What we once were ...
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| Carrier Group |
Count 'em!
1 carrier
4 submarine escorts
13 surface ship escorts
3 logistic support ships
Now, imagine four such groups combined into a single carrier combat task force. And many of you doubted my stated requirement for 30+ escorts for a carrier group?
This is what we once were ... combat ready and capable. We need to return to that.
While larger carrier groups have more robust defenses and logistics, they're also more liable to concentrated attacks. The bigger they are the harder they sink I suppose.
ReplyDelete"they're also more liable to concentrated attacks."
DeleteI seriously debated deleting this comment for abject stupidity. Taking your implied logic to its logical conclusion, the ideal group would be a single ship (and a small one at that?). To use your own words, it would have less robust defenses and logistics but would be less liable to concentrated attack. The counter to that ridiculous notion is history which demonstrates that single ships almost always wind up sunk. It is easy for the enemy to muster enough force to sink a single ship. It is very difficult for the enemy to muster enough force to sink a large, well defended group.
One hopes you're familiar with the phrase, 'defeat in detail', and what it means although it appears you're not? Go study and understand the phrase.
You want the biggest, most powerful defense you can muster and if the enemy obligingly attacks in force, you destroy them in force and thank them for making your job easier (destruction of enemy forces is, after all, your overall objective!) by assembling their forces in one, easy to find/defeat location. The Marianas Turkey Shoot or Letye would be examples of this.
You need to study basic naval warfare concepts before you comment again.
In the good days of Soviet Naval Aviation, we'd send many regiments of Backfires to attack the American carrier groups off the Kola Peninsula. All available regiments would attack a single group, to maximize the chance of success. (Based on many games of "Seapower & the State")
DeleteTo back up the CNO’s response, during the carrier battles of 1942, the USN had individual carriers and their escorts on defense (and offense) operating independently. This policy was reversed later as concentration of anti aircraft fire power and combined combat air patrols were much more effective than any gain from dispersal of forces.
DeleteYes, but that fleet does not meet environmental standards or minimal manning requirements, so it won't do.
ReplyDeleteI think it would require a LOT of escorts to secure a carrier.
ReplyDeleteEach carrier probably needs at least 4 Burke/Ticonderoga for AAW.
ASW doesn't really seem to exist in the current navy.
But for ASW, I would have two types of dedicated ships; a Perry type of ship with two helicopters and a Fletcher type of ship without helicopters.
These would work as 3-ship teams with one "Perry" and two "Fletchers" working together in the screen.
I would think that each carrier would need, at a minimum, three of those teams to cover their perimeter.
With the carrier that becomes 14 ships. A three-carrier battle group would be 42 ships, and that's before adding logistic support.
Is there anything I'm missing here?
Lutefisk
"Is there anything I'm missing here?"
DeleteYes! You're missing the definitive primer on carrier group escort requirements:
Escorts
Check it out!
Regarding escorts, I'd like to see the Constellation-class frigate canceled and split into two programs. One would be a small AAW frigate (FFG) like this:
Deletehttps://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2022/03/atlantajuneau-anti-aircraft-cruiser.html
The other would be an ASW frigate (FF) with an arsenal including long-range, 21-inch torpedoes and either VL-ASROC missiles with greater range, or a revival of the canceled Sea Lance anti-submarine missile. To keep costs down, the ship would not have aviation facilities. Credit goes to this blog for some of my new ideas--CNO has discussed the advantages of large torpedoes. (I also like CDR Chip's idea of reloadable launchers firing both 12.75- and 21-inch torpedoes.) I had a discussion with CNO in which he said extending the range of the ASROC missile made more sense than developing a modern DASH helicopter drone.
With good planning, we might be able to build one of these AAW frigates and one ASW frigate for the price of one Constellation-class frigate. (I was going to say good luck, but in light of a recent discussion... With respect to everyone, I do think there is such a thing as luck, but good planning usually produces good results.)
Also, the DDG(X) cruiser we're calling a destroyer should be canceled and replaced with a 21st-century follow-up to the Spruance class destroyer (DD). At some point we'll want to build a new AAW destroyer, but for the time being we still have a lot of Burke class destroyers in service. I can't remember who suggested this, but if we built a number of dedicated ASW ships, some of the ASW technicians serving aboard the Burkes could gradually transfer to these new ships.
While I could be wrong, I feel that an ASW ships prosecution strength is in its helos. For an inshore ASW corvette, cheapness and numbers would be enhanced by deleting them, but for a blue water CVBG escort, I think the avaition facilities are necessasary. In the vein of this post- large numbers of escorts are needed, and the way to get them is to return to single purpose ships. Calling the Constellations ASW ships, but outfitting them with Aegis is, well, retarded. Build a Burke AAW focused replacement without avaition facilities. Poof!! Smaller and cheaper! ASW ship?? Build the Connies closer to the original ASW design (without Aegis! ), or a freshened Perry. Give it point defenses and nothing else that isnt ASW-centric. If we feel we need an ASuW ship, fine. Give it TLAM, Harpoon, NSM, LRASM, etc, and give me two twin 8in mounts based on the MCLWG tested in the 70s, with substantial magazines, so it could be used for NGFS if we should ever need it.
DeleteTwo, possibly three simpler ships, that individually would be cheaper, and available in somthing closer to the numbers we truly need...
And yes, ⬆⬆⬆ this post is borderline redundant, because its nothing that hasn't been advocated here in various forms for eons...
DeleteI think these discussions can be most interesting.
