FY27 Five Year Plan

If you want to read a sales brochure that raves about the magnificence of the Navy, check out the latest 30 year shipbuilding plan.
 
Here are some tidbits from the most recent five year plan for the years 2027-2031 inclusive.[1]
 
Battleship (Qty= 3, $14.5B ea) – Setting aside the reality that these will never be built, the plan is to have three built within the next five years while our high priority, “must get hulls in the water” frigate will only complete four?  There’s some serious delusion at work here.
 
Burke (Qty= 7, $3.61B ea) – Sure, these ships are long since obsolete, non-stealthy, overloaded, have no growth margins, lack close in weapons, and have sub-optimal radars but we’re going to build seven of them anyway because it’s the only ship we know how to build.  Along those same lines, I’ve read that the Navy is going to restart the F6F Hellcat production line because it was successful and we know how to build them.
 
NSC-FF Frigate (Qty= 4, $1.76B ea) – This is our most urgent shipbuilding project, according to the Navy, and we can only get four in five years?  Does this give a feel for our ability to replace sunken ships during a war?  Check out that price!  That’s a long ways from the numbers the Navy was publicly tossing around!  Remember when the Navy was claiming they would build Constellations for around $800M ea?  Now, we’re building slightly upgunned NSC patrol boats for twice that cost!  Yikes!
 
Virginia SSN (Qty= 10, $6.3B ea) – Setting aside the fact that we’ve been unable to maintain a build rate of two subs per year and now we think we’ll build two plus an SSBN each year, do you remember when the Navy proudly (and fraudulently!) claimed it was building Virginia’s for $2B apiece?  Well, now the cost is up to $6.3B and, of course, that’s a lowball Navy estimate.
 
Landing Ship Medium LSM (Qty= 23, $298M ea) – I have yet to hear any viable Concept of Operations for these sitting ducks and yet we’re going to build 23 of them?  I wouldn’t want to be a Marine in the near future!  Shipping on one of those promises to be a one-way trip and a short one at that.
 
Unmanned – Paraphrasing Star Wars, “The delusion is strong in this one.”  From the Navy’s shipbuilding plan,
 

The United States faces a strategic inflection point where peer adversaries have achieved naval mass that the U.S. cannot match with traditional shipbuilding alone.[1]

This statement is utterly false.  We can easily match China’s shipbuilding but we choose not to for reasons that only an insane person could agree with.  This is purely a self-inflicted disadvantage.  We’ve discussed the many ways we could easily and hugely increase our shipbuilding so I won’t belabor it here.
 
The Navy’s solution?  Why, unmanned, of course!
 

To counter this and deliver warfighting capability fast, the USV FoS strategy outlines a rapid, competitive path to deliver affordable, scalable, and adaptable unmanned surface capabilities … [1]

False!  The Navy’s unmanned vessels do NOT delivery warfighting capability.  They are largely unarmed.
 
Retirements - What about retirements?  The five year plan calls for 58 new ships and 46 retirements.  That’s a net gain of 12 ships.  Take that number at face value.  It’s a gain of 12 ships over 5 years which is 2 ships per year.  Compared to Chinese shipbuilding rates, that’s embarrassingly pathetic.  Still, it’s an improvement.  Or is it?  When we start looking at what types of ships will be added and lost, the picture is not good.
 
- 10 CG/DDG will be retired and 10 DDG added.  That’s a net gain of 0 for our top of the line surface combatants.
 
-  Counting all combat ships (carriers, surface ships, attack subs), we’ll gain 22 and lose 25 for a net loss of 3.
 
The numerical gains will be in auxiliary ships, not combat ships.  Auxiliaries are vital but they add no firepower to the fleet.
 
 
Summary
 
Though I’m sure they didn’t intend it as such, the 30 year plan perfectly documents the Navy’s delusions, fantasies, runaway costs, and schedule slippages.  In that sense, it’s quite informative and interesting.  As far as reality … well, that’s not included in the document. 
 
