Ohio Versus Columbia Cost

Just for fun, let’s do a quick check of the Columbia SSBN program costs and see how they compare to the Ohio class.  The costs should be about the same after adjustment for inflation, right?  The Columbia is just a modern repeat of the Ohio - same function, same basic sub so the costs should be the same.  Well, let’s see …

 

As a quick review and in order to have a basis for comparison, here’s a brief table of specifications and cost for the Ohio and Columbia classes.

 

 

	Ohio	Columbia
Length, ft	560	560
Beam, ft	42	43
Displacement, tons submerged	18,750	21,140
Missile Tubes	24	16
Inflation Adjusted Cost	$3.3B a (FY2021)	$9.15B b (FY2021)

 

 

^a Ohio:  $2B (around 1997) for final sub of class (1) = $3.3B (FY2021)

^b $109.8B total class procurement cost for 12 submarines = $9.15B average cost (FY2021) (2)

 

From this table, a couple things jump out:

 

Size.  We see that the Columbia is, essentially, a repeat of the Ohio class as regards basic dimensions so the costs ought to be comparable, allowing for inflation.  In fact, we see that the Columbia has 8 fewer missile tubes so the sub should be significantly smaller/shorter since the missile tube section is the largest section of the sub. 

 

Looking at the cutaway drawing of the Ohio class below, we see that 8 fewer missile tubes (4 on each side, so 4 tubes in the profile drawing) represents around 11 m (33 ft).  From that, one would expect that the new Columbia would be around 33 ft shorter than the Ohio and yet they’re the same size.  Since no new functions have been added that we’re aware of, what’s occupying the 33 ft of ‘empty’ space?

 

Ohio Class Cutaway Drawing

 

Similarly, nuclear reactors have gotten steadily smaller.  Here’s the best data I could find:

 

Ohio - The Ohio class uses 1x S8G pressurized water reactor.  The S8G reactor compartment for the Ohio submarines is 42 feet (13 m) in diameter, 55 feet (17 m) long and weighs 2,750 tons.(3)

 

Columbia - The Columbia class uses 1x S1B pressurized water reactor of unknown dimensions.  A concept drawing of the Columbia class suggests that the reactor compartment is around 30-35 ft long.  While this agrees with the reasoning that the reactor compartment should be smaller than the Ohio’s, a concept drawing is a highly suspect source of information and the information should be treated accordingly.

 

So, comparing reactor compartment lengths,

 

 

	Ohio	Columbia
Reactor Compartment Length, ft	55	30-35

 

 

Since no new functions have been added that we’re aware of, what’s occupying the 20-25 ft of saved space from the smaller Columbia reactor?

 

Adding the 33 ft of saved length from the reduced number of missile tubes to the 20-25 ft of saved length from the smaller reactor, we see what should be a reduced overall length of 53-58 ft for the Columbia.  Inexplicably, it seems that the Columbia is actually slighter larger than the Ohio and has a significantly greater displacement!  How can a sub with 8 fewer of the massive missile tubes and a smaller reactor be larger and have a greater displacement?

 

Specifications.  As we’ve already mentioned, the Columbia has been down-spec’ed compared to the original Ohios:  33% reduction in missile tubes and a smaller reactor.  The missile reduction is puzzling given that the original threat that drove the Ohio design not only hasn’t decreased, it’s increased as China has significantly more military capacity and potential than the Soviet Union did.

 

Cost.  As we’ve just seen, the Columbia is, essentially a repeat of the Ohio class but with significantly fewer missile tubes and a smaller reactor.  Setting the internal contents aside, the two subs have nearly identical dimensions and one would reasonably expect them to cost the same after adjustment for inflation and yet this is not even remotely the case.  Why?  Why should a down-spec’ed modern Ohio be nearly three times the cost of the original?

 

 

 

 

Speculation

 

Why has the cost nearly tripled for what ought to be a significantly smaller and cheaper submarine?  Well, we have no actual idea so here’s some speculation:

 

Numbers – The Navy has not only reduced the number of missile tubes per submarine but also the total number of subs with a reduction from 24 Ohios to just 12 Columbias.  It would be reasonable to assume that cutting the total build in half would increase production costs.  Of course, economy of scale is rarely seen in Navy ship programs so this is a highly debatable assumption.  Still, simply spreading a shipyard’s overhead costs over fewer ships is guaranteed to increase purchase costs (see, “Shipbuilding Costs – Impact of Low Volume”).

