We already have a thousand mile cruise missile, the
Tomahawk, however, it is old and bordering on obsolete. The Tomahawk is subsonic, not maneuverable,
non-stealthy, and carries no on-board electronic countermeasures or penetration
aids. Its effectiveness as a long range
strike weapon is highly questionable against a peer defender. Consider … would we have any great difficulty
shooting down Tomahawks? I don’t think
so.
Setting aside the Tomahawk’s shortcomings, we need tactical
ballistic missiles with ranges out to 3000 miles or so. Just as the US is struggling to develop an
effective defense against ballistic missiles, so too would any enemy struggle
to stop a ballistic missile of ours. The
advantages of these missiles in both the land attack and anti-ship roles
(assuming we can solve the targeting challenge) are obvious.
Many readers are terrified about using tactical ballistic
missiles because the Chinese might ‘misunderstand’ their intent and respond
with nuclear weapons. Well, the Russians
and Chinese, in particular, see no problem with the use of ballistic missiles
and any potential ‘misunderstanding’ over their type and intention since they
are fully committed to producing and using them. Oddly, the same readers who are terrified
about US ballistic missile use seem to have no concerns about Chinese ballistic
missile use or our ability to discern their true nature. Apparently, in their minds, the onus of risk is
completely on the US. That’s just
ridiculous. Turnabout is fair play so
let’s develop our own.
I’ll leave the question of land based ballistic missiles to
the Army other than noting that such missiles have two issues: range and
vulnerability. We have very few useful
bases for ballistic missiles in the Pacific theatre (Guam being the notable
one) and those we have are thousands of miles from China. Further, the limited number of bases and the
fixed or semi-fixed nature of any land based ballistic missiles makes them
susceptible to first strike elimination.
This is a naval blog so let’s look at ship based ballistic
missiles. The obvious advantages of ship
based ballistic missiles are:
Mobility/Survivability
– Ship based ballistic missiles are more survivable simply due to the mobile
nature of a ship. Ship mounting would
also ensure a survivable, retaliatory strike capability against a surprise,
first strike attack whereas land sites are susceptible to first strike
destruction.
Range – Ships can
move closer to the target prior to launching, thereby reducing the range, if
necessary.
Stealth – In the
case of submarine based ballistic missiles, the launching platform is about as
stealthy as is possible. Even for
surface ships, the mobility of the ship confers a degree of stealth.
For surface ships, ballistic missiles are dependent on the Mk
57 VLS (the Zumwalt VLS system) being able to accommodate the desired missile
or else a new launch system will have to be developed. To refresh,
Mk 57 VLS Specifications
|
|
Missiles
|
4
|
Width (ft)
|
7.25
|
length (ft)
|
14.2
|
Height (ft)
|
26, 7.93
|
Weight (lb)
|
33,600
|
Max. canister width (in)
|
28
|
Max. canister length (in)
|
283
|
Max. encanistered weight (lb)
|
9,020
|
While the Mk57 VLS is not much larger than the standard Mk41
VLS, Raytheon claims that the big difference between the MK41 and MK57 is
thrust capacity. Raytheon product
brochures claim the system can handle up to 45 percent greater rocket motor
mass flow rate thereby allowing for much more powerful booster designs. The Mk57 also allows for heavier canister
weights: 9000 lbs vs. 6000 lbs for the
Mk41.
Whether a missile with the desired performance characteristics can fit in a Mk 57 VLS is unknown. If not, one has to seriously wonder what the rationale was behind the Mk 57 since no current or developing missile requires the extra capacity of the Mk 57. But, I digress …
Whether a missile with the desired performance characteristics can fit in a Mk 57 VLS is unknown. If not, one has to seriously wonder what the rationale was behind the Mk 57 since no current or developing missile requires the extra capacity of the Mk 57. But, I digress …
Back to naval ballistic missiles …
What specific ships would make good naval ballistic missile
platforms?
Battleship - A
modern battleship would make an excellent ballistic missile launch platform. It would offer sufficient size for a
significant loadout and excellent armored protection.
Submarine – A sub
would obviously make an excellent ballistic missiles platform as demonstrated
by the existing SSBN and SSGN vessels.
Arsenal Ship –
This is another good possibility with the vessel being, essentially, a mobile
ballistic missile barge. Theoretically,
the Zumwalt could be converted to a ballistic missile launch platform if a
suitable missile could be designed that would fit the Mk 57 VLS.
As demonstrated by the concerns and the enormous effort the
Navy, and military, in general, is putting into stopping enemy ballistic
missiles, naval ballistic missiles would offer significant striking power on
mobile, survivable platforms. With
treaty limitations no longer a concern, there is no reason not to develop tactical
naval ballistic missiles and every reason to do so.
(1)Navy Matters blog, “Mk57 VLS”, 18-Jul-2016,
https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2016/07/mk57-vls.html
Are those supposed to be ASBMs? Then how are they supposed to know where to hit? Those targeting capabilities may also be available to the enemy in which case a slow surface ship with escorts around would be likewise vulnerable. That means the missile platform should be going alone. Which makes a submarine the best bet. It can move undetected and then disappear after launch. What about ALBMs? Aircraft can move faster into the launch area requiring less prepositioning time than ships and faster retreat. Smaller mission time also allows for less advance warning time and a smaller time window for detection and interception.
ReplyDelete"Are those supposed to be ASBMs?"
DeleteYour question was answered in the post:
"The advantages of these missiles in both the land attack and anti-ship roles (assuming we can solve the targeting challenge) are obvious."
" What about ALBMs?"
DeleteFrom the post,
"This is a naval blog so let’s look at ship based ballistic missiles."