 
 
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[1]Department of the Navy, ”US Navy Shipbuilding Plan”, May 2026, Tables p.15 & 40

2025 Shipbuilding Plan

China is building warships faster than we can keep track of them with dozens of new ships every year.  How is the US Navy doing, by comparison?  Let's take a look at the Navy's most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan and, more importantly, the five year portion of that plan (everything beyond five years is just made up guesses).

 
New Construction
 
According to the Navy’s most recent 2025 30 Year shipbuilding plan [1], over the next five years the Navy plans to build 33 combat ships (average 6.6 per year) which break down as follows:
 
Carriers CVN           0
Burke DDG            10
Constellation FFG   7
Virginia SSN            9
San Antonio LPD    3
Columbia SSBN      4
 
In comparison, China went from around 190 to 250 (+60) in the four years 2020-2023 inclusive for an average of 15 new ships per year which is twice the build rate of the US.
 
In addition, the Navy plans to build 24 assorted auxiliaries and logistics vessels.
 
 
Retirements
 
Balanced against the build plans, the Navy plans to decommission 64 ships as indicated below and broken down by year.
 
2025 19
2026 17
2027 12
2028   7
2029   9
 
2025 CG 4, SSN 3, LCS 2, LSD 1, other 9
2026 CVN 1, CG 3, LCS 1, SSN 3, SSGN 2, LSD 2, other 5
2027 CG 2, SSN 1, SSBN 1, other 8
2028 DDG 2, SSN 1, SSGN 2, SSBN 1, LSD 1
2029 DDG 3, SSN 1, LSD 1, LHD 1, other 3
 
Total retirements by type:
 
CVN     1
CG       9
DDG    5
SSN     9
SSGN  4
SSBN  2
LCS     3
LSD     5
LHD     1
other  25
 
 
Discussion
 
We see, then, that in the five year plan (beyond five years is just pure made up guesses), the Navy is planning to retire 39 combat ships and 25 auxiliaries while building 33 combat ships and 24 auxiliaries for a net decrease of 6 combat ships and 1 auxiliary … while we’re supposedly gearing up for a near term war with China.  What’s wrong with this picture?
 
Other notable findings:
 

• The entire MCM force will be retired
• All SSGNs will be retired
• Nimitz class retirements will begin
• Burke class retirements will begin
• No new carriers are scheduled in the period
• No Burke/Tico replacement is planned

 
The MCM capability is of major concern.  The entire current MCM force of Avenger class ships and MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters will be retired with only a half dozen or so Independence variant LCS-MCM to take over mine countermeasures for the entire world.  Worse, the LCS MCM module is not yet functional and is entirely ineffective.  For all practical purposes, we no longer have any mine countermeasure capability.
 
The SSGN is far and away our most stealthy and effective land attack naval asset and will be retired without direct replacement.  The Virginia class, even with the VPM, simply cannot equal the SSGN in effectiveness and operational usefulness.
 
The lack of a Burke/Tico replacement is a major weakness.  We’ll be losing VLS (strike and AAW) capacity from the fleet while replacing them, numerically, with small, unmanned vessels with a fraction of the VLS.  The Burke Flt III is obsolete even before the first joins the fleet and is emphatically not the solution to future naval warfare due to the lack of stealth, armor, firepower, weight/stability margins, combat resilience, effective damage control, and a sub-optimal radar system.
 
 
 
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[1]Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, ” Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2025”, Mar 2024

Navy 2024 30-Year Plan

Let’s take a look at the latest (FY2024) Navy 30-year plan (30YP).[1]
 
Submarine Cruise Missiles - The main weapon of the Navy is the Tomahawk cruise missile.  It’s not even really debatable.  It’s been the weapon of choice for decades.  The 30YP shows that the imminent retirement of the four SSGN submarines with their 154 missiles each will result in a dip from the current 1100 submarine missiles to 500 missiles – a 54% drop in capacity.  The capacity will not recover to current levels until 2037 according to the Navy’s plan.  With a Taiwan invasion and a war with China looming, according to the Navy, does this seem wise?
 
 
Nuclear Construction Shipyards – The 30YP points out that there are only two nuclear shipbuilders.
 

