Lessons From Truk

How often have we seen comments stating that our carriers are hopelessly outmatched against China because a carrier has only around forty combat aircraft (160 in a 4-carrier group) and China has thousands of aircraft?  As good naval analysts always do, let’s turn to history to see what lessons we can learn that might be applicable.  A salient example is the US Navy’s WWII attack on Japan’s Truk island bases on 17–18 Feb-1944.
 
Truk was the major Japanese base in the South Pacific and was referred to as the "Japanese Pearl Harbor" and "the Gibraltar of the Pacific”.  It was believed to be heavily defended, fortified, and nearly impregnable with five airfields and a seaplane base and large numbers of warships.
 
It was feared that an attack on Truk would be quite costly and might well not succeed.  Despite this, an attack was ordered (Operation Hailstone) and conducted by three carrier task forces consisting of 5 fleet carriers  (Enterprise, Yorktown, Essex, Intrepid, and Bunker Hill) and 4 light carriers (Belleau Wood, Cabot, Monterey, and Cowpens) along with seven battleships, including Iowa and New Jersey, and many cruisers and destroyers.
 
The US carriers employed their usual run in under cover of night and pre-dawn launches to begin the attacks and achieved total surprise.  The result was a completely lop-sided victory for the US and Truk was never again a significant threat.
 
As it turned out, the Japanese had already begun withdrawing major naval units from Truk prior to the attack but that does not lesson the courage and skill of the attackers.
 
What can we learn from this?
 
Surprise – Surprise has forever been a major contributor to success on the battlefield and there is no better instrument for achieving surprise on the naval battlefield than a carrier group (submariners might argue that!).  In WWII, carriers conducted high speed run ins to their target under cover of night.  Today, darkness offers less cover but the tactic is still valid.  A carrier at sea is generally “invisible” and can show up anywhere at any time.  An enemy’s superiority can be decisively overcome if surprise can be achieved.  The art and task of the military planner is to arrange matters so as to achieve surprise.
 
Localized Superiority – It doesn’t matter how many assets the enemy has in its total inventory.  What matters is how many are instantaneously available at the point and moment of attack – a concept that seems to elude many of today’s naval observers.  The Japanese had superior numbers of aircraft when the initial US fighter sweep arrived but the Japanese aircraft were largely caught on the ground (see, Surprise, above) thus enabling the US to establish and maintain local, effective superiority.  As long as the attacking force doesn’t hang around too long, local superiority can be achieved and maintained for the duration of an operation.  Thus, the oft claimed superiority of numbers of Chinese aircraft in their total inventory is meaningless.  What matters is how many they can put into the air at the moment of attack.  Even having superior numbers locally is meaningless if surprise is achieved and the aircraft are caught on the ground.
 
Firepower – In addition to the hundreds of attacking aircraft, the US utilized large caliber naval guns on its battleships and cruisers to bombard bases and facilities on the islands and sink several fleeing ships, thus effectively supplementing the carrier aircraft.  As devastating as the air attacks were, nothing compares to large caliber naval gunfire for effective, sustained, unstoppable (with air superiority established!) destruction.  This is a lesson the Navy has completely forgotten.  We have no surface firepower and will one day rue the absence.  Large caliber naval guns are a devastating weapon and it is the responsibility of the naval planner to recognize that and work to bring that firepower into play, as appropriate.
 
Another aspect of firepower is numbers of delivery platforms.  The attack on Truk succeeded due to the immense numbers of carrier aircraft involved (500 aircraft).  An aircraft can only deliver a very limited amount of firepower and has no ability to sustain that delivery without returning to its base/carrier to rearm which means aerial firepower can only be applied sporadically.  This limitation was overcome at Truk (and throughout the war) by applying huge numbers of aircraft.  Each individual aircraft carried an almost insignificant amount of firepower but numbers compensated.  Our carrier air wings, today, consist of only around thirty actual combat aircraft (subtracting out combat aircraft relegated to tanker duty because we idiotically gave up our tankers without replacement).  We’ve forgotten that quantity matters when it comes to delivering firepower.
 
Courage – Last but not least, Truk teaches us the importance of courage.  At the time, there was a great deal of trepidation about an attack on Truk but we went ahead anyway.  Today, we have far too many Chicken Littles who see nothing but doom and gloom and are unwilling to take the slightest risk. 
 
Who Dares, Wins
Fortune Favors the Bold
 
These are the mottos and philosophies we should be living by, not
 
What Will the Chinese Think?
We Can’t Risk Escalation
 
Look at all the people, including within the military, who are terrified by the mere thought of engaging Iran, a third rate military, at best, certain that we cannot win.
 
 
 
As with any battle throughout history, there are important lessons to be learned and, as with every battle throughout history, the Navy is deaf, dumb, and blind to the lessons history is screaming at us.

Ready! Ready? Not Ready …

It is the job of the military to have contingency plans for every conceivable scenario sitting on the shelf, ready to execute and to ensure that the force is properly trained, maintained, and equipped to execute those plans on a (figurative) moment’s notice.
 
When the Administration decided to strike Iran, it should have required nothing more than to pick a plan off the shelf and assemble the required assets.  We should have been ready and able.
 
Let’s digress for a moment.  How many aircraft carriers did we use during Desert Storm?  The answer is 6.  They were:
 

• USS Midway
• USS Roosevelt
• USS America
• USS Kennedy
• USS Saratoga
• USS Ranger

 
Compare that assemblage of power to the current Iran conflict.  How many carriers are active for this?  The answer is 2.  They are:
 

• USS Ford
• USS Lincoln

 
And Ford was at the end of a long deployment and overdue to return home.  We should also note that air wings during Desert Storm were larger than today’s air wings which makes the two carriers for Iran more like one and a half carriers!
 
An obvious question arises;  did operational requirements only need two carriers or were there only two carriers physically available?  Not knowing the detailed operational plan, we can’t say for sure but a common sense assessment sure seems to indicate that we needed more especially when we compare the needs of Desert Storm to this conflict.
 
Consider:
 
-We seem to lack sufficient air and naval coverage to keep the strait open.
-We clearly lack the air coverage to protect our bases and our Middle East allies from Iranian drones and missiles.
-USS Ford is approaching its one year deployment anniversary which clearly says that the vessel was used because no other carriers were available.
 
 
Were we ready or were we caught unprepared? 
 
A peripheral piece of evidence is the attempted deployment of a MEU during the early Ukraine conflict.  Despite having around 30 amphibious ships, the Navy was unable to form a ARG and provide ships for the MEU.  This suggests that the Navy is nowhere near combat ready and, further, has zero surge capability.
 