What a difference a year makes: DeepStrike missiles. Currently being tested to attack such moving targets as ships.
Deletehttps://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a26960/army-new-long-range-tactical-missile-deepstrike/
USN had proposed a conventional Trident III based system that did not get funding. Going back to this would be the quickest to field and be cost effective. This without having to create a new system from scratch and line defense contractors pockets.
ReplyDeleteBut I would take the Prompt Global Strike program over nothing to deter the PLA/PLAN. In my opinion all the press hand wringing about the Russians and ourselves opting out of the missile treaty misses the point about the Chinese.
Which is what I believe the current Russian Kinzhal etc are really aimed at deterring the Chinese. And soon our equivalent system. Hell, a modernized Pershing II would work too.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf
Take a look at the SM-3 warhead size and terminal velocity. 50-100 kg at mach 10-15 (block I vs II). Look at the terminal velocity for old INF missiles (ballistic physics hasn't changed). Mach 8 for Pershing 2.
ReplyDeleteWe could gain some (warhead) throw weight by sacrificing some sensors and aerodynamic surfaces, but these don't weigh that much more than ballistic missile control systems. SM-3 is pretty close to an ideal booster, so VLS cannot fit IRBMs with significant throw weights. I still like the I'd idea, but it requires new ships with dedicated cells or deck launchers for XL missiles. SSBNs are the most effective and most expensive option. Whether that's worthwhile or you want an attritable missile boat depends on the role these end up playing in your naval strategy.
SM-3 is way under the Mk 57 9000 lb. limit, but I don't think you can scale booster size and propellant levels up in that constrained volume more than 20-30% (optimistically), and the rocket equation says that gives you a lot less that 20-30% extra burnout speed.
DeleteEven a 10% increase in efficiency is huge (from an engineering perspective).
DeleteGAB
The Navy was always free to develop ballistic missiles. The INF treaty didn't have any limits on surface ship launched ballistic missiles.
ReplyDeleteCost is an issue. Ballistic missiles are far more expensive than cruise missiles per target struck.
The Russians and Chinese are probably less concerned about our misunderstanding a non-nuclear launch because our sensor, command and control architecture is more sophisticated and extensive. We can tell the difference. Can they?
Also, in the case of the Chinese, they lack the ability to put our retaliatory strike capability at risk. So they can reason that we will be less likely to have a hair trigger on a nuclear response. We can wait out their first strike to ensure its nuclear, especially if they launch against theater targets only (vs intercontinental). No risk to CONUS.
If we launch ballistic missiles against targets in the South China Sea area, how quickly can they tell if they're conventional ASBMs targeted at naval vessels at sea or a nuclear strike on Hainan?
"The Navy was always free to develop ballistic missiles."
DeleteTrue, but there was a political and institutional reluctance to develop ballistic missiles, for reasons I can't fathom. Now that the INF is void, there is absolutely no reason not to proceed.
" Ballistic missiles are far more expensive than cruise missiles per target struck."
DeleteThey are also far more difficult to stop which could actually make them cheaper per target hit!
"how quickly can they tell if they're conventional ASBMs targeted at naval vessels at sea or a nuclear strike on Hainan?"
DeleteIf they're concerned, all they have to do is enter into a treaty with us to eliminate ALL tactical ballistic missiles. The US seems only too eager to do that. Given that the Chinese have shown zero interest in that, I have to conclude that they aren't concerned with weapon identification on either side.
As the country that is engaged in a massive ballistic missile build up, the onus is entirely on China to deal with the risk.
"We can tell the difference. Can they? ... No risk to CONUS."
DeleteI have mixed feelings on this. It is a very complicated topic that shouldn't be brushed aside, but the risks of ballistic missile use shouldn't be overstated either. First off, if we were to keep our conventional IRBM inventory in the 500-2500 mile range, I think it's very unlikely that they'd be mistaken for ICBMs or nuclear SLBMs under most use cases. When fired from less than maximum range, SLBMs and ICBMs still reach the same speed on a depressed trajectory - Russia and China are both advanced enough to be able to make that discrimination.
Now, for the part that should concern us. We have a lot of dual-use weapons and/or conventional weapons that can *theoretically* be confused for nuclear delivery vehicles, but only ballistic missiles can *credibly* be confused for a nuclear attack. For instance, a tomahawk or conventional AGM-86 strike could be confused for a nuclear AGM-86 strike... but most observers (including most Russian/Chinese generals) agree that the USA's (classified) nuclear targeting doctrine probably doesn't involve a limited nuclear first strike with cruise missiles alone (or first). That scenario is insufficient for a “successful” nuclear counterforce strike, and would simply result in the USA (and/or its allies) suffering an unacceptable retaliatory strike. Because of this, there isn't a credible concern about the nature of US cruise missiles unless they're detected alongside other clear signs of a nuclear counterforce strike (broad attacks on C4 centers, IADS, retaliatory strike capability, etc.). On the other hand, a lone ballistic missile can accomplish an EMP attack on the enemy to blind them as a prelude to a first strike. This can be accomplished even if its apparent target (point of impact) isn't strategically valuable, as long as the trajectory takes it high over the enemy’s sensors. Because nuclear warheads are about the same mass as (or lighter than) anti-ship missile warheads, enemy leaders are likely to assume the worst even if the trajectory makes it clear that it isn’t an SLBM and the USA’s IRBM force is officially conventional-only.