Nuclear powered ship production, a unique capability with little to no opportunity for commercial or dual use production, is provided by two private shipyards that are currently facilitized and certified to construct nuclear powered ships and will be at capacity for the next 15-plus years building Columbia class SSBNs, Virginia class SSNs, next generation SSNs, and Ford class CVNs.[1]

One can’t help but think that a Pearl Harbor-ish sabotage strike on one or both of these facilities would effectively eliminate future shipbuilding of all US carriers and submarines – essentially ending the future US Navy for all practical purposes and eliminating any chance of building replacement ships in a war with China.
 
Shipyards – The Navy offers a mea-culpa of sorts related to the woeful state of the shipbuilding industry.
 

The Navy recognizes the “boom and bust” profiles of the last 60-plus years resulted in
sharp peaks followed by significant valleys, and sometimes breaks, in production. Today’s shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base is at a level of fragility in the supplier and labor force, amplified by COVID and inflationary impacts, such that without consistent and continuous commitment to steady and executable acquisition profiles the industrial base will continue to struggle and some elements may not recover from another “boom/bust” cycle.[1] 

 
Five Year Shipbuilding Plan - The following table shows the planned new ship construction for the next five years.
 
 

The table shows that in the next five years the Navy plans to retire 45 combatants and build 29 … with a war with China looming.  Does that seem wise?

 
 
LCS - The 30YP provides some clarity on the Navy’s intentions for the LCS.  The Independence-LCS will be dedicated to mine countermeasures (MCM) with 15 ships.  The remaining Freedom-LCS will be dedicated to anti-surface (ASuW).  Anti-submarine (ASW) has been dropped as an LCS mission set.
 
 
Funding - This brings us to money.  The Navy is requesting obscene amounts of money for new construction and yet I don’t hear a whisper of remorse or apology to Congress and the American taxpayer for having completely mismanaged the LCS, Zumwalt, JHSV, Ford, MLP, AFSB, etc. procurement programs after Congress entrusted the Navy with money for those programs with the expectation that the Navy would be good stewards of the taxpayers money.  I would like to see Congress put a hold on all Navy construction funding until every flag officer has been fired, the existing fleet has been made fully operational and ready with no maintenance backlog, and the Navy develops a viable plan for maintaining all existing and new ships.
 
 
 
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Even though the Navy doesn’t intend it as such, every 30 year plan is a testament to, and documentation of, the total ineptitude of Navy leadership.  Congress should use the plan to eliminate Navy leadership and start over.
 
 
 
 
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[1]“Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2024”, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, March 2023

Seriously, What’s Going On With The Navy?

The Navy just recently submitted its latest 30 year plan to Congress.[1]  In it, the Navy laid out ship retirements for the next five years (FYDP), as listed below, showing the year and the number of retirements:

 

 

Year	Retirements
2023	24
2024	13
2025	13
2026	14
2027	13

 

 

Okay.  We’ve already discussed how retiring dozens of ships (most of them early retirements) while building only half a dozen new ships each year is a bafflingly stupid plan but … there it is.

 

Now, however, it appears that the 30 year plan barely lasted a month … if it was ever a real plan to begin with.  The Navy has announced that instead of retiring 24 ships, as called for in the 30 year plan, they want to retire 39 ships.

 

That’s 13% of the entire fleet.  In one year.  With only half a dozen replacements. 

 

That’s insane.

 

Just as bad as the reckless retirement program is the utter aimlessness and randomness of Navy planning.  As we recently documented, the Navy has been tossing out random fleet size plans on a seemingly daily basis (see, “Floundering”).  Apparently, they couldn’t follow their most recent 30 year plan for more than a few weeks.  30 year plan?  Try 30 day plan.

 

I have to ask.  Is the Navy being run by Chinese agents?

 

 

 

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[1]“Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023”, Table A4-1, p.21-22

 

[2]USNI News website, “Navy Wants to Decommission 39 Warships in 2023”, Heather Mongilio, 15-Aug-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/08/15/navy-wants-to-decommission-39-warships-in-2023

Navy 30 Year Shipbuilding Plan

After ignoring the law for the last few years and not providing Congress with an annual, 30 year shipbuilding plan as mandated in Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code, the Navy has finally delivered a plan to Congress.  The Navy’s blatant and illegal disregard for the law is both appalling and criminal although, disappointingly, no criminal penalties are specified in the legislation.  But, I digress …

 

Let’s take a look at the plan.

