Where Are The Troops?

This is not a land combat blog but, sometimes, I’ve just gotta dip my toe into that world. 
 
We’ve repeatedly seen the US get attacked (with very little success) in the Strait of Hormuz by a drone or a speedboat and then we retaliate by striking combat related facilities.  The blindingly obvious question is why aren’t we striking these targets before they can be used against us since, clearly, we know where they are?  What kind of idiot commander allows known enemy combat facilities to exist during a war?
 
Now, here’s the land combat portion.  Why haven’t we put a brigade ashore to sweep, say, a 5-10 mile deep swath along the length of the strait?  As best I can tell, that would eliminate every remaining speedboat and most of the relevant combat facilities (weapons warehoused, radars, command and control facilities, troop housing/hideouts, etc.
 
Oh, but what if Iranian troops confront us?  Oh no!  What will we do?  Well, how about we thank them for revealing themselves and gathering together in one place so that we can more easily and efficiently kill them?
 
A sweep would remove most of the remaining ability of Iran to harass shipping in the strait.
 
Are we so afraid of casualties that we won’t risk soldiers?  If so, then this war isn’t very important.  If it is important, then ground troops are justified.  This would be a training exercise for a WWII battalion.  
 
We started the war with a good approach but it’s devolved into a decidedly half-assed affair the last couple of weeks.

US Helo Crew Rescued By Drone!

An Apache helicopter crashed in the water off the coast of Oman and the military is telling us that the 2-man crew was rescued by an unmanned boat, a 24 ft Corsair.  That’s astounding!  An unmanned boat rescued downed aircrew who had been adrift for two hours.  Here’s the headline.[1]
 

In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat

 
The promise of unmanned is finally being fulfilled!
 
We have no details, only sensationalistic headlines but, presumably, the boat located the aircrew on its own, plotted a course, found the crew, lifted the crew into the boat, applied emergency first aid as needed, and returned the crew to safety.
 
Of course, unless the boat had capabilities I’ve never heard of, it didn’t locate the crew, lift the crew into the boat, or apply emergency first aid because unmanned boats can’t do any of that.  Don’t get me wrong.  Pulling up near the crew so that they could climb aboard, unaided, see to their own first aid (were there any emergency supplies on the boat?  I doubt it), and be transported out of the area is very helpful if no manned asset was available but to call this a rescue by an unmanned boat is akin to saying that a sling on a helicopter rescued a swimmer in the water.  The sling didn’t do anything.  It was just a tool.
 
My larger question is, given that we’re in a high intensity war in the area, shouldn’t we have manned assets blanketing the area, including dedicated search and rescue units?  For example, an SH-60 type helo traveling 170 mph could travel the length of the strait in a half hour or so, depending on the start and end point and could reach any specific point in less time than that, flying a straight line.  Was there no manned ship, boat, or helo anywhere in the strait?  To rescue downed aircrew, we pull out all the stops.  All the stops meant no manned assets?  We’re not talking about covering the entire Pacific Ocean.  The area around the strait is pretty small.  The Navy’s presence in the area seems abnormally sparse which may explain why we seem incapable of escorting ships through the strait.  Is this a war we’re serious about or not?  The Navy doesn’t seem all that serious about it and this is just one more example.
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat”, 9-Jun-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/us/drone-boat-rescue-us-pilots/2026/06/09/id/1259057/

What Could the LCS Do in the Middle East?

Currently, two of the three LCS supposedly based in the Middle East have been moved (evacuated?) to Singapore.[1]  The whereabouts of the third is unknown.  Why aren’t they in the Middle East, perhaps ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz?  Isn’t this kind of mission exactly what they were designed for?  As you recall, the original LCS concept was that they would boldly enter littoral (hence, the ship’s name) waters and neutralize mines, subs, surface, and land threats so that larger, more expensive ships could operate in the area with less risk.
 
So, why aren’t they there?  Well, we all know the answer.  The originally envisioned modules were just flights of fantasy and never materialized.  But, what if the original modules had become available as fully functioning equipment?  Would such LCSes be useful in the Middle East today?
 
