AUKUS Program

There has recently been speculation that the AUKUS submarine project may be cancelled.  The speculation is likely fueled by the fact that the current administration is reviewing the program, as it’s doing with all major defense programs.  At the moment, the project is not cancelled and, I suspect, is unlikely to be though it may well be altered.
 
Let’s take this opportunity to review and reassess the program.
 
To review, the program calls for Australia to receive eight nuclear powered submarines (SSN).  Construction would be in the UK and Australia although plans have varied with time so this is probably not locked in yet.  The first delivery would not be until at least 2040.  The US has committed to providing Australia with up to five Virginia class subs as interim replacements.
 
My take is that the deal makes no strategic or operational sense, whatsoever.  Here are a few issues:
 
Strategic Situation - A few more submarines in Australia won't appreciably change the strategic situation.  The US already has enough submarines to cover monitoring the E/S China Seas and trail any Chinese subs that enter the open ocean.  Of course, this assumes that the US can get their subs to sea instead of sitting for years pierside waiting for maintenance.
 
The delivery date of 2040 or beyond also renders any discussion of near to moderate term strategic relevance nearly moot.  If Australia could, magically, operate a fleet of SSNs today, that would potentially benefit the US as we grapple with our own (long recognized and yet ignored!) submarine shortfall.  Of course, that can’t happen and by 2040+, the US plans (hopes!) to have its submarine numbers on the upswing again which makes a few more AUKUS subs much less impactful. 
 
Support - I assume Australia will have a very difficult time maintaining and crewing the subs given their well documented difficulties with the Collins class submarines.  As of November of last year, only one of the six Collins class subs was operational.[1]  Manning and maintaining nuclear subs will be even more challenging.
 
Australia will also come to find out that establishing and maintaining a nuclear industry to support the subs will be costly beyond their imagining and prove highly unpopular with the citizenry.  Establishing a nuclear technology base will be much harder than simply sending a few officers to a US/UK training course.  Nuclear technology, technicians, scientists, and support staff are not conjured out of thin air.  It would take decades to establish.
 
As has happened in the US, the Australian government will likely pass comprehensive and onerous nuclear regulations that will create significant costs.
 

Collins Class Submarine - It will only get harder with SSNs

Nuclear Storage – Disposal and storage of spent nuclear materials and reactors is an issue.  Whether Australia would attempt to take that on or whether the US would do it is unknown.  Either way, someone will have to foot the costs.  Similarly, nuclear fuel storage is an issue as would be the handling and storage of contaminated nuclear equipment that needed to be changed out as part of maintenance.
 
Basing – One of the claimed major benefits for the US is basing in Australia with access to full nuclear submarine support capabilities.  Referring back to the support issue, it seems very unlikely that there will be any significant nuclear submarine support capability in any useful time frame.  Complicating matters is that basing for nuclear vessels has far more stringent security issues than for conventional ships.  Again, this is a significant added cost for Australia that I have not heard anyone discussing, yet.
 
 
 
Alternative
 
A better approach would be to assist Australia in building a significant SSK force for use in the China/Pacific region, something the US totally lacks. These submarines could be used to monitor and control shallow water chokepoints along the first island chain, a task better suited to smaller SSKs than the larger US SSNs.  That would actually be a strategic and operational benefit for the US and Australia and the support industry already exists in Australia. Crewing and maintenance remain ongoing challenges, of course.
 
