Large, Slow, And Non-Stealthy Is No Way To Go Through Life

There are many naval observers who espouse the idea of balloons of some type (aerostats, for example) as a means of providing long range surveillance.  ComNavOps has scoffed at those ideas as being devoid of realistic usefulness and, worse, a detriment to surrounding forces due to being easily detected.  Well, here’s further evidence of the impracticality of such aerostats.  Israel, who famously implemented the Sky Dew aerostat system amid much fanfare and proclamations of miraculous capabilities, is now leaning towards abandoning the entire concept due to unaffordable repair costs, questionable usefulness, and demonstrated vulnerabilities following a Hezbollah suicide drone strike that hit the balloon and rendered it inoperable (see, “You Had One Job”).
 

Israeli defense officials are reevaluating the future of the military’s Sky Dew project, a high-altitude balloon system designed for aerial threat detection, following a series of setbacks including weather damage and an attack by the Hezbollah terror group.[1]
 
In light of these repeated setbacks, defense officials are now seriously considering terminating the project. The vulnerability of the system, its high costs, and the excessive time required for repairs have all factored into this revaluation of a program that has already consumed millions in defense spending.[1]

It’s not just enemy actions that threaten the aerostat;  weather is also a threat.
 

… severe weather had rendered the system inoperable months earlier.  After a protracted repair process, the balloon was redeployed in January [2024] … [1]

Setting aside the actual performance failure of Sky Dew in failing to detect a drone which was its exact intended function, the aerostat has been found to be vulnerable to weather and highly susceptible to enemy attack.  Is this surprising?  No!  Any large, slow (non-mobile, in this case), non-stealthy object is easily detected and simply waiting for the enemy to get around to it on their ‘items to destroy at leisure’ checklist.
 
So, what does this mean for us?
 
This is yet another example demonstrating that large, slow, and non-stealthy aircraft such as AWACS, E-2 Hawkeye, P-8 Poseidon, all large non-stealthy UAVs (Predator, Global Hawk, Reaper and the like), etc. are simply not survivable on the modern battlefield.  It doesn’t matter whether it’s a balloon tethered to a ship or a P-8 Poseidon lumbering around looking for things, large, slow, and non-stealthy is simply not viable.
 
 
 
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[1]JNS website, “Israel weighs shutting down multi-million-dollar ‘Sky Dew’ project”, Lilach Shoval, 29-Aug-2024,
https://www.jns.org/israel-weighs-shutting-down-multi-million-dollar-sky-dew-project/

Satellite Imagery Dispersal

There is a significant faction of military/naval observers who have the mistaken belief that satellites can see every vessel sailing on the ocean and that the satellites have some sort of direct link to the firing controls on ships and aircraft thus rendering every ship a kill waiting to happen.  This is nonsense, as ComNavOps has repeatedly pointed out.  The resolution of satellite imagery precludes that kind of omnipotent detection and tracking.  If you have sufficient resolution then you give up breadth of field.  If you have breadth of field then you give up resolution.
 
All this is compounded by the fact that satellite imagery is in high demand and the raw image must be processed and analyzed.  After that, it has to be dispersed to the hundreds of offices wanting access to it.  In the case of fire control, you have to add in layers of command (bureaucracy) before any useful detection/tracking imagery can reach a ship or aircraft where it can be put to actual firing use. 
 
The entire process takes hours or days.  We simply don’t have the kind of instantaneous, raw image-to-the-missile-launch-button that so many imagine.
 
Many of you still doubt that reality.  Well, here’s more proof. 
 

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is working with US Combatant Commands (COCOMS) to operationally test an early version of its Joint Regional Edge Node (J-REN) system designed to speed satellite-based intelligence to the battlefield, according to NGA officials.
 
NGA began development of J-REN — a modernization of NGA’s current information technology “pipe” to more rapidly fulfil commanders’ requests for urgent access to remote sensing imagery and analysis — just last year.[1]

The lack of timeliness of satellite imagery has been a known and on-going issue for many years and even recent advances have been insufficient.
 

The ever-increasing calls from COCOMS for more timely imagery and analysis from remote sensing satellites has been the subject of a tug-of-war between NGA and the Space Force — an issue the two agencies have been struggling to work out for more than a year.
 
The concept is to avoid clogging up limited communications bandwidth with overly-dense data packages, while still ensuring that military operators have good enough information to work with …[1]

There you have it.  If satellites were the omnipotent, all-seeing miracles with direct links to firing controls, this entire effort wouldn’t even be happening, would it?  The blindingly obvious conclusion is that the image-to-fire-control process is a slow one, as ComNavOps has repeatedly stated.
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “NGA field testing new processor to speed imagery to US regional commands”, Theresa Hitchens, 18-Apr-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/nga-field-testing-new-processor-to-speed-imagery-to-us-regional-commands/

Satellite Surveillance Reality

People keep wanting to believe that satellites can track every ship on the ocean in real time, with the data being tied directly to the launch buttons of anti-ship weapons.  I keep refuting this idea but it persists.  Here’s some relevant information on the subject from our space force. 

By the early 2030s, the Space Force hopes to have satellites equipped with sensors to target aircraft in the hands of operators, according to the service’s second in command, Gen. Michael Guetlein.
 
Satellites equipped with Air Moving Target Indicators (AMTI), which would send precise tracking data to “shooters” on the ground, at sea and in the air, would be a new capability — joining the Space Force’s joint program with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to develop Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) satellites that track vehicles and ships.
 