One might also ask why the Japan based carrier was not moved to the Middle East?  It’s not as if anyone believes that carrier serves any legitimated purpose in Japan.
 
I can’t offer any definitive answers but the circumstantial evidence suggests that the Navy is woefully unprepared for combat.

A Stealthy Carrier

Reader ‘SRB’ recently wondered about how to make a carrier stealthy.  What a great thought exercise!  Let’s have some fun and explore the idea a bit.
 
At first glance, it would seem difficult or impossible to make a carrier stealthy and still retain its full functionality.  The sheer size, alone, makes it a challenging task.  In addition, the sponsons add all kinds of non-stealthy protuberances.  Sprinkle on the multitude of weapons, masts, radars, domes, etc. and the task seems impossible.  Well, that means we’ll need to think outside the box to design a stealthy carrier.  In no particular order, here are some design characteristics of a stealthy carrier.
 
Aircraft Elevators – Conventional external, side opening elevators would be eliminated in favor of internal elevators that momentarily open at flight deck level to load/unload aircraft.  This eliminates the non-stealthy openings and external elevator gear and allows a smooth, uninterrupted hull whose shape can be maximized for stealth.
 
Sponsons – Sponsons, whose purpose is to mount weapons out of the way of the flight deck, would be eliminated and the weapons converted to forms that are embedded in the hull (side angled VLS cells, for example) or retractable (under the flight deck, for example, as flight ops would not be conducted while firing weapons).  A carrier is mammoth and it’s not as if a carrier has lots of weapons.  We should be able to find plenty of room.
 
Island – The island, if it is still needed, would take the form of a typical slanted superstructure of a surface ship like the LCS or Visby.  In fact, the Ford class has a slightly stealthy island with a couple of slanted faces.  Of course, it then totally negates any benefit by festooning the island with protruding bridges, catwalks, masts, domes, etc.
 
Even better than a stealthy, slanted superstructure would be no superstructure, at all.  Why not have the functions buried inside the ship?  The only possible legitimate need for an island is to provide an elevated overwatch from which to direct flight deck activities and movements.  However, I’m thinking that we could function without this by using extensive camera views from many dozens of angles with the views being assembled into an ‘overhead’ view via software manipulations. 
 
Antennae – All antennae (Satcoms and the like) would have to be flush mounted into the superstructure just as radar panels are now.
 
Aircraft Spotting – Assuming a stealthy carrier would only operate stealthy aircraft, deck spotting should not be a major problem as far as impacting radar signature since the aircraft are, inherently, stealthy. 
 
Overhangs – I don’t know whether deck overhangs negatively impact stealth but I suspect they do.  A stealthy carrier would need a smooth hull that joins the deck all around – no overhanging decks.
 

An artist's concept of a stealth carrier

Discussion
 
One obvious implication from the preceding is that we’ll need a lot more internal ship’s volume to contain the many external functions that need to be internalized.  Just as it is a challenge to find room for internal weapon bays on stealth aircraft, so too, will it be a challenge to find room for the carriers external functions that now need to be moved internally.  This dictates that we ruthlessly eliminate any current function that is not directly combat related.  That means eliminating crew comforts, non-essential functions such as the extensive and powerful radar fits (carriers don’t radiate in combat), one or two aircraft elevators, and so forth.
 
Clearly, any attempt at a serious stealth carrier would result in a design well outside the conventional box but, why not?  There’s nothing inherently impossible in the task.  The basic carrier design hasn’t changed since pre-WWII.  Perhaps it’s time.  What do you think?  Could we build a stealthy carrier with enough stealth to be worth the effort?

Beckoning Beacon

Over the last several years ComNavOps has, quite rightly and wisely, criticized and mocked the Navy’s many absurd, ill-considered, individual plans and acquisitions.  It’s time, now, to look at the Navy’s overall fleet concept and see how it holds up to analysis.  Of course, given the failure and poor performance of the many individual elements, it’s probably not too hard to anticipate the result of this analysis but we’ll go through the exercise anyway in the hopes that it can offer some guidance about what not to do.
 
When I talk about the Navy’s overall plan, I’m referring to the Navy’s vision of the ideal task force.  Again, we’ve discussed the individual components but let’s bring them together, now.
 
HVU (High Value Unit).  The ideal task force will have a HVU(s) which could be a carrier(s), amphibious ships, or vitally important cargo ships surrounded by escorts. 
 
Escorts.  The escorts are envisioned to be a few (2-3?) Burke class destroyers for AAW and control of unmanned assets.  The Burkes will be in constant two-way communication with the unmanned assets as well as the other Burkes and HVUs.
 
The unmanned assets will consist of:
 
LUSV (Large Unmanned Surface Vessel).  Sailing near the Burkes will be these small (by ship standards and large relative only to the smaller unmanned vessels), missile-carrying, unmanned vessels operationally tethered to and controlled by a Burke.  Essentially, these are unmanned, mini-arsenal ships whose purpose is to supplement the missile magazines of the Burkes.  They have no weapons or sensors, themselves, and are wholly dependent on the Burkes for control.  These vessels will be in constant communication with the controlling Burkes who will provide them with remote operation and fire control solutions.
 
MUSV (Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel).  Forming an outer ring around the Burkes will be these small, sensor vessels operationally tethered to and controlled by a Burke.  Their function is to provide detection and situational awareness for the task force.  They will have no significant weapons or fire control.  Essentially, these are very large floating sensor barges.  These vessels will be in constant two-way communication with the controlling Burkes, continuously broadcasting high bandwidth, large volume data streams for analysis by the computers and analysts on the Burkes as well as receiving operational remote control.
 
UAV.  Ranging out beyond the task force ships, these small UAVs will conduct surveillance.  An example would be the MQ-8B/C Fire Scout.  These UAVs will be in constant communication with the controlling ship for remote operational control and continuously streaming transmission of sensor data.
 
USV.  Farthest out from the task force will be these tiny, free roaming, unmanned surface vessels that will operate way out in front of the task force, detecting and tracking enemy submarines and providing situational awareness.  Sea Hunter and the tiny sailboats we’ve seen are examples of these assets.  These USVs will be in constant communication with the controlling ship for remote operational control and will continuously stream sensor data back to the controlling ship.
 
P-8/Triton (BAMS – Broad Area Maritime Surveillance).  When available, the P-8 Poseidon/Triton combination, the pairing being referred to as BAMS, will provide overwatch and far distant surveillance, situational awareness, and, in their spare time, anti-submarine detection and prosecution.
 
