Israeli Air Defense

As you know, Israel has established its multi-tier Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 2/3 defense systems for defending against incoming rockets and missiles.  Official claims have put the success rate somewhere in the 90+% range. However, based on careful consideration of photos and reading between the lines of various attack news stories (mostly Iron Dome) over the years, ComNavOps places the success rate at something closer to 40%-50%.  Now, with the latest hostilities between Iran and Israel, we are accumulating a new, extensive set of data with seemingly much less public relations spin applied.
 
A Breaking Defense article states,
 

As of this report, the IDF said Iran had managed to launch at least 400 missiles in 17 salvos since Israel’s strike on Iran last week, in addition to 1,000 drones.
 
The drones do not appear to have penetrated Israel’s defenses, but more than 20 of the ballistic missiles have, killing more than two dozen people.[1]

As of Monday morning, Israel reported 24 dead and 500 injured which gives an indication of the degree of penetration of Iranian missiles through the Israeli defenses.
 
So, what does all this tell us about the effectiveness of the Israeli defense system?  The numbers we have suggest a success rate of 95%, on the face of it, however, my understanding is that many missiles are not even engaged due to being assessed as not a threat.  Iranian missiles are not exactly renowned for accuracy.  Thus, if 400 missiles have been fired at Israel, only a fraction of them were actual threats and had to be engaged.  Here, now, is where we have no basis, whatsoever, to further judge effectiveness.  However, for the sake of illustration, if only, say, 30% of the Iranian missiles were actual threats then the defensive success rate would drop to something on the order of 80%.  You can plug in whatever numbers you wish and calculate resulting defensive success rates, if you’re so inclined.
 
The takeaway from this is that the state of the art Israeli defense system, matched against some pretty low capability Iranian missiles, still allowed, perhaps, something on the order of 20% of attacking missiles to get through.  What does this mean to us?  Well, consider what will happen when Aegis faces modern, highly capable Chinese missiles.  What will the defensive success rate of our ships be?  Who can say, but this is just another data point that leads ComNavOps to conclude that Aegis will be nowhere near as effective as we hope.  This, in turn, strongly suggests that we need to mount many more short range and close in weapons on our ships.  Combine this with the analyses we’ve done about engagement windows and it paints a pretty bleak picture – one that Navy leadership is ignoring instead of preparing for.
 
 
 
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[1] Breaking Defense website, “Left of boom: Israeli strikes concentrate on Iranian missile threat”, Seth J. Frantzman, 18-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/left-of-boom-israeli-strikes-concentrate-on-iranian-missile-threat/

Naval Ballistic Missiles

Now that the US is officially withdrawing from the INF treaty, the Navy is free to develop short and medium range ballistic missiles.  While the INF treaty allowed naval ballistic missiles, the prevailing political climate and limited applicability and associated high costs precluded naval ballistic missile development.  Now, we're free to develop missiles that can be used by any/all the services, thereby taking advantage of commonality and economy of scale.

We already have a thousand mile cruise missile, the Tomahawk, however, it is old and bordering on obsolete.  The Tomahawk is subsonic, not maneuverable, non-stealthy, and carries no on-board electronic countermeasures or penetration aids.  Its effectiveness as a long range strike weapon is highly questionable against a peer defender.  Consider … would we have any great difficulty shooting down Tomahawks?  I don’t think so.

Setting aside the Tomahawk’s shortcomings, we need tactical ballistic missiles with ranges out to 3000 miles or so.  Just as the US is struggling to develop an effective defense against ballistic missiles, so too would any enemy struggle to stop a ballistic missile of ours.  The advantages of these missiles in both the land attack and anti-ship roles (assuming we can solve the targeting challenge) are obvious.

Many readers are terrified about using tactical ballistic missiles because the Chinese might ‘misunderstand’ their intent and respond with nuclear weapons.  Well, the Russians and Chinese, in particular, see no problem with the use of ballistic missiles and any potential ‘misunderstanding’ over their type and intention since they are fully committed to producing and using them.  Oddly, the same readers who are terrified about US ballistic missile use seem to have no concerns about Chinese ballistic missile use or our ability to discern their true nature.  Apparently, in their minds, the onus of risk is completely on the US.  That’s just ridiculous.  Turnabout is fair play so let’s develop our own.