 

The first thing that jumps out is that the Navy couldn’t even come up with a plan.  Instead, they’ve submitted a group of three alternative shipbuilding paths.  Two are predicated on constant shipbuilding budgets in terms of real growth and one is predicated on substantial real growth.  Apparently, despite taking multiple years to produce this plan, the Navy couldn’t even settle on a single plan.  So, instead of a plan we have nebulous optional paths.  That’s pathetic that our professional warriors couldn’t even map out a shipbuilding plan.  Instead, they’ve opted for options, presumably, so as to avoid having to commit to an actual plan.  There’s no responsibility if there’s no actual plan, is there?  Way to avoid responsibility, Navy.

 

All three plans share a common first five years (2023-27, the so called Five Year Defense Plan or FYDP period).  Since the out years (beyond the five year FYDP period) are just pure fiction, let’s take a look at the five year FYDP period.

 

 

FYDP

 

New Construction

 

Per Table A1-2 in the plan, the FYDP period calls for the construction of 50 new ships (32 combat vessels plus 3 SSBN plus 15 logistics and support vessels).  That’s an average of 10 new vessels per year.  The new construction type breakdown is:

 

Decommissionings by year:

 

2023  24

2024  13

2025  13

2026  14

2027  13

 

Total  77

 

That's an average of over 15 per year versus the construction rate of 10 per year.

Of the decommissionings, 31 of the 77 will be early retirements.

 

The retirements include, among others, 2 carriers (Nimitz, Eisenhower), 17 Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers, 11 LCS (9 Freedom and 2 Independence), the entire remaining Avenger class MCM vessels, 10 of the remaining 11 Whidbey Island and Harper’s Ferry class LSDs which carry the bulk of our LCAC landing craft and well deck capacity, 3 of the 4 SSGNs which are the most potent offensive assets in the Navy, 7 Henry J. Kaiser class T-AO oilers, and assorted other logistic and support ships.

 

So, over the next five years we’re decommissioning 77 ships and building 50 new ones for a net decrease of 27 ships.  Anyone see a problem, here?

 

Unmanned

 

Here’s the Navy vision for unmanned vessels:

 

… unmanned platforms will achieve 89-149 platforms in FY2045 … [1, p.8]

 

As you can see, with no proof of concept, the Navy has already committed to a significant portion of the fleet being small, unmanned vessels.

 

 

Sealift Capacity

 

The report cites a current requirement for 85 sealift ships versus a current inventory of 71 ships for a net deficit of 14 ships.  The Navy plans to address the deficit by acquiring 22 used ships for conversion to sealift at a total cost of $1.011B (average $46M per ship).

 

 

Summary

 

The plan random paths offered by the Navy paint a clear picture of a Navy that is floundering, unable to even offer a coherent, single plan.  We are retiring, and will continue to retire, ships at twice the rate we’re building new ones.  Worse, the ships we’re shedding are large and powerful and are being numerically replaced by small, nearly defenseless, unmanned vessels.  As we’ve demonstrated in previous posts, the Navy VLS inventory is going to shrink drastically along with a shortfall of submarines.

 

This so-called 30 year plan is both a joke and a horrifying nightmare demonstration of incompetence on a scale that leads to the inexorable conclusion that our nation’s maritime security is in great danger.

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023”, Apr-2022

 

The Future Navy

We’ve been examining trends, programs, and policies for the last year or so.  I think it’s time for some predictions!

The Navy has been in a state of flux for some time with a lack of clear strategic direction, uncertainty about funding, disagreement about weapons and platforms, and so forth.  Predicting the shape of the future Navy has been difficult if not impossible.  Now, however, the effects of sequestration and separate but on-going budget cuts are settling in, direction is being provided by the Pacific Pivot and AirSea Battle concepts, and the definition of the next round of weapons and platforms has become fairly clear and the shape of the future Navy is becoming visible.