Let’s briefly recall the intended functionality of the original modules.
 
MCM – The LCS was intended to stop well outside a minefield and use remote, unmanned assets to clear the area of mines.
 
ASuW - This was, perhaps, the key to the entire LCS concept.  The NLOS (not to be confused with the current Spike NLOS missile) system of loitering, smart, networked munitions would address all threats out to a range of 20+ miles.  By removing all visible threats, it would allow fellow LCSes to deal with mines and submarines.
 
ASW – The LCS was intended to basically stop and throw out an ASW barrier of remote vehicles that would track down and destroy enemy submarines while the LCS remained safely out of reach.
 
 
Thus, a mixed group of LCS would enter an area and the ASuW equipped vessels would eliminate all visible land and surface threats while ASW and MCM equipped vessels eliminated the subsurface threats.  Such a group in the strait, today, would eliminate all missile, rocket, artillery, and speed boat threats to shipping across the width of the strait and twenty miles inland.  UAVs would provide continuous surveillance with NLOS munitions on-call, moments away.  Hidden enemy launchers would be destroyed moments after they emerged from hiding.  The MCM-LCS would search for the rumored, but not yet confirmed, mines.
 
Highly effective, indeed!
 
Of course, the LCS modules were never realized (that’s why it’s called fantasy!) and the LCS proved useless as demonstrated by the Navy’s removal of the ships from the very mission they were designed for.  The concept was okay but it was dependent on non-existent technology coupled with unbelievably inept execution.
 
Since we don’t have fantasy modules but the conceptual need still exists, what do we have that could do the job?  Well, there’s always air power that could, for enormous cost and effort, provide the continuous surveillance and quick response strike that’s needed to deal with emergent threats.  We have Burkes with their single 5” gun that could provide persistent, on-call, fire support if some other asset can provide targeting.  We could land Army/Marines in various locations to search and destroy or provide counterbattery fire.using G/ATOR or similar systems.
 
We have the theoretical capability for ships to do counterbattery fire since the radars are fully capable, lacking only the software to do so.  Why hasn’t the Navy ever bothered to implement counterbattery capability?  Because it doesn’t put big, new, shiny hulls in the water which is how large budget slices are ensured.
 
 
The original LCS concept was valid and the need was legitimate but the actual design was based on non-existent technology and wishful thinking.  We didn’t need the LCS.  The need could have been met with existing assets by implementing counterbattery capability on Burkes, adding much more small UAV capability to ships, and incorporating air power and land forces.  The cost would have been minimal – free compared to what the LCS program has cost us.
 
That we didn’t take the approach of using existing assets simply highlights the Navy’s focus on budget over mission accomplishment.  The LCS gained the Navy large budget share as opposed to simple software modifications or buying some more small UAVs.
 
Until we stop viewing the Navy as a business organization trying to turn a profit (budget slice) and start viewing it as a tool for mission accomplishment, nothing will improve.
 
Where are the LCSes?  The past Navy CNOs need to be brought out of retirement and forced to take responsibility for their dereliction of duty.
 
 
 
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[1]The War Zone website, “U.S. Navy Minesweepers Stationed In Middle East Are Now In Singapore”, Joseph Trevithick, 18-Mar-2026,
https://www.twz.com/sea/u-s-navy-minesweepers-stationed-in-middle-east-are-now-in-singapore

This is Why You Don’t Depend on Allies

In my ongoing theme about the extremely questionable usefulness of training with, and depending on, allies, we get this:
 

President Donald Trump said Sunday that he has demanded about seven countries send warships to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, but his appeals have brought no commitments as oil prices soar during the Iran war.[1]

Any country that complains about increased oil prices has to explain why it won’t send military forces to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil.
 
Any commentator who criticizes the US military for not keeping the strait open and shipping moving has to explain why they aren’t also asking why the affected countries aren’t providing military forces to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil.
 
Each country has their own agenda but when those agendas frequently conflict with US interests, one has to wonder why we waste time, money, and resources training with countries that we can’t rely on.  Devoting resources to unreliable allies is illogical in the extreme..
 