I’ll leave the question of land based ballistic missiles to the Army other than noting that such missiles have two issues: range and vulnerability.  We have very few useful bases for ballistic missiles in the Pacific theatre (Guam being the notable one) and those we have are thousands of miles from China.  Further, the limited number of bases and the fixed or semi-fixed nature of any land based ballistic missiles makes them susceptible to first strike elimination.

This is a naval blog so let’s look at ship based ballistic missiles.  The obvious advantages of ship based ballistic missiles are:

Mobility/Survivability – Ship based ballistic missiles are more survivable simply due to the mobile nature of a ship.  Ship mounting would also ensure a survivable, retaliatory strike capability against a surprise, first strike attack whereas land sites are susceptible to first strike destruction.

Range – Ships can move closer to the target prior to launching, thereby reducing the range, if necessary. 

Stealth – In the case of submarine based ballistic missiles, the launching platform is about as stealthy as is possible.  Even for surface ships, the mobility of the ship confers a degree of stealth.

For surface ships, ballistic missiles are dependent on the Mk 57 VLS (the Zumwalt VLS system) being able to accommodate the desired missile or else a new launch system will have to be developed.  To refresh,

Mk 57 VLS Specifications
Missiles	4
Width (ft)	7.25
length (ft)	14.2
Height (ft)	26, 7.93
Weight (lb)	33,600
Max. canister width (in)	28
Max. canister length (in)	283
Max. encanistered weight (lb)	9,020

While the Mk57 VLS is not much larger than the standard Mk41 VLS, Raytheon claims that the big difference between the MK41 and MK57 is thrust capacity.  Raytheon product brochures claim the system can handle up to 45 percent greater rocket motor mass flow rate thereby allowing for much more powerful booster designs.  The Mk57 also allows for heavier canister weights:  9000 lbs vs. 6000 lbs for the Mk41.

Whether a missile with the desired performance characteristics can fit in a Mk 57 VLS is unknown.  If not, one has to seriously wonder what the rationale was behind the Mk 57 since no current or developing missile requires the extra capacity of the Mk 57.  But, I digress …

Back to naval ballistic missiles …

What specific ships would make good naval ballistic missile platforms?

Battleship - A modern battleship would make an excellent ballistic missile launch platform.  It would offer sufficient size for a significant loadout and excellent armored protection.

Submarine – A sub would obviously make an excellent ballistic missiles platform as demonstrated by the existing SSBN and SSGN vessels.

Arsenal Ship – This is another good possibility with the vessel being, essentially, a mobile ballistic missile barge.  Theoretically, the Zumwalt could be converted to a ballistic missile launch platform if a suitable missile could be designed that would fit the Mk 57 VLS.

As demonstrated by the concerns and the enormous effort the Navy, and military, in general, is putting into stopping enemy ballistic missiles, naval ballistic missiles would offer significant striking power on mobile, survivable platforms.  With treaty limitations no longer a concern, there is no reason not to develop tactical naval ballistic missiles and every reason to do so.

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(1)Navy Matters blog, “Mk57 VLS”, 18-Jul-2016,

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2016/07/mk57-vls.html

Ballistic Missile Defense - Operator Error

The Navy has concluded that a recent failed anti-ballistic missile test of the Standard SM-3 Block IIa was due to an operator who inadvertently input an identification of the target as a “friendly”, thus causing the SM-3 to self-destruct before hitting the target.

“A U.S. Missile Defense Agency review of a failed ballistic missile intercept test showed that a mistaken input into the combat system by a sailor on the destroyer John Paul Jones caused the missile to self-destruct before reaching the target.

