Upgraded Cannons for Old Ironsides

The Navy has announced that USS Constitution, Old Ironsides, will receive upgrades to its 32 pounder cannons which enable more précised fire control as the ship pitches and rolls in battle.  The wooden sailing ship is one of the Navy’s true success stories and this upgrade will keep Old Ironsides at the forefront of naval development.
 
Amazingly, the Navy has also announced yet another upgrade for the E-2 Hawkeye, the airborne early warning and battle management aircraft that has been around almost as long as Old Ironsides.  The propeller driven aircraft with the giant rotunda radar dome on its back that has a radar signature the size of the Empire State Building is the Navy’s newest AEW platform, having begun development in 1956 and first flown in 1960.  Truly now state of the art in modern aerial sensor platforms!
 

The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Block II upgrade passed its critical design review … [1]

I know the Navy is pathologically gun shy after a couple of decades of successive program failures but, at some point, you have to move on to new technology.  Perhaps a jet engine for the E-2?  Whoa!  I’m sorry, that’s just crazy talk!  I didn’t mean it.
 

32 Pounder Cannon Undergoing Upgrade Tests

Seriously, we’ve talked about the need for a stealth version of the E-2 and/or, perhaps, an emphasis on passive sensing as opposed to a giant billboard of active emissions saying, here I am!  At some point, the Navy has to develop a new AEW aircraft.  Perhaps after the run of Burkes ends in the year 2167 with the Flt 217 Burke?
 
 
 
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[1]USNI News website, “E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Block II Passes Critical Design Review as Navy Plans to Expand Fleet”, Sam LaGrone, 18-Aug-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/08/18/e-2d-advanced-hawkeye-block-ii-passes-critical-design-review-as-navy-plans-to-expand-fleet

UK Airborne Early Warning

Despite glowing claims by some UK carrier fanboys, the UK’s carriers are not, and have never been, capable of meaningful roles in high end combat scenarios due to the lack of Airborne Early Warning (AEW), tankers, and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft.  The small size of the air wings (even after surging – a dubious concept) and the fact that the aircraft are the ‘B’ models of the F-35 further diminish the combat capabilities.
 
Now, though, the UK is beginning to explore the possibility of enhancing their carrier AEW capabilities.
 

The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has issued a Request for Information (RFI) notice seeking feedback on the solutions offered by the manufacturers to replace the airborne early warning (AEW) systems currently operated by the Royal Navy to protect its carrier strike groups (CSG).
 
The new systems would replace those currently operating from the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, and would have significantly enhanced capabilities. Indeed, the MoD is looking for a system capable of operating from the carriers and providing “persistent 24 hours surveillance” with significant detection capabilities to spot both surface and airborne threats, including anti-ship missiles.
 
Currently, the Royal Navy operates Merlin helicopters fitted with the Crowsnest radar as an airborne surveillance system. However, this system should be decommissioned at the end of the decade, despite entering service in 2021.[1]

Merlin AEW Helicopter

While this is a nice step in the right general direction, no one should be under the impression that this will solve the UK’s AEW problem.  There will still remain two severe, unsolvable problems:
 
1. Lacking catapults and arresting gear, the UK’s carriers are constrained to operating helos in the AEW role which means that the size of any radar and operator station is severely limited.  Further, helos have significant altitude limits.  The Merlin, for example, has a service ceiling of 15,000 ft as opposed to the US E-2 Hawkeye which has a ceiling of 35,000 ft.
 
2. AEW, as practiced by the UK, is only half of what is needed.  US AEW E-2 aircraft are not just early warning aircraft, they are battle management assets.  The operators direct the air battle and it is this function that is as important or more so than the early warning function.
 