“I would say you’re looking at probably early ’30s for some of that capability to start coming online, both for GMTI and for AMTI,” Guetlein told the annual Defense News conference today.[1][emphasis added]

 
These statements demonstrate that satellite tracking is something that does not yet exist but is being worked on and someone hopes to have it working in several years (which, of course, will stretch out to a decade or two, at best).
 
The next quote demonstrates that data is not directly linked to anti-ship launch buttons: 

Space Force since 2021 has been pushing their case to fill part of the gap in ground tracking/targeting left by the Air Force’s retirement of the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft. That campaign has run up against roles and missions related challenges — some of which have yet to be fully resolved — from both the NRO and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). The NRO owns and operates the nation’s spy satellites, while the NGA is responsible for disseminating space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) imagery and analysis to users across the US government.[1][emphasis added]

Difficulties abound: 

… the closer I can come to the target, the more resolution I get on the target. As I move to space, it becomes harder and harder to get that same level of resolution on a target … [1]
 
… one of the key challenges for tracking enemy aircraft from space is that airplanes and drones move much faster than tanks, trucks and ships. This is compounded by the fact that to be best able to take high-quality pictures or establish radar images of objects on the ground or in the air, satellites would have to be stationed in low Earth orbit where they themselves move around the Earth at about 7.8 kilometers per second (4.8 miles per second) … [1]

 

I see a ship.  Fire!

We see, then, that the common belief in omniscient satellites, tied directly into fire control circuits is pure fantasy.  The Space Farce wants to make that a thing but the military constantly wants things that never happen (how’s that rail gun and laser coming?).  We’re looking at a decade or more for even the rudiments of this king of capability to happen and that’s probably being ridiculously optimistic.
 
Once and for all, let’s give up the fantasy of the all-seeing eye-in-the-sky providing real time weapons launch control.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Space Force vice wants sats to track aircraft by early 2030s”, Theresa Hitchens, 4-Sep-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/09/space-force-vice-wants-sats-to-track-aircraft-by-early-2030s/

Stealth UAVs

ComNavOps has long stated that conventional UAVs are useless in high end combat against a peer enemy because they’re not stealthy which means they’re not survivable.  Worse, being non-stealthy, their operation will lead directly back to the controlling unit’s location.
 
The lack of stealth means that they can’t be used for naval recon and targeting because they’ll be spotted and destroyed long before they can find the enemy.  Some have claimed that, being UAVs, they can fly at wave top height to avoid detection.  This is true but it also means they can’t see anything.  If you want a useful field of view (range), you have to operate at some significant altitude.  If a non-stealthy UAV is at a significant altitude, it will be spotted and destroyed before it can accomplish anything.
 
All of this changes, however, if the UAV is stealthy.  Stealth, in this context, refers not just to reduced radar signature but also to reduced infrared and visible signatures. 
 
Let’s briefly consider the known stealthy UAVs in the US inventory.  I’m only aware of two: 
 

• RQ-170 Sentinel
• RQ-180 ?White Bat?

 
Let’s look at a few of their specifications in the following table.

^a The RQ-180 specs are speculative with estimates putting the size in the RQ-4 Global Hawk category so specifications have been adapted from that.  Photos have fairly accurately determined the wingspan and length.

 

RQ-170 Sentinel

 

Both the RQ-170 and RQ-180 have the now common stealthy ‘bat’ shape of the B-2 bomber.
 
The key specification is the size.  The RQ-180 is huge!  Even the RQ-170, while smaller, is far too big to operate off surface ships.
 
The existence of the stealth UAVs likely explains the Air Force’s loss of interest in the more conventional UAVs such as Predator, Global Hawk, etc. as the Air Force has publicly stated that such UAVs are not survivable over the battlefield.
 
Let’s turn our attention to naval UAVs.  The Navy seems to be counting on the P-8 Poseidon and MQ-4 Triton for maritime surveillance, distributed lethality (is that still a thing?) targeting, and anti-surface targeting which seems unwise in the extreme.  As the Air Force has noted, large, non-stealthy aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, are not survivable.
 
ComNavOps has called for large numbers of small UAVs for the surface group surveillance and targeting mission.  The caveat is that these UAVs must be stealthy in order to survive long enough to accomplish their mission.  Losing them is not a concern but they must survive long enough to find targets and transmit their findings back to the host ship.
 
The naval UAV mission calls for a stealthy UAV with the following characteristics:
 
Cheap – The mission is high risk and calls for the use of many UAVs to establish and maintain situational awareness and target detection.  Affordability is a mandatory requirement.
 
Small – These UAVs will operate off various surface ships so they must be small enough to be operational in limited deck space and be stored in large numbers.  The size goal is something on the order of RQ-21 Blackjack (8 ft long x 16 ft wingspan)  or Scan Eagle (5 ft long x 10 ft wingspan) which can be launched with mini-catapults.
 
Range – A useful scouting range is a minimum of 200 miles on out to 500 miles.
 

Conceptual UAV Size for Surface Group Surveillance

Discussion
 
As we’ve discussed in the past, the vast majority of the sensing capability would be passive (EO, IR, SigInt) in keeping with the stealth and survivability requirements.
 
A small, stealthy UAV would give surface ships the ability to establish situational awareness and conduct surveillance without automatically giving away their own presence.
 
Consider what small, stealthy UAVS can do.
 

• They can extend the situational awareness out to 200+ miles.
• They can act as early warning detectors of attacking aircraft and missiles.
• They can act as fire control spotters for naval guns and missiles.
• They can provide targeting for anti-ship missiles.