A tactical datalink controller, in charge of maintaining encrypted data exchanges between ships and aircraft, accidentally identified the incoming ballistic missile target as a friendly in the system, causing the SM-3 missile to self-destruct in flight …” (1)

We’re building a vast network of sensors and weapons as the foundation of the Third Offset Strategy – a strategy that will give us an unrivaled edge over our enemies and assure us of maintaining combat superiority.  At least, that’s what we’re being told.

And now, we see that a simple operator input error can entirely negate a ballistic missile intercept.  What if that had been an actual intercept instead of a test and the missile had been a nuclear missile aimed at a US base or city?  Do we really want to base our entire military “advantage” on a system so prone to inadvertent and haphazard failure?

All of us understand that software systems, and their inputs/outputs are subject to bugs and glitches under the best of conditions, let alone in the middle of war when electronic countermeasures will be blitzing the system, cyber/hack attacks will be constant, and the stress of combat will guarantee that input mistakes and output misinterpretations (remember Vincennes?) will happen with regularity.  Do we really want to bet our military future on such a strategy and such systems?

It’s interesting to note that the Russians and Chinese, while investing heavily in electronic and cyber warfare, are also producing massive increases in traditional, raw, brutal, explosive firepower.  They seem to understand that electronic and cyber warfare will be useful but that firepower still rules the battlefield.

Recall the Vietnam war.  Recall the air strikes by US planes.  For all the sophisticated surface to air missiles, radar warning receivers, countermeasures, and high performance aircraft with computer controlled navigation and weapon delivery systems, etc., our aircraft were still shot down, all too often, by old fashioned ZSU-23 barrage gunfire.

There’s a place for electronic and cyber warfare, without a doubt, but it’s as a complement to explosive firepower not a replacement for it and certainly not as the foundation of an entire military strategy.

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(1)Navy Times website, “Sailor error led to failed US Navy ballistic missile intercept test”, ”, David B. Larter, 24-Jul-2017,

https://www.navytimes.com/naval/2017/07/24/sailor-error-led-to-failed-us-navy-ballistic-missile-intercept-test/

North Korean Ballistic Missile Tests

North Korea continues its insane saber rattling and its stone cold sober preparations for nuclear war with more ballistic missile tests.  NKorea also brazenly stated that the tests were practice for hitting American bases, as reported by the Washington Post website.

“North Korea was practicing to strike United States military bases in Japan with its latest barrage of missiles, state media in Pyongyang reported Tuesday …” (1)

The US, meanwhile, continues its policy of world wide appeasement.

At some point, it ought to occur to US government leaders that appeasement is not working. 

• Despite our best efforts at appeasement, NKorea continues its inexorable march towards developing nuclear ballistic missiles. 

• Despite our best efforts at appeasement, China continues to ignore international law by building artificial islands and militarizing them while making illegal and outrageous territorial claims in and around the South China Sea, Philippines, and Japan.

• Despite our best efforts at appeasement, Russia continues its program of annexation and  invasion while harassing US military aircraft and ships.

• Despite our best efforts at appeasement – and bribery! - Iran continues its inexorable march towards developing nuclear ballistic missiles while harassing US ships.

Here’s a thought for the new administration.  Instead of appeasing NKorea, why not station an Aegis/BMD cruiser off NKorea and shoot down the next ballistic missile they launch.  We can call it, “practice” for shooting down ballistic missiles.

The NKorean missiles fell within the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  If I were Japan, I’d think that was way too close to my land and I’d want to prevent any future missile shots.  What if the next one travels a little further (whether intentionally or inadvertently – NKorea is not exactly the most technologically accomplished country in the world – they may have little idea where the missiles will land) and impacts Japanese land?

We are way past the point where any reasonable person can claim that appeasement is working.  It’s time to insist that rogue nations behave responsibly and to back up that insistence with demonstrations of resolve and, if necessary, force.

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(1)Washington Post website, “North Korea says it was practicing to hit U.S. military bases in Japan with missiles”, Anna Fifield, 6-Mar-2017,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-says-it-was-trying-to-hit-us-military-bases-in-japan-with-missiles/2017/03/06/b375ad36-327f-4d9e-9dba-398a7cde8742_story.html?utm_term=.646875eaaaef