The US is once again shouldering the burden of protecting the Middle East from terrorism, nuclear threats, and evil regimes with only Israel to aid us.  The rest of the world is content to stand off and reap the benefits without offering any support. 
 
Japan is bracing for potential gas shortages and increased prices.  Yeah?  Where are their military forces ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the strait?  Don’t complain if you’re not willing to do something about it.
 
This is entering into political commentary so I’ll leave it at that.
 
 
 
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[1]Navy Times website, “Trump asks ‘about 7′ countries for help to open the Strait of Hormuz”, Sam Metz, Will Weissert, Julia Frankel and Cara Anna, 16-Mar-2026,
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/03/16/trump-asks-about-7-countries-for-help-to-open-the-strait-of-hormuz/

Russian Naval Base in Syria

The Russians have long cultivated a relationship with Syria for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the access to a Mediterranean naval base. 

Before this week, Moscow in part projected power in Syria and beyond through two military installations: Hemeimeem air base near Latakia and Tartus naval base on the Mediterranean.[1]

With the overthrow of Assad, the Russians have been ejected (or elected to leave to avoid combat and losses) from Syria and the Tartus naval base. 

Open source intelligence photos indicate that Russian military ships have departed from Tartus naval base …[1] 

The loss of a Mediterranean naval base greatly complicates Russia’s attempts to exert influence in the region and cedes dominance in the region to the West.
 
Given that there is no coherent ruling government in Syria, at the moment, Russia faces difficult choices:
 

• Abandon the Syrian base
• Fight to conquer and hold the base
• Pull back and hope that they can work out a future diplomatic arrangement that would allow them to use the base again with whatever force eventually seizes power

 
None of the choices are particularly palatable or easy.
 
Similarly, the US faces choices although it does not need the base for its own use:
 

• Do nothing which could result in Russia regaining the base one way or another
• Hope to work out an eventual political arrangement that would deny Russia the use of the base
• Eliminate the base as a functional facility thereby denying it to Russia

 
The last option, eliminating the base, would require the US to destroy the facilities to deny them to Russia.  There is precedent for this.  Israel has already launched heavy attacks that have destroyed Syria’s naval assets, air force, and chemical weapons, among other targets so that those assets cannot be used against Israel in the future.
 
Since Syria no longer exists as a coherent country with a functioning, recognized government, attacks on potential threats are not a legal obstacle.  Right now, Syria is open, unclaimed territory controlled by various factions.  The US has the opportunity to act boldly, if it wishes.
 
Now, just for fun, let’s stir the pot a bit and rattle the timid …
 
An extremely bold move would be for the US to actually seize and occupy Syria, thereby obtaining a large foothold of sovereign US territory in the Middle East, surrounding Lebanon, hugely bolstering Israel and, potentially, securing actual stability in the region.  Of course, the drawbacks are many and far from insignificant.  Such an act would require a completely different approach to dealing with the various factions (an absolute smashing imposition of discipline and peace via military might), a zero tolerance policy towards terrorism, and a domineering approach to foreign relations with neighbors.  Before you go off the deep end attempting to rebut this, consider that the most stable regimes in the region have done exactly this.  Modified to exclude conquest of neighbors, this approach could work.  The US becomes the biggest warlord and rules by might – the way of the Middle East.
 
Anyway, back to the main premise of the post, crisis, unrest, and turbulence creates opportunity for the bold.  We have an opportunity to reduce Russian influence and, possibly, improve the Middle East.  Do we have the boldness to do it?
 
Once upon a time, we acquired our entire country through various bold acts. Do we still have the courage and boldness to seize the future?
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Russian bases and Hezbollah weapons: Key questions follow fall of Syrian regime”, Agnes Helou, 12-Dec-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/12/russian-bases-and-hezbollah-weapons-key-questions-follow-fall-of-syrian-regime/

PT Gunboat

As we have previously discussed, the gunboat version of the WWII PT boat was the most effective form of the PT Boat (“PTboat”) and, along with its surveillance (ISR) duties, were the most useful functions.  Interestingly, we have modern PT boat equivalents in the Mk VI and, in a larger form, the Cyclone class, although both are being eliminated from service.  There have been other small boats, as well, in recent decades.  The Navy, although it has toyed with small boats from time to time, has rejected all attempts at establishing a persistent small boat naval component within the fleet.
 
