I just read a single headline that blindingly exposed the idiocy
of the US (and the West, in general) military’s fascination and obsession with information,
networks, and artificial intelligence as the basis for future warfighting
capability. From a Newsmax article, this
headline perfectly sums up the situation [1],
Despite the cumulative monitoring by the entire Western
world and, specifically, the intensely focused monitoring by Israel, Hamas
managed to utterly surprise Israel with a massive attack that included
parasails, thousands of rockets, hundreds of vehicles, boats, etc. Despite one of the world’s most extensive and
sophisticated sensor systems of radar, optics, ground vibration sensors,
observation towers, and human intelligence backed by the West’s satellite and
signals intelligence, the Israelis and the West completely missed the
preparations involved in a massive assault by Hamas. All of that high tech, state of the art
(state of the universe?) surveillance focused on one tiny strip of land and we
completely missed the months/years long assault preparations
… and the US wants to base its entire future
military capability on that demonstrably ineffective technology.
Despite all evidence to the contrary, the US military has
placed its bet for future warfare on the pursuit of perfect situational
awareness. Armor has been ignored. Firepower has been relegated to an
afterthought. Logistics is a distant
tertiary concern, if even that. Our
entire concept of future warfare is based on perfect sensing: large, all-encompassing, regional sensor
networks that see everything. Of course,
no one has yet explained how, even if this could be achieved, that would
destroy the enemy. Destruction requires
overwhelming amounts of firepower and we have no interest in firepower. But, I digress.
So, despite the fact that some of the most concentrated and
intense surveillance and data collection the world has ever seen was focused on
a tiny strip of land and failed, utterly, we’re betting we can flawlessly
monitor all of China, the entire East/South China Seas, and all of the surrounding
areas, thereby assuring our victory over a hapless and helpless China? That’s some world class fantasy, there.
Just to remind ourselves that the Hamas assault was not some
sort of one-off, fluke occurrence, let’s examine some other well known, real
world examples of the failure of perfect situational awareness.
Afghanistan Drone Strike – During the US’ Afghanistan
evacuation, the US executed a drone strike on terrorist leaders in a vehicle
based on perfect observations from a UAV.
The only problem was that the target was actually an innocent family.
USS Mason – Despite their own Aegis radar system,
scores of regional surveillance assets, nearby ship sensors, overhead
satellites, and extensive signals intelligence, the USS Mason falsely detected
three separate missile attacks and launched defensive missiles.
Malaysia Flight 370 – A Malaysian Boeing 777 vanished
from one of the world’s most heavily travelled and monitored regions despite
multiple radars, IFF, an established flight plan, regular communications, and
satellite surveillance.
Vincennes – Despite their own Aegis radar system,
scores of regional surveillance assets, nearby ship sensors, overhead
satellites, and extensive signals intelligence, the USS Vincennes mistakenly
shot down a commercial airliner.
Riverine Boat Seizure – Despite GPS navigation,
regional fleet surveillance assets, and unhindered communications, two riverine
boats obliviously got lost and wandered into Iranian territorial waters where
they were promptly seized.
Port Royal Grounding – Despite GPS navigation,
regional fleet surveillance assets, established charts, automated navigation
software, and visible landmarks, the USS Port Royal got lost and grounded.
McCain and Fitzgerald Collisions – Despite Aegis radar,
navigation radars, EO/IR sensors, regional surveillance assets, and IFF systems
on both the Navy and commercial ships, the destroyers managed to run into
giant, hulking commercial ships in known, well defined, shipping lanes.
Helo Shootdown – In 1994, two F-15C aircraft misidentified
and shot down two US Blackhawk helicopters enforcing a no-fly zone over
Iraq. This occurred despite the
sophisticated radars and sensors on the F-15s as well as concentrations of
regional sensors aimed at the no-fly zone.
I can continue with example after example but these should
suffice to make the point. In each case,
there was overwhelming surveillance technology and situational awareness assets
and yet they failed spectacularly.
Making the failures worse is that none occurred in the face
of cyber or electronic opposition as would be the case in a war. Whatever degree of surveillance success we
enjoy now (none?) will be greatly reduced in a real war when the enemy applies
cyber, electronic, and kinetic attacks against our surveillance and network
systems.
The only possible conclusion is that surveillance technology
is highly unreliable and ineffective.
On a closely related note, we’ve talked at length about the
dependency and vulnerability that inevitably develops when technology replaces
human skill. Discussing the Hamas
assault, a senior Israeli reserve officer clearly pointed out the problem with
technology and dependency:
That’s exactly what happens when technology replaces human skill – we become blind, unaware, and dependent and, like any addict, we lose the ability to function and reason.
Of all the things we could possibly base our future military
capability on, information, data collection, and networks is the least
effective or desirable.
____________________________
Hamas Attack Shows Limits of AI, Tech
for Global Security
“We were living in an imaginary reality for years,” …“We became over-reliant on the sophisticated underground barrier, on technology.[2]
That’s exactly what happens when technology replaces human skill – we become blind, unaware, and dependent and, like any addict, we lose the ability to function and reason.
https://www.newsmax.com/platinum/hamas-attack-israel/2023/10/19/id/1138867/
I think you are forcing a couple of examples.