 
 
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[1]The National Interest website, “Australia Has Only 1 Collins-Class Submarine ‘In Service’”, Peter Suciu, 4-Nov-2024,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/australia-has-only-1-collins-class-submarine-service-213563

Upgraded Littoral Perrys

Once upon a time, the US Navy faced a choice about how to deal with the fake ‘littoral’ issue (see, “LittoralWarfare – Is There Such a Thing?”):  either upgrade/modify the Perry class frigates or build an entire new class of ships, the LCS.  One required new hulls.  The other required only upgrades of existing hulls.  Of course, the Navy being the Navy, unhesitatingly opted to build new LCS hulls, thereby ensuring their continued shipbuilding budget slice.  In order to eliminate the possibility of anyone suggesting that Perrys could be upgraded for a fraction of the cost of new construction, the Navy neutered the Perrys by removing weapons (2003 timeframe) and stating publicly that it was not possible to upgrade the Perrys to use the new SM-2 missiles that were then coming.  In addition, the Navy wound up giving away Perrys in order to irretrievably remove them from possible service.
 

The USN had decommissioned 25 "FFG-7 Short" ships via "bargain basement sales to allies or outright retirement, after an average of only 18 years of service".[1]

Of course, as is so often the case, the Navy was quickly proven wrong as the Australian navy proceeded to upgrade their Perrys (the Adelaide class) to use the SM-2 and, in fact, added an 8-cell VLS in the bow of the ship.
 
Not only did Australia upgrade their Perrys and continue to operate them but so did quite a few other countries.  Let’s take a look at some of the upgrades performed by other countries after the US Navy stated that upgrades were not affordable or technically feasible.
 
 
Australia
 
The Australian Perrys (Adelaide class) received an extensive upgrade in the mid-2000’s.  The program cost around A$1.46B to upgrade four Perrys (A$365M ea).  Following is a partial list of the upgrades.[2]
 

• Added 8-cell tactical length VLS in the bow for ESSM missiles
• Upgraded to use SM-2MR Standard missiles
• Switched to Eurotorp MU90 Impact torpedoes
• Upgraded fire control from Mk92 Mod 2 to Mod 12
• Replaced sonar with new Thompson (Thales) Spherion Medium Frequency Sonar
• Upgraded Phalanx CIWS to Block IB
• Added Link 16
• Upgraded computers
• Upgraded SPS-49 and SPS-55 radars
• Added Radamec 2500 EOTS long-range passive TV & infrared surveillance
• Added laser rangefinder.
• Added multi-sensor Radar Integrated Automatic Detect and Track System (RIADT) for improved target detection, tracking, and engagement, particularly against low altitude targets in cluttered ocean or near-shore environments
• Replaced SLQ-32 EW system with Elbit (EA-2118) and RAFAEL (C-Pearl)
• Added ALBATROS towed sonar
• Added two RAFAEL Mini-Typhoon 12.7mm remote weapon systems
• Added additional decoy launchers

 

Adelaide Class Frigate with 8-Cell VLS and SM-2

 
Taiwan
 

• Added 8x Hsiung Feng II/III SSM in two box launcher racks
• Added 2x Bofors 40 mm/L70 guns
• Added 2x Type 75 20 mm/75 guns

 
 
Spain
 

• Replaced Phalanx CIWS with Meroka 20 mm CIWS
• Replaced SLQ-32 with Nettunel Mk-3000 EW suite
• Added RAN-12L/RAN-30 air search radar for low horizon scanning

 
 
Pakistan
 

• overhaul of all four diesels
• replacement of sea valves and air conditioning
• new bridge and navigational suite
• composite dome over the overhauled AN/SQS-56 sonar array

 
 
Following are some other countries that have operated Perrys although I could not readily find lists of upgrades:
 
Poland
Turkey
Bahrain
Egypt
Philippines
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that the Navy lied when they stated that the Perrys could not be upgraded.  They simply wanted to ensure that no viable option remained that could derail the – even then – controversial LCS program.
 
Looking at the list of upgrades proves that we could have added racks of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, VLS cells, added more guns, and upgraded almost every weapon, sensor, and piece of equipment on the ship.  In short, we could have had a very powerful littoral combat ship worthy of the name that would have put the LCS to shame and all for a fraction of the cost of the LCS.  This is all the more disappointing when we note that many of the Perrys were retired after only 14 years or so of service.  We had serviceable ships, viable upgrades, acceptable costs, and we chose to scrap the entire Perry class and build the LCS … just a monumentally stupid decision.  And, of course, we are now early retiring the LCS which simply emphasizes and compounds the near-criminal stupidity of the Navy.
 