US Navy E-2 Hawkeye

E-2 cabin for a crew of five

 

 
Conclusion
 
The UK’s decision to go with a ski jump carrier instead of a conventional cat/trap approach consigned its carriers to lower end combat roles due to the inability to operate the crucial AEW, EW, and tanker support aircraft.  A new, better AEW helo radar system would be nice but won’t significantly alter the limited reality of the UK’s carrier capabilities.  Those who would advocate using the UK carriers as models for the US Navy are failing to recognize the requirements for high end aerial combat.

 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Royal Navy seeks new airborne early warning capability for its carrier strike groups”, Martin Manaranche, 12-Apr-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/royal-navy-seeks-new-airborne-early-warning-capability-for-its-carrier-strike-groups/

Is The E-2 Hawkeye Still Needed?

The E-2 Hawkeye has long been recognized as the most important aircraft in the carrier air wing.  In fact, the Ford program manager stated exactly that.[1]  The E-2 provides detection of enemy aircraft and, more importantly, directly manages the aerial battle.  It is the battle management function that makes the E-2 so important and provides naval aircraft with their most important tactical advantage in air combat – the ability to avoid radiating.  It is also this function, by the way, that precludes any other radar-equipped aircraft from filling the E-2 role because no other aircraft can perform the battle management function.  Those who think an F-35 can be an E-2 simply don’t understand what the E-2 does.  But, I digress …
 
The lack of an E-2 is also why the British carriers are so limited in their combat usefulness.  Again, I digress …
 
Until the advent of stealth, the E-2 was able to monitor the location of every aircraft in the aerial battlefield and direct our planes in combat without those planes needing to radiate and reveal their own locations.  The ability of a Tomcat or Hornet to maneuver and launch missiles without revealing themselves was an enormous advantage. 
 
Now, however, stealthy and semi-stealthy aircraft have taken over the aerial battlefield.  What impact does this have on the E-2’s function and usefulness?  Well, let’s consider what we know about the E-2 and related issues. 

• The E-2 radar is credited with a detection range of around 200 miles. 
  
• Stealth aircraft are credited with golf ball size radar returns and detection ranges limited to a few miles or so, according to manufacturer claims.
• Current long range A2A missiles are credited with many dozens to multiple hundreds of miles range.
• The E-2 is non-survivable in the presence of enemy aircraft due to its immense radar return, active radar emissions, slow speed, and poor maneuverability.

 
Analysis
 
Now, let’s assemble and analyze the individual facts and see where that leads us.
 
We have, seemingly, conflicting claims.  The E-2 radar is credited with a 200 mile detection range.  Stealth aircraft are credited with mosquito to golf ball size radar returns and detection ranges limited to a few miles or so, according to manufacturer claims.  Both claims can’t be simultaneously true.  If an E-2 radar can detect stealth aircraft at 200 miles, what’s the point of stealth?  On the other hand, if an E-2 radar can’t detect stealth aircraft until a few miles, what’s the point of having an E-2?
 
What we have to recognize is that the E-2 radar detection claims of 200 miles are based on detecting large, non-stealthy aircraft like Russian Tu-95 Bears.  On the other hand, stealth aircraft manufacturer’s claims of being nearly non-detectable are exaggerated just like all manufacturer claims. What is the actual detection range of stealthy and non-stealthy aircraft?  Well, anyone who knows isn’t saying so we’re left to guess.  My best estimate is that semi-stealthy aircraft (Fulcrum and Flanker derivatives, Chinese J-16 for example) can be detected around 30-50 miles and full stealth aircraft (Chinese J-20, J-31, Russian Su-57 for example) can be detected around 10-20 miles, depending on conditions and circumstances.
 
E-2 radar detection and sustained tracking of stealthy or semi-stealthy aircraft is likely on the order of 10-30 miles which means an E-2 would have to operate within 10-30 miles of enemy aircraft in order to be effective in the battle management role and that is well within range of almost all modern A2A missiles.
 