 
Discussion
 
There you have it – the ideal Navy task force.  Of course, I’ve ignored a multitude of problems which would render the individual components ineffective but, setting that aside, did you notice the one, overriding characteristic of every element of the task force?  That’s right, it’s the requirement for constant, high bandwidth, streaming communications between the various elements.  We don’t have Terminator level AI yet so constant control communications are required.  None of the unmanned assets have any significant degree of on-board computer analysis so all data must be streamed back to the control vessel for analysis, interpretation, and decision making.
 
What we’ve just described is, in reality, a large task force sized, floating electromagnetic beacon continuously shouting, “Here I am!”, while some enemy surveillance technician tasked with finding the American running dogs smiles and says, “Well, that was easy.”.
 
Having handed the enemy our exact location, the only remaining unknown is the exact amount of time it will take for final ship of the task force to be sunk.
 
One of the constants of warfare throughout the ages has been EMCON.  This is beyond elementary.  You stay silent while, hopefully, tracking the enemy who is oblivious to your presence.  This allows you to choose the time and conditions of battle, - an enormous advantage!  The ideal task force not only violates the very concept of EMCON, it is directly the opposite.  It is a continuous electromagnetic beacon, pinpointing your location for the enemy. 
 
To believe that the degree of required communication can escape notice by the enemy is simply delusional.  If anyone has conducted a wargame about this (I doubt they have or they would have recoiled in horror at the idiocy of the concept), I’d love to see how they hand-waved away the free detection advantage for the enemy … and I’m sure their wrists were sore from all the waving!
 
What about the special case of a carrier as the HVU?  Wouldn’t this change things?
 
Carrier.  Of course, if the HVU is a carrier, this changes things a bit but, disappointingly, not all that much.  A carrier’s air wing will add another layer to the task force’s defense, which is good, but it comes at the price of additional communications.  The E-2 must communicate with the aircraft it controls and must transmit its sensor data to the ships of the task force.  The individual aircraft must communicate with the E-2 and the carrier for air traffic control.  The carrier must communicate with the aircraft.  And, of course, the Ford class EMALS is just the world’s largest electromagnetic beacon all by itself!
 
So, what has this analysis taught us?  It has demonstrated that we are violating the oldest principle of warfare by not concealing our location.  We need to be structuring the fleet to operate with the least amount of communication possible – none, being the ideal condition. 
 
Every asset we design and procure that requires communication is a step along the path to defeat.  The path to victory is silence (and firepower!).  During the Cold War, we practiced EMCON operations (we learned how to launch an entire carrier strike without transmitting!).  Unfortunately, the situation has gotten worse since every new piece of electronics seems to require even more power and communications. 
 

• We need to reverse this trend. 
  
• We need to restore the requirement that every piece of equipment (I’m looking at you, EMALS) be shielded and EMCON-capable.
• We need to halt the rush down the unmanned path.
• We need to realistically exercise our communications in a combat setting and see how bad the problem is.
• We need to begin designing equipment with minimal communications as a mandatory requirement.
• We need to rethink our command and control concept and eliminate the top down control bias.
• We need start thinking in terms of combat operations rather than technological fixation.

 
In combat, you talk, you die.  Stop talking!

The Mighty Carrier Strike Group 3

The USS Abraham Lincoln and escorts, comprising Carrier Strike Group 3 (CSG-3), are headed to the Middle East in reaction to a potential attack on Israel by Iran.  The mighty CSG-3 consists of,
 
Ships

• USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)
• USS O'Kane (DDG-77)
• USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. (DDG-121)
• USS Spruance (DDG-111)

 
Air Wing

• Strike Fighter Squadron 14 F/A-18E
• Strike Fighter Squadron 41 F/A-18F
• Strike Fighter Squadron 151 F/A-18E
• Strike Fighter Squadron 314 F-35C
• Electronic Attack Squadron 133 EA-18G
• Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117 E-2D
• Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 14 MH-60S
• Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 71  MH-60R

 
There you have it … CSG-3;  one carrier and three destroyers.  The carrier’s air wing (Carrier Air Wing 9) consists of three Hornet squadrons, one F-35 Marine squadron, and the usual mix of AEW, EW, and helos.
 
The mighty CSG-3.  Awesome combat power.
 
 
As you know, CSG-3 has existed for many years.  Purely as a point of historical interest, Wikipedia describes the group’s composition in 1992 as the Lincoln, five cruisers, four destroyers, and two frigates. 
 
The carrier’s air wing consisted of two Tomcat squadrons, two Hornet squadrons, one Intruder squadron, one Viking squadron, and the usual mix of AEW, EW, and helos.
 
Ships

• USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)
• USS Shiloh (CG-67)
• USS Princeton (CG-59)
• USS Texas (CGN-39)
• USS California (CGN-36)
• USS Sterett (CG-31)
• USS Ingersoll (DD-990)
• USS John Young (DD-973)
• USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62)
• USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53)
• USS Ingraham (FFG-61)
• USS Gary (FFG-51)                  
  

 
Air Wing

• Fighter Squadron 213: F-14A    
  
• Fighter Squadron 114: F-14A    
  
• Strike Fighter Squadron 94: F/A-18C     
  
• Strike Fighter Squadron 22: F/A-18C
• Attack Squadron 95: A-6E, KA-6D
• Electronic Warfare Squadron 135: EA-6B
• Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117: E-2C
• Sea Control Squadron 29: S-3B
• Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 6: SH-60F, HH-60H

 
 
Does this really need any discussion?  The decreased in numbers, firepower, and capability is self-evident.  We are on the wrong path.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Wikipedia, “Carrier Strike Group 3”, retrieved 12-Aug-2024,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_Strike_Group_3

Ford Class Notes

Here’s some tidbits pertaining to the Ford class, as noted in the recent CRS report.[1]
 
 
Carriers – The Navy is statutorily (10 U.S.C. 8062(b)) required to maintain 11 operational carriers.  Note that one (now, two due to chronic maintenance delays) carrier is always in long term overhaul so we only have 10 (now 9) operational carriers.  Note that the Navy’s own 30 year plan indicates that the Navy would operate less than the mandated 11 carriers for over half of the 30 year period of the plan.  This is blatant disregard for Congressional mandates.
 
Air Wings – The Navy is statutorily (10 U.S.C. 8062(e)) required to maintain 9 air wings.  The original statute required 10 air wings but Congress acceded to the Navy’s request for 9.
 
Early Retirement – The Navy is statutorily (10 U.S.C. 8062(g)) prohibited from retiring a nuclear carrier prior to its first refueling.  This was implemented in response to the Navy’s attempt to early retire Nimitz class carriers prior to their refueling.
 
CVN-79 John F. Kennedy – CVN-79 has already exceeded its cost cap and the Navy has revised the cap upward.
 
CVN-80 Enterprise – The Navy now estimates that CVN-80 delivery will be delayed 18-26 months.
 