 
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[1]Wikipedia, “Adelaid-class frigate”, retrieved 12-Apr-2025
 
[2]Defense Industry Daily website, “Australia’s Hazard(ous) Frigate Upgrades: Done at Last”,
https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-hazardous-frigate-upgrade-04586/

Australian Nuclear Submarine

USNI News had an article about Australia acquiring asymmetric military capabilities to help deter China.  Unfortunately, the article was just a useless collection of vague babbling by John Lee (former national security advisor to Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, 2016-18) who clearly has no idea what asymmetric means.  For example, he cited ‘unmanned and undersea technologies’ as examples of asymmetric capabilities, apparently unaware that unmanned equipment is pretty much standard by now and hardly constitutes ‘asymmetric’.  I have no idea what he meant by ‘undersea technologies’;  presumably unmanned undersea vehicles which, again, are now commonplace.

 

There was, however, one good thought in the article which appeared to reference Australia’s nuclear submarine acquisition desire:

 

“Leasing has to be an option” to fill the timeline gap in undersea readiness, but the submarine does not necessarily have to be an American Virginia-class boat. “We need to learn how to operate them” and maintain them, he said. [1]

 

Now, I’m not sure what, exactly, the leasing reference was to …  perhaps SSKs? perhaps a nuclear sub from some country?  perhaps training simulators or facilities?  Regardless, this raises the intriguing possibility of Australia acquiring an early-retired Los Angeles class submarine … of which we have many.

 

The LA class subs would provide valuable nuclear submarine and nuclear power plant operating experience.  While the subs may not have thirty more years of operational life left, that’s not a requirement for a country that first needs to simply learn how to operate the subs and their reactors. 

Los Angeles Class Submarine

 Of course, there are practical considerations to deal with:

 

• You don’t become a [safe] nuclear capable navy overnight.  Australia has no nuclear plant operating expertise that I’m aware of.  It would require years to build up that level of [safe] competency.  This is also not something that can be done on a part-time, occasional basis which leads directly to the next consideration …
• Nuclear subs require fairly substantial crews and long term, sustained expert manning.  This is not something that can be done using one-enlistment term sailors.  I’m thinking now about the difficulty Australia has had manning the few conventional subs that they have.[2]  Where are the needed long term, professional nuclear organizations and personnel going to come from?
• It’s not enough to train a crew to operate a nuclear sub.  It also requires a substantial shore-side nuclear support organization for specialized maintenance, inspection, repair, refueling, etc.  Again, given Australia’s manning challenges, where will the shore support people come from?
• Assuming an Australian nuclear submarine force would operate much closer to China than is currently the case for Australian submarines, this would require substantial open ocean and first island chain oceanography/mapping support.  Perhaps the US Navy would share their data but, if not, Australia would have to generate their own which requires a large investment and effort.
• Nuclear submarines are a major commitment.  I hope the Australian military/navy has carefully thought out the CONOPS for a [very?] small force of nuclear subs and thought through how these fit into, and support, the country’s overall geopolitical and military strategies.  If not, it will be a massive waste of resources and effort.  I hope this isn’t just a knee-jerk reaction to something … you know, the way the US Navy does things.  Given that the desire for nuclear subs seems to have appeared out of nowhere, this is a concern.
• Finally, operating nuclear powered ships does impact political interactions in the region.  New Zealand, for example, bans ships with nuclear weapons or power from their waters. 

 

 

Assuming Australia can successfully address the various concerns, acquiring an LA class sub(s) would provide a rapid (on a relative basis) route to nuclear submarine operations and is well worth pursuing.  However, this is not something to be entered into lightly.  It requires a massive commitment of people and resources and needs to be carefully thought out prior to acting.