Given that modern A2A missiles have ranges of many dozens or hundreds of miles, the concept of a non-survivable E-2 operating within 10-30 miles of enemy aircraft is a non-starter.  The conclusion is that stealth has rendered the E-2 ineffective as a battle management asset.  The E-2 can still function, to a somewhat degraded degree, as an elevated radar platform for carrier defense but that is a limited subset of its traditional role.
 
So, where does that leave us?
 
Institutional inertia and a total lack of realistic field exercises guarantees that we’ll continue down the traditional E-2 path for many decades to come.  Wouldn’t you love to see the results of a stealth (F-22) ‘attack’ against a carrier/E-2?  My bet is that the F-22 would never be detected.  If I’m correct, that’s the end of the E-2 as an effective platform.
 
Are there alternatives to the traditional E-2?  Yes!  Here’s a couple of possibilities we’ve covered:
 

• A stealthy, long range, B-21 ‘Hawkeye’ derivative
• A passive, non-radiating ‘Hawkeye’

 
 
Conclusion
 
Unless the E-2 Hawkeye has stealth detecting capabilities that have never even been hinted at, the E-2 Hawkeye is no longer survivable or effective when facing a peer with stealthy or semi-stealthy aircraft armed with long range A2A missiles.  We have alternatives but we need to stop our unthinking inertia and stop building E-2s just because they once were effective – the same goes for the endlessly produced Burkes but, I digress …
 
We need to conduct realistic air battle management exercises using B-2 bombers and other aircraft as surrogates for future ‘Hawkeyes’ and start defining the requirements for the next Navy AEW aircraft.
 
Consider this … if we develop very long range fighter aircraft, as I’ve called for, we also need to develop an accompanying, survivable AEW aircraft to support the fighters and manage the far away aerial battle.  Failure to do so means we enter the future air combat area on equal footing with the enemy and a fair fight means you haven’t done your job planning and preparing.  You don’t limit yourself to bringing a knife to a knife fight, you bring a gun!  We need AEW battle management support and the E-2 is no longer it.
 
 
 
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[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/search?q=ford+program+manager

Passive Sensors and Aerial Combat

An Anonymous reader (please, everyone, add a username to the end of your comments;  there are too many anonymous commenters to keep straight who’s who and to give proper credit for good comments, such as this;  no, it’s not a requirement, just a plea!)  posed the following question in a comment: 

“Will losses of high end radiating sensors or reluctance to use them bring us back to aircraft that fight primarily with passive E/O [electro-optical] sensors?”[1]

As the anonymous commenter noted, ComNavOps has often stated that ships in combat will not radiate (EMCON) until an attack is actually incoming.  To do otherwise betrays one’s own location and invites destruction.  We have passive electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) sensors but we need to fully develop them into a complete, hemispherical sensor system (with extensive redundancy, of course!) that is fully integrated into the ship’s combat software system.  In other words, we need to be able to scan, detect, identify, track, and establish firing solutions/fire control using purely passive sensors just as we now do with radar [question: how will we provide guidance for missiles requiring illumination?].
 
The ability to fully engage using only passive sensors would be a significant advantage as it would eliminate the enemy’s ability to detect and target our radars – no more ‘free’ guidance for the enemy and no more concern about anti-radiation (ARM-type) missiles!  The enemy would have to earn his targeting and if he uses active radar, as most current missiles do, that would give us the ‘free’ detection and engagement.
 
Returning to the main topic … will/can aircraft fight primarily with passive sensors and, if so, what would that look like?  How would it differ from what we do now?  What new tactics would we need?
 
As you know, passive aerial sensors are nothing new.  WWII aircraft fought using optical sensors (Mk1 eyeball) almost exclusively.  In more modern times, the F-14 Tomcat had truly impressive EO/IR capabilities (see, “Tomcat Eyes”) although the Navy then promptly abandoned those capabilities with the advent of the F-18 Hornet and only now, weakly, is claiming to have developed a never before seen Infrared Search and Track (IRST) capability that the rest of the world has had for decades.
 