It’s also clear that the 30 year shipbuilding plan is pure fantasy.  Let’s see if we can visualize a realistic future.  Note that this will be a realistic vision but not necessarily a desirable one!  That means that this may not be the future I want but, rather, the future I see.

It’s clear, now, that severely restricted budgets are here to stay.  There will be no net growth in shipbuilding or total budget for the next decade or more.  At best, budgets will hold with adjustments for inflation (though even that isn’t a given!).  At the same time, shipbuilding costs will continue to rise on a real basis.  Personnel costs will probably continue to rise but very slowly as Congress looks at cutting once sacred salaries and benefits for service people.  Research budgets will take steady cuts.  The result of the budget challenges is that shipbuilding will be reduced in numbers and acquisition times will be lengthened.



The Navy of the Future?



Major ship acquisitions will suffer and construction times will be stretched out.  The carrier fleet has already seen construction times stretched from around 4.5 years to 6-7 years.  The carrier fleet will drop from the current 11 to around 8.

New construction major units such as destroyers and amphibious vessels will be steadily reduced in numbers.  The Ticonderoga Aegis vessels will not be directly replaced in terms of function but will be replaced by a less capable, generic Burke Flt X vessel that will replace both current Burkes and Ticos – a drop in overall capability.  Amphibious vessels are experiencing ever increasing real costs, as are all ships, and will be acquired in significantly fewer numbers than currently anticipated especially as the Marine Corp undergoes significant personnel reductions.

Amphibious forces will be hamstrung by a lack of cohesive assault doctrine and ship-to-shore connector craft/vehicles.  The Marine’s EFV was cancelled and there is no viable replacement (or even rational need) scheduled.  The MV-22 is severely limited in weapons/vehicle lift capability.  The Marines are on the verge of losing the ability to conduct a major assault, if they haven’t already, and will not regain it in the foreseeable future.

The Navy shows no sign of abandoning the LCS and every sign of following through on the full 50+ unit acquisition plus the planned follow-on LCS.  Combined with decreasing numbers of major combatants, the LCS will come to make up a third to, more likely, half of the future combat fleet.

The SSBN(X) will prove to be vastly more expensive than currently estimated by the Navy (what ship hasn’t?!!) and acquisition numbers will be rationalized and reduced to around 8.

The SSN fleet will, on a relative basis, continue to receive strong support but will still be reduced by around 25% from current levels, probably steadying out at around 40 units.

Our MCM forces are almost non-existent, currently, and will not make much of a come-back.  There will be no replacements for the Avenger class, the last dedicated MCM platform.  Unless the LCS develops into a world class MCM platform, the Navy will be paralyzed in the face of future mine threats.

I won’t bother commenting on the JSF because you all know how that program is progressing.

Weapons wise, we’ll probably continue to develop the LRASM as Harpoon’s replacement.  We have no land attack Tomahawk replacement or serious upgrade in the works that I’m aware of.  We have no intermediate range ballistic land attack or surface attack missiles in development that I’m aware of (tell me again why we developed the larger Mk57 peripheral launch cells that were installed on the Zumwalts?).  In short, the Navy’s ability to reach out and touch someone is going to be shorter ranged and less explosive than our enemy’s.

As if the preceding weren’t bad enough, we’re witnessing an increasing rate of early ship retirements in an effort to fund new construction.  That’s the definition of a death spiral.  When the above trends are combined with the accelerated rate of early retirements, the fleet is realistically looking at a force level of around 230 ships within the next 10-20 years.  Quite a drop from the 600 ship fleet or even the current 285 ship fleet.  Factor in the drop in combat capability due to the LCS making up a third to half the combat fleet and we’re looking at a stunning drop in naval force projection capability.

There you have it …  Your future Navy.  Not a pretty picture.

SSN Shortfall

A recent DoD Buzz website article (1) discussed SSN attack submarine levels as reported at a Sep 12^th House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces hearing.  Rear Adm. Breckenridge was quoted in the article as stating that SSN levels would fall from the current 55 or so to 42 in the early 2020’s.  It was further stated by Navy leaders that the combined combatant commander’s demand for submarines “far exceeds what is available or possible”.