Pivoting our thinking away from the ship-sinking role for the PT-ish boat (we’ll use the term ‘PT boat’ in a generic sense for the rest of the article) and keeping in mind that the most effective use was as barge-busting gunboats and ISR, we could easily imagine a very useful PT boat component in the Navy, today.  For example, we could flood the Persian Gulf with PT boats to monitor and eliminate Iran’s maritime harassment, ship seizures, and ship mining.  Of course, that would require us to have the will to use force, as necessary, otherwise there would be no point.
 
 
Weapons
 
Consider the impressive density and types of weapons on PT gunboats.  As an example, listed below is the weapons fit on PT-596 later in the war:
 
PT 596

• 4x torpedo
• 1x M4 37 mm autocannon
• 2x Mk50 5” Rocket Launcher
• 2x Twin .50 cal MG
• 1x 20 mm single
• 1x 40 mm single

 
In addition, many PT boats added various types of weapons as desired and as availability allowed.  Such ad hoc weapons included the 37 mm anti-tank gun, depth charges, mounted bazooka, .30 cal MG, 40 mm dual, 20 mm dual, 81 mm mortar, and so forth.
 
All that weaponry was packed on an 80 ft boat!  We struggle, today, to mount one CIWS on a 500+ ft Burke.
 
Now, consider modern equivalent PT boat weapons on a small boat.  With such a boat, what kinds of missions could we effectively perform?
 
 
Missions
 
Here’s a partial list of missions that could be performed by a modern PT gunboat:
 

• Persian Gulf anti-Iranian maritime harassment
• Philippines anti-Chinese patrol
• Fishery anti-Chinese incursion patrol
• Africa and South America riverine patrol and raid
• Anti-terrorism

 
Note:  None of the above missions are major war missions.  The PT boat is simply not suited for major combat, today.  It would, however, offer benefits in the pseudo-peacetime role as long as we’re willing to use them forcefully, when necessary.
 
It’s also noteworthy that the missions we’ve discussed generally occur at a useful level, meaning at the source of problems rather than at the high end, geopolitical level where we wind up having Burkes standing by watching bad actors instead of taking action because we’re too afraid of escalation or international hurt feelings.
 
One argument against a modern PT boat is that they’re rendered ineffective by the whole ‘don’t fire until fired upon’ philosophy that so many people believe is some kind of ironclad, mandatory requirement that prevents us from using force.  This, however, is complete bilgewater.  There is nothing in the law or the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice) that prohibits US forces from firing first if they feel sufficiently threatened.  That a prohibition against firing first appears in some Rules of Engagement is a purely self-imposed constraint and, arguably, contradicts the military Code of Conduct.
 
For example, if an Iranian boat makes an attack run on a US vessel, we should assume it’s real and fire first.  We are not responsible for reading the enemy’s mind.  We cannot depend on past behavior to know for certain that the attack run is just a bluff.  Indeed, the local commander would be derelict for not taking action if it did turn out to be a real attack.  Most importantly, after a few Iranian boats are destroyed while attempting reckless harassment, they would stop harassing us, knowing that to do so is fatal.  Iran is responsible for the consequences of its own stupid acts.  It’s not our job to be responsible for their stupid behavior and to rescue them from the consequences of their own stupid behavior.
 
Additional benefits of a PT gunboat, authorized to take appropriate action, would be that it would provide low level command opportunities and would be a great way to begin identifying personnel with actual combat mindsets and promoting them into higher commands instead of the cowering crap we have for captains and admirals today.
 
What do you think?  Are there useful missions for a modern PT gunboat?
 
 
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Note:  For a fictional story describing the use of a PT gunboats, see, “MkVI –Gunboat Diplomacy Story”

Houthis and the Marines – Same Mission?

Reader ‘Robtze’ just thoroughly embarrassed me in a comment with an incredibly astute observation that I completely missed.  He observed/asked whether the Houthis were executing the same mission  the Marine Corps envisions with their island/coastal missile shooter concept.
 