CVN-81 Doris Miller – The Navy estimates the cost of CVN-81 to be $14B.
 
Cost Cap – The provisions that established and later amended the cost caps are listed below.  Note the continual increases in cap levels.  It’s not really a cap if it’s continually increased, is it?
 

Section 122 of the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006) established a procurement cost cap for CVN-78 of $10.5 billion … and a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford-class carriers of $8.1 billion each …

 

Section 121 of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3304/P.L. 113-66 of December 26, 2013) amended the procurement cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $12,887.0 million for CVN-78 and a revised cap of $11,498.0 million for each follow-on ship

 

Section 122 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015) further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $11,398.0 million for each follow-on ship in the program

 

Section 121(a) of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017) further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $12,568.0 million for CVN-80 and subsequent ships in the program … The cap for CVN-79 was kept at $11,398.0 million … The provision also amended the basis for adjusting the caps for inflation, and excluded certain costs from being counted against the caps.

 

Section 121 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 of December 20, 2019) further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide revised caps of $13,224.0 million for CVN-78, $11,398.0 million for CVN–79, $12,202.0 million for CVN–80, and $12,451.0 million for CVN–81. The provision directs the Navy to exclude from these figures costs for CVN–78 class battle spares, interim spares, and increases attributable to economic inflation after December 1, 2018.

 
 
Discussion
 
What these notes demonstrate is the blatant disregard the Navy has for Congress’ wishes (and laws!).  Most of these legal mandates are the result of the Navy ignoring Congress’ directives.  The problem is that there are no consequences for the Navy’s disregard of Congress.  New laws need to have statutory criminal penalties associated with them.  Currently, the Navy can ignore Congress and there is no criminal penalty.  A minimum penalty for failure to meet Congress’ mandates should be termination from service, forfeiture of pay and pension, and a year in jail for everyone associated with a particular failing, beginning with the CNO and moving down the line.  Perhaps that would encourage compliance with Congress’ wishes.
 
To be fair, Congress is not blameless in this, by any means.  Congress keeps appeasing the Navy by raising cost caps, approving flag positions, and increasing the Navy’s budget.  Congress needs to institute a moratorium on approval of flag positions until the Navy begins obeying Congress, hold firm on cost caps, and begin decreasing the Navy’s budget 10% per year until the Navy begins obeying Congress.
 
The Navy has forgotten that it serves Congress and the people, not the other way around.
 
 
 
[1]Congressional Research Service, “Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, 12-Jul-2024, RS20643

The Carrier Ascendant

WWII saw the twilight of the battleship and the ascendency of the carrier as the primary source of naval strike firepower.  Why?  What characteristics made carrier power superior?  No, this isn’t a trick question.  The answer is the simple and obvious one.  Carriers were able to deliver significant firepower but so could any surface ship so that’s not the answer.  What made the carrier so effective was that it could deliver that firepower
 

• from a great distance and,
• cheaply

 
Carriers could strike from well beyond the horizon and, possibly more importantly, it could do so cheaply in the sense that the firepower delivery unit, the individual aircraft, cold be easily and affordably replaced to mitigate the inevitable attrition.  Trained pilots, of course, were a separate issue.
 
Consider the import of the cost aspect.  Previously, in a clash of surface ships, the firepower delivery unit was the ship itself and multi-billion dollar ships (expressed in terms of today’s relative costs) were routinely lost in combat.  It took years and enormous costs to replace a lost ship.  Carriers, however, did not risk themselves in the delivery of their firepower – they just risked their aircraft and each aircraft represented only around 1/90^th (an air wing of 90 aircraft) of the carrier’s combat effectiveness.  Further, losing an aircraft was a nearly insignificant event (the pilots would, of course, vehemently disagree!) and the aircraft could be readily replaced.  In fact, carriers routinely carried spare aircraft, ‘boxed’ and ready to assemble.  Replacement aircraft were free, on a relative basis.
 

SBD Dauntless - Rise of the Carrier

 

Yes, carriers were at risk during the overall strike operations.  If a carrier was in range to strike, it was also in range to be struck.  We’re talking about the act of striking, not the overall operation.
 
So much for belaboring the obvious.  How is this relevant to us, now?
 
Consider the cruise missile.  What are its outstanding characteristics compared to the current primary strike unit of the Navy which is, of course, the carrier and its aircraft?  Cruise missiles have two major characteristics that distinguish them from aircraft:
 

• Greater range
• Much lower cost (nearly free on a relative basis compared to aircraft)

 
Does this sound familiar?  Are these not the exact characteristics which led to the ascent of the carrier over the battleship?
 
The cruise missile is now ascendant over the carrier for strike operations.  Indeed, ComNavOps has repeatedly stated that the carrier is in its twilight as a strike platform.  It is, of course, still dominant in the air superiority role.
 
We need to remember what led to the demise of the battleship and rise of the carrier and be wise enough to recognize those same characteristics in the cruise missile relative to the carrier.
 

LRASM - Demise of the Carrier

 

We also need to recognize that one of the characteristics that led to the rise of the carrier and now the cruise missile is affordability.  We need to keep that characteristic firmly in mind.  If the missile becomes too expensive, which is the path we’re on now, then it loses its ascendency.  Cruise missiles have tripled in price over the last decade or two as we add ever more sophisticated and complex functionality which serves no real combat purpose.  We need to keep the missiles as simple as possible which will keep them affordable and rapidly producible.
 
During WWII, we built an average of 80 F6F Hellcats per week.  Today, we’re doing well if we can build 80 missiles per year.  We’ve got to bring the missile cost and complexity down so that we can produce them at useful war rates.
 
Strike has moved on from the carrier and we need to adjust our fleet composition and air wings accordingly.

Essex vs. Ford Comparison

Here’s a quick, fun little comparison …
 
The USS Ford, CVN-78, was commissioned Jul 2017, some 76 years after the USS Essex, CV-9, was commissioned in Dec 1942.  The improvements in carrier combat capability over the intervening 75 years must be astounding!  Let’s consider a few of the stunning improvements.
 
Speed
Essex   30+ kts
Ford     30+ kts
 
Hmm … Well, no difference there.
 
 
Range
Essex   16,000 miles at 20 kts
Ford     Unlimited
 
Of course, for operational purposes, 16,000 miles is unlimited range since there are no 16,000+ mile missions so I guess there’s no practical difference there.
 
 
Anti-Air Armament
Essex   90 guns of various types
Ford     5 guns + 2 missile launchers of various types
 
While a direct comparison of anti-air weaponry is pointless, the density of available weapons is quite pertinent and a WWII Essex puts a modern carrier to shame.
 