 
And, they can do this survivably with a reasonable chance of not being detected.  Isn’t that exactly what we want in a naval surveillance asset?
 
The concept of operations (CONOPS) would be to continually operate a dozen or more (work out the effective number in exercises) UAVs in all directions while concentrating on the expected threat axis.  As needed, a UAV could be sent on a one-way mission which would double its range.
 
The major challenge in this concept is communications and I simply don’t know enough to offer a solution.  Satellite communications are an option if we have sufficient surviving satellites.  High altitude communications relay aircraft using line-of-sight is another option.  As I said, I just don’t know.  Communications experts would have to work that out.
 
Larger UAVs, on the order of the RQ-170, can be operated from dedicated UAV carriers and thought should be given to routinely integrating a UAV carrier with every surface group.

Ripped from the Headlines

I just read a single headline that blindingly exposed the idiocy of the US (and the West, in general) military’s fascination and obsession with information, networks, and artificial intelligence as the basis for future warfighting capability.  From a Newsmax article, this headline perfectly sums up the situation [1],
 

Hamas Attack Shows Limits of AI, Tech for Global Security

 
 
Despite the cumulative monitoring by the entire Western world and, specifically, the intensely focused monitoring by Israel, Hamas managed to utterly surprise Israel with a massive attack that included parasails, thousands of rockets, hundreds of vehicles, boats, etc.  Despite one of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated sensor systems of radar, optics, ground vibration sensors, observation towers, and human intelligence backed by the West’s satellite and signals intelligence, the Israelis and the West completely missed the preparations involved in a massive assault by Hamas.  All of that high tech, state of the art (state of the universe?) surveillance focused on one tiny strip of land and we completely missed the months/years long assault preparations
 
  …  and the US wants to base its entire future military capability on that demonstrably ineffective technology. 
 
Despite all evidence to the contrary, the US military has placed its bet for future warfare on the pursuit of perfect situational awareness.  Armor has been ignored.  Firepower has been relegated to an afterthought.  Logistics is a distant tertiary concern, if even that.  Our entire concept of future warfare is based on perfect sensing:  large, all-encompassing, regional sensor networks that see everything.  Of course, no one has yet explained how, even if this could be achieved, that would destroy the enemy.  Destruction requires overwhelming amounts of firepower and we have no interest in firepower.  But, I digress.
 
So, despite the fact that some of the most concentrated and intense surveillance and data collection the world has ever seen was focused on a tiny strip of land and failed, utterly, we’re betting we can flawlessly monitor all of China, the entire East/South China Seas, and all of the surrounding areas, thereby assuring our victory over a hapless and helpless China?  That’s some world class fantasy, there.
 
Just to remind ourselves that the Hamas assault was not some sort of one-off, fluke occurrence, let’s examine some other well known, real world examples of the failure of perfect situational awareness.
 
Afghanistan Drone Strike – During the US’ Afghanistan evacuation, the US executed a drone strike on terrorist leaders in a vehicle based on perfect observations from a UAV.  The only problem was that the target was actually an innocent family.
 
USS Mason – Despite their own Aegis radar system, scores of regional surveillance assets, nearby ship sensors, overhead satellites, and extensive signals intelligence, the USS Mason falsely detected three separate missile attacks and launched defensive missiles.
 
Malaysia Flight 370 – A Malaysian Boeing 777 vanished from one of the world’s most heavily travelled and monitored regions despite multiple radars, IFF, an established flight plan, regular communications, and satellite surveillance.
 
Vincennes – Despite their own Aegis radar system, scores of regional surveillance assets, nearby ship sensors, overhead satellites, and extensive signals intelligence, the USS Vincennes mistakenly shot down a commercial airliner.
 
Riverine Boat Seizure – Despite GPS navigation, regional fleet surveillance assets, and unhindered communications, two riverine boats obliviously got lost and wandered into Iranian territorial waters where they were promptly seized.
 
Port Royal Grounding – Despite GPS navigation, regional fleet surveillance assets, established charts, automated navigation software, and visible landmarks, the USS Port Royal got lost and grounded.
 
McCain and Fitzgerald Collisions – Despite Aegis radar, navigation radars, EO/IR sensors, regional surveillance assets, and IFF systems on both the Navy and commercial ships, the destroyers managed to run into giant, hulking commercial ships in known, well defined, shipping lanes. 
 
Helo Shootdown – In 1994, two F-15C aircraft misidentified and shot down two US Blackhawk helicopters enforcing a no-fly zone over Iraq.  This occurred despite the sophisticated radars and sensors on the F-15s as well as concentrations of regional sensors aimed at the no-fly zone. 
 
 
I can continue with example after example but these should suffice to make the point.  In each case, there was overwhelming surveillance technology and situational awareness assets and yet they failed spectacularly.
 
Making the failures worse is that none occurred in the face of cyber or electronic opposition as would be the case in a war.  Whatever degree of surveillance success we enjoy now (none?) will be greatly reduced in a real war when the enemy applies cyber, electronic, and kinetic attacks against our surveillance and network systems.
 
The only possible conclusion is that surveillance technology is highly unreliable and ineffective.
 
On a closely related note, we’ve talked at length about the dependency and vulnerability that inevitably develops when technology replaces human skill.  Discussing the Hamas assault, a senior Israeli reserve officer clearly pointed out the problem with technology and dependency:
 

“We were living in an imaginary reality for years,” …“We became over-reliant on the sophisticated underground barrier, on technology.[2]

That’s exactly what happens when technology replaces human skill – we become blind, unaware, and dependent and, like any addict, we lose the ability to function and reason.
 