 

Berthing – Presumably, the Navy is planning to man the subs with mixed gender crews and the need to duplicate facilities undoubtedly increases costs.  Still, we’re trying to explain a nearly $6B cost increase so there must be more to it than gender related amenities and duplication.  The need to duplicate facilities may, however, explain some of the lost ‘empty’ space that we can’t account for.

 

Comfort – We’ve seen an across the board increase in creature comforts for crews as the Navy has moved to nearly year long deployments (see, ”Crew Comfort”).  Despite the idiocy of turning WARships into cruise ships, this may account for some of the missing ‘empty’ space and cost. 

 

Supra-Inflation – We’ve seen cost growth over and above the rate of inflation for almost every Navy shipbuilding program and the magnitude of the increases for some of them, such as the Ford class, have defied belief.  This may be more of that same unexplained supra-inflation.

 

Bid Inflation – The Navy has clearly demonstrated to industry that the Navy’s construction plans are etched in water and not to be relied on.  In fact, with Navy shipbuilding programs, it is almost a guarantee that the numbers will be cut before the program is over, thus negatively impacting industry profits.  Without a doubt, industry is aware of this and builds in some profit margin cushion to compensate for the expected decrease in numbers.  How the Navy could decrease the SSBN build below 12, which is already reduced from 24, is unknown and yet history suggests that it is a very real possibility.  For those who might think that a leg of the nuclear/strategic triad would be immune to reductions, one has only to consider the example of the Air Force B-2 nuclear/strategic bomber which was planned to build 132 and then was reduced to 21.

 

Gold Plating – I have zero evidence that the practice of unnecessary over-spec’ing, referred to as ‘gold plating’, is taking place in the Columbia program but, given the Navy’s constant tendency to do this, it would be surprising if this was not taking place to some, likely significant, degree.

 

 

Conclusion

 

We have no concrete conclusion that explains why the Columbia is 53-58 ft longer and nearly $6B more expensive than we can account for – only speculation.   Without a doubt, some or all of our speculation is correct although we cannot quantify the magnitude of any of it and none of it seems sufficient to explain the $6B increase.  Regardless of the actual reasons for the staggering cost increase, the Navy’s continually demonstrated inability to produce reasonably priced new ships is a monumental concern and is inexorably shrinking the fleet to a point of combat-ineffectiveness.  The latest evidence of this is the Navy’s turn to small, weak, unmanned ships to replace Aegis cruisers and Burke destroyers in an effort to keep ship counts up despite the resulting decrease in combat power.  The Navy simply must get control of its shipbuilding programs and learn to produce affordable, combat-effective ships or we will find ourselves without an effective Navy.

 

 

_________________________________

 

(1)https://web.archive.org/web/20090426041620/http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-local_subs_0424apr24,0,5810806.story

 

(2)Congressional Research Service, “Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, May 2020,

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41129/179

 

(3)Wikipedia, “S8G reactor”,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S8G_reactor

SSBN and New START

This post is just a point of interest that I hadn’t been aware of.  I’m sure many of you knew about this but for those, like me, who were unaware, it’s just a bit of information.

The Navy’s Ohio class SSBN submarines were built with 24 missile tubes.  However, due to provisions of the New START treaty (effective 2011) with Russia, each sub has had 4 of its missile tubes permanently deactivated resulting in just 20 functional tubes/missiles.(1)  I was unaware of that.

As a brief reminder, 18 Ohio class SSBNs were built, however, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review study resulted in a reduction in the requirement from 18 to 14.  The 4 subs that were deemed unnecessary were converted to guided missile subs (SSGN) each of which can carry 154 Tomahawk missiles.

START was conceived for a two-power scenario (US-Russia).  Is this still wise and viable given the rise of China as a global threat?  START constrains the US while China is unconstrained.  Is this wise?

______________________________

(1)https://www.csp.navy.mil/SUBPAC-Commands/Submarines/Ballistic-Missile-Submarines/

Burke Upgrades Cancelled

The Navy has cancelled planned ballistic missile defense (BMD) upgrades for five Burke class destroyers due to budget constraints (1).  The ships will not receive the Baseline 9 Aegis combat system upgrades.  The cuts in modernization funding will save around $500M over five years.

The cuts also impact the ship's networking and target data sharing capabilities.

"Additionally — without the Baseline 9 upgrade — the ships will not be wired into the Navy’s emerging Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA (pronounced: nifk-kah)) that would allow destroyers to download targeting information from assets outside of the range of their SPY-1D radars to attack air and BMD threats with the Raytheon Standard Missile 6 (SM-6)."