 
Air Wing
Essex   100 combat aircraft [1]
Ford     44 combat aircraft^a (65 total aircraft counting helos, EW, and AEW)
 
^a Available combat aircraft is around 36 since many are used as tankers
 
Well, that’s surprising.  Today’s carrier seems to have less than half the air wing combat capability of a WWII Essex. 
 

Essex - Greater Combat Value

 

Conclusion
 
Do you find it a little disturbing that the combat capability of our aircraft carriers has not improved since WWII and, in fact, the only really important characteristic, air wing size, has markedly decreased? 
 
Further, when factoring in the construction cost,
 
Early Essex      $40M  ($750M in 2023) [2]
Late Essex        $78M  ($1.33B in 2023) [2]
Ford                  $16B+
 
the Ford represents a staggering decrease in combat value for the dollar.
 
It’s clear that our carriers have become less combat effective over time.  I know that some of the less enlightened among you will attempt to say that a Ford can strike from a longer distance and with more precise, devastating weapons.  Well, first, that’s a reflection of the air wing, not the carrier and, second, that’s an absurd comparison.  The proper way to compare between WWII and today is to do so relative to the time period and the threats that existed during that period. 
 
During the Essex’s time, our carriers overmatched enemy forces, whether ship or land based, by a significant margin.  The 100 aircraft (Hellcats, Corsairs, Avengers) per carrier were far superior to enemy aircraft.  The carrier could operate with near impunity anywhere it wanted. 
 
In contrast, modern carriers are significantly inferior to land based forces (aircraft, missiles, etc.) and we acknowledge that we can’t operate them too near enemy forces.  Our 36 combat aircraft (Hornets) per carrier are, at best, on par with enemy aircraft and, more realistically, a bit less capable than enemy aircraft.
 
Despite nearly eighty years of development, today’s carriers have less combat value than a WWII Essex.  That’s disappointing and a damning indictment of Navy leadership.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_air_wing
 
[2]https://www.patriotspoint.org/news-and-events/carriers-from-heaven-or-how-much-did-they-cost/

What We Once Were

 What we once were ...

Carrier Group

Count 'em!

1 carrier

4 submarine escorts

13 surface ship escorts

3 logistic support ships

Now, imagine four such groups combined into a single carrier combat task force.  And many of you doubted my stated requirement for 30+ escorts for a carrier group?

This is what we once were ... combat ready and capable.  We need to return to that.

The Whale

The Douglas A-3 (originally, A3D) Skywarrior, known as the Whale, offers several insights to modern carrier and aircraft (in particular, a large, long range air superiority fighter) design.
 
To briefly review, the Whale was the largest aircraft to routinely operate from a carrier (the E-2 Hawkeye comes close depending on what parameter one looks at).  With a crew of 3-7, depending on the variant, it filled the roles of strike, nuclear strike, electronic warfare (EW), tanker, recon, and bomb damage assessment.  The ample room in the aircraft afforded great flexibility in design of the many variants.  The aircraft served from the 1950’s to 1991.
 

A-3 Skywarrior

Interestingly, the A-3 had the most capacity of any Navy tanker, delivering 29,000 lb of fuel at 460 miles (see, “Navy Aerial Refueling”).  The Navy is currently struggling to develop a tanker with half that capacity (stated goal of 15,000 lb at 500 miles).
 
 

 

What lessons does the A-3 Skywarrior/Whale offer for today’s ship and aircraft designs?
 
 
Aircraft Weight – A constant claim, today, is that we can’t operate large tankers, large air superiority fighters, or any large aircraft because we can’t launch/recover heavy aircraft.  This is patently false as the Whale demonstrated.  We not only routinely operated the Whale from carriers but we did so from post-WWII Essex and Midway class carriers![1]  The steam catapults of the day were sufficient to launch the 40,000-80,000 lb Whale which leads one to wonder why we felt we needed EMALS.  We could launch and recover heavy aircraft before.  We didn’t need EMALS and certainly didn’t need it until it was fully debugged and ready.
 
Aircraft weight, at least up to that of the Whale, is not a constraint on modern carrier or aircraft design.
 
 
Aircraft Size - There is a common misbelief that we can’t operate aircraft much larger than a Hornet from a carrier deck.  For example, this fallacy is used to argue against large air superiority fighters.  However, we see from the Whale’s operational history that this is not true.  The A-3 was 72 ft long with a 76 ft wingspan and we managed to operate them from post-WWII Essex and Midway class carriers up through the supercarriers of the Nimitz class.  This doesn’t mean we can have an air wing of 90+ Whale size aircraft but it means we can certainly operate larger aircraft than we have now (the Hornet).  Our carrier decks are barely half-full.  We can easily operate many more large aircraft.
 
 
Payload – Weapons were carried in an internal bomb bay which demonstrates that large amounts of weapons can be carried internally on a large fighter – how large, of course, is the question.  An AMRAAM is around 360 lbs so, in theory, a Skywarrior could have carried 33 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles (ignoring actual launch mechanisms and dimensional constraints).
 
 
Carrier Design – The A-3 initially operated from post-WWII Essex and Midway carriers thus demonstrating that the massive deck of the Nimitz/Ford is not a requirement to operate large aircraft.  We don’t have to constantly design larger and larger carriers.  We simply have to remember how to operate large air wings on moderate sized carrier decks.  Our current air wings are steadily shrinking while the carriers are steadily increasing in size.  What’s wrong with this picture?
 
 
Air Superiority Fighter
 
Let’s look at the specific case of the air superiority fighter.  As you know, ComNavOps has proposed a very long range, air superiority fighter and, due to existing paradigms among commenters, arguments have claimed that it’s not possible to design a suitably long range fighter and that, if it were possible, the aircraft would be:
 
-too large to operate from a carrier
-too heavy to operate from a carrier
-unable to carry enough weapons
 
and, finally, that if such an aircraft could be built, there’s no room on a carrier for such an aircraft.
 
As the Whale routinely demonstrated, we can, and did, operate large, heavy aircraft from a carrier – larger and heavier than anything we operate currently.  Combined with the nearly half-size air wings, we have lots of room for large aircraft such as a long range, air superiority fighter.
 
 
Conclusion
 
We’ve forgotten what we were once had and what we were once capable of doing and now believe those things to be impossible.  The only impossibility seems to be remembering what we once had.
 
Routine operation of large, heavy aircraft was long ago proven.  This invalidates the argument that we can’t operate a large air superiority fighter from a carrier.
 
The Whale proved that we don’t need EMALS or Advanced Arresting Gear to operate large, heavy aircraft.  The ancient steam catapult and landing gear were perfectly adequate.  We could revert to the Kitty Hawk carrier design and be perfectly capable of operating many large air superiority fighters. 
 