Given this kind of demand and the recognized stealth, power, and usefulness of SSNs, the drop in attack submarine levels from 55 to 42 seems reckless, at best.  One would think that the Navy would consider the SSN to be one of the top priorities and would do everything in their power to ensure that adequate force levels are maintained.  Clearly, this is not the case.  By comparison, the Navy remains firmly committed to 50+ LCS despite no demand from the combatant commanders.

To be fair, the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding joke plan does call for a return to around 48 SSNs in the 2030 range or so.  Unfortunately, no one outside the Navy believes the 30 year plan has the slightest chance of realization.  The funding levels required to achieve the plan are so far beyond current budget levels or any reasonable extrapolation of budget resources that the plan may as well call for 100 SSNs – it isn’t going to happen anyway.

The real issue here isn’t the exact number of submarines (or LCSs!) that will be built or the exact funding that will be required.  Rather, the issue is the obvious disconnect between strategic/tactical requirements and what’s being procured.  It’s obvious that submarines provide enormous value as demonstrated by both history and the combatant commander’s demand.  Why, then, are we building the LCS (or Zumwalt, or JSF, or JHSV, or whatever your favorite boondoggle program is) when we have shortages of platforms that can actually be of service?  Wouldn’t it make more sense to fund SSNs to the required level before funding LCSs?  I see this phenomenon throughout the military.  We’re procuring far too many weapons, systems, and platforms that have only a nodding relation to our strategic and tactical needs and then we’re forced to try and fit them into our needs (anyone got a mission for the LCS?).  It should be the other way around – our strategic and tactical needs should be driving our procurement.

The juxtaposition of the SSN and the LCS procurement programs is illuminating, discouraging, and reveals the lack of strategic/tactical focus by Navy leadership.  Instead, the Navy’s acquisition strategy seems to be to procure anything it can, whenever it can, and worry about what to do with it later.  This is how you find yourself on the losing end of combat.

(1) DoD Buzz Website, “Navy Confronts Anticipated Submarine Shortfall”, Kris Osborn, 13-Sep-2013, http://www.dodbuzz.com/2013/09/13/navy-confronts-anticipated-submarine-shortfall/

Destroyer and Cruiser Shortfall

According to their own calculations, the Navy is facing a serious shortfall in the number of destroyers and cruisers over the next decade or so.

As reported in the recent CRS report on the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs,

“A January 2013 Navy report to Congress establishes a cruiser-destroyer force-level objective of 88 ships.”

However, the report goes on to state,

“… Navy projects that implementing the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan would result in a cruiser-destroyer force that remains below 88 ships for more than half of the 30-year period, and that bottoms out in FY2014-FY2015 and again in FY2034 at 78 ships.”

Curiously, though, the report also points out that the shortfall was significantly greater only a year ago.

“The projected cruiser-destroyer shortfall under the FY2013 30-year shipbuilding plan is not as deep as the projected shortfall under the FY2012 30-year  shipbuilding plan. Under the FY2012 30-year plan, the cruiser-destroyer force was projected to reach a minimum of 68 ships (i.e., 26 ships, or about 28%, below the then-required figure of 94 ships) in FY2034, and remain 16 or more ships below the 94-ship figure through the end of the 30-year period.”

“The projected cruiser-destroyer shortfalls is less deep under the FY2013 30-year plan than under the FY2012 30-year plan in part because the January 2013 Navy report to Congress reduces the cruiser-destroyer force-level goal to 88 ships …”

 


Shortage Coming

Did the force level requirement for destroyers suddenly change in one year from 94 ships to 88?  That seems highly unlikely.  Far more likely is that the Navy is playing games with the stated requirements so as to reduce the apparent shortfall and the negative publicity that would result.  This is yet another example of force level planning based on public relations and politics rather than strategic and tactical requirements.  This is a failure of leadership by both the civilian and uniformed levels but especially by the upper levels of uniformed Navy leadership.  While the Navy can’t ignore the budget limitations imposed by the government, it has a duty to make the consequences of those limitations abundantly clear and truthful.  In the final analysis, if the government is embarking on a path that threatens national security, Navy leaders must do everything possible to prevent it, including mass resignations along the lines of the Revolt of the Admirals.  When it comes to the nation’s security, duty and integrity are more important than job security.