Well, that’s very unfortunate that we can’t afford those upgrades but as CNO Greenert said,

"When asked about the reductions following a House appropriations hearing on Thursday, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert told USNI News the cuts were a result of hard fiscal choices and reflected the service’s priorities."

Well, CNO Greenert is right.  When you have a limited budget, you have to make hard choices based on your priorities and …  wait … let me go back to that cost number …  $500M ?!! … to get 5 BMD and network capable Burkes? … $500M – isn’t that the cost of a single LCS?  So, CNO Greenert is telling us that the Navy’s priorities are that they would rather have an LCS than five BMD/network capable Burkes?  Does that make sense to you?!  I’ve said all along that Greenert is completely focused on low end and peacetime activities at the expense of warfighting and readiness and this just proves it.

I recently posted that, for reasons totally obscure to me, the Navy considers the LCS untouchable and this yet another example.  The Navy would rather pass on five BMD/network capable Burkes than give up one LCS. 

However, according to the article,

"Currently, the Navy’s number one priority is the $100 billion design and construction effort for a new nuclear ballistic missile submarine to replace the aging Ohio-class boomers (SSB)."

I'm not sure if the Navy's internal top priority really is the replacement SSBN.  As I’ve pointed out, the LCS looks to be the Navy’s top priority.  Still, it demonstrates the domino effect that occurs when a program, the SSBN replacement, in this case, is so expensive that it not only limits itself but cripples other programs.  The F-35, for example, is gutting the Marines and Air Force by forcing those services to cancel other badly needed programs to pay for the F-35.  Similarly, the SSBN has long been predicted to gut Navy shipbuilding, operating, and maintenance funding and now we're seeing the first concrete results.

We’ll continue to watch the SSBN funding play out but I predict that we’re going to see many more examples of early retirements, deferred maintenance, cancelled upgrades, and truncated shipbuilding to pay for the SSBN unless the Navy can get the funding shifted to a higher DoD level (of course, that just means that every service will have its budget cut a bit more to pay for the SSBN – there are no free lunches).  This is further evidence that the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding plan is pure fantasy.  Many future ships will have to be cancelled to pay for the SSBN.

Seriously, how do you defend prioritizing the LCS over five Burke BMD/network upgrades?  Every time I think the Navy has hit rock bottom in decision making they dig a trench and lower the bar a bit more.

(1) USNI, "Navy Again Reduces Scope of Destroyer Modernization, 5 Ships Won’t Receive Any Ballistic Missile Defense Upgrades", Sam LaGrone, 3-Mar-2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/03/03/navy-again-reduces-scope-of-destroyer-modernization-5-ships-wont-receive-any-ballistic-missile-defense-upgrades

SSN Shortfall

A recent DoD Buzz website article (1) discussed SSN attack submarine levels as reported at a Sep 12^th House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces hearing.  Rear Adm. Breckenridge was quoted in the article as stating that SSN levels would fall from the current 55 or so to 42 in the early 2020’s.  It was further stated by Navy leaders that the combined combatant commander’s demand for submarines “far exceeds what is available or possible”.

Given this kind of demand and the recognized stealth, power, and usefulness of SSNs, the drop in attack submarine levels from 55 to 42 seems reckless, at best.  One would think that the Navy would consider the SSN to be one of the top priorities and would do everything in their power to ensure that adequate force levels are maintained.  Clearly, this is not the case.  By comparison, the Navy remains firmly committed to 50+ LCS despite no demand from the combatant commanders.

To be fair, the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding joke plan does call for a return to around 48 SSNs in the 2030 range or so.  Unfortunately, no one outside the Navy believes the 30 year plan has the slightest chance of realization.  The funding levels required to achieve the plan are so far beyond current budget levels or any reasonable extrapolation of budget resources that the plan may as well call for 100 SSNs – it isn’t going to happen anyway.

The real issue here isn’t the exact number of submarines (or LCSs!) that will be built or the exact funding that will be required.  Rather, the issue is the obvious disconnect between strategic/tactical requirements and what’s being procured.  It’s obvious that submarines provide enormous value as demonstrated by both history and the combatant commander’s demand.  Why, then, are we building the LCS (or Zumwalt, or JSF, or JHSV, or whatever your favorite boondoggle program is) when we have shortages of platforms that can actually be of service?  Wouldn’t it make more sense to fund SSNs to the required level before funding LCSs?  I see this phenomenon throughout the military.  We’re procuring far too many weapons, systems, and platforms that have only a nodding relation to our strategic and tactical needs and then we’re forced to try and fit them into our needs (anyone got a mission for the LCS?).  It should be the other way around – our strategic and tactical needs should be driving our procurement.