To address his comment, yes, this is almost exactly the mission set.  Let’s take advantage of this remarkable similarity and examine how the coastal ‘missile sniping’ concept is working out.
 
Weapons.  One probable difference is the weapons.  While we have no definitive information on the missiles the Houthis are using, it’s likely that they’re smaller and shorter ranged than the missiles the Marines envision using.
 
Targeting.  From day one, this has been one of the unaddressed, major mysteries about the missile shooting concept.  The Marines have no ability to target beyond the horizon and, if they did, the size and scope of that effort would totally negate the ‘hidden’ and ‘small’ characteristics of the concept (using medium to large UAVs, for example).  We see that many of the Houthi missiles appear to be blind fired, being described by US spokesmen as having indeterminate targets. 
 
From this, we can infer that the targeting issue is a valid one that is not easily solved and will, indeed, be problematic for the Marines.
 
Logistics.  One difference is that the logistic (resupply) issue isn't present for the Houthis since this isn't an isolated island.  They can obtain supplies overland.  Of course, even in this case, the supply routes and methods present a vulnerability that could be targeted and disrupted by US forces.  It seems patently obvious that this logistic vulnerability will exist many times over for Marines on an isolated island in Chinese controlled waters.
 
One of the characteristics of the Houthi attacks is the scarcity of attacking weapons.  It would have been reasonable to expect that they would launch swarms of drones or saturation levels of missiles to try to increase the odds of getting a hit on a Navy warship.  That has not happened which leads one to wonder if their weapon inventories are significantly limited.  If so, this would, again, raise the logistic issue with resupply of missiles, despite being overland, being a weakness.  Again, this illustrates the difficulty (impossibility) of the Marines getting resupplies under their concept.
 
Survivability.  The US and UK have finally executed a counter-strike. 

The US and UK launched some 72 strikes against 60 targets in 16 locations.  The Pentagon described its targets as radar systems, drone storage and launch sites, missile storage and launch facilities and Houthi command and control nodes.[1]

This suggests that an isolated Houthi force, with no significant air defense or counter-air capability cannot prevent the enemy from locating and destroying them.  The Marines, of course, with no significant air defense or counter-air capability, believe that they’ll be able to operate undetected on tiny islands a miniscule fraction of the size of Yemen.  This incident would seem to suggest that the Marine concept is heavy on wishful thinking and light on reality.
 
Effectiveness.  The ultimate measure of the worth of anything is in the results.  The Houthis, due to targeting difficulties and, apparently, logistic (missile inventory) challenges, have been remarkably ineffective.  Some four dozen or more attacks have generated no sunk ships, no hits on a warship, and only minor damage to several ships.
 
The Marines, of course, can expect even less success.  Chinese ships merely have to remain beyond the 12 mile or so horizon and thus achieve total safety due to the lack of targeting.  In addition, there won’t be any Chinese merchant shipping in an active war zone so the Marines would be shooting at warships, not commercial vessels and the Houthi experience demonstrates that warships are, thus far, immune to damage from limited attacks by low end weapons and drones.
 
 
Conclusion
 
This Houthi scenario is offering us a rare opportunity to observe the Marine missile shooting concept in action.  The Marines were quick to jump on – and badly misinterpret – the Ukraine experience to justify their vision.  Will they be as quick to jump on this scenario which is a near perfect duplicate of their concept and is failing badly?  I suspect you know the answer.
 
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “A 'Morning After' Look At the Strike on Yemen and What It Is Likely to Mean”, streiff, 12-Jan-2024
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/01/12/a-morning-after-look-at-the-strike-on-yemen-and-what-it-is-likely-to-mean-n2168651

Again and Again

The current Israeli-Hamas conflict has perfectly illustrated one of ComNavOps’ themes:  a war with less than total victory is a war that will be repeated.  I covered this in detail in a previous post, “Ending War – True Victory”.  Read it.
 