Given the above, I do *not* think we should be afraid to develop conventional ballistic missiles. As I mentioned in the last post discussing this topic, they're an excellent tool for bringing China to the negotiating table for INF 2.0, and they have significant military utility as well. It is entirely possible to use these weapons without triggering another scenario like the 1995 Norwegian Rocket Incident. Launched from the second Island chain towards PLAN vessels meddling in the first island chain, this would be a potentially effective weapon that would not be mistaken for a nuclear attack.
Darth, what brought Soviet to INF was their broken economy; USSR fell 4yrs after the treaty.
DeletePLA's DF21/26 are land based, therefore, any US BM pre-emptive or counter strikes will have to land in continental China. Since both 'cities and mil.targets' are indistinguishable either by nature of target or missile flight, China will go for true MAD capability/capacity deterrence and revise its minimal 2nd-strike nuke doctrine, in other word, an arm race between two equal economies.
When this generation's bone are cold and long buried, our (and their's too) children will curse us for bring in the human race to another brink of nuke abyss.
Just curious, are you writing the same comments on Chinese blogs, blaming them, as well, or is it only the US' fault?
DeleteI didn't last long there, too 'American' for them. Politics is a no-go area for them, I can't even suggest America/Americans are by and large alright, except for that how-to-get-into-war-but-don't-know-how-get-out part, and there lies their danger.
DeleteTim, you're right that USSR was not in a position to win an arms race due to their broken economy, but your comments on deterrence are far off the mark, and this is probably causal in your misunderstanding of the multiple reasons that both sides opted into the INF treaty.
DeleteUnfortunately, unless CNOps decides to make a rare post on the subject, this just isn't the place to have an argument about whether deterrence works. I only even mentioned nuclear targeting policy because it's an important factor which informs the types of conventional ballistic missiles we can build with minimal risk of unintentionally escalating crisis situations (something we should only ever do intentionally. Suffice it to say that great power competition and war still exist, but we’re a good 30 years past due for WW3 and still nobody seems willing to start it up.
Regarding the following:
Axiom 1: [counterforce requires strikes on mainland China]
Axiom 2: [China can't determine if a BM is targeting a city or their military]
Conclusion: "China will pursue a more credible deterrent"?
Frankly, the conclusion is just a fact. China is pursuing a more credible deterrent, but I'm not really seeing the relationship between the previous couple of sentences and that fact/conclusion. It's also difficult to determine what this sentence fragment means on its own:
"Since both 'cities and mil.targets' are indistinguishable either by nature of target or missile flight,"
Are you referring to the target of a BM being indistinguishable while it's in the air? That is factually incorrect. A ballistic object follows a very predictable path. Russia and China (along with every other country that has been to space, and then some) have radars that are advanced and powerful enough to track a ballistic missile with enough precision to predict the target down to a couple hundred meters. What’s difficult is getting a good enough track to target a BM with an ABM interceptor, and discriminating the warhead from decoys and other countermeasures. If you meant something else, I got the impression you might, but I can’t for the life of me figure out what it is.
“When this generation's… nuke abyss”
I agree completely, but the scenario where I see this happening is probably a lot different from yours. We live with MAD today. The USA and Russia have MAD. India and Pakistan have MAD. Heck, even North Korea can ensure that Seoul turns to rubble on the same day that Pyongyang does – and one Seoul is worth a lot of Pyongyangs no matter how you slice it. We also live with SAD (self-assured destruction). If India and Pakistan have at each other – particularly if they target each other’s cities – then they’ll take the whole world with them, no matter their intention or the rest of the world’s efforts. The firestorms they would start would loft enough ash into the stratosphere to turn the biosphere into a cryosphere. Nobody wants this, nobody does this. Our greatest risk of nuclear destruction isn’t MAD (especially not intentional MAD), it is SAD, particularly accidental SAD where a rising nuclear power (North Korea, Pakistan, China, etc.) falsely detects a first strike and launches a “retaliatory” countervalue strike. I highly recommend you look into the 1995 Norwegian Rocket Incident I noted. This has already almost happened more times than we’re likely to have survived; we’re all living charmed lives.
"Since both 'cities and mil.targets' are indistinguishable either by nature of target or missile flight,"
DeleteCase 1: look how Baghdad (or targets amidst) got blown up during both gulf wars.
Case 2: non-military metropolis (which are numerous in china) could be right next to military targets.
"Conclusion: "China will pursue a more credible deterrent"? "
It could be a strategic deterrent. The US is trying to stretch the grey area between two ends of the warfare; conventional and nuke. In response, China will try to shrink that grey area, because 1. China will not be able to stop the US from conventional strike should A2AD (a defense oriented disposition strategy) fails to deter the US from trying, and 2: once that war starts, given the proximity nature of both nations (after balancing out US-mil superiority by Pacific's distance and geography), both sides won't be able to check the escalation, not after great blood letting. As I said before, we have habit of starting a fight but don't know how to end it. China can't afford to bear the brunt of that non-thinking.
Therefore, China will make it either no-war, or full nuclear, with no grey area, for a US-China peer war. Currently China has credible minimal 2nd-strike, not guaranteed MAD, and I think it may change if we BM'up the Pacifics.
I'm sorry I forgot to bring up a point in your axim 2:[China can't determine if a BM is targeting a city or their military]
DeleteChina will assume BM, coming down on Beijing or Shanghai, or any one of its population centers, to be nuke tipped. Just as we would assumed so, for example, during the Cuban missile crisis.
"The firestorms they would start would loft enough ash into the stratosphere to turn the biosphere into a cryosphere."
DeleteI assume you're referring to the so called, "nuclear winter". Have you ever seen any data on how many nuclear explosions are required to trigger the condition? The Earth is far more resilient than we think. For example, the amount of ash the gets spewed into the atmosphere every year from volcanoes is immense and yet we don't have continual winter.