The juxtaposition of the SSN and the LCS procurement programs is illuminating, discouraging, and reveals the lack of strategic/tactical focus by Navy leadership.  Instead, the Navy’s acquisition strategy seems to be to procure anything it can, whenever it can, and worry about what to do with it later.  This is how you find yourself on the losing end of combat.

(1) DoD Buzz Website, “Navy Confronts Anticipated Submarine Shortfall”, Kris Osborn, 13-Sep-2013, http://www.dodbuzz.com/2013/09/13/navy-confronts-anticipated-submarine-shortfall/

Do We Need An SSBN?

The current issue of Proceedings has an interesting article on the SSBN(X) Ohio replacement submarine (1).  In short, the author’s premise is that the SSBN(X) program will be far too expensive and, more importantly, the need for the submarine based leg of the strategic triad is no longer valid.  The strategic triad and the submarine leg, in particular, historically served as an assured and invulnerable nuclear second strike capability.  The need for an assured second strike is predicated on the possibility, however remote, of a disabling first strike by an enemy against our land and air based nuclear weapons.  Thus, the SSBN provided the guarantee that an enemy would be totally destroyed even if they succeeded in executing a disabling first strike on the other two legs of the triad. 

The author claims that no likely enemy currently possesses the capability to launch a disabling first strike and, hence, there is no need to maintain a second strike (SSBN) capability.  The premise is fascinating and worthy of additional serious consideration.

Before I go any further I must state that I am not an expert on nuclear deterrence or nuclear strategy, by any means.



SSBN Still Needed?



That said, I’d like to look briefly at the author’s concepts from a bit more unorthodox perspective.  The author postulates that no other country or non-state actor has the capability to execute a disabling first strike.  He explains that this means that no other country has a sufficient quantity of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to achieve a disabling first strike.  The author acknowledges that the Russians do have the capability but dismisses them as a threat on the basis of recent “warm” relations.  He further acknowledges that relations could turn bad and suggests that if that happens we can reconstitute our SSBN capability though the extremely long lead time for design and construction of a new SSBN class would seem to render that option moot.



With the caveat of the Russians, the author’s premise is not without validity and, as I said, warrants serious consideration.  But, what about unconventional disabling first strikes?  Could an enemy, whether a nation or non-state actor, execute a disabling first strike without using nuclear weapons?

Could a nation or non-state actor execute a cyber attack that could disable our ability to control and launch nuclear weapons?  Such an attack could be direct, via software viruses inserted into and spread throughout our control software or indirect by disabling electrical grids and the like.  Now before you go and pound out a reply telling me all about backup electrical supply systems and whatnot, recognize that I’m posing an outside the box question rather than suggesting that the scenario is feasible or imminent.  However, just because we can’t imagine the scenario today, doesn’t mean it can’t happen tomorrow.  I bet Iran thought their centrifuges were secure before they were hacked.  Speaking of which, China has devoted a significant military effort towards offensive computer attacks.  Is such a scenario beyond them?  Are we willing to bet our country on it? 

Could a nation or non-state actor execute an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack that would disable our land and air based nuclear assets?  Again, just posing the outside the box question.

Returning to the Proceedings article and the author’s premise that the SSBN leg of the triad is no longer needed, if we can answer the above questions with even a hesitant “highly unlikely but maybe” or “it can’t be 100% totally ruled out” then the SSBN leg is still needed.

This is one of those posts where I don’t have an answer, only questions.  People with more knowledge than me will have to address this.  The question the author poses is fascinating and, in this era of severe budget limitations, the possibility of eliminating the SSBN leg of the triad must be very appealing to Congress and the carrier Navy leadership.  I hope we make this decision on the basis of military reality rather than politics and wishful thinking.

(1)United States Naval Institute Proceedings, “The Future of Deterrence? Ballistic Missile Defense”, Maxwell Cooper, Sep 2013, p.52.

SSBN(X) Update

The United States Naval Institute has a short article with a few details about the future SSBN(X). 

Here's a bullet list of features:

• Single mission
• X-stern
• Electric drive
• Virginia anechoic hull treatment
• Virginia Large Aperture Bow Sonar array
• Water jet propulsor
• Dimensions 561 ft x 43 ft - 2 ft longer than Ohio
• Crew of 155 - same as Ohio

The most interesting feature is the focus on single mission.  There has been a lot of discussion about using the SSBN(X) as a combination SSGN & SSBN or acting as a Special Forces platform.  It appears that none of that will happen.  This will be a straight up repeat of the Ohios with modernized equipment.