Moving on, how does the Navy plan to address the destroyer and cruiser shortfall?  According to the report,

“The figures shown in Table 1 reflect a Navy cost-saving proposal in the FY2013 budget to retire seven Aegis cruisers in FY2013 and FY2014, more than a decade before the end of their 35-year expected service lives in FY2026-FY2029.”

So, faced with a destroyer/cruiser shortfall, the Navy’s plan is to retire 7 Aegis cruisers more than a decade before the end of their service lives.  How does this make sense?  Even Congress sees the problem as evidenced by the report’s quote from Senate Report 112-196

“… For the Department of the Navy, the Committee does not concur with the recommendation to prematurely retire nine Navy ships…”

“The Committee is concerned with the apparent disconnect between the Navy’s publicly stated priorities and the Navy’s fiscal year 2013 shipbuilding budget submission which, as compared to the fiscal year 2012 plan, reduces planned ship procurement for the next 5 years by 16 ships and eliminates funding for one Virginia class attack submarine, one amphibious ship, and three oilers.”

When Congress, which is epically out of touch with reality, says you have a disconnect from reality, you have a real problem!


(1) Congressional Research Service, “Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer
Programs: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke, March 27, 2013

30 Year Shipbuilding Plan

The Navy has released data tables from its FY2014 long range, 30 year, building plan.  There are plenty of interesting bits of information contained therein. 

The construction/retirement numbers by class are revealing.  The “+” numbers are new construction and the “-“ numbers are retirements.  The number following that is the net change over the period, either positive or negative.

CVN  +6 / -6 ; 0

DDG/CG  +70 / -61 ; +9

LXX (amphibs)  +19 / -20 ; -1

LCS/FFG  +66 / -50 ; +16

SSN  +47 / -52 ; -5

SSBN  +12 / -14 ; -2

SSGN  +0 / -4 ; -4

We see that major surface combatants, DDGs and CGs will increase by 9.  All other classes of ship except the LCS/FFG will either remain unchanged or decrease.  Discounting the LCS which has no credible combat capability, the net change across all ship classes is -3.  The Navy is banking heavily on the LCS to maintain ship numbers.  What that means is that Ticos and Burkes will be retired and replaced, numerically, by the LCS.  That seems like a reasonable swap, doesn’t it?

Another noteworthy item is that over the next two years, FY14 and FY15, the Navy proposes to build 16 ships of all types and retire 31 for a net change of -15.  Yikes!  That will drop the fleet size from the current level of about 285 to 270.

The Navy is saying that over the next couple years when we have a pretty solid idea of what budgets and costs will be, the fleet will shrink significantly due to lack of construction funds.  During the out years in the 2020’s and beyond, when we have no idea what budgets and costs will be, the Navy rosily forecasts growth from 270 ships back to around 306.  Hey, Navy, as long as you’re making stuff up, why not forecast growth to 400 or 500 ships?  You won’t have to actually do it and it will sound way more impressive for public relations and political purposes.

We’ve already demonstrated that the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding plan isn’t even remotely achievable, financially.  Indeed, the next two years, which most accurately reflect the fiscal realities, clearly show that the fleet will shrink significantly.  The Navy is, at best, engaging in wishful thinking with the 30 year plan and, more realistically, is engaging in misinformation, misdirection, and fraud.

Combat Fleet Count

Below is a historical listing of the combat ships of the Navy.  The count includes carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, submarines, and amphibious ships.  It does not include logistics support ships, mine warfare vessels, patrol craft, hospital ships, JHSV, and the like.  I have also not included the LCS in the count since it currently has no combat capability.  If/when it does, I'll include it.

Year  Count
1980  392
1985  421
1990  405
1995  283
2000  243
2005  220
2010  225
2012  210

Data is taken from http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-4.htm

The trend is undeniable.  The combat fleet is getting steadily smaller.  Already, 13 ships have been announced for retirement next year although there are attempts underway in Congress to provide funding to retain 2-4 of those ships so the final number may vary.  Even with a couple of scheduled commissionings, the net result will be a decrease of several ships for 2013.