 
 
Of all the things we could possibly base our future military capability on, information, data collection, and networks is the least effective or desirable. 
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Hamas Attack Shows Limits of AI, Tech for Global Security”, Marisa Herman, 19-Oct-2023,
https://www.newsmax.com/platinum/hamas-attack-israel/2023/10/19/id/1138867/
 
[2]https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/09/how-did-hamas-manage-to-carry-out-its-rampage-through-southern-israel

Goodbye Triton?

As you may recall, the MQ-4C Triton UAV was going to solve all the Navy’s surveillance monitoring requirements.
 
The Triton is a large, high altitude, long endurance (30 hrs) UAV derived from the Global Hawk.  It was intended to team with the P-8 Poseidon under the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) concept.  Triton would conduct high altitude surveillance and the P-8 would focus on anti-submarine and anti-surface surveillance.
 

MQ-4C Triton

The first demonstration aircraft flew in 2013 and, ten years later, Initial Operating Capability was just announced.  Plans called for 70 aircraft to be produced.  Groups of 4 aircraft were planned to operate from 5 sites, keeping 20 aircraft in active operations at any one time. 

 
A USNI News article notes the wonders of Triton,
 

… Triton is poised to bring significant improvements that will increase its effectiveness in the battlespace, enabling our manned-unmanned team to maintain awareness in the maritime domain,” Rear Adm. Adam Kijek, the commander of the Navy’s patrol and reconnaissance group, said in the service news release. “The Indo-Pacific theater is the ideal arena to demonstrate the advanced capabilities that Triton brings to our Fleet Commanders and the nation.”[1]

This would certainly sound like amazing news if it weren’t for the fact that the Navy, having just declared IOC, is halting production and severely cutting the Triton inventory.
 

The IOC benchmark comes as the Navy looks to halt the MQ-4C line. The Fiscal Year 2024 budget proposal sought to buy the final two MQ-4Cs in the next fiscal year, drastically cutting the program of record from an original 70 airframes to 27, according to service budget documents.
 
“The MQ-4C Triton inventory requirement has been re-assessed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which has modified MQ-4C Triton’s Capability Development Document (CDD) to reduce total inventory requirement,” the budget books read.
 
“The total number of aircraft are attributed to the program as 22 production, and 5 development … ” [1]

So, the Triton inventory is being cut from 70 to 22 production airframes.  In addition, the number of operating sites has been reduced from 5 to 3.
 
Why?
 
No explanation has been given.  My speculation is that the Navy has concluded, as has the Air Force, that large, slow UAVs are not survivable in the modern aerial battlefield – something they should have realized before development even began!
 
Does this sound eerily reminiscent of the LCS which the Navy is retiring almost as fast as they’re being produced?  Or, perhaps it reminds you of the Zumwalt which went from being the absolutely vital, future of naval warfare to being deemed entirely unneeded by the Navy in a matter of months?  Or, maybe it sounds like the brand new Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP) which the Navy attempted to retire, was thwarted by Congress, and was, instead, placed in Reduced Operating Status (retired in all but name)?
 
This is what happens when you produce assets without any Concept of Operations (CONOPS) – you quickly realize that they have no use and then you’re forced to dump them. 
 
Humiliating.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “MQ-4C Triton Reaches Initial Operational Capability, UAV on 2nd Guam Deployment”, Mallory Shelbourne, 14-Sep-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/09/14/mq-4c-triton-reaches-initial-operational-capability-uav-on-2nd-guam-deployment

Balloon Story Grows

Well, this story just gets better and better.  If – and I stress the ‘if’ part – we can believe

General Glen D. VanHerck (Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the Chinese have floated balloons over the US multiple times … that we know of.

 

A senior U.S. general responsible for bringing down a Chinese spy balloon said on Monday the military had not detected previous spy balloons before the one that appeared on Jan. 28 over the United States and called it an "awareness gap."

 

The Pentagon said over the weekend that Chinese spy balloons had briefly flown over the United States at least three times during President Donald Trump's administration and one previously under President Joe Biden.

 

Air Force General Glen VanHerck, head of U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command and Northern Command, said the balloon was 200 feet tall and the payload under it weighed a couple thousand pounds.

 

"I will tell you that we did not detect those threats, and that's a domain awareness gap," VanHerck said.[1]

 

We are basing our entire military future and national security/existence on total battlefield awareness, data, surveillance, and networking and yet a simple balloon has eluded our detection at least four times … that we know of.  How many other times did it occur that we never became aware of?

 

Our very best surveillance equipment, networks, and software couldn’t see a balloon.

 

These were not tiny little children’s birthday party balloons.  As Gen. VanHerck stated, the balloons were 200 ft tall with slung payloads of a couple thousand pounds.  How do you not detect that?  How many people on this site have claimed that our various radar systems can spot aircraft and ships hundreds of miles away … and yet we can’t see a giant balloon?  Heck, we claim to be able to spot tiny submarine periscopes in the middle of the ocean with our all-knowing, all-seeing radar … but we can’t see a giant balloon.

 

How many people on this site have claimed that carriers are a thing of the past, just waiting to be sunk, because satellites will be able to track carrier groups anywhere in the ocean … and yet none of our satellites could see a giant balloon slowly drifting towards and across America for days on end?

 

Do you people who believe in the omniscience of our radars and detection systems see the ignorance of your claims?