For decades, Israel attempted to wage constrained, proportional, partial wars with Hamas and, as a result, kept having to refight the war, over and over, with the ultimate result that we see today.  Worse, each clash with Hamas, though technically victories for Israel, taught Hamas valuable lessons and allowed Hamas to come back stronger, wiser, more determined, and more experienced.  In other words, Israel kept strengthening their enemy through repeated conflicts that left their enemy intact and with lessons learned. 
 
Had Israel reacted initially, the way they are now, none of the subsequent endless conflict and deaths would have occurred.
 
The lesson is simple and obvious:  if you fight a war, fight it to win, totally and completely, so that you don’t have to fight it again.
 
It will be interesting to see whether Israel has finally learned the lesson and truly finishes this conflict or stops with some sort of partial victory (as the US did in Desert Storm) thereby guaranteeing that the war will be fought again and yet more people will die.
 
Also, if Israel doesn’t finish off Hezbollah when they’re done with Hamas, they’ll have to face yet another war in the future after more years of conflict and deaths.  Again, this is not a judgment on the politics of the situation, just a recognition of the military realities.
 
This conflict and the lesson from it should serve to influence and guide US geopolitical and military strategies. 
 
 
 
Note:  This is, emphatically, not a pronouncement about the politics of the situation.  It is purely about the military aspect of total versus partial victories and what the negative implication of partial victory is.  I will not tolerate any political comments, whatsoever.  We’re not going to debate who’s right or wrong.  Fair warning.

Lead Before You Ask Others To Follow

As you undoubtedly know, Iran has been increasing its attacks on international shipping in the Persian Gulf.  These attacks can be categorized in one of two ways: 

1. Acts of war against the victim’s home (flagged) country
2. Acts of piracy

In either case, the appropriate response, as allowed by international law and treaty, is, at a minimum, destruction of the attacking force.
 
Rather than taking legal, allowable, forceful action, the US Navy has stood by and watched, doing nothing.  An article by two retired Navy admirals, and others, calls for other countries to “accept greater responsibility”, whatever that useless phrase means, as the way to address Iran’s increasing lawlessness. 

In order to convince Tehran to stop its illegal activities in some of the world’s most important sea lanes, determined American leadership is necessary to convince our partners to accept greater responsibility for protecting freedom of navigation.[1]

So, rather than take forceful action, the authors would have the Navy beg other countries to do something.  What that something might be is left unarticulated. 

… the epicenter of US-led naval cooperation in the Middle East, Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), recognizes the need to more effectively encourage and integrate regionwide cooperation, including by leading the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). This 38-nation partnership includes five task forces addressing freedom of navigation, counterpiracy, counternarcotics, and, most recently, training for partner navies. However, amid this most recent bout of unchecked reprisals from Tehran, the United Arab Emirates suspended its voluntary contribution of maritime assets to CMF task forces.[1] 

The problem with begging other countries for help is that it sends the clear message that we, far and away the most powerful force in the region, are unable/unwilling to do anything.  The result of that is that other countries will wonder why they should contribute resources when the US isn’t willing to take any forceful, productive action.  As the authors note, 

Despite these admirable efforts, they are apparently insufficient to convince our partners that the United States is fully committed to countering Iranian aggression and, thus, will also be inadequate to deter or deny further Iranian aggression.[1] 

We’re attempting to substitute group hugs, meetings, and wishful thinking for forceful, effective action.  This is why no amount of forward presence can accomplish anything.  We could have ten carriers in the Persian Gulf and it wouldn’t deter Iran in the slightest since we clearly won’t take any action.  Iran is seizing ships and shooting at others and we merely watch.
 
Rather than calling for other countries to “accept greater responsibility”, perhaps we should try leading.  If we would exert some force then other countries might be more willing to contribute resources.
 
If we want others to follow us, we have to actually lead and that means taking forceful, effective action.  No one is going to follow a trembling coward.
 
This mindset, as evidenced by these two admirals, demonstrates the lack of courage endemic throughout the Navy today.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “To counter Iran at sea, US must sell partners on doing more”,Donegan, Miller, Ruhe and Cicurel, 12-Jul-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/07/to-counter-iran-at-sea-us-must-sell-partners-on-doing-more/