Before we can go any further in describing a passive-only aerial battle, it is necessary to recognize some characteristics of passive aircraft systems and operations.
 
Field of View – This is the soda straw issue.  Aircraft are limited to small sensors and, therefore, have limited fields of view as compared to radar.  Some aircraft, like the F-35, have attempted to address this with total spherical coverage but with only limited success.  As far as I know, the F-35 remains incapable of using its ‘see through’ sensors effectively in a combat scenario.  Of course, the AF sends me surprisingly little classified combat information on the F-35.  I have to get most of my detailed, classified information off video gamer’s websites!  (Couldn’t resist that one! LOL)
 
The salient point, here, is that an aircraft using passive sensors is not capable of ‘sweeping’ the sky like radar.  The aircraft can see a fairly limited section of sky at any given moment.  This greatly increases the likelihood that detection and encounters will occur at much close ranges than we anticipate and that impacts doctrine and tactics.  The F-35, for example, was never intended to be an up-close dogfighter but was, instead, intended to stand off and be an aerial sniper.  With limited sensing, this is likely to mean the F-35 will find itself engaged in visual range dogfights, all too often.
 
Stealth – Stealth is completely negated by passive optical sensors and significantly negated by infrared (IR) sensors.  Thus, in a pure passive environment, stealth aircraft will possess no advantage over non-stealth aircraft as regards detection, tracking, and targeting.
 
Concealment – With radar, the traditional tactics of hiding in the clouds, flying low, etc. are largely useless.  Radar is relatively unaffected by weather, clouds, or terrain (look-down radar is pretty much the standard, today).  However, with passive sensors many of those tactics are once again effective.  Optical sensors are significantly degraded by clouds, IR sensors are somewhat affected by clouds depending on density and moisture content, optical and IR sensors are affected by terrain, and so on.
 
What this is suggesting is that passive-only aerial combat is likely to be much closer range affair than current doctrine and tactics envision.
 
AEW Control – Aerial combat is generally controlled by ground and/or airborne radar systems and controllers.  This can still take place, however, AEW active control has become a major risk, with active emitting AEW aircraft being susceptible to very long range A2A missiles (see, “GoodbyePoseidon and Hawkeye”);  I’ve proposed passive AEW (see, “Passive Hawkeye”) but that has not yet been implemented.
 
The US Navy and Air Force rely heavily on AEW for detection and battle management and that will be significantly impacted if not nearly eliminated.  In fact, one could envision aerial combat devolving into back and forth attempts by both sides to alternately attack and defend their high value AEW and EW aircraft.  Whichever side can establish AEW control of the battle will have a significant advantage.
 
BVR (Beyond Visual Range) – BVR combat, the ideal of the US military and exactly what the F-35 was designed to do, becomes a difficult, if not impossible scenario in passive-only aerial combat.  Radar is the sensor of choice to implement BVR combat and passive sensors simply can’t provide reliable 50-100+ mile detection and targeting against fighter size aircraft – large bombers or support aircraft, yes … fighters, no.
 
 
Scenarios
 
With the above discussion in mind, one can envision various aerial combat scenarios:
 
1. Low altitude combat with aircraft trying to get lost in the visual and IR ‘clutter’ of the ground.
 
2. High altitude combat with aircraft making use of the clouds as cover to hide from optical sensors although IR sensors would mitigate some of that advantage.
 
3. Fighter sweeps wherein one accepts the lack of long range sensing and compensates with sheer numbers of aircraft.
 
4. Aircraft might not even carry long range missiles such as AMRAAM, preferring to carry a larger number of shorter range heat seeking missiles.
 
 
Caution
 
What’s disturbing about all this is that the US military does not appear to have given this even a moment’s thought.  We believe that aerial supremacy is our birthright and AWACS/AEW control of the skies is an article of faith.  What will we do when China starts routinely shooting down our AWACS/AEW and we lose control of the aerial battle?  Are we training for it?
 