DeleteIf the Navy had the money, I'd equip my frigates with a landing pad and hangar facilities for two Seahawk helicopters. I was going for a high-low mix, and hoping the Sea Lance missiles and long-range torpedoes would, to some extent, compensate for the frigate's lack of helicopters.
Jjabatie, your proposed ASuW ship sounds like something the Zumwalt-class should have been.
Funny thing, Id likely try to make the AAW ships more stealthy in the hopes itd enhance their survivability. They protect the golden egg, so anything we can do to help them avoid taking a hit, within reason, seems worthwhile. Now, with the ASW ships 'out front' of the BG, it could be argued that they need to be stealthy also, although id expect them to still be under the umbrella of AAW ships. The ASuW ships- same thing. There is a benefit to stealth, but I wouldn't pursue it if it drives up the cost or interferes much with the functionality. I don't think we can afford Zumwalt-esque ships in the numbers needed, and none of the ships can be so gold plated that we cant afford to lose them.
DeleteThe Fletchers were arguably the best DD of WWII, BUT- imho, it wasn't just their design that made them war winners, it was the fact that we built a ton of them IN COMBINATION with a good design that did!!! And thats what we need to keep in mind with ship design and building today...
"stealthy"
DeleteToday, stealth is the price of admission to the modern battlefield, whether aerial (aircraft) or naval (ships). Any non-stealthy platform will have a short lifespan.
Stealth no longer confers an advantage since all sides now have it. Instead, stealth is just a basic requirement like fuel or armor (should be!) or speed or endurance. If you have it, you can at least have a chance to compete. Without it, you have no chance.
Regarding ship stealth, the shining example is the Visby. Of course, Visby is a small ship and it remains for someone to scale that up to functional destroyer size while retaining maximum firepower, sensors, and armor.
Im not saying stealth isnt somthing to pursue. Obviously with aircraft, its super important. But with ships, Im honestly not as convinced. Sure, making detection ranges change is a good thing. But from the perspective of an inbound missile... The Zumwalt has been described as having the radar return of a small trawler, but on the open ocean, isnt that trawler still going to be targetable by the aforementioned missile? And while i understand that the add-ons to Zumwalt that hampered its stealthiness were likely due to cost issues- things like CIWS/RAM would need to be altered to make them stealthy as well and not increase the reflectivity. If we choose to commit to stealthiness, its going to have to be a full effort. Visby is certainly a good example. Sort of the modern equivalent of the "all or nothing" concept??
Delete"But with ships, Im honestly not as convinced. "
DeleteRe-read this post:
Stealth for Dummies
@CNO
DeleteIn regards to the 'escorts' posting...there is a lot of good information there.
This seems to be the key statement;
Said Mitscher: “The ideal composition of a fast-carrier task force is four carriers, six to eight support vessels and not less than 18 destroyers, preferably 24. More than four carriers in a task group cannot be advantageously used due to the amount of air room required. Less than four carriers requires an uneconomical use of support ships and screening vessels.” (1)
Lutefisk
" ideal composition of a fast-carrier task force is four carriers"
DeleteWe had this stuff all figured out, once upon a time. We've now chosen to ignore those lessons.
Bear in mind that in WWII, four carriers had around 400 COMBAT aircraft. Today, four carriers have around 176 combat aircraft - actually, around 152 when you subtract out the combat aircraft that are dedicated to tanking.
400 vs. 152. That's a huge difference. I wonder what it does to the four-carrier concept? Does it render carrier groups ineffective? What can we productively do with 152 aircraft that's worth the risk to the carriers?
You will see this again but they are Chinese fleets, worse, much more high tech than US'.
ReplyDelete4 carriers with fewer airplanes on each. Hmmm
ReplyDeleteBear in mind that in WWII, four carriers had around 400 COMBAT aircraft. Today, four carriers have around 176 combat aircraft - actually, around 152 when you subtract out the combat aircraft that are dedicated to tanking.
Delete400 vs. 152. That's a huge difference. I wonder what it does to the four-carrier concept? Does it render carrier groups ineffective? What can we productively do with 152 aircraft that's worth the risk to the carriers?
What our Navy once was: It was a fighting force ready for war. Our submarine force faces shortfalls in numbers (Recently the prospective CNO ,at her confirmation hearing, stated that our sub production needs to be increased to 2 per year in order to meet the commitment to AUKUS) Our ships lack armor and we lack proper mine mitigation. Then we have the travesty of lacking ship maintenance and rushing new technologies on ships before testing !
ReplyDeletePer posts by ComNavOps
Solutions for the shortfall in submarine numbers:
Delete- Slow or stop the rush to decommssion the Los Angeles class.
- Come up with a cheaper nuke attack boat that doesn't need the VPM capability.
- Build up to 20 SSGNs based on updated Ohios instead of the far more expensive Columbias.
- Lengthen out the numbers by building some cheaper AIP SSKs to cover littoral and choke point assignments, freeing SSNs for blue water work.
- Convince somebody to open/reopen and additional sub manufacturing/maintenance yard. Mare Island could be a possible location.
Problems to address with the surface Navy:
- Inadequate mine countermeasures, and the LCS MCM module is not the answer
- Inadequate NGFS; need big gun battleships and cruisers.
- Inadequate armore protection for existing ships; rework designs.
- Inadequate ASW; need a dedicated class of ASW frigates.
- No real way to conduct an amphibious assault; either redesign the phib force or give up the mission.
Thanks for your summary of what the Navy should become : a fighting force !
DeleteGiven the Navy's recent shiphandling performance, how long could that many ships remain in that tight a formation without somebody running into somebody else?
ReplyDelete