 

 

Note:  I am not well versed on Australian naval matters so some of the preceding may be inaccurate and, if so, feel free to [politely!] offer corrections.

 

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “Australia Needs Asymmetric Capabilities to Counter China in Indo-Pacific, Former Australian Official Says”, John Grady, 26-Nov-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/11/26/australia-needs-asymmetric-capabilities-to-counter-china-in-indo-pacific-former-australian-official-says

 

[2]The Guardian website, “Crew shortage could leave Australia's new submarines high and dry – report”, Lisa Martin, 8-Oct-2018,

https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/oct/08/crew-shortage-could-leave-australias-new-submarines-high-and-dry-report

Australian ESSM Test

Be still my beating heart!  Someone has finally conducted live fire missile testing that wasn’t completely useless and, to the shame of the US Navy, it was the Australian Navy that did it.  HMAS Perth (FFH-157) conducted several live fire exercises for the ESSM and CEAFAR/CEAMOUNT sensor systems at the US Navy's Pacific test range and the testing apparently included multiple targets and supersonic targets.

HMAS Perth is an Anzac class (MEKO 200 variant) frigate with an 8-cell Mk41 VLS, single 5” gun, and two triple torpedo launchers.  Sensors include the CEAFAR/CEAMOUNT S and X band radars.  Wiki has a good description of the ship.

HMAS Perth

To be sure, the tests were still highly scripted, staged events with all the attendant unreality imposed by US Navy safety regulations.  Consider the following quotes extracted from Robert Macklin's report describing the Anzac program and the live fire testing that was conducted.

Now the targets being fired at Perth included two supersonic Coyote missiles—each costing $4  million—which would come screaming out of the blue, cutting a path across Perth’s station as the combined radar and combat system on board responded with the ship’s own relatively slow ESSMs in the hope of intercepting the incoming target. In addition, Perth would track at least seven subsonic missiles, some of which would be in combination with supersonics. (1)

This statement is a bit misleading as it suggests that Perth faced seven or more missiles, some of which were supersonic, at the same time.  That would be a major challenge, indeed!  The reality, as best I can tell, is that the Perth faced a total of seven missiles over four or so separate tests (referred to in the quotes as “profiles”).  There is a YouTube video that shows three missiles being fired from Perth simultaneously so three seems to be the maximum number of simultaneous threats faced in the exercise.

As indicated in the next quote, a subsonic and a supersonic were paired in a single test.  Whether the two missile types appeared in the engagement window at the same time or whether they arrived separately is not clear.

First up, he says, they did the seven subsonics but on occasion they were mixed with supersonic interference. The test, he says, ‘was designed so you could potentially be attracted to the subsonic target at the expense of the supersonic. And in fact I can assure you each of them was a success—in fact probably more successful than we thought possible.’  (1)

Note is made of the difficulty of intercepting a crossing missile as opposed to a head-on target.  The write up suggests that Perth did test a crossing missile and, if this was the case, this is a degree of difficulty and reality that the US does not test.

The ESSM missile has traditionally been a point defence system designed for a weapon coming in directly, which is easy [to take out]. But once it starts crossing—heading for a high‑value unit, especially if it’s doing mach 3—then it becomes exponentially more difficult.

We’d simulate being a short distance from a high‑value unit on its quarter, so when we’d take out the incoming supersonic mach 3 missile with the ESSM, they’d never seen it done before. (1)

If the US Navy had never seen a supersonic missile being intercepted by an ESSM before (referring to a crossing missile?), that speaks volumes about the lack of realistic testing by the Navy.

On one occasion—I think in profile three—we actually lost the target momentarily—and that happens sometimes in the fog of war—and when it came up again a young operator, a sailor who was literally in front of me in the Operations Room—saw it and intuitively pressed a ‘hostile’ and a missile went and took it out at the minimum engagement range. So at the last moment we were able to save the [high‑value unit]. (1)

The next quote illustrates the point that we’ve made repeatedly and that is that the engagement window against a supersonic threat is very short.