What will happen when the Chinese conduct fighter sweeps against us and achieve aerial superiority?  Are we developing alternate doctrine and tactics?    
 
The enemy gets a vote and we may not like their vote.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The future aerial battle will be a battle for control of the long range sensing capability.  With long range sensing comes the prize of control of the battle by airborne combat controllers.  The side that can establish and maintain long range sensing and, thus, control of the aerial battle will, most likely, win that battle.
 
Both sides will attempt to remain silent by using passive sensors and this will result in close range encounters likely involving the scenarios described above.  The close ranges will shift the emphasis from long range, radar guided missiles to short range, heat seeking missiles.  Aerial combat will return to optically-based (EO or eyeball), close range dogfights.
 
The exception to this will be the specialized hunter-killer (H-K) aircraft that will be tasked with finding and destroying the other side’s AEW aircraft.  The H-K aircraft will be armed with the longest range, fastest, air-to-air missiles the enemy has.
 
 
 
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[1]Navy Matters blog, “More Incorrect Ukraine Lessons”, Anonymous, March 26, 2023 at 6:23 AM,
https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2023/03/more-incorrect-ukraine-lessons.html?showComment=1679836994339#c418576362046182892

Passive Hawkeye

Without a doubt, the most important aircraft in the carrier air wing is the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and battle management aircraft, the E-2 Hawkeye.  The problem with the Hawkeye is that it is mostly an active sensor and reveals its position when it operates.  Yes, the aircraft flies offset from the carrier group because of that but it still tells the enemy that there’s a carrier in the area and where to begin looking for it. 

 

We’ve also noted that in future combat the E-2 will be forced to operate much farther back than desired due to the threat of very long range air-to-air missiles (see, “Goodbye Poseidon and Hawkeye”).  The Chinese VLRAAM reportedly has a range of 300 miles and a speed of Mach 6.  Hawkeyes are not survivable against such a threat.

 

What is needed is a stealthy, passive version of the Hawkeye.  A passive version of the Hawkeye would use:

 

• IR/IRST (Infrared/Infrared Search and Track)
• EO (Electro Optical)
• SigInt (Signals Intelligence)
• TCS (Tactical Camera System)

 

Being passive, there would be no aircraft sensor emissions for the enemy to locate and track.  In addition, if the airframe were stealthy the aircraft could operate much closer to the enemy thereby compensating for the reduced sensor range, resolution, and field of view compared to active radar.

 

A partial – and successful ! - model of such an aircraft is the old electronic version of the S-3 Viking, the ES-3A Shadow, which used signals analysis to provide situational awareness for the carrier group.  By all accounts, the ES-3A was quite effective and was phased out only as a [badly misguided] cost savings measure.

ES-3A Shadow - Passive Hawkeye?

 

Operating multiple such passive AEW aircraft would allow triangulation location of targets and increased coverage area.

 

Alternatively, we’ve discussed a stealthy active radar AEW aircraft based on the B-21 (see, “B-21 Hawkeye”).

 

The main point is that the E-2 Hawkeye is no longer survivable on the modern battlefield.  We need a fast, stealthy version of a Hawkeye, likely based on the B-21.  The aircraft can be either passive or active (ideally, both!) or an air wing could have a mix of the two.  We've got to stop simply repeating the past because it was once successful.  Building more and more Burkes just because they were once successful and screwed up every design since is wrong.  Building endless upgrades to an ancient, prop driven aircraft because it was once successful is timid and wrong.  Instead, we have to start thinking about what future combat will be like and start designing equipment and operating concepts to fit that future.