So says the Whale!
 
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]https://www.a3skywarrior.com/ready-room/a-3-squadron-history.html

Carrier Scouting

ComNavOps constantly harps on targeting (see, “Weapons Don’t Matter”).  As I always say, a million mile missile is useless with ten mile targeting.  Closely related to targeting is scouting.  You want to know where the threat is and is not.  In a sense, targeting is a subset of scouting; the final ‘phase’ of scouting before the strike. 
 
Unlike targeting which is purely offensive, scouting supports both offense and defense.  If you know where the threat is, you can prepare your defenses accordingly.  Scouting provides the commander with situational awareness and, as such, it is just as important to know where the enemy isn’t as where he is.
 
Let’s look a bit closer at carrier group scouting.  As always, we begin with historical examples.
 
 
WWII
 
Many of us don’t realize that the standard operating procedure of American carrier groups in WWII was to send a dozen or so scout planes (generally SBD Dauntless aircraft) out at dawn every morning to search the surrounding seas for any sign of enemy ships or aircraft.
 

SBD Dauntless

In the book, Queen of the Flat-Tops, Lt.Cmdr. Mort Seligman, executive officer of the Lexington (CV-2) had this to say about scouting: 

“We are under a handicap out here.  The limited range of our scouts makes it necessary for us to be forever on our toes.  If we want to find out what the enemy is doing we’ve got to move up to within easy range of his land-based aircraft to find out.
 
“On the other hand, the Japanese, by using these 3000-mile Kawanishi [flying] boats, can see a lot farther than we can.  They range out over the ocean and watch every movement within some 1,000 miles of their bases.  There’s little we do in daylight that they can’t know about.  It costs them a plane every so often because we shoot them down every time we come across them.  But with these clouds out here this isn’t always possible because even though we know they are there we can’t always find them.
 
Once their day patrols have come out and they know their waters are clear for 500 miles around, they can relax.  Even if they find us they have time to bring up air defenses before we can get in our poke.  That limits our attacks almost to early morning only after an all-night fast approach.  And it makes it very difficult for us to gain the advantage of the element of surprise which is a much more important factor in war than most people realize.”[1]

Lt.Cmdr. Seligman succinctly defines both the problem and solutions for the carrier group:
 

• Problem:  Our carrier scouts were shorter range than the Japanese land based scouts.


• Solution:  Seek out and destroy the enemy’s scout planes (counter-scouting) and conduct high speed, night run-ins to the target to launch dawn strikes before the enemy can get their scouts out and alert their defenses.

 
Of course, in the open ocean, out of range of land-based scouts, the enemy naval forces had the same scout range limitations we did and the scouting contest was even;  both sides had an equal chance of finding the other first.
 
Prior (or in addition) to carriers, one of the functions of cruisers was to operate floatplanes to conduct scouting.  The Brooklyn class cruiser, for example, operated four floatplanes using a pair of stern catapults and a recovery crane.
 
That summarizes the issue for WWII surface and carrier groups but how does the issue translate to modern times?
 
 
Today
 
The same general issue and constraints apply today with the carrier at, perhaps, a somewhat worse disadvantage. Let’s consider some aspects of modern naval scouting.
 
Scout Planes – Part of the problem is that we have no carrier scout aircraft.  The E-2 Hawkeye is most emphatically not a scout aircraft and they are never deployed too far from the protection of the carrier.  We lack a dedicated scout aircraft with great range and great sensors (passive and active).  Instead, we would have to use F-18 Hornets as scouts and the Hornet simply hasn’t got the range (or sensors) to be an effective scout.  The F-35C offers a slight improvement in range and survivability but is still not an effective broad area maritime scout.
 
Conversely, China has very long range, land-based bombers, maritime patrol aircraft, and UAVs that can serve the scout function, just as Japan did in WWII.
 
Sensors – Enemy scout assets include land-based, very long range aircraft, satellites, UAVs, etc. which, in the aggregate, offer potentially multi-thousand mile scouting as compared to our few hundred mile range carrier scouting capability.  Of course, we also have the possibility of using satellites and UAVs as scouts but given that we’ll be operating far closer to China than to any US bases, we’ll be much more limited in the degree of scouting support we can expect.
 
Strike Range – WWII carriers only had to scout a couple hundred miles out to be assured of safety since that was the limit of carrier aircraft strike range.  Today, cruise and ballistic missiles have extended the potential strike range – and, hence, scouting range requirement - to thousands of miles.
 
Counter-Scouting – One of the F-14 Tomcat’s roles was counter-scouting.  Their job was to eliminate the Soviet Tu-95 Bears before they could find our carriers.  Counter-scouting, today, includes countering satellites, submarine surveillance, over-the-horizon radars, SOSUS-type listening arrays, aircraft, etc.  This can no longer be done just by the carrier’s organic assets.  For example, countering satellites is a strategic responsibility outside the carrier’s capability (barring ship launched anti-satellite missiles).  Countering sea bed listening arrays is, again, a strategic responsibility.
 
 
Conclusion
 
While we may optimistically hope that we can get land-based scouting support, the reality is that our nearest source of scout aircraft in the Pacific theater will be Guam or some such base that is thousands of miles from likely carrier operating areas and that makes any scouting support sporadic, at best, and utterly ineffective, more likely.  Our carriers need an organic scout aircraft that is available whenever and wherever needed
 
Night, and the corresponding dawn search from WWII, is no longer sufficient given that darkness is no longer the ‘shield’ it once was.  We need to be able to scout 24 hours a day and, again, land-based scouts simply cannot provide that capability on a sustained basis.
 
Interestingly, the F-35C could serve as an effective scout plane if it were given a dedicated set of effective passive and active sensors.  The F-35C has a useful degree of stealth, though not up to modern combat standards, and this would allow it to conduct scouting missions survivably and with a fair chance of not being spotted, in turn.
 
The F-35C can also effectively perform the counter-scout role against non-combat aircraft and would even have a chance against combat stealth aircraft, though not dominantly so.
 
It’s clear to see that counter-scouting must extend many hundreds of miles in all directions, on a continuous basis.  This last part is vital.  Given the speed of modern aircraft, it is no longer sufficient to scout/clear an area once a day.  We must have nearly continuous coverage.  An enemy scouting asset can appear far too quickly and cover far too much area to assume an area once cleared will stay clear of enemy scouting assets.  This suggests a heavy reliance on long endurance UAVs.  Ideally, we’d have long endurance, stealthy, UAVs operated by the dozens from a dedicated UAV carrier (a converted merchant ship).
 