They saved the last two profiles for the supersonic Coyotes. The first one, Goddard says, came at them skimming at its minimum safe height. ‘You probably have 10 to 11 seconds to react, and as soon as you’ve made it “hostile” the system just automatically does it and of course it’s just “hands off.”’

In fact, when that first Coyote came at them the system fired two missiles. The first smashed into the target and the second took out the debris. ‘The Americans said “We’ve never seen that. You’ve actually taken out the target and we thought the second missile would just disappear. But all of a sudden it turned and actually took out the debris on the way through.”’  (1)

In the next quote, note the reference to a ‘ghost’ radar image and the resultant wasted defensive missiles.  We recently noted a ‘ghost’ image of sorts being part of the reason why a US Aegis cruiser was hit by an out of control drone.  Also, in terms of overall system efficiency and performance, the unintended and unnecessary expenditure of extra defensive missiles is a problem.  To be fair, if the main target(s) is destroyed, no Captain is going to begrudge a few wasted missiles.

On the second attack, only one ESSM was needed—the Coyote was pulverised. However, a ‘ghost’ image had appeared briefly on the screen and Lee Goddard actually fired three ESSMs, two of which weren’t needed. ‘So it was all very positive,’ he says. (1)

In summary, Perth’s testing was far more extensive and realistic than anything I’ve read about the US Navy conducting.  Is this enough?  Not by a long shot!  They should conduct similar tests ten times over to get a feel for long term reliability and success rates.  They should use different approach angles.  They should conduct the test under adverse weather conditions.  They should try the test with a ship that wasn’t ‘tweaked’ for the test and didn’t have tech reps helping out.  Still, for whatever drawbacks, limitations, and flaws the test might have had, it was still leaps and bounds beyond what the US Navy does and the Australians are to be commended. 

________________________________

(1)Australian Strategic Policy Institute, “Rearming the Anzacs”, Robert Macklin,

https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2017-12/Rearming%20the%20ANZACs_3.pdf?ttG8fYqc_iQGzyArk.LvSIL_1xo4rIpj

Austal Raided By Feds

USNI News website reported on an interesting LCS shipbuilding development.  It appears that Federal agents are searching the Austal LCS manufacturing site at Mobile, Alabama as part of an investigation related to costs linked to the USS Jackson which was commissioned in Dec 2015.  Jackson, you’ll recall, took part in shock testing in June and July of 2016.

Federal agents visited Littoral Combat Ship manufacturer Austal USA in its Mobile, Ala., shipyard as part of an unspecified investigation involving the U.S. Navy, according to local media.

“Department of Defense, NCIS and [the Defense Criminal Investigative Service] have been seen on site,” according to NBC 15 in Mobile, Ala.

“Investigators are expected to be on site for several hours.” (1)

Apparently, Austal’s troubles are not confined just to the US.

Earlier Thursday, Australian media reported Austal was under investigation by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission over market updates related to losses around the Independence-class LCS.

The Australian authorities are said to be focusing on statements issued by Austal regarding the blow out, or sudden increase in costs, associated with finishing USS Jackson (LCS-6). (1)

The Jackson was the first of a block buy contract and, according to the article, Austal implemented a variety of production and productivity improvements that failed to produce the expected cost savings.  From a Dec 2015 Austal statement,

Austal’s ability to apply lessons learnt and productivity enhancements from LCS 6 to vessels in advanced construction, namely LCS 8 and LCS 10, has been more limited than anticipated. (1)

The most interesting part of the article was this somewhat cryptic statement,

A significant portion of the company’s loss for the year was the US $115 million charge Austal recorded to account for the increased cost in LCS construction. The sudden increase in cost was related to work required to make the ships meet the Navy’s military shock testing, according to a July 4, 2016, release from Austal. Jackson conducted full ship shock trials in June and July 2016, which required the shipyard to prepare for the trials and then conduct maintenance afterwards to repair anything that broke during the underwater blast. (1)

This would seem to suggest that the shock testing resulted in far more costs, both in immediate repairs and required construction design changes, than the Navy had previously acknowledged.  You’ll recall that the Navy declared the shock testing an unmitigated success.  Shockingly (no pun intended), it would appear that the Navy’s declaration was inaccurate, misleading, and borderline fraudulent, as usual.