 

 

Consider these previous examples of our vaunted systems being unable to see what’s in front of them:

 

Yemen Missile Attacks – Recall that the Navy claimed that the Burke class destroyer, USS Mason, was attacked multiple times by anti-ship missiles from Yemen.  In reality, despite all the sensors in the region, satellite surveillance, Aegis radar, etc., the Navy was unable to even decide whether an attack had occurred despite the ship launching several defensive missiles (see, “Yemen Missile Attacks").

 

Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 – This commercial aircraft disappeared without a trace in the middles of one of the most heavily monitored regions of the world.  Searchers had no clue where to even begin looking.

 

Balloons – Apparently, there were four previous balloons that entered US airspace undetected.

 

Destroyer Collisions – As you know, two Burke class destroyers collided with giant merchant ships during simple sailing.

 

 

If these examples of large objects, none of which were making any attempt to evade, couldn’t be detected, why are assuming we can detect enemy forces that are stealthy and making every effort to hide?  Our entire foundation of future warfare is invalid.

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

[1]Newsmax website, “General: US Failed to Detect Past Chinese Spy Balloons”, 6-Feb-2023,

https://www.newsmax.com/us/china-spy-balloon/2023/02/06/id/1107478/

Pointless Drones

The Navy is experimenting with small, unmanned boats in the Middle East.  VAdm. Brad Cooper, commander 5^th Fleet, talked about small motorboats and a small sailboat operating out of Bahrain and Jordan,

 

“The drones that we have operating at Aqaba, [Jordan,] have been at sea for 33 straight days,” he said. “They’re really redefining what persistence means in the maritime environment.” [1]

 

So what?  Persistence without action is pointless.  We already have all the persistence we need.  Remember the video of Iranians attaching mines to a cargo ship?  We had persistence but we refused to couple it to action.  We don’t need any more persistence.  We have thirty or more significant bases in the Middle East and dozens more smaller or undisclosed bases.  US Central Command reports 60,000 – 70,000 troops in the region.  On any given day, the Navy operates dozens of ships ranging from patrol boats to carrier groups.  The Air Force operates hundreds of aircraft in the region.  UAVs crowd the skies.  How much more persistence do we need?

 

Persistence?  We fart persistence!

 

Action?  Uh … … …  not so much.

 

When you do couple action with persistence you get positive results.  Do you recall the Iraqi soldiers trying to surrender to a battleship’s UAV in Desert Storm?  That’s because the UAVs presence (persistence) was directly coupled to a battleship bombardment.  The Iraqis knew this and the mere presence (persistence) of the UAV was then sufficient to instill fear and induce surrender.

 

• Persistence without action is pointless.
• Persistence with action produces results.

 

We’ve opted for the former instead of the latter, to our great detriment.

 

23 ft Saildrone Explorer

Mantas Tx Family

 

This small unmanned boat experiment is further evidence of putting the unmanned cart before the horse.  Instead of developing specific military needs (CONOPS) and then acquiring or developing the equipment (possibly unmanned or possibly not) to meet those needs, we’re developing technology for its own sake and then trying to shoehorn it into some operational fit.  Thus far, that approach has been a stunning failure (for example, see, “AFSB – Looking For Something To Do”).

 

We have got to stop trying to use technology as a substitute for strategy.

 

We have got to break this cycle of technology first and then operational requirements.  The proper cycle is requirements (CONOPS) first and then equipment.

 

Moving on …

 

So what can a small unmanned boat do for us?  We can mount a camera or some other small, short range sensor on it but what does that gain us?  We can already see everything that’s going on in the Middle East.  How will some additional small boats help?  Even if we were so inclined, they’re incapable of any action.  I’m missing the operational requirement for small, unmanned boats that carry a camera and don’t do anything.

 

On the negative side, I can see the potential for lots of trouble.  Iran didn’t hesitate to seize two fully armed, manned Navy combat boats so how long do you think it will be until they seize a small, unmanned boat?  Iran hasn’t hesitated to seize US UAVs so how long do you think it will be until they seize a small, unmanned boat?  Iran hasn’t hesitated to blow up cargo ships while we watch so how long do you think it will be until they take target practice at one of these unmanned boats just for fun and propaganda purposes … while we watch?

 

We have jumped right over CONOPS and landed on unmanned.  Why?  No one knows since there is no validating exercise.  Actually, we do know why – it’s technology for the sake of technology;  it’s change for the sake of change so that some admiral can claim to have done something.

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

[1]Breaking Defense, “US 5th Fleet commander: ‘Dramatic uptick’ in Iran’s drone use ”, Valerie Insinna, 14-Jan-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/01/us-5th-fleet-commander-dramatic-uptick-in-irans-drone-use/

Special Forces in a Conventional War

Desert Storm provided an interesting perspective on the use of special forces in a conventional war.  General Schwarzkopf was dead set against the use of special forces and had no plans to use them until forced by the President to do so.

 

Army Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the four-star commander of US Central Command and the war's military leader, viewed unconventional-warfare units with skepticism.

 

Initially, Schwarzkopf was adamantly against special-operations units having any significant role in the conflict — though he did accept some Delta Force operators as personal bodyguards.

 

…  after some persuasion from the White House and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Schwarzkopf relaxed his no-commandos policy. (1)

 

The problem with special forces in conventional wars is that, by definition, they can’t provide any significant firepower effects due both to their small unit size and their lack of heavy weaponry.  The best case scenario is a minor, occasional, nuisance effect and that’s not a war-winning impact.  Balanced against that minor impact is the significant cost required to man, train, and logistically support an entire military branch.  In addition, special forces seem to constantly require emergency extraction which takes away from the activities of other forces.