The Navy has to start getting serious about combat instead of just being focused on new hulls.  We need to focus on mine warfare, mine countermeasures, logistics, large caliber naval gun support, long range fighters, small ASW ships, close in defensive AAW weapons, and scouting  …  you know, all the things that aren’t shiny and sexy but that win wars.
 
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Johnston, Stanley, Queen of the Flat-Tops, Bantam Books, 1942, ISBN: 0-553-24264-4, p.130

Yokosuka Pearl Harbor

The US Navy has, for several decades, maintained a permanently forward deployed carrier at Yokosuka, Japan.  Here’s the sequence of carriers that have been based at Yokosuka:
 
1973  Midway
1991  Independence
1998  Kitty Hawk
2008  Washington
2015  Reagan
2024  Washington
 
 
To have maintained a carrier at Yokosuka for so many decades, the Navy must perceive some value in it.  What is that value?  I ask because I’m not seeing it.  Let’s examine some possible benefits and risks.
 
 
Deterrence
 
The obvious potential benefit – and the one that I’m sure the Navy believes - is deterrence of the Chinese.  In general terms, we’ve discredited forward presence as a deterrent.  Let’s look at the history of China’s actions over the last several decades and see whether deterrence has worked.  Note, this is attempting to prove a negative which is not possible so we’ll try to discern a pattern to see whether we’re succeeding at deterring China.  Consider the following Chinese actions:
 

• China has annexed every unclaimed or disputed island/reef in the East and South China Seas.
• China has built and militarized several artificial islands, illegally and in violation of the UNCLOS treaty of which they are a signatory.
• China forced down and seized a US EP-3 surveillance aircraft in international airspace.  They then held the aircraft and crew, stripped the aircraft of equipment, and dismantled the aircraft before eventually releasing the crew.
• China seized a US underwater drone vehicle.
• China has routinely violated Philippine and Vietnam territorial waters.
• Chinese fishing fleets have routinely encroached on the territorial waters of various countries.
• China has routinely threatened Taiwan and violated its territory and air defense zones.
• China has interfered with US military operations in international waters (McCain towed array incident near Subic Bay, Philippines, for example).

 
Does this sound like we’ve deterred China?  Does this sound like a pattern of deterrence?  Not in the least!  It sounds like a pattern of unrestrained, non-kinetic conquest!
 
Some of you are going to attempt to claim the fact that China hasn’t initiated a war demonstrates that deterrence must be working.  Of course, there is absolutely no indication that China had any intention of going to war with the US, prior to now.  You can’t deter someone from doing something they weren’t going to do anyway. 
 
Even now, why would China want to go to war with the US?  They’re getting everything they want without needing a war!  They’ve annexed and fortified the entire East and South China Seas.  For all practical purposes, they’ve kicked us out of the E/S China Seas.  They’re expanding into the Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South America, and Cuba.  They’re in the process of annexing the Philippines through a combination of emigration, intimidation, and foreign assistance.  They’re isolating Taiwan and working to encircle Japan.  They’re attempting to intimidate Australia and gain control of various strategic resources via financial and business manipulations.  And the list goes on and on.
 
They don’t need or want a war when they can get everything they want thanks to our policy of appeasement.
 
Is a single carrier in Japan deterring China from anything?  No.
 

USS Reagan at Yokosuka

 

Combat
 
Another potential benefit is combat.  Can a single carrier conduct initial, forward, combat operations to disrupt Chinese operations and buy time for a more forceful US response?
 
Unfortunately, as we’ve repeatedly proven, a single carrier is not an effective combat force.  It’s a ship waiting to be sunk.  A single carrier is incapable of effective self-defense let alone able to simultaneously mount any kind of useful offense.  A single carrier serves no purpose other than to provide China with a live fire, carrier SINKEX.  So, if a single carrier is not survivable in combat and serves no useful combat purpose … why are we maintaining one there?
 
 
 
Risk
 
Okay, so a Japan-based carrier offers no benefits but what’s the harm?  Why do we care whether there’s a carrier in Japan?  The answer is that we care because of the concomitant risk of losing that carrier.
 
There are only a couple of possibilities for a Japan-based carrier at the start of a war with China:
 

• The carrier is sunk in the first hour of the war.  China is not going to pass up a free sinking of a carrier.
• Japan opts to remain neutral and the carrier is interned for the duration.

 
Neither of those options provides any useful combat capability and both result in the loss of the carrier.  The inescapable conclusion is that a Japan-based carrier is a certain loss in a war with China.  Is the loss of a hideously expensive carrier and air wing for no positive return really what we want?  I would hope not!
 
A carrier in Japan is a ‘Pearl Harbor’ waiting to happen.  You might be tempted to say that we’ll simply pull the carrier back to the US if war seems likely.  That’s possible but history suggests that’s unlikely.  We had ample warning about the actual Pearl Harbor and opted to do nothing.  China is all but telling us they’re just about ready to initiate the invasion of Taiwan and we haven’t pulled our carrier out of danger.  History – and our current inactions – strongly indicate that our carrier will still be sitting, docked in Japan, when war starts.
 
 
Summary
 
So, if a single Japan-based carrier isn’t providing any discernible deterrent effect, isn’t survivable in combat, can’t contribute any useful offense, and is certain to be ‘Pearl Harbored’ in the first hour of a war  …  why do we have a carrier there?  There are two answers:
 

1. Inertia – we’ve always had one there so we’ll continue to do so.
2. Stupidity – our so-called professional warriors are too stupid to understand the situation and change it.  As we’ve repeatedly documented on this blog, the extent of stupidity by Navy leadership is staggering and this is yet another example.

 
The conclusion is obvious – we need to end the Japan-based, forward deployment of a carrier and bring the carrier back home.

Assault Carrier

Over the course of the blog, many commenters have suggested using the big deck LHA/LHD (LHx) as baby carriers.  We’ve discredited this notion in terms of traditional carrier operations (see, “LightningCarrier”) due to the limited size of the air wing and the complete lack of ability to operate E-2 Hawkeye AEW, tankers, and E/A-18G Growler EW aircraft that are crucial to combat effective air operations.
 
Other commenters have suggested using supercarriers for ground support to make up for the complete absence of naval gunfire.  This is a non-starter as the role of the carrier in an amphibious assault is interdiction of enemy strikes and reinforcements and the proper place to do that is hundreds or thousands of miles from the assault site.  It is suicidal folly to ‘tie’ a carrier to one location which is what would be required for a carrier to provide direct ground support for an amphibious assault.  And, lest we forget, we also lack a true ground attack naval aircraft.
 
However, the possibility exists that a dedicated, small, assault carrier could be useful in supporting amphibious assault operations.  Well, wait … don’t we already have ground support carriers in the form of our big deck amphibious ships (LHA/LHD)?
 