ReplyDeleteA-Stan drone strike falls on people they mis identified the occupants of the target. In a hot war that would have been just collateral damage I don't see any indictment of the technology. I not sure what you think failed in this case. Clearly either somebody made a bad judgment call or itell was poor but say clear that was not the case with doing in Ayman al-Zawahiri
Vincennes was command error. One of the destroyers getting link 11 (or was it 14 can't recall ) info correctly identified the plane as civilian. By all accounts the commander of the Vincennes was uber aggressive which is in fact proved out by him having his Cruiser in a situation it should not have been in.
note it may have been a Perry class class frigate not a destroyer
Delete"drone strike falls on people they mis identified the occupants of the target."
DeleteApparently, you don't realize that you're simply agreeing with, and confirming, my analysis and examples. People are an integral part of the technology. People are the receiving end of all the data. People are one of the weak links in the technology chain by their failure to interpret the data and understand its strengths and weaknesses.
Again, people are an integral part of the technology. Perhaps I should have made that clearer although I thought that was too obvious to even warrant a mention.
If the technology produces data that is incomplete or too overwhelming to correctly interpret or is nuanced beyond our ability to comprehend or is mistakenly accorded veracity where it is not warranted or whatever else, that is the fault of the technology-human construct. Since we don't have robots receiving the data, I thought the human part did not require an explicit statement.
There's certainly a problem, but I think it's a bit subtler than you're portraying it as.
ReplyDeleteModern sensors can be very effective, but they require skilled use and interpretation to achieve that. But their output looks so clean, shiny and perfect that it's really easy for people brought up on action movies, CSI and computer games to assume they're seeing all of what's going on. The answer to that is training that convinces the people that trusting the computer is not reliable in the real world, where highly motivated people are trying to devise ways to mislead it. That's just as true of Hamas as it is for the Chinese Navy.
Ironically, old radars that had a fair bit of noise on the screen may have been more suitable for human interpretation. It was obvious that they could not tell you everything, so people had to concentrate.
Current "AI" makes this problem worse. People think it's smarter than they are, because an AI can write better English than them. It isn't, and once you know how to mislead it, it's as dumb as a rock. People want to rely on it, but that makes misleading them easier.
"But their output looks so clean, shiny and perfect that it's really easy for people ... to assume they're seeing all of what's going on."
DeleteTHAT'S my point. We've become dependent on technology and have fallen into the fatal habit of assuming that whatever information it produces is correct and complete when the reality is that it never is.
We've also come to believe that the underlying technology, once put in place (like the Israelis monitoring Hamas), requires no further effort on our part and cannot be fooled or circumvented. Technology makes us cease our efforts; it makes us lazy and blind. We stop looking.
"Ironically, old radars that had a fair bit of noise on the screen may have been more suitable for human interpretation."
An outstanding observation! Older radar required the operators to have a total understanding of the capabilities AND LIMITATIONS of their equipment and to use judgement to interpret the results. Now, we just take on blind faith whatever result the computer spits out. The accidental drone strike on the Aegis cruiser during an exercise is a perfect example of this.
You're simply confirming my premise and adroitly expanding on the mechanism behind it! Thank you!
Also to be fair it seems pretty clear that Human failure with Hamas was government that put its focus and resources and manpower elsewhere assuming Hamas was not going to do anything.
ReplyDelete"assuming Hamas was not going to do anything."
DeleteNo. They always assumed Hamas would continually try new attacks but they grew lazy because of their technology. They assumed the technology would reveal any causes for concern and failed to understand the weaknesses and limitations of that technology and quit trying to fill in the weaknesses with old fashioned, human, hard and dirty work.
The technology made the Israelis weak and vulnerable which is EXACTLY the premise of the post.
"The technology made the Israelis weak and vulnerable which is EXACTLY the premise of the post."
DeleteJust to add onto this, the Israeli has received multiple warnings from Mossad (their HUMINT service), fellow friendly governments and even by some Palestine leaders at varying degree depending on what kind of reports you are reading. All of them has been dismissed due to the doubt that Hamas is capable of wielding any sophisticated attack that is NOT DETECTABLE by the massive technological intelligence and defense system that Israel has in place. The ignorance of the threat is DIRECTLY caused by the overconfidence in technology.
Technology is awesome, it can be a true combat multiplier.
ReplyDeleteReliance on technology, however, not so much.
It's challenging but critical to find the balance between the two so that the military can maintain its critical thinking capabilities while still leveraging technologies.
A tall order.
Lutefisk
Chinese Gordon
DeleteOne of the problem with modern sensors is that they show you too much data, as there is such a thing and it's a real problem. As you work a specific task the first thing to do is to filter out all data that doesn't cocern your task disregarding the rest. If no one watches the disregarded data you'll end up with a large hole in your situational pictures.
ReplyDeleteRegarding the destroyer collisions I would not say they are caused by technology as it seems that the watchstanders didn't know basic navigational rules, so even if there was tecnology present they would not know how to use it.