 

I recognize that this is not going to be a popular post for many people but, objectively, it is what it is.

 

Now, let’s consider some of the historical successes by special forces in conventional wars:

 

WWII Coastwatchers – This consisted of individuals who were inserted into enemy territory to report on enemy ship movements.

 

Vietnam Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP, “Lurp”) – These small units inserted into enemy territory to provide deep reconnaissance.

 

French and Indian War (1754-1763) Rogers Rangers – This force was initially formed to provide scouting and reconnaissance but grew and morphed into light infantry.

 

Decima Flottiglia MAS – This Italian group of ‘frogmen’ conducted many ‘human torpedo’ attacks with a couple of partial successes such as temporarily disabling the British HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant.  Overall, the effect was negligible and many/most forces were killed or captured.

 

 

 

The preceding examples demonstrate that there are a couple of characteristics of successful historical special forces:

 

Small Size – The forces have been small, ranging from individuals to small units.  Contrast that to today’s special force organizations which have ballooned in size and have become bloated, self-propagating entities.

 

Reconnaissance – The focus of successful historical special forces has been reconnaissance as opposed to firepower effects.  The question is whether the enhanced reconnaissance is worth the maintenance of entire organizations?  Could the information thus obtained have been obtained using other, possibly better, methods?

 

 

Unfortunately, the historical characteristics of successful special forces seem to be at odds – indeed, almost direct opposites – with today’s special forces which are large and ever-growing and have moved far beyond (left behind?) traditional reconnaissance roles and into light infantry roles.

 

How does all this tie into the Navy?

 

The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) comprises approximately 10,000 personnel, including active duty and reserve component Special Warfare Operators, known as SEALs; Special Warfare Boat Operators, known as Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC); reserve personnel; support personnel, referred to as Enablers; and civilians. NSWC headquarters is located at Coronado, CA, and is composed of eight active duty SEAL Teams, two reserve component SEAL Teams, two SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams, three Special Boat Teams, and two Special Reconnaissance Teams. Because SEALs are considered experts in special reconnaissance and direct action missions—primary counterterrorism skills—NSWC is viewed as well-postured to fight a globally dispersed enemy ashore or afloat. NSWC forces can operate in small groups and have the ability to quickly deploy from Navy ships, submarines and aircraft, overseas bases, and forward-based units. (2)

 

That’s 10,000 people, untold quantities of equipment, and vast sums of money all to support a force that will have little use in a conventional peer war.  That’s a lot of resources that could be better used by the regular Navy.  None of this is to suggest that Navy special forces be totally eliminated – just that they be vastly scaled back.  Navy SEALs, for example, should stop deploying as a ground infantry force and get back to operations in the water.  For an in-depth discussion of SEAL forces and the kind of missions they should be performing see, “SEALs”.

 

 

Conclusion

 

The US’ special forces have grown out of the last few decades of continual small wars and anti-terrorism activities.  Given that impetus and the inexorable tendency of any organization to attempt to grow itself (the bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy), the special forces have expanded beyond all reason and need.

 

As stated about Navy SEALs , this is not to suggest that all special forces be eliminated but they should be vastly scaled back.  Conventional forces are more than sufficient for most of the missions we’re currently using special forces for.  We also need to reorient our military away from minor conflicts and back to peer war.

 

Future peer wars are going to be massive, fast, and deadly with armor and artillery being emphasized (as the US will quickly discover, to its regret).  This is not an environment where special forces will be particularly useful unless they re-embrace their roots of small size and reconnaissance.

 

 

 

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(1)Insider website, “How US special-operations forces helped the US military win its first post-Cold War victory”, Stavros Atlamazoglou, 23-Feb-2021,

https://www.businessinsider.com/how-us-special-operations-forces-helped-win-the-gulf-war-2021-2

 

(2)https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf

Passive Hawkeye

Without a doubt, the most important aircraft in the carrier air wing is the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and battle management aircraft, the E-2 Hawkeye.  The problem with the Hawkeye is that it is mostly an active sensor and reveals its position when it operates.  Yes, the aircraft flies offset from the carrier group because of that but it still tells the enemy that there’s a carrier in the area and where to begin looking for it. 

 

We’ve also noted that in future combat the E-2 will be forced to operate much farther back than desired due to the threat of very long range air-to-air missiles (see, “Goodbye Poseidon and Hawkeye”).  The Chinese VLRAAM reportedly has a range of 300 miles and a speed of Mach 6.  Hawkeyes are not survivable against such a threat.

 

What is needed is a stealthy, passive version of the Hawkeye.  A passive version of the Hawkeye would use:

 

• IR/IRST (Infrared/Infrared Search and Track)
• EO (Electro Optical)
• SigInt (Signals Intelligence)
• TCS (Tactical Camera System)

 

Being passive, there would be no aircraft sensor emissions for the enemy to locate and track.  In addition, if the airframe were stealthy the aircraft could operate much closer to the enemy thereby compensating for the reduced sensor range, resolution, and field of view compared to active radar.

 

A partial – and successful ! - model of such an aircraft is the old electronic version of the S-3 Viking, the ES-3A Shadow, which used signals analysis to provide situational awareness for the carrier group.  By all accounts, the ES-3A was quite effective and was phased out only as a [badly misguided] cost savings measure.

ES-3A Shadow - Passive Hawkeye?

 

Operating multiple such passive AEW aircraft would allow triangulation location of targets and increased coverage area.