I like to emphasize data on this blog so I'd love to see a reference of some sort for your statement - not the concept but the quantity. I'm not disputing it, just looking for some quantitative data. Got any?
"Therefore, China will make it either no-war, or full nuclear, with no grey area, for a US-China peer war. "
DeleteThere is not a shred of evidence to back that statement up and much logic and data to refute it. If, as you contend, China sees either no-war or nuclear war, then why are they building a military that is far, far, far, far, far, beyond that necessary to provide no-war self-defense or even that necessary to intimidate local, small countries as they advance their regional expansionist, annexation policy?
That simple logic, alone, utterly refutes your statement. China is clearly gearing up for a toe-to-toe conventional war with the US.
"China will assume BM, coming down on Beijing or Shanghai, or any one of its population centers, to be nuke tipped."
DeleteI'll repeat … If China is concerned, all they have to do is stop building their own ballistic missiles and ask the US to enter into a treaty - something the US would be only to eager to do. China has no intention of do so and clearly doesn't fear the threat the way you do.
Re nuclear winter. The same crowd of peaceniks that pushed that claimed the Kuwaitii oil well fires in 1st Gulf would cause the same.
DeleteCNO, China does not have the historical-track as the US, not the experience-track as you (i.e. military and geopolitical), not the present disposition (i.e. pax americana) as you- so how you can expect China to come up with the same rationale as you to diffuse the situation. (if that be the case, we should of been able to bring everyone to the tables, from Chinese to Muslims, and spare all that conflicts.) Unintended consequences are the rules, not the exception
Delete"Re nuclear winter."
DeleteHence, my request for supporting data. This blog is all about data and logic.
" Unintended consequences"
DeleteIf China cannot see the consequences of pursuing a massive buildup of potentially nuclear ballistic missiles then they are complete idiots. I don't think they are. I think they've made a very careful calculation and decided that the benefits of ballistic missiles outweigh the costs.
"careful calculation and decided that the benefits of ballistic missiles outweigh the costs"
DeleteI can't agree more. They saw that they were likely to be a pariah in the Western world, had a (unreasonable but real) fear of loss of sovereignty, and decided they didn't have much reputation to lose anyways. It's a problem we should *coerce* them to the negotiating table over... or at least that's my preference.
That comment on the physics of nuclear winter is coming up, but it's really more of a review article, since that's what you're describing as necessary.
In regards to:
"The same crowd of peaceniks that pushed that claimed the Kuwaitii oil well fires in 1st Gulf would cause the same"
Yeah, I'm not quite one of those "peaceniks", I'm pretty sure those oil fires caused more warming than cooling, and they didn't cause much of either. A preview of my conclusions regarding nuclear winter is that massive counterforce strikes are 100% okay, even reciprocal counterforce exchanges without specifically avoiding cities are okay. It takes a couple hundred large modern cities being nuked to produce catastrophic climate effects, but that isn't such a tall task. I'll have numbers for that for you soon, I've had them for me for a while but it's taking a bit to put together nicely. All of the official nuclear countries can probably achieve that if they engage in at least 70% countervalue targeting *and* their enemy responds in kind, while the USA and Russia can use half of their arsenal for counterforce targeting and keep a reserve capable of causing famine-inducing cooling on their own. For the USA and Russia, that's a fair balance. China can't cause SAD unless we help, and especially not if we execute a counterforce strike on them. Russia...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ozg7gEchjuM
... but that's all they've got.
The problem with China is that China doesn't trust the US, and while China's official position with regard to nukes is "No first use", that position will last only until China thinks that the first use of nukes is viable - perhaps, say, suppressing USAF airbases in Japan, South Korea, and Guam. So even with the US's own "No first use" policy, even with the US publicly moving away from a launch on warning posture, even if the US signs treaties promising that it's only going to use conventional warheads in new build MRBMs, I don't think China's going to trust that the hypothetical conventional US MRBMs are in fact conventional, not when China has been recapitalising its MRBM arsenal: all this talk of DF-26 being a carrier killer out to pierside at Guam is, IMO, maskirova to draw attention away from how China is increasing its MRBM arsenal, because the only thing seperating a nuke MRBM from a conventional ASBM is the warhead.
DeleteMyself, I'm not really in favor of developing conventional MRBMs for the Navy's warships, I'd rather effort be made towards a Tomahawk sucessor. Sure, MRBMs are difficult to intercept, but they're also rather unsubtle things on radar, and you can work back the point of origin from its flightpath. Meanwhile, a stealthy subsonic terrain-following cruise missile can be programmed to fly an deception flight path to disguise the point of origin, and you can get a bit more utility out of it, since cruise missiles are a lot more viable as antiship weapons, compared to ballistic missiles.
"you can work back the point of origin from its flightpath."
DeleteWho cares? When the launch point is a thousand to a few thousand miles away and the launch platform ship is moving away from that point the entire time, there is no way to get a counter weapon there in time.
"Yeah, I'm not quite one of those "peaceniks", I'm pretty sure those oil fires caused more warming than cooling, and they didn't cause much of either."
DeleteOil fires != Burning cities resulting from nuclear strikes
Just because one didn't cause appreciable "nuclear winter" doesn't mean the other won't. Different composition of particulates, different volumes, different area distribution.
Without actually blowing up cities with nukes, it's hard to know for sure either way.
Oil fires != burning cities.
DeleteTell that to Carl Sagan's ghost.
"Tell that to Carl Sagan's ghost."