ReplyDelete"I would not say they are caused by technology"
DeleteOf course technology was a root cause! We forgot how to sail a ship (the use of lookouts, shooting a bearing, rules of the road, etc.) and the technology we did have was unusable due to interface complexity, lack of training, variation between systems on the same class of ship, etc.
We had become lazy and dependent on technology and were no longer willing to do the 'hard' work of human sailing. We believed that having extra mess hands was more important than posting lookouts - after all, why should we post lookouts or shoot bearings? We had GPS, radar, navigation software, etc.
Absolutely technology was one of the root causes of each of the collisions and groundings. It's not even debatable.
That you might think otherwise simply indicates the degree to which you, yourself, have fallen victim to the belief in technology.
Just a fun question: Do you carry a map and compass in your car when you drive somewhere unfamiliar or do you, like 99%+ of people, blindly depend on your car's nav system?
How many people drive into lakes or don't even notice a bridge is out when they just trust their car land NAV???
DeleteI'm a map guy, I always have a map of some sort at hand, paper or digital (offline and without GPS) and I avoid using GPS as much as possible. When out in the woods I always carry a map and compass, the GPS comes out 3-4 times a day max for fixes and to compare positions when I'm in unfamiliar areas. Otherwise the very basic GPS that I own stays off for days at a time, no fancy functions, no maps on it, just coordinates. This summer I've covered about 200+ km on foot per month with minimal GPS usage.
Delete"I'm a map guy"
DeleteA salute to you, then! Sadly, you're one of a vanishing breed.
I've backpacked and hiked considerable mileage on trails and cross-country over the years (Scoutmaster) and a map and compass are essential. Drop the map, pick it up. Drop the compass, pick it up. Drop the GPS unit, uh oh. Interesting though is you rarely really need a compass in the back country - a good topo map coupled with excellent continuous observation typically keeps you well oriented. At night? Then pull out the compass.
DeleteCulture compounds this problem. I see it at work all the time - if the automated system didn't alert me to the problem, I can't be held responsible. It's a technology problem. Not my fault!
ReplyDeleteThe Navy’s culture of “don’t make mistakes, and don’t rock the boat” instead of “get the job done the best way possible, damn the politics” makes it more likely sailors will rely on technology instead of questioning the data and using their instincts. Besides, nobody gets a gold star for second-guessing the latest innovation. That’s why the Ford is the ultimate warship*! And the F35 is better than perfect**!
* When elevators, catapults, arresting gear and toilets are working
** When flight ready, target is in range, and carrier is functional
" * When elevators, catapults, arresting gear and toilets are working
ReplyDelete** When flight ready, target is in range, and carrier is functional "
I wonder what the Venn Diagram overlap is for those two sets of circumstances?
Lutefisk
"Venn Diagram"
DeleteYes! Given the state of our public education, the average person on the street has no idea what a Venn diagram is. The readership of this blog is a cut above! Tip of the hat to you!
Venn diagram description regarding trash bins by a NPS Ranger. "There is considerable overlap between the intelligence of the smartest bears and the dumbest tourists."
DeleteThere is something to be said about reintroducing teaching how to use tools in schools and what those skills really represent.
Venn Diagram...
DeleteWow havent heard that in eons... Oh, except last week when i doodled one to explain somthing to one of the kids...!!! ;)
3 points:
ReplyDelete1) PK was pointing out that since the 2006 war, Israel assumed that Hamas wouldn’t do anything until after protests funded by Iran to make Hamas’s terrorist actions seem justified. Hamas did not follow the expected course of action, so this was a HUMINT failure not sensor failure.
2) All sensors data requires analysis and interpretation for intent (for example, someone pushing a cart down the street could be a bread vendor or an IED emplacer or both). Israelis saw Gaza activity but assigned different intent to Hamas actions (look, Hamas is using parasailing to build morale).
3) We need to target known capabilities, not effects. This pretending that our intel is so awesome that we can deny the enemy the effect they are looking for while achieving our effects like we teach in “effects based targeting” is a fantasy like CNO says because it is difficult to interpret intentions of the enemy (just ask yourself what is Putin’s goal in Ukraine despite the fact that we have been studying him for 20 years).
We need to target enemy capabilities with overwhelming firepower and take out any enemy capabilities above a threshold or be prepared for a big fight when we fail to prevent capability formation.
I would disagree here. For a truly balanced argument you have to also consider every counterpoint. How many drone strikes have been successful, how many less threats of possible commercial airliners being shot down have there been due to these systems, how many navigational errors have been avoided due to GPS and such. Many of these numbers are almost impossible to even quantify, as we are trying to count events that haven't happened. A better way would be to examine the amount of collisions per decade, per 1,000,000 Km of distance traveled by US navy vessels. And I'm pretty sure that those numbers would be seeing a continuous downward trend. Now this doesn't detract from your underlying point that basic seafarer skills are still essential and an over reliance on technology can be dangerous, but I don't think that the technology is solely at fault here.
ReplyDelete