 

Alternatively, we’ve discussed a stealthy active radar AEW aircraft based on the B-21 (see, “B-21 Hawkeye”).

 

The main point is that the E-2 Hawkeye is no longer survivable on the modern battlefield.  We need a fast, stealthy version of a Hawkeye, likely based on the B-21.  The aircraft can be either passive or active (ideally, both!) or an air wing could have a mix of the two.  We've got to stop simply repeating the past because it was once successful.  Building more and more Burkes just because they were once successful and screwed up every design since is wrong.  Building endless upgrades to an ancient, prop driven aircraft because it was once successful is timid and wrong.  Instead, we have to start thinking about what future combat will be like and start designing equipment and operating concepts to fit that future.

UAV Carrier

We’ve frequently noted the need for a UAV carrier (see, for example, the fictional snippet, “Piece It Together”, for a description of a UAV carrier involved in an amphibious assault).  What might such a carrier look like and how would it operate?  Let’s speculate.

 

 

Conceptual Foundation

 

Here’s the major foundational assumptions underlying a UAV carrier concept:

 

Small UAVs - The key concept in a UAV Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is that the UAVs are not the large Predator type UAVs that would be utterly non-survivable over a modern battlefield but would, instead, be small, cheap, expendable, limited functionality UAVs somewhere in the ballpark of a slightly enhanced RQ-21 Blackjack UAV (see, “RQ-21 Blackjack”).

RQ-21 Blackjack

 Swarms - Critically important is the concept that UAVs would be deployed in swarms rather than singly.  Thus, a UAV carrier needs the ability to launch swarms of UAVs simultaneously.

 

Numbers - These small UAVs will suffer significant attrition in battle so a UAV carrier needs to carry lots of UAVs – around 500 would be a good amount.

 

Control - Since we don’t have ‘Terminator’ level artificial intelligence yet – nor are we likely to in the foreseeable future – we will need lots of aircraft controller stations on the carrier.  Most UAVs won’t require hands on, continuous, remote piloting but all will require the ability to be controlled via waypoints and basic flight and operational instructions with occasional hands-on remote piloting.

 

Communications - In addition to sending instructions to UAVs, receiving return communications will be important.  Swarms of UAVs will be sending brief bursts of data back to the carrier so the carrier needs a robust, two-way, UAV communications suite.

 

Data Assembly - The UAV data will be fragmentary, at best, so the carrier needs the ability to assemble comprehensive ‘pictures’ out of lots of individual data points.  This dictates a large data synthesis center.

 

 

Design

 

Now that we understand the foundational requirements for a UAV carrier, what does the preceding suggest about the look and design of a UAV carrier?  Well, for one thing, it won’t look much like a ‘normal’ carrier as we think of it, today.

 

Launch – The carrier will launch UAVs from small catapults.  Thus, long runs of clear open deck, as with a conventional carrier, will not be required.  The small catapults (again, see the RQ-21 Blackjack for an idea of what these catapults might resemble) will line the sides of the deck, facing out.  Around 30 catapults ought to be sufficient to launch swarms of UAVs in a reasonable time frame.

 

Recovery – Recovery of small UAVs does not require traditional arresting gear and long, open, landing areas.  Instead, a short 50 foot long x 30 foot wide section of deck with a net at the forward end will suffice to catch returning UAVs which would be manually disentangled and removed from the landing area. 

 

Hangar – The ‘hangar’ would not be a hangar in the traditional sense.  While UAVs would be brought below for repair and maintenance work, that work would occur in small workshops.  The ‘hangar’ area, instead of being an open aircraft work space, would be a UAV storage area with UAVs stored in racks with enough space between the racks to allow equipment to raise/lower the UAVs and move them to elevators as needed.  Alternatively, the ‘hangar’ could simply be a superstructure on the same level as the flight deck so that UAVs could be moved straight to the launch catapults rather than requiring elevators.

 

Dimensions – Carrier size would be something on the order of 250-300 feet long, depending on the UAV storage requirements.  Something like a small cargo ship ought to serve as the design basis with the modification of some open deck space as described above.

 

 

Future

 

Looking slightly further into the future, a true UAV carrier would also include underwater unmanned vehicle (UUV) launch and recovery capability, as well.  UUV launches would involve underwater torpedo tube type systems and recovery would be via a small well ‘tunnel’.

 

 

Summary

 

A UAV carrier would be very small relative to a real carrier, likely based on a fast cargo ship design, and would be intended to provide situational awareness for a group through the use of UAV sensor swarms with the swarm making up for the lack of sensor capability in the individual UAVs.

 

The exact design details would, as always, depend on the specific Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  Though not quite spelled out, here, the CONOPS would likely emphasize operations with amphibious groups and non-carrier surface groups since a carrier’s aircraft would be able to provide all the needed sensor capability for the group. 

 

This concept could, and should, be prototyped using an available small cargo ship with some simple modifications.  Let’s see what kind of situational awareness we can generate from a small swarm of UAVs.  Let’s see if we can assemble a comprehensive picture from lots of individual data points.  Let’s see if we can launch, control, and recover a swarm.  Let’s see how detectable a swarm of small UAVs is.  Let’s see if they can survive long enough to accomplish the mission.  Let’s see what this concept can do.

