Russia just lost another landing ship to a Ukrainian drone
swarm.[1] The mind simply boggles at the
degree of ineptitude being exhibited by the Russians. Let’s use this incident to examine the use of
surface drone swarms.
Let’s start by looking at the drones Ukraine is using and
see how deadly they really are.
Magura V5
The commonly reported Ukrainian drone craft is the Magura
V5. There have been different versions
produced so the specs vary, depending on the source and the referenced
variant. The drone is a relatively small
craft (5.5 m long) with a low silhouette which would make them difficult to
spot visually, however, at speed they leave a very visible wake. Their shape is not notably radar stealthy
although they are smooth and relatively free of protrusions so they may be
somewhat radar stealthy. Propulsion is
said to be an electric motor or hybrid (gas-electric?) of some sort. Presumably, the craft are readily visible in
the infrared and should be easily detectable at the horizon, some 12 miles
distant or so, depending on the height of the EO/IR sensor. Range is variously reported to be 250-500
miles. Control is via optical sensor and
satellite (Starlink?) communication. Drone
weight is 1000 kg (2200 lb) with a payload variously reported as 300-400 lbs
explosive. Cruising speed is 20 mph with
a terminal burst speed about twice that.
 |
| Magura V5 Drone |
 |
| Magura V5 Drone |
Acoustically, an electric motor running at high speed and a
craft sailing at high speed should generate significant noise and be readily
detectable at 10-25 miles, using passive sonar.
I would imagine the sound would be similar to that of a torpedo at
speed.
I would assume that, like all weapons with a range, the
reported range is much greater than the effective operational range. Thus, the operational range is likely 50-100
miles but that’s just informed speculation on my part. It does, however, greatly impact the overall
effectiveness of the drone since it impacts the launch distance from the
target.
This is a surface running torpedo, for all intents and
purposes. Like a torpedo, it can be
deadly if not treated appropriately.
Unlike a torpedo which can be decoyed but cannot be destroyed, these
drones are easily destroyed with appropriate weapons.
Now, let’s look at the Russian landing ship.
Ropuch Amphibious
Ship
The Ropucha class landing ship is a medium size (369 ft
long, 4080 tons displacement), lightly armed LST with either 2x 57mm dual guns
(Ropucha I) or 1x 76mm gun and 2x AK-630 30mm CIWS (Ropucha II). Either way, that’s not a lot of armament!
The ship has multiple fire control, search, and navigation
radars. I assume it has EO/IR sensors
but that’s speculation.
Crew size is around 90.
Now, let’s consider some of the relevant operational
factors.
Operational
Factors
Launch Site.
The drone can be launched from shore or from a host vessel. Either way, the drones must be close enough
to the target to be within the range of the drone. It’s not as if the drone can be safely
launched from a thousand miles away. One
would think that a host vessel, meaning, potentially, any unidentified vessel
within 500 miles, would be easily spotted and sunk before it could launch the
drones.
Alternatively, if launched from shore, the launch operation
would require trucks and handling equipment given the overall drone weight of a
ton or more. This is not something that
one tucks into a backpack. It’s a fairly
major operation to transport, handle, and launch the craft. One would think that surveillance of the
likely launch areas and access roads would be effective in spotting and
preventing launches.
Detection. As
noted, there are multiple modes of detection including visual, infrared,
acoustic, and radar. A semi-alert
defender should have no trouble detecting the drones at a distance. The use of swarms of multiple drones further increases
the chance of detection.
Satellites.
Satellites (reportedly Starlink) are, apparently, being used to control
the drones. I assume Russia is
attempting to disrupt the satellite communications although given the
demonstrated degree of incompetence, this may not be true. Satellite vulnerabilities include physical
destruction in space, local signal disruption, cyber attacks at various points
of the satellite system (ground control, master communications, local
receivers, etc.). If Starlink
involvement is confirmed, Russia would be within their rights to conduct
physical sabotage of Starlink facilities even in the US.
If Russia is attempting any of these actions, they appear to
be having little or no success.
