Wayne Hughes is one of the foremost proponents of small
vessel naval forces and has spoken and written extensively about it. Before I go any further, let me commend Capt.
Hughes for his willingness to formulate, publicize, and discuss a point of
view. It takes courage to put one’s
opinions into the public realm where they are open to criticism. Whether I agree or disagree with Hughes’
theories, I respect him for holding and publicizing his thoughts.
In Hughes’ book, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, he
presents his theories and then, in conclusion, offers a naval combat scenario
to illustrate their application [1, p.321].
I’d like to examine his combat scenario as a means of describing the
limits and constraints of his theories.
There are many naval observers and commentators who ascribe to his
theories so this exercise is well worth the effort.
In brief, the combat scenario involves a conflict between
Greece and Turkey with the US stuck in between, using naval force to,
ironically, keep the peace by attacking docked Turkish amphibious transport
ships. The US attack force consists of
several small missile boats that are transported undetected, by a mothership,
to a location near the proposed battle and then dispersed, again undetected, to
their launch points where they will attack docked Turkish troop transports
thereby preventing a widespread Turkish amphibious assault on several Greek
islands.
Interestingly, Hughes does not conclude his naval battle scenario. Instead, he ends his narrative at the moment
of engagement. His purpose was setting
the stage for the battle to demonstrate the value of his small combatants. Whether the outcome is successful or not is
irrelevant for what he is trying to accomplish and whether he successfully
demonstrates the value of his theories is up to the reader.
In order to make an assessment of Hughes’ scenario and the principles
he applies, it is necessary to clearly understand the conditions he sets for
the scenario. As with any wargame, the
input conditions determine the result (garbage in, garbage out) and this combat
scenario has a number of constraints built into it, to the point of rendering
the scenario nearly irrelevant. I’ve long
maintained that Hughes’ theories and conclusions are of very limited value and
applicability and his battle scenario clearly illustrates this. Following are some of the conditions Hughes
sets for his scenario. Judge for
yourself the validity and usefulness of the overall scenario in light of the
constraints imposed on the scenario.
You can draw your own conclusion but my assessment is that
Hughes constructed a scenario that perfectly fits his theories so as to
illustrate and extoll them. As such, my
conclusion regarding his theories is that their ‘window’ of applicability is so
small and so unlikely as to render them nearly irrelevant. For example, the US small missile boats, the
heart of Hughes’ envisioned fleet structure concept, are almost magically
transported to the perfect placement on the naval battlefield with no possibility
of detection by the enemy. He also
ignores the issue of fuel and logistical support for the small combatants. A single enemy helicopter would wreak havoc on
the small, defenseless missile boats but enemy air activity was excluded since
its presence would turn a nice, neat scenario into a disaster for the US and
Hughes.
As I was reading the description of the scenario, I was
struck by the thought that there was a far easier and far more assured,
alternate battle plan available. Hughes
hypothesized a single US carrier with four Aegis escorts. He limited their involvement to some minor
scouting but he could, instead, have assigned the four Aegis escorts to deal
with the enemy air forces while the carrier’s aircraft swiftly dispatched the
nearly defenseless Turkish amphibious and naval forces. That, however, would not have served the
purpose of illustrating his theories or, rather, would have pointed out a
preferred alternative to his theories.
Hughes’ theories of small combatants have numerous flaws but
the book serves as an excellent Navy 101 or primer on naval combat. It is a starting point for the study of naval
combat, not an endpoint. As a starting
point, it is well worth reading and studying.
Simply identifying the flaws in Hughes’ concept is an invaluable
education in itself.
For those of you who opt to read his book or writings, the
biggest overall flaw is that his theories all begin with his favored small
combatants already in position, perfectly poised for the salvoes that are the
basis of his theories. He neglects the
logistics, basing, detection, lack of anti-air defense, EW, etc. that are all
crucial to, and precede, any successful naval engagement. As you read his writings, keep that in mind
and recognize the weaknesses. It will
help you assess the validity – or lack thereof - of his theories.
______________________________
[1]”Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat”, 2nd Ed., Wayne P. Hughes Jr.,
Naval Institute Press, 2000, ISBN 1-55750-392-3, p.321.
- The scenario is tailor made to fit his theories. In other words, Hughes’ theories are not
applied to the scenario; the scenario is
applied to his theories. That’s
backwards and unrealistic! There’s
nothing wrong, per se, with doing that but the reader needs to recognize what
was done and be very wary of extrapolating the success – or lack thereof – of a
very specific scenario to other, perhaps more likely scenarios such as open
ocean combat or combined arms (aviation) naval combat.
- The scenario forbids attacks on the enemy homeland, land
bases and airfields, land sensors, etc.
In other words, a foolish way to conduct a war. Of course, historically, we generally do
limit ourselves in combat to the point of harming ourselves so this may not be a
totally ridiculous constraint!
- Electronic warfare (EW) is ignored and networks are assumed
to be flawless and unimpeded with the US having perfect communications,
command, and control.
- Land based strikes by enemy aircraft against naval targets
are not included.
- US Air Force and Army assistance is ignored so no friendly air
strikes, reconnaissance, intel, tanker, or EW support.
- Carrier air strikes on ships are ruled out due to fear of a
hypothesized 200 enemy fighters.
- It is assumed that no Greek or Turkish surveillance will
detect the US small combat vessels.
- Complete US satellite coverage is assumed.