The next most interesting feature is the crew size which is identical to the Ohio.  Given a significantly greater degree of automation in this sub versus the Ohios, this seems odd.  I would have thought a reduction in crew size would have been part of the design.

I still don't get the why the sub is the same size (2 feet longer, actually!) as the Ohio when it has 33% fewer missile tubes. 

Cost estimates are unchanged from those reported in our previous post.  This is a very expensive sub!

SSBN(X) Costs

Continuing our weekend SSBN examination, let's look at the cost of the SSBN(X) program.  As you know, the Navy is planning to build 12 new SSBN(X) Trident ballistic missile submarines to replace the 14 Ohio class subs currently in service.  And what, you ask, is this program going to cost?

A lot!  So much so that, for starters, budget issues have pushed the procurement program two years further out than originally planned, to 2021, which will result in the SSBN fleet dropping to 10 or 11 subs during the period from 2029-2041.

The costs discussed below come from the recent CRS SSBN(X) report (1).

The Navy’s original cost estimate was $6-$7B per sub in 2010 dollars.  As a result of cost cutting (reduced capabilities, for example, reducing the number of missile tubes from 24 to 16 and reducing the tube size from a planned 97 inches diameter to accommodate future, larger missiles to 87 inches which is the current size), the Navy now estimates the cost of subs 2-12 to be $5.6B in 2010 dollars ($6.0B-2012) and has set a further cost reduction target of $4.9B-2010 ($5.3B-2012) cost per sub.  Of course, the accuracy of the Navy’s cost estimates has historically been understated by significant amounts. 

GAO estimates the total acquisition cost for the program to be $90.4B in 2012 dollars which is $7.5B per sub.  This figure includes $11.1B in Research & Development plus $79.3 of actual procurement costs.  Considering only the acquisition costs, the average cost is $6.6B-2012 per sub.

In FY2011, CBO estimated the average cost at $8.3B-2011 (includes R&D) with the lead ship costing $13.3B-2011.

To summarize, the average procurement costs (excludes R&D costs) per sub in 2012 dollars from the various sources is:

Navy    $5.3B

GAO    $6.6B

CBO    $7.3B   (approximate after ballpark adjustment for R&D)

We see that the Navy’s cost estimates are the most optimistic which is in line with their demonstrated inability to accurately estimate program costs.  Thus, it is far more likely that the GAO or CBO costs will turn out to be closer to reality.  An average procurement cost of $7B-2012 per sub with a total average procurement cost of around $9B-2012 per sub seems likely to me.

The impact of this program on the Navy’s shipbuilding plans will be huge.  The Navy is already struggling with trying to maintain fleet size at around 285 ships.  The current administration and Navy leadership have put forth ridiculous shipbuilding plans that call for increasing the fleet to 300+ ships, however, every objective analysis of the plan has pointed out that the current budget projections don’t even remotely allow for the plan to succeed.  Adding a 12 year period wherein half the $15B yearly shipbuilding budget will be consumed by the SSBN(X) program renders the 30 year fleet size plan utterly unachievable.

There have been suggestions, including from CNO Greenert, that the Department of Defense should pay for some of the program from other, non-Navy account lines.  Of course, this is simply moving money around on paper and doesn’t change the overall impact.  We’ll have to wait and see how this one plays out.

(1) Congressional Research Service, “Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke, June 12, 2012

SSBN(X) - Smaller Without Being Smaller

The Navy is in the process of developing a replacement for the Ohio class Trident ballistic missile submarines (SSBN).  The next generation ballistic missile sub (SSBN[X]) is described in the recent CRS report (1) as containing 16 missile tubes versus 24 in the Ohio class.  The tubes will be the same dimensions.  The sub’s beam and displacement will be comparable to the Ohio’s.  So, although containing one third fewer missile tubes the SSBN(X) will be the same size as the Ohio.  Throw in presumably smaller, more efficient nuclear plants, greater levels of automation, and the likelihood of reduced (or eliminated – though that seems unlikely) torpedo spaces and one might be tempted to reasonably conclude that the resulting sub should be smaller than the Ohios.  Apparently, one would be wrong!

This seems totally illogical on the face of it and I don’t understand it.  I’ll keep looking into this.

(1) Congressional Research Service, “Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke, April 5, 2012