DeleteNo need,
"Sagan later conceded in his book The Demon-Haunted World that his prediction did not turn out to be correct: "it was pitch black at noon and temperatures dropped 4–6 °C over the Persian Gulf, but not much smoke reached stratospheric altitudes and Asia was spared."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuwaiti_oil_fires
"Who cares? When the launch point is a thousand to a few thousand miles away and the launch platform ship is moving away from that point the entire time, there is no way to get a counter weapon there in time."
Delete@ComNavOps: True, that's a fair point. It's the same rationale behind the Soviet SSBN bastion, I suppose: you know the SLBMs are flying from the Barents Sea, but if you can't get in there...
I'd still argue that stealthy cruise missiles are an avenue where we can get better results, especially given that you can pack in more cruise missiles for the same space occupied by a medium-range ballistic missile, and they're arguably more bang for the buck: for 40 million USD, a Trident II drops fourteen 360 lbs MIRVS on a target; 24.92 million gets you 14 Tomahawks with 1000lbs warheads. (I'm fudging somewhat with this comparison; IMO the fastest way to get a conventional SLMB into service is to do a warhead swap on Trident. But it really ought to be a purpose-built design, IMO.)
Still, if there's the money for the both, I suppose there's nothing lost by exploring the possibilities. It wouldn't be the first time the USN would have toyed with the idea of launching ballistic missiles off surface ships - I recall reading about proposals to deploy Regulus II missiles aboard the Iowas.
"Trident II ... launching ballistic missiles off surface ships"
DeleteYou've completely missed the topic. We're not talking about 8000+ mile range ballistic missiles like the Trident, we're talking about smaller, presumably cheaper, missiles with a range of one to a few thousand miles so your Tomahawk-Trident cost comparison is invalid.
An blog post close to my heart.
ReplyDeleteWe are fully in the age of missiles, and this means cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and boost-glide missiles.
Tomahawk is old, but we could quickly build and give GLCM to our allies, which would greatly complicate any Chinese contingencies.
LRASM seems like a nice missile, but if there were a way to develop a longer-range version, with perhaps a smaller, lighter warhead, the trade might be worth making.
LRASM-B, the hypothetical supersonic Navy ASCM, needs to come out of development and into VLS tubes ASAP. I can only hope that development has been delayed waiting for the political support for offensive missiles that we're only now getting. Perhaps this is what Mk 57 was built for? On that note, do we begin to consider buying Zumwalt again, or requiring Mk 57 in the new Large Surface Combatant?
Could SM-3 (more likely, I think) or SM-6 support a boost-glide warhead? Even if it would be a small warhead, the weapon could still be highly useful.
The Virginia Payload Tube will hold a conventional ballistic missile nicely, but I'm assuming that permanently moves the tube from a multiple-Tomahawk to a single BM usage.
If any of this is scary to Russians and Chinese, I would happily welcome INF 2.0- but I seriously doubt that China has any interest in moving away from their moves to base large amounts their combat power and strategy on INF-class weapons. I strongly believe that as long as that's the case, China should experience the logical reciprocal.
How about packing Hyper Velocity Projectiles into the warhead as submunitions? It's already designed with a targeting system that should handle the speed involved and I'll believe in a modern battleship firing ballistic missiles before I believe in rail guns. . .
ReplyDeleteBallistic missiles tend to pack in warheads in the 500 to 1000 pound range - that would let you fire a salvo of 5 or more hyper velocity projectiles even from a small launch platform. Larger missiles carry multiple reentry vehicles each with a warhead weight of nearly eight hundred pounds, so the number of submunitions could potentially be much higher.
A modern battleship so equipped could potentially drill an aircraft carrier and its escorts from well out of range of either the aircraft or any weapons that they carry. The battleship has an advantage over the submarine in being a visible and mobile deterrent. If equipped only for conventional warheads (no nuclear missile capability) then the battleship option reduces the risk of accidental nuclear escalation. Being mobile also reduces the push from our allies to eliminate a supposedly "threatening" weapon system from their territory. The battleship's armor, endurance, and throw weight would give a single ship all the deterrent effect you could ask for. No need to modify every destroyer in the fleet or, heaven forbid, order more Zumwalts. . . .
@RE Jones: the problem with that idea is that in order to drill the carrier from outside the range of the carrier's aircraft, the battleship is going to need sensor assets to find and fix the carrier. This is why DF-21 isn't a credible antiship weapon against carriers on the high seas: China doesn't have the sensor assets to be able to find and fix a carrier on the open seas at 1700 kilometers, let alone the 4,000 km range of DF-26. The further out you're trying to fix the carrier's position, the larger your search area. Satellites won't cut it, land-based aircraft don't have the range, out on the open seas that means carriers and aircraft of your own.
Delete(It's a different matter in the Taiwan Strait, or in the East China Sea or the Yellow Sea, because those areas are China's back yard, and can be covered by land-based maritime patrol aircraft and AEW aircraft.)
As ComNavOps has mentioned before, a weapon that outranges its sensors is useless. (https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2019/01/outranging-sensor-long-lance-torpedo.html)
Sure you've got to find it, but you've only got to find it once. Continuous tracking might be impossible at 1700 km or whatever, but a single sighting would get the job done.
DeleteMoreover, the carrier would be under the constant pressure to hide. That's a constant drain on operations impacting every aspect of its mission. Among other things that means that the carrier has to operate under tight emissions control, avoid passing near any major landmasses (difficult in the Western Pacific), and undertake radical course and speed changes at every potential sighting by an enemy ship, plane, or drone.
In the face of an ugly ballistic missile threat the carrier has to get it right every time, the battleship only has to get lucky once.
" single sighting would get the job done. "
DeleteOnly if the target obligingly stays in one spot!