Here’s some additional information which further emphasizes just how bad the shock trials really were.

On June 30, 2016, after the preliminary trials, Austal entered into a trading halt and issued an earnings announcement. The firm cautioned that it would have to increase its cost estimate for follow-on hulls due to "design changes required to achieve shock certification and U.S. Naval Vessel Rules." 

10 contracted ships were already in various phases of construction at the time of the announcement, and Austal anticipated "significant modifications to vessels already nearing completion" in an "extensive rework program." LCS 6, 8, 10 and 12 would all require at least 4,000 specific modifications each. The expense amounted to a $115 million writeoff and a full-year loss groupwide for FY2016. (2)

Thus, it appears the Austal has been hit with massive, unforeseen (unforeseen by Austal), cost increases related to shock trial deficiencies.  Does this sound like the spectacular success the Navy declared the shock trials to be?

USS Jackson, LCS-6

So, what do we make of this? 

There are two possible scenarios.

One is that Austal made contract cost commitments based on anticipated production cost savings that did not materialize and was left facing large cost increases that it tried to pass on to the Navy in some manner that triggered a criminal investigation and the Navy, for unknown reasons, has picked this program and this manufacturer to contest the charges and has opened a criminal investigation. 

The alternative explanation is that this is strictly an Australian stock exchange investigation that the Navy is assisting on although the use of NCIS for a foreign financial investigation seems odd. 

Regardless of which scenario, there are a few aspects that warrant some additional consideration.

Systematic Underestimating – It is no secret that systematic and chronic underestimating of production costs is a widespread and, indeed, accepted practice.  It is used routinely to secure contracts and mislead Congress.  The Navy is not only complicit in the practice but is the leading practitioner.  Navy cost estimates are ridiculously underestimated as proven in program after program.  For example, the Navy’s original cost estimate for the LCS was $200M which immediately rose to $220M, then to $700M or so, and has steadied out somewhere around $500M depending on what numbers are used – and this doesn’t include module costs!  The Ford is $2B-$4B over estimate, depending on what numbers are used!!!!!!

Unrealized Savings – Every program builds cost savings assumptions into its cost estimates – especially long term cost estimates – and those savings rarely, if ever, materialize.  Savings are assumed from serial production, manufacturing efficiencies, computer aided design, block buys, wildly optimistic labor hour reductions, optimistic inflation estimates, etc. and they simply never materialize or, if they do, they’re swamped by other cost increases.

Frigate Competition – Austal is one of the contenders in the Navy’s new frigate competition.  The inability to estimate costs and achieve production efficiencies should be concerning in the extreme to the Navy and, if the rumored issues are true, should disqualify Austal from the competition.

Inexperienced Builder – There were clearly massive shock trial deficiencies that now require correction and for which Austal appears to bear the responsibility for.  These deficiencies were, presumably, unforeseen by Austal which can only be ascribed to their inexperience at building naval warships.  I suspect that they’ve never experienced shock trials for any vessel they’ve built so they would have no way of knowing what should or should not have been designed into their LCS.  This is what happens when you turn warship design over to industry and over to and inexperienced builder.  This is also what happens when the Navy abdicates its design responsibility and eliminates its in-house expertise.  No one in the Navy was able to competently review the LCS design and identify shock deficiencies.  This is also what happens when you start construction of a ship while the design is still being worked on.  We need to bring back BuShips but, I digress … 