Naval Stealth Helicopter

ComNavOps has long criticized the Navy’s plan to use helicopters as off-board sensor platforms in combat.  Helos also appear to be the Navy’s main distributed lethality sensor asset.  As we’ve discussed, the problem with helos is that they are extremely slow and decidedly non-stealthy.  Add to that the need to operate an active radar and the helo has zero chance of remaining undetected and zero chance of surviving the resultant enemy attack.  Unfortunately, the use of active radar ensures that the enemy will see the helo long before it sees the enemy.

Making the situation worse is the fact that each warship will only carry one or two helos which ensures that coverage will be sporadic and sparse and that combat attrition will quickly reduce the host ship to its own organic sensors.  In other words, in combat, helos will be prove to be only a very tiny step above useless and then, only for a very brief period before they are destroyed.

So, what’s the solution?

The ideal solution is to use lots of small, cheap, limited range UAVs and accept the inevitable attrition while depending on numbers to provide the necessary sensor coverage (see, “TheNext Cruiser and Mini-Hawks” and “UAVs – Numbers Matter” and “SensorAttrition”).

While the concept of small, cheap, numerous UAVs makes eminent sense, the Navy almost always prefers much more expensive and complex solutions.  So, …

Alternatively, a stealth helo might enable the helo to carry out the Navy’s desired off board sensor function.  Is there such a thing as a stealth helo considering those large, radar reflecting rotary blades?  Well, the Army seems to think so and pursued the Boeing/Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche as a stealth reconnaissance helicopter in the late ‘90s and early ‘00s before the project was cancelled due to cost overruns and technical issues.  Other examples include the HAL Light Combat Helicopter and Eurocopter Tiger.  Let’s briefly review these examples.

RAH-66 Comanche – This was intended to be a reconnaissance and light attack helo.  Regarding its stealth, Wiki states,

As intended, it would have functioned as a stealth helicopter, incorporating a number of different techniques and technologies in order to reduce its radar cross-section (RCS) along with other areas of visibility and detectability. The exterior surfaces of the RAH-66 were faceted and covered with both radar-absorbent material (RAM) coatings and infrared-suppressant paint; as a result of these combined measures, the Comanche's RCS was stated to be 360 times smaller than that of the AH-64 Apache. The acoustic signature of the helicopter was also reported to be noticeably lower than comparative helicopters; this reduction had been partially achieved through the adoption of an all-composite five-blade main rotor and pioneering canted tail rotor assembly. (3)

RAH-66 Comanche

HAL Light Combat Helicopter – This is an Indian produced, attack helo featuring very light weight and very high altitude.  According to a Wikipedia article, it is claimed to have stealth profiling, armor protection, a digital camouflage system, infrared (IR) suppression, and an exterior covered by canted flat panels to minimize its radar cross-section.(1) 

HAL Light Combat Helicopter

Eurocopter Tiger – This is a stealthy multi-role attack helo that uses advanced composites which reduce its radar cross section and features reduced visual, IR, and acoustic signatures.

Eurocopter Tiger

Russia - Wikipedia reports the existence of a stealthy Kamov helicopter with a reduced radar cross section (RCS), IR suppression, and an internal weapons bays.(2)

Ka-58 Stealth Helicopter?

A naval stealth helo combining the state of the art stealth features from the preceding examples might allow the Navy to achieve the manned, off-board helo surveillance asset that they’ve been chasing for many years and which is the pre-requisite foundation for a viable distributed lethality concept.  Of course, the question is how stealthy can a helo be?  The only hint we have is the Comanche claim of an RCS 360 times smaller than an Apache but without knowing what kind of radar signature an Apache has, that’s not really helpful.  However, it does suggest that a sufficiently stealthy naval helo might be possible.  At the very least, it would be worth some developmental effort along the lines of calculations and small scale testing.

Hand in hand with any physical stealth design is a stealthy Concept of Operations.  How would a stealth helo operate?  Would it radiate, thereby pinpointing its own location?  Can it radiate, obtain a useful picture of the area, and move sufficiently far away to survive the resultant aircraft or surface-to-air missile attack?  Can passive sensors be used to obtain a useful situational awareness or to supplement active radar to a useful degree?  How many helos are needed to provide sufficient coverage?  And so on …

One of the problems the Navy has is its insistence on using only the SH-60 Seahawk family.  These are large, ungainly, helos – decidedly non-stealthy.  If the Navy were to consider the use of smaller, specialized reconnaissance helos, they might be able to operate more of them and attain better coverage and be better able to deal with mechanical and combat attrition.  The RAH-66 Comanche, for example, was 47 ft long, 11 ft high, and a bit over 6 ft wide as compared to the Seahawk which is 64 ft long and 17 ft high.  An LCS, for example, might be able to operate 3-4 small, stealth helos instead of the single Seahawk family helo they can now.  A smaller, lighter, stealth helo would also be more compatible with the structural strength constraints of the LCS flight decks which are the limiting factor in their helo ops.  A Burke might be able to operate 3-4 stealth helos as opposed to 1-2 Seahawk types.

All of this is conjecture, of course, but it offers a possible path for the Navy’s desired distributed lethality concept.  Of course, there’s still the fact that distributed lethality is just plain stupid but the Navy’s going to do stupid anyway so this, at least, offers a possibility of doing it slightly less stupidly.

_______________________________

(1)Wikipedia, “HAL Light Combat Helicopter”, Retrieved 21-Aug-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HAL_Light_Combat_Helicopter#Design

(2)Wikipedia, “Stealth Helicopter”, Retrieved 18-Aug-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stealth_helicopter

(3)Wikipedia, “Boeing–Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche”, Retrieved 24-Aug-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing–Sikorsky_RAH-66_Comanche#Design