Targeting. Targeting
information is likely being gathered via satellites and UAVs, probably from
Ukrainian-allied countries like the US. Again,
if confirmed, Russia could conduct attacks on the targeting assets with minimal
risk of escalation. The last several
years have demonstrated that the US is highly unlikely to respond beyond
speeches and warnings that are never acted on.
Lethality. The
drones reportedly carry around three hundred pounds of explosive which is a
reasonably substantial amount of explosive.
However, it should be noted that the explosive is a non-penetrating
effect as compared to a shell, bomb, or missile. This lessons the extent of damage relative to
the nominal weight of explosive since a significant amount of the explosive
force is directed away from the ship. A
similar phenomenon occurred in the attack on the USS Cole.
Proximity. The
Ukrainian drones benefit greatly from the unique geography of this
situation. The operating area is a
fairly small, constrained area as opposed to the open ocean that the US Navy
would operate in during a war with China.
Of course, if the Navy opted to do something stupid, like operate near
land with inadequately armed and sensored ships, as the Russians are doing,
then the result could well be similar.
Damage Control.
The Russians appear to have had very little success in applying damage
control to ships that have been struck.
Obviously, hard data on this is difficult to come by.
Analysis
To sum up the preceding, the drones are potentially damaging
with a few hundred pounds of explosive but they are also small, highly
vulnerable to destruction, and easily detected.
So, why are they having some success?
Note: We hear about the successes but we do not
hear about the failures, if any, and I assume there are many. For example, it could be that only one in a
hundred drones succeed. While that
wouldn’t change the overall end result, it would certainly change the
assessment of the efficiency of the drones.
There is simply no getting around the staggering degree of
Russian ineptitude. They are sending
ill-equipped ships, unescorted, into known dangerous waters with, apparently,
no aviation surveillance support such as helos or UAVs. A handful of small, simple escorts with
suitable sensors and weapons would end the drone threat. Even submarines ought to be able to provide
detection of drones, interdiction of host ships, if any (most hints suggest
shore launches), and covert surveillance of possible shore launch sites.. Russia supposedly has seven Kilo class subs
in the Black Sea and their sonars should be able to detect drones and provide
early warning.
The operational stupidity is compounded by the lack of long
range interdiction of the launch points and ships/trucks that are used to
transport and launch the drones. Russia
should have air, land, and sea patrols dedicated to finding and destroying the
transport/launch vehicles or ships.
If we consider the kill chain concept, there are several
links in the chain where the Russians could take effective action to disrupt
the chain (production facilities, storage facilities, transport, launch event,
local detection, and local destruction).
Bafflingly, the Russians seem to be unwilling or unable to break the
chain at any of those points.
In the hints we get from videos, the Russians appear unable
to kill many (any?) drones with the weapons they do have. This speaks volumes about the overhyped
claims of Russian weapon performance (as we’ve seen throughout history and
covering ALL Russian weapon systems) and/or the woeful state of Russian
training.
Compounding all this is the Russian’s unwillingness to seek
out and destroy targeting platforms. The
Russians could, simply, declare suitably large exclusion zones and then destroy
any foreign (US) aircraft in the area.
Similar actions could be taken against satellite surveillance if,
indeed, that is a source of targeting information.
As with all other aspects of this war, Russia is conducting
the drone defense operations in the most inept manner imaginable.
The Ukraine success is due almost exclusively to Russian
ineptitude rather than any inherent capabilities of the drones which, as we’ve
discussed, are not particularly formidable on paper.
Conclusion
So many naval observers want to jump on the drone bandwagon
because of Ukraine’s handful of successful attacks but is this enthusiasm
justified?
An objective analysis suggests that drones are not a threat
to an alert, suitably equipped defender who counters the threat with
intelligent operations, doctrine and tactics.
The ineptitude of the Russians cannot be ignored and, therefore, trying
to derive universal lessons from this is an exercise in futility if not
downright misleading.
Like any threat, if one fails to treat the threat with the
respect it deserves, it can be lethal.
The US needs to be aware of drone threats and train and equip to counter
them but they are not, inherently, a serious threat.
_______________________________