Why Austal? – Was Austal engaged in deceptive cost estimating, intentional underestimating of costs, and overcharging?  Probably, but why single out Austal for criminal investigation?  Given the exact same practices for the Ford, LPD-17, Zumwalt, and F-35 programs but on a massively larger scale, why choose Austal to focus on?  The Ford is billions of dollars over cost but no one cares.  The F-35 has demonstrated fraud on a scale that defies belief but no one cares.  The LCS program, and Austal’s portion of the LCS program, is small potatoes by comparison.  This suggests that the investigation is more likely the stock exchange scenario.  We’ll have to wait for more information.

The most interesting aspect of this story is the emerging information about just how badly the shock testing went and how many modifications are required as a result.

____________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Federal Agents Comb Through Austal USA Shipyard as Part of Apparent Financial Investigation”, LaGrone, Werner, & Eckstein, 24-Jan-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/01/24/austal-usa-part-unknown-investigation-federal-agents-comb-shipyard

(2)The Maritime Executive website, “Austal Confirms Investigation into its Market Announcements”, 25-Jan-2019,

https://maritime-executive.com/article/austal-confirms-investigation-into-its-market-announcements

Australian Hobart Class Destroyer

Australia’s HMAS Hobart class destroyer has generated a lot of interest from naval observers.  Let’s take a closer look at it.

The Hobart class is intended as an anti-air warfare destroyer.  The ship is 483 ft long with a displacement of around 6200 tons.  Relevant weapons include a 48 cell Mk41 VLS, two Harpoon quad launchers, two triple torpedo tube launchers for lightweight torpedoes, a single Phalanx CIWS, and one 5” gun.  The main sensors include the Aegis/SPY-1, SPQ-9B for low level detection, two missile guidance illuminators, hull-mounted sonar, and a towed array/variable depth sonar.

Just as a frame of reference, here’s a brief comparison of the Hobart’s characteristics and the Burke, as another example of an anti-air warfare ship.

              Hobart            Burke

Length        483 ft            509 ft

Displacement  6200 tons         9200 tons

Range         5000 @ 18 kts     4400 @ 20 kts

Speed         28 kts            30 kts

VLS           48 cells          96 cells

Harpoon       8x                8x

Torpedo       2x Mk32 Triple    2x Mk 32 Triple

Gun           1x 5”/54          1x 5”/62

Close In      1x CIWS           1x CIWS

Illuminators  2x                3x

Helos         1x Seahawk type   2x Seahawk type

It is clear that the Hobart is a slightly smaller version of the Burke with the main difference being the Hobart’s VLS capacity is half that of the Burke and one less illuminating radar for missile guidance.  That reduced capacity classifies the Hobart as a frigate, at least in comparison to the Burke.  Unfortunately, this also illustrates the problem with frigates – they tend to be 80% of the cost of a Burke with half the capability. 

In this case, for the vessel’s main function, anti-air warfare, the Hobart has half the capacity on a hull that is 95% of the Burke’s length.

Hobart Class Destroyer

A cost comparison between countries borders on pointless but Wiki lists the cost as A$8B (US$6.2B) for 3 ships (US$2.1B per ship versus the $1.8B per Burke).  Wiki also reports that the program is A$1.2B over cost.  Thus, the Hobarts are as expensive as Burkes or more expensive.  As I say, take the cost figures with a huge grain of salt.  It’s hard enough getting accurate US Navy cost figures, let alone Australian costs.  While the Hobart’s capability is decent, though limited, the ship appears to be poor value for the money.  It would seem that Australia could have simply purchased full Burke for the same cost.  I won’t pretend, however, to understand Australian acquisition policies since I can barely explain our own!

US naval observers and commentators tend to ascribe near miraculous characteristics to foreign ship designs but, inevitably, when the designs are examined more closely their luster tends to fade.  The Hobart is a decent ship but a poor value for the money.  It offers nothing for the US Navy.