Radar Fallibility

I constantly hear from commenters about the infallibility of radar.  For example, I’ve repeatedly stated that it is quite likely most missile defense engagements will start at the horizon and yet there are always people quoting some maximum radar range and stating, with absolute certainty, that an E-2 Hawkeye, for example, will unfailingly detect the missiles and enable engagements hundreds of miles out.  Well, here’s a documented example of a Hawkeye’s (two actually!) failure to detect a low flying, inbound target. (1)

Note: thanks to Navy Matters commenter, “FM” for the link. (1)

The exercise in question occurred shortly after Desert Storm.  A B-52 bomber was tasked with attempting to reach attack range, inside 200 miles, against the USS Ranger and its air wing.  The defending force consisted of two E-2 Hawkeyes, F-14s for CAP, EA-6Bs, S-3s, and A-6s.  The short version is that the B-52 got within 20 miles of the carrier before being detected and announcing its presence.

This was a giant, hulking B-52, not some small, sleek, wave-clipping missile!

Radar is NOT the infallible, all-seeing, omniscient eye that so many believe. 

This is analogous to the documented Cold War exercise of a carrier group sitting off the Russian coast and remaining undetected for an extended period.

In the real world, detection of any object by any means is a challenge.  We need to keep that reality firmly in mind as we discuss the various Navy plans and concepts that all assume perfect situational awareness on our part and zero awareness on the enemy’s part.  The reality will be quite different and that reality strongly suggests that many of our plans and concepts desperately need to be re-evaluated.

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(1) Username: FM, Navy Matters, “USS Boxer – A Second Drone”, August 5, 2019 at 11:36 PM

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25572/confessions-of-an-e-2c-hawkeye-radar-operator

B-21 Hawkeye

A recent comment about using a B-1 bomber as a sensor/guidance asset, working with missile truck aircraft, triggered some thoughts about the Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye. 

The E-2 Hawkeye is the Navy’s long time aerial battle management and situational awareness asset for carrier groups.  The Hawkeye typically operates offset from the carrier and many miles away so as not to give away the carrier’s location.  The problem with the Hawkeye is that it is no longer survivable.  Chinese and Russian Very Long Range Air to Air Missiles (VLRAAM) are now in service that can reach a large, slow, non-stealthy target like a Hawkeye from two hundred or more miles away (see, “Goodbye Poseidon and Hawkeye”).  The Hawkeye’s lack of speed, stealth, and maneuverability all but guarantee that, if targeted, the Hawkeye will be destroyed.  Even the mere threat of VLRAAMs means that the Hawkeyes will have to operate much farther back than previously.  Situational awareness will be greatly reduced and aerial battle management will be rendered much less effective due to simply being unable to see the battle from so much further back.

E-2 Hawkeye

We’ve kicked around the idea of a stealthier, faster version of the Hawkeye but there’s been no getting around the obstacle of the giant radar system perched on the back of the aircraft.  This totally negates any stealth and hugely impacts speed and maneuverability.  Even the more advanced ‘fin’ type radars are still extremely large and negatively impact stealth, speed, and maneuverability.

Even if we could, somehow, defy physics and create a stealthy, fast, maneuverable Hawkeye with a giant radar on its back, the radar itself precludes stealth and survivability.  The powerful radar broadcasts continuously and loudly announces its location to the world and, specifically, to VLRAAM-carrying aircraft.

Chinese VLRAAM

So, what’s a battle management/situational awareness aircraft designer to do?

Enter the B-1/2/21 …

The B-1/2/21 bombers were designed as stealthy, fast, penetrating aircraft.  The B-2, in particular, was, apparently, originally designed as a high altitude, penetrating bomber, with a ceiling of 60,000 ft.  Operational requirement changes for a low level penetrating capability implemented late in the design process are claimed to have reduced the B-2’s ceiling to under 50,000 ft. (1)  The Drive website’s Tyler Rogoway speculates that the B-21 will return to a high altitude bomber. (1)

If we’re willing to consider a radical change in operational methodology regarding how we perform aerial battle management and situational awareness, we can immediately see the possibility of a new approach using large, fast, high flying, stealthy ‘bombers’. 