"Moreover, the carrier would be under the constant pressure to hide. ... Among other things that means that the carrier has to operate under tight emissions control, avoid passing near any major landmasses (difficult in the Western Pacific), and undertake radical course and speed changes"
DeleteThat's what carrier groups do! You need to read up on Pacific carrier operations of WWII and Cold War operations and come up to speed on carrier operating tactics.
@REJone: How to Hide a Task Force is interesting reading (http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-031.php); the biggest takeaway is that during NORPAC 82, two US carrier groups operated off the Russian coast within strike range of the air wing, and were not detected until they finally showed themselves to the russians - even with ruassian patrols and attempts to find the carriers.
DeleteMy understanding is the new Large Surface Combatant RFI requirements include the ability of the ship’s Vertical Launch System to accommodate longer and larger diameter missiles for increased speed and range of weapons [new Hypersonic missile in development to replace Tomahawk, will be too large to fit Mk 41 or 57 VLS cell].
ReplyDeleteRear Adm Boxall, DefenseNews September 17, 2018 “We are going to need, we expect, space for longer range missiles. They are going to be bigger. So the idea that you could make a bigger cell, even if you don’t use it for one big missile, you could use it for multiple missiles — quad-pack, eight-pack, whatever.”
Ballistic Missiles have a pretty undeserved reputation for wonderfulness.
ReplyDeleteThat's not to say they are useless, but they have good points, and bad points.
Any Ballistic missile is going to be seen very very quickly, very far away, hard to intercept, sure, but plenty of opportunity to do so. On its way up, on its way down, and possibly even by the CAP whilst its high.
HMS Sheffield, made mistakes, but had all of ten seconds to react to an incoming sea skimming missile, its hard to see a situation in which there isn't at least a 2 minute warning of an incoming SRBM.
Early Detection also gives away the location of the shooter, a sea skimmer could launch, fly 100 miles north then 400 miles west and hit a target, it could even hook around and hit from the rear, the defender would have no way of tracking the launcher.
I'd need examples as to what they would be used for
Boost phase intercepts aren't possible unless the interceptor is, essentially, on top of the shooter. That's the problem the Navy's BMD faces. Barring an extremely unlikely scenario, they can only intercept on the re-entry phase which is very difficult to do. So, yes, warning will be ample but intercept opportunity is limited to re-entry and, even then, is very difficult.
DeleteAs far as giving away the shooter, this was addressed in another comment and is not even remotely an issue. Check the other comment.
You need examples of how to use a ballistic missile???? How about against every fixed target there is: harbors, airbases, naval facilities, HQs, factories, dams, critical roads, etc.?
First if we are going to assess this we need to clarify the actual potential damage of non-nuclear ballistic missile. It is not going to be like a small nuclear bomb as some believe. Those calculations are based on the projectile somehow keeping orbital speed (around 9,000 m/s). The Air-Forces Project Thor (aka rods from god) started at that velocity but USAF estimated it would have slowed to about 3700 m/s (a little under Mach 7) by the time of impact. Atmospheric drag, some guidance, and keeping the velocity friction heat below the melting point of tungsten being a few of the reasons why. A reasonable AsBM with a 3000 mile range could presumable reach a max velocity of say 6000 m/s and then drop down to a sedate 3040 m/s (mach 6).
ReplyDeleteWhat would the missile look like? The MK-57 is a rather small tube and I can’t imagine the final warhead would be very large. But if we left off the 2nd and 3rd stages of the Trident D-5 and just used the first stage it should do nicely and have very little development cost. In fact if a replacement SLBM goes into production for Columbia, we could convert retired Tridents. A shorter, 1st stage only Trident would fit in the Virginia payload module of our submarines. A VPM would only fit one. But this would have 8 warheads at about 360 kg each, so actually 1 more warhead than a tomahawk carrying module. (I base the number of warheads and weights on the original nuclear payload.)
Now we need a benchmark for comparison so let’s pull out this blog’s favorite weapon the 16 inch gun. The AP round launched a 1220 kg projectile at 760 m/s. At the muzzle (not at impact) this produces roughly 350000000 joules of energy. The 360 kg AsBM warhead at 3040 m/s delivers roughly 1670000000 joules of energy or nearly 5x the amount of energy on impact that the 16 inch has at the muzzle. Being a solid tungsten penetrator with a superheated exterior on a ballistic trajectory it would punch through a carrier from the top and exit the bottom passing through the carrier and igniting everything flammable (including metals like aluminum) on its way down then dumping most of the remaining energy into the water beneath the carrier with an explosive force equivalent to a couple mk 48 torpedo warheads.
If we use the CEP of the Trident, we could target a sitting carrier with 3 warheads, and get at least 1 and possibly all 3 as hits with the remaining 5 warheads spread around destroying other ships, fuel/ammo/command bunkers, etc. Or if we are afraid the carrier is steaming away, blanket a possible target area. I have my doubts about moving targets which is why I used the CEP of an existing SLBM against a sitting target. But even if we target a capital ship undergoing maintenance, this does deny the enemy an asset valuable enough to make the strike worthwhile.
I used a kinetic energy calculator at Calculator Soup for the energy calculations. The information on Project Thor can be found at the excellent Atomic Rockets web site which focuses on providing some science for science fiction writers. (http://www.projectrho.com/public_html/rocket/planetaryattack.php)
I'd be curious to know if existing ATACMS missiles can be adapted for launch from the Mk 57 VLS. The ATACMS Block IVA has a range of 300 km. But, its range, according to Wiki, is "limited more by the legal provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) than technical considerations." What that means, I don't know.