Yes, we do, but not effectively.  Consider, currently, the aviation component of an assault is housed on the LHx ships of which we only have a few (9 total LHA/LHD) and they have very limited air wings.  A typical LHx air wing consists of:

 

That’s a limited capability mix that lacks the number of aircraft to be effective in any of its roles.  Six strike aircraft can’t provide effective ground support, a dozen tiltrotors can’t transport a useful number of troops and gear, and four heavy lift helos can’t provide rapid, efficient heavy equipment transport.  Like most mixes, the air wing is a compromise that can do a little bit of everything but nothing well and ‘nothing well’ is not how you succeed in combat.  We’ve thoroughly analyzed the shortcomings of the LHx as regards aviation (see, “Aviation Amphibious Assault Ships”)  and provided the rationale for splitting off aviation from assault (see, “Separate Aviation FromAmphibious”) so I won’t belabor it any further, here.
  
The LHx came about because the Marines, institutionally terrified of being abandoned by the Navy (the Guadalcanal legacy) tried to combine the functions of both a carrier and an assault transport and, not surprisingly, managed to construct an unaffordable monstrosity that places too many eggs in one basket while performing neither function well.  So, why don’t we try separating the two functions into dedicated ships, each optimized for their role?  We previously discussed dedicated attack transports (see, “Attack Transport - APA”).
 
Having established the problems with an LHx and the rationale for separating the aviation and assault functions, let’s now consider what a dedicated amphibious assault aviation support ship (an assault carrier) would conceptually look like.
 
Focus – Separating the aviation component from assault allows us to eliminate the transport function leaving the carrier able to focus on ground attack/support.  This is crucial for a ship that will, hopefully, be substantially smaller than a full size carrier.
 
There is no need for transport helos.  They’re inefficient at their function and they’re non-survivable over a battlefield as amply demonstrated in Vietnam, Soviet Afghanistan, US Afghanistan, and elsewhere.  If we really think we need helos for some limited aspect of logistics support, we can easily provide a dedicated transport/cargo helo carrier by converting a merchant ship.
 
Aircraft – This is key to determining what an assault carrier would look like.  The choice of aircraft will determine the size and characteristics of the carrier.
 
Stealth aircraft are not needed and, indeed, stealth is largely useless when providing close range ground support (CAS).  The enemy can see you and the main threat is guns (ZSU-ish weapons) and small heat seeking, Stinger-type, shoulder launched anti-air missiles.  Radar stealth offers no benefit against either of those threats.
 
What is needed is an aircraft with the best possible combination of the following characteristics:
 

• Inexpensive so that appropriate numbers and replacements can be procured
• Armored for maximum airframe and pilot survivability
• Redundant and manual control systems enabling the aircraft to absorb tremendous amounts of damage
• Minimal IR signature to mitigate the main threat of Stinger-type missiles
• Minimal complexity which allows for easy repair/maintainability for excellent availability rates and combat damage repair
• Low maintenance per flight hour
• High sortie rates
• Excellent low speed maneuverability
• Minimal carrier operating requirements such as no, or simple, catapults and arresting gear
• Maximum number of weapons (hard points) as opposed to payload weight maximums.  In CAS, it’s far more useful to have a large number of weapons rather than a high payload weight.  To illustrate, it would be far more useful to have an aircraft with, say, ten weapon stations (hard points), each rated for a 500 lb bomb (5000 lb total payload) than an aircraft with four weapons, each rated for a 2000 lb (8000 lb total payload).

 
Having identified the desirable aircraft characteristics, let’s consider some candidate aircraft.
 
F-35B - The F-35B is often touted as a CAS aircraft but, in reality, is ill-suited for the ground attack/support role.  It is a large, fuel hogging, maintenance intensive, complex, non-damage resilient, limited hard point aircraft with staggeringly atrocious availability rates.  In addition, it is hideously expensive to procure and operate.
 
A-10 - The A-10 has many of the characteristics we’d like such as armor, redundant/manual flight controls, low maintenance, high sortie rates, and 11 weapon stations.  Of course, a naval version of the A-10 does not exist and would have to be developed.
 
F-16 – The F-16 is fairly maneuverable at moderately lower speeds but has only 6 (possibly 7?) weapon hard points and, like the A-10, does not exist as a carrier variant.  It also lacks any useful ground sensors, is unarmored, and lacks rugged, redundant controls.
 
A-1 Skyraider - A candidate you might not think of is the prop driven A-1 Skyraider.  It is incredibly simple (compared to a jet), free by current standards, easily maintainable and repairable (a wrench and duct tape), armored, highly maneuverable at low speeds, has very high availability rates, has 15 weapon stations, and can use simple catapults and arresting gear.  Further, it is a carrier aircraft and would need no development, whatsoever!
 
It is clear that high performance jets are not desirable for the aviation support role.  The best match to the desired aircraft characteristics is the A-1 Skyraider!  This, then, is the conceptual basis for an assault aircraft.  Having determined that, we can now focus on the design of the ship, itself.
 
Air Wing – Having chosen a conceptual aircraft, we now need to decide how many aircraft are needed in the air wing.  The answer, of course, is ‘as many as possible’.  Well, that’s not very helpful.  A better answer is that the number of aircraft is derived from a combination of factors such as the resultant carrier size/cost, combat effectiveness, dispersal of risk, etc.  A reasonable answer would seem to be somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 aircraft.  More than that and the carrier gets too large and costly.  Less than that and combat effectiveness drops precipitously.
 
Carrier – The first determination is whether we need a straight deck or angled deck.  Ideally, we’d like a straight deck, operated like WWII carrier, with no catapults and simple arresting gear.  If we could launch B-25’s off a Yorktown class carrier, I’d like to believe that we could design a Skyraider type aircraft that could launch unassisted.  Elimination of catapults would greatly reduce mechanical and utility (steam or electric) requirements which reduces the size and cost of the ship.  Assuming we can do this, we’ll be able to use a straight deck design which, again, reduces the size and cost of the ship.
 
As a point of reference, the US Navy WWII escort carriers were around 500 ft long and 10,000 – 20,000 tons with air wings of 30+ aircraft.  That seems like a good conceptual starting point for a design.
 
If we can keep the cost low enough, we can afford to build the carriers in sufficient numbers and be able to replace the inevitable losses of a vessel that is purposely placed in harm’s way.
 
The final consideration in this discussion is the fact that I don’t think there’s a strategic or operational need for amphibious assaults so the entire discussion is moot.  However, if we did want to maintain an amphibious capability, an assault carrier would be a step in the right direction though ultimately pointless without lots of large caliber naval guns.