For the moment, let’s focus on the B-21 since it’s the only one that could currently be built although existing aircraft could be modified.  However, given the limited numbers of existing bombers, that would seem unlikely.

We’ve noted that the requirement for a giant radar on the back of the aircraft precludes stealth, speed, and maneuverability.  Why do we need such a large radar?  We need it to provide the power, sensitivity, and performance necessary to operate hundreds of miles from the actual aerial battlefield which is a necessary requirement to ensure the survivability of the Hawkeye, given its non-survivable characteristics.  However, think about it … what if we didn’t have to stand a hundred-plus miles off from the battlefield?  What if we could stand essentially in, or on top of, the battlefield?  If we could, we wouldn’t need such a large radar.  We could get by with a much smaller one.  Well, that’s exactly what a B-21 would give us:  a high flying, stealthy, fast, survivable aircraft that could bring a much smaller radar much closer to the battlefield – essentially, on or in the battlefield.

The B-21 ‘Hawkeye’ would be mixed into the battlefield and, using a low probability of intercept AESA radar combined with its inherent stealth, could monitor and control the battle up close.  With Mach+ sprint speed to escape and evade when threatened, the aircraft’s survivability is further enhanced.

Of course, the entire concept comes down to whether or not a sufficiently capable radar exists, or could be developed, that could fit internally on the B-21.  If it could, the concept is viable.  If not, ignore this post!

There is one other requirement for a B-21 ‘Hawkeye’ and that is a large crew.  With all due respect (none) to the people who suggest that the F-35 will perform battle management, that’s just nonsense.  True battle management, not just guiding a single missile that someone else launched, requires computers, displays, and manpower.  Fortunately, a suitably modified B-21 would have ample room for a battle management crew.  I note that the preceding sentence may not be accurate given the B-21’s flattened airframe.  If sufficient space for crew and work stations can’t be fit into the B-21 then it would be necessary to design a somewhat modified aircraft though still along the same lines we’ve been discussing.  That’s an engineering issue and without detailed B-21 blueprints none of us are qualified to assess it.  We’ll stick to the conceptual design and leave the physical design to the designers.

B-21 'Hawkeye' ?

If the concept appears viable, it would be easy for the Navy to tap into the upcoming production of the B-21 and purchase a number of aircraft for conversion to a ‘Hawkeye’ variant.  Taking the concept a step further, it would also be an opportune moment to design a ‘Hawkeye’ variant based on the B-21 but incorporating more extensive, specific modifications intended to enhance mission performance such as greater altitude, increased internal space (if needed), enhanced bottom aspect stealth, enhanced self-defense electronics, greater sprint speed, etc.  Of course, this would drastically drive up the cost of what will, undoubtedly, be an already expensive airframe but the capability offered would justify the cost.  Effective battle management and situational awareness is a force multiplier of priceless value.

One final aspect to consider is that a B-21 ‘Hawkeye’ doesn’t need to be a carrier based aircraft and, likely, wouldn’t be.  Given the 6,900 mile range of a current B-2, a B-21 ‘Hawkeye’ could easily be land based and cycle to carrier/naval operations, as needed.  Carriers could, in fact, maintain on-board E-2 Hawkeyes for routine operations and call on B-21 ‘Hawkeyes’ when necessary although this may be an overly costly redundancy.

In summary, if we’re willing to adopt a completely different approach to situational awareness and battle space management, a B-21 ‘Hawkeye’ may be the answer to the carrier’s current E-2 vulnerabilities while still accomplishing the function.  With upcoming B-21 production run, the Navy has an opportunity to acquire some very advanced capabilities without having to pay for the basic airframe development costs although the ‘Hawkeye’ modifications would still be significant.

________________________________

(1)The Drive website, “The B-21’s Three Decade Old Shape Hints At New High Altitude Capabilities”, Tyler Rogoway, 6-Oct-2017,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/14919/the-b-21s-three-decade-old-shape-hints-at-new-high-altitude-capabilities