While some may argue that today's ships are more capable than ever before, it's disturbing that combat power is being concentrated in ever fewer numbers which means the loss of any single ship is becoming ever more devastating.  This phenomenon results in a situation where commanders are more and more reluctant to put ships in harm's way.  We're already seeing this in the Navy's refusal to stand near a coastline due to the presence of shore launched anti-ship missiles which means that amphibious assaults must be conducted from well out to sea.  I'll set aside the issue of whether that's ultimately a good thing or not and simply note that it's driven by fear of loss rather than tactical advantage.

The combat fleet is headed towards a level of 150 or so in the moderately near future (not withstanding the current administration's 30 year shipbuilding plan which is pure fantasy) given the budget limitations and the Navy's single-minded focus on building ever bigger and more expensive ships.

Compare the Navy's trend to China's and ponder the implications for yourself.

I'll update this from time to time.

CBO Shipbuilding Analysis Report

The Congressional Budget Office has published its analysis of the Navy’s current shipbuilding plan.  It’s worth noting several points from the report. 

First, the Navy’s cost estimates are, charitably, incompetent or, more realistically, intentionally misleading, bordering on fraudulent.  The Navy’s estimate is that it will build 268 ships over the next 30 years at an average yearly cost of $16.8B.  CBO estimates the yearly required cost will be $20.0B and even suggests that their estimates may be too low.  By comparison, the current actual yearly cost is $14.9B.  Does anyone believe that figure is going up in the foreseeable future, given the budget problems, looming cuts, and possible sequestration?

Setting aside the incredible unlikelihood of budget increases, does the Navy’s history of cost estimating inspire any confidence?  The LCS, LPD-17, CVN-78, Virginia, etc. all wound up costing 30% - 100% more than the Navy’s estimates.  So, it would seem that CBO’s estimates are likely to closer to reality than the Navy’s. 



300 Ship Fleet?  Not Likely!



Now, the interesting part of this cost estimating is that the Navy knows its own history of estimating failures and yet continues to insist on using the same methods it always has.  That’s either incompetent or fraudulent.  You decide for yourself.

Moving on, the Navy plans to build 268 ships to achieve a 300+ fleet.  However, using the CBO’s estimate of the average cost per ship of $2.2B, the build rate for new ships under the current budget is only 6.7 ships per year which gives a total of 203 over the 30 year period as opposed to the Navy’s goal of 268 ships.  The more realistic CBO numbers show that the Navy is not going come anywhere near a 300 ship fleet.  To be fair, no one knows what the yearly shipbuilding budget will be ten or twenty years from now.  It may be higher than now but, then again, it may well be smaller.  I’m guessing that it will remain unchanged for the next several years.

Speaking of achieving a 300+ ship fleet, CBO notes that the Navy is assuming that the Burke class destroyers will have a service life of 40 years even though no previous destroyer class has even come close to that.  If they have a more realistic life of 25-30 years, the 300+ ship fleet becomes even more of a fantasy.  And, of course, the Navy is now counting the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) and ocean surveillance ships as part of the fleet.  Throw in the absolutely toothless LCS which will make up a quarter of the fleet and the fleet numbers may look better on paper but it illustrates how much less capable the future fleet will be.

Finally, CBO notes that the Navy’s cost estimates fail to include the costs for post-delivery fitting out, nuclear refuels, and various other things that come from the new construction account.  These push the actual construction costs up by about $2B per year which means the yearly construction budgets should actually be $18.8B (Navy) and $21.9B (CBO) which are even less likely to be achieved.

The CBO report makes it pretty clear that the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is just a fantasy of wishful thinking rather than a realistic plan.  To me, it looks like a political ploy to enable the current administration to be able to claim that they are maintaining the fleet even though it is actually shrinking.  The really sad part is that the uniformed Navy leadership is going along with this.

(1) Congressional Budget Office (CBO) – An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan, July 2012, Pub. No. 4456