ReplyDeleteIt doesn't have the range you wanted, but its a start. The missile is out of production, but a new version with an extended length first stage or a two-stage missile could have a range of 1,000 km or better. That would give the Zumwalt's a short-range ballistic missile. But, raises the problem of how many missiles to build as there are only three Zumwalt's in the Fleet. This could be another LRLAP problem.
Another possible launch platform is a modified container ship, with the missiles protected by multiple tows of Conex boxes, using missile canisters from the Virginia Payload module.
"But, its range, according to Wiki, is "limited more by the legal provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) than technical considerations." What that means, I don't know."
DeleteFor legal reasons, they swapped out the big fuel tank that could carry it 2000miles with a tiny one that has fuel for 300miles.
The ATACMS has a solid rocket motor. A fuel tank implies liquid fuel and the tank is usually sized for the particular mission. Fuel sloshing around in flight generally isn't a good thing as it affect the center of gravity of the rocket and the ability to control it in flight.
DeleteI'm guessing it has more to due with shaping its trajectory at launch. The old Army Lance missiles ware launched at slightly better than a 45 degree (49 degrees, I think) angle to enable the missiles to rise faster where the air was thinner creating less drag on the missile. I'm guessing it's something like that with ATACMS. Plus, there are probably some software limits in the guidance system to prevent a longer flight.
I think basing is the more interesting question. AS CNO mentioned about land based missiles, I'm doubtful we will see them, I don't see many allies in SEA OR EUROPE FOR THAT MATTER accepting basing for IRBMs... so that realistically leaves us with ship launched missiles.
ReplyDeleteI see a couple of options: Virginia's with VPM or something similar OR maybe new Columbia class modified as arsenal ships. Other interesting option would be to take a ZUMWALT and rip out the guns and add more cells and adapt it as a prototype IRBM launcher. IMO, I would start with a ZUMWALT, think it would be faster and would be a good base to start experimenting with. Could you then move on to a new class or some other hull, don't know. If done right (crazy to think that USN would do it right!), I think you could develop an arsenal ship on the cheap, sadly, USN would just end up loading it up with so many radars and other systems, it would become crazy expensive.
After the Zumwalt, I think I like the idea of modifying a SSBN, after the series has launched a few boomers, I would insert an SSGN Columbia. It brings more launchers, more diversity of missiles (could you combine LO cruise missiles with a mix of IRBMSs on board?), lots of stealth, plus it would help with the production line, keeping it warm for longer. It would keep our adversaries guessing what loadout our SSBNs are carrying, I don't think that would be bad idea. Are you tracking a complete nuke warhead one, a mix (nuke/conventional) or complete conventional warhead IRBM one? Are you facing just LO slow cruise missiles, hypersonic cruise missiles or more "rocket" like IRBMS? A mix would really create a problem for the bad guys since they would offer so many different attack profiles.
There's been rumors of a Chinese arsenal ship, I almost want to see China produce one so we can have a real example to talk about since USN is too stupid or chicken to build one....
Another rumor is USA has quietly looked into to (rapidly?) reintroduce/restart some of the parts that were used in the 80s for land based BGM-109G.
I dont think that the enemy guessing what weapons loadout a ship is carrying is of much importance. If theyre tracking it (which nobody should be doing...) then its dead and irrelevant at the opening of hostilities.
DeleteAs far as an arsenal ship, with the exception of SSGNs, the concept just seems bad... Looking at actual weapon inventories, putting lots of "eggs in one basket" seems risky. Plus how many of them would we have, and could they be where we need them, when we want them?? Would they be so expensive and important that theyd need their own escort group? Or are they envisioned as an add-on to a CVBG??
An arsenal ship has drawbacks (and benefits) and the main one is 'too many eggs in one basket'. However, there is no reason we have to build a 10,000 missile arsenal ship. We can build a 50 missile arsenal ship - or whatever size makes sense. The name 'arsenal' has come to imply massively large loads but there is no reason that has to be. Just a small, simple, missile barge would be just fine.
DeleteI was scratching my head trying to determine what advantage a ship would have over a submarine in terms of a cruise/ballistic missile platform. The only one I could think of was cost. I suppose an argument could be made ships have the potential to be better armored, though 60 feet of water has a way of protecting you as well...
ReplyDeleteIs there any reason you can think of for using surface ships as primary launching platforms for cruise/ballistic missiles over submarines?
Yeah, because they're there. Seriously, where did you get the idea that it's a one-or-the-other choice? Too many weapons discussions devolve exactly into this on-or-the-other debate and that's almost always wrong. The more choices we have, the better. We have a limited number of subs who, in war, will have a LOT of missions and limited availability for those missions. We're going to need every offensive platform we can get.
DeleteIf we are talking about using the assets we have, fine. I was thinking more in terms of future decision making in our force structure.
Delete“Seriously, where did you get the idea that it's a one-or-the-other choice? Too many weapons discussions devolve exactly into this on-or-the-other debate and that's almost always wrong. The more choices we have, the better.”
Diversification is important, but it is not the ultimate priority. If one platform is shown to be vastly superior to another, diversification (for its own sake) is not a good idea.
That is why we have a nuclear triad (subs, bombers, and land-based) instead of a nuclear tetrad (surface ships). The first three are generally similar and complement each other well. The fourth adds little (if anything) and sacrifices much. The naval contribution to nuclear deterrence isn’t diversified between ships and subs for this reason.
Your principle is better stated as, the more (equally capable) choices we have, the better.
I know ships offer several disadvantages to submarines as missile platforms. I was asking if you could think of any advantages, because I couldn’t (besides cost).
