170101