I already stated the main advantage but, apparently, not clearly enough. I'll try again. In war, the main mission of submarines is ASW (kill the other side's subs). The secondary mission is ASuW (kill the other side's surface ships). The tertiary mission, if that, is land attack. In war, one rarely gets around to tertiary missions. THERE WON'T BE ANY SUBS AVAILABLE FOR LAND ATTACK!!!! Thus, surface ships, for whom land attack is a higher priority (possibly a primary mission, depending on the specific ship), will have to fill the role.
DeleteI understand what you are saying.
DeleteI’m suggesting we build EVEN MORE submarines in the future, even at the cost of some surface ships (i.e. Burkes), because submarines are vastly superior to surface ships for launching attack missiles. Building additional subs with the primary purpose of launching attack missiles would allow our “current” subs to focus on the missions you mentioned, while these arsenal subs could focus on launching missiles.
We can build more subs like the converted Ohio-class, and/or we can build smaller versions. This would give us fewer launching platforms (since subs inherently cost more than surface ships), but a vastly superior force overall.
In short, I am saying that using Burkes as our primary launching platform for launching cruise missiles is a bad idea, and we would be better off giving up three dozen Burkes in exchange for two dozen submarines designed specifically as attack missile platforms.
Who isn't in favor of more subs? And more ships? And more aircraft? And more tanks? And more … Oops, I think we ran out of money somewhere along the way, there.
DeleteSSGNs are a wonderful platform and I'm all for them. However, given that a plain Virginia costs around $3B, a SSGN, presumably adapted from an already incredibly expensive SSBN ($7.3B projected Average Procurement Unit Cost - APUC), is going to cost somewhere in the $8-$10B range. Yikes!
The current SSGN carries around 150 cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles are larger and an SSBN(tactical) would likely carry far fewer than 150 - FOR $8-$10 BILLION DOLLARS!!!!!! In contrast, a small ballistic missile 'barge' would cost nothing on a relative basis.
Surface ballistic missile ships would be equal in all respects to a sub except for degree of stealth but, given the 1000-3000 mile launch range, stealth is almost irrelevant. The enemy won't be anywhere near. Given the mammoth cost savings from a surface ship launch platform, it seems clear that surface ballistic missile launch ships are a good idea.
"I am saying that using Burkes as our primary launching platform for launching cruise missiles is a bad idea"
This discussion is about ballistic missiles, not cruise missiles.
Just a thought, but I've often pictured an offshore supply vessel as the ideal platform for fielding cruise missiles or ballistic missiles.
DeleteLong range, good sea keeping, EXTREMELY easy to add weapons modules, and cheap to purchase or build.
Any reason why this wouldn't work? I see it that you could have several hundred hulls very quickly if you needed to.
https://products.damen.com/en/ranges/platform-supply-vessel
"offshore supply vessel as the ideal platform for fielding cruise missiles or ballistic missiles."
DeleteI like that you're thinking outside the usual Navy gold-plated solution. The speed looks a bit low and the height of the launch tubes is probably greater than the available deck depth (have to build upward - stability?). Still, worth looking at.
When you loot at cross section of then 155mm on the Zumwalt, there is already a huge vertical shaft for the ammunition hoists.
DeleteAn NBM (naval ballistic missile-my preferred term) big enough to carry a sufficient warhead will be at least as large as a Pershing or a skinnier Trident. The two space designed for the useless guns Could accomate a 4 cell NBM VLS each, or each could be a single larger missile but with multiple warheads.
Their stealth could be useful, and they have some defensive capabilities....and are otherwise much the world’s largest and most expensive frigates as their armaments and small crew is less than a Burke at this point. So let’s put them then to good use.
One of the better comparative data points for missile size is the Indian Agni III IRBM which is 50 ft long and 6 ft diam with a range of 2000-3000 miles. Warhead capacity is unknown.
DeleteYour story also illustrates why I think PB's are a great training post for new SWO's in many ways.
ReplyDeleteOne way is that it instills a trait often missing in today's service; Aggression. A PB skipper realizes quickly that their survival depends on quick aggressive action. They have to strike hard, strike fast, and get the hell out of there. If they trained for a scenario like this one, it is something they would plainly see.
They also HAVE to learn good seamanship. If you are in a vessel under 100 tons somewhere like the Persian Gulf with it's high traffic of big vessels you have a lot of incentive to not become a nautical speed bump.
A good PB skipper also has to forge connections with his small crew and learn to depend on his CPO's. The crew size gets bigger as you rise in rank, but understanding how to communicate and utilize your crew never goes away.
All good points.
DeleteThere is a very serious limitation to terminal guidance on ballistic missiles. The plasma sheath created by hypersonic flight is highly ionized and essentially opaque to RF. A radar seeker can't see out and radio commands for datalink can't pass through either.
ReplyDeleteThat effect I believe is the reason for the pull up maneuver of the Pershing II RV in the terminal phase. It had to shed enough velocity from the mach 8 reentry to get rid of the plasma sheath so the radar it used for terrain matching could see. If that is the case, almost any anti-ship MRBM or IRBM would still have to slow to around mach 4 to even see the target or get updated 3rd party targeting data. Obviously that is not a consideration for fixed land targets but the firing solution against an ASBM may not be quite as difficult as everyone thinks.
An interesting option here is the naval-izing the Precision Strike Missile. It is going to have at least a 500 km range, but the rumor is that will be extended some with the treaty withdrawal. It isn't as big as some of the Chinese missiles, but its relatively inexpensive at $1.2 million each so you can build a lot. Four can fit on M270 launcher rails, which can fit on more ships than new VLS tubes if it is modified for sea duty and could presumably reload at sea. There are also options in development for sensors to hit moving targets.
ReplyDelete