Atlas Elektronik SeaFox

ComNavOps has long criticized the Navy for its utterly misguided philosophical approach to mine countermeasures (MCM) as well as its incompetent execution thereof.  It’s the philosophy that I want to look at today.

 

To review, there are two broad categories of MCM:

 

Leisurely Clearance – This is the removal of mines with no special time constraints and no threat of combat while doing so.  Examples would be mine removal after a conflict or mine removal from an area that has been bypassed by war and is no longer a critical task.  The clearance effort can be conducted at a leisurely pace and the goal is 100% clearance.

 

Combat Clearance – This is the removal of mines with immediate combat implications and severe time constraints.  Examples would be mine removal from the beach approach lanes during an amphibious assault or mine removal from a navigational chokepoint in support of fleet combat movements.  The clearance effort must be conducted at a very fast rate and likely under enemy fire.

 

 

For unfathomable reasons, the Navy seems totally fixated only on the former, the leisurely clearance option.  Almost every Navy MCM platform and piece of equipment is designed for slow, leisurely clearance and the numbers of MCM platforms is woefully small and shrinking every day.  In fact, the Navy’s only formal MCM force will be the LCS once the two dozen or so decrepit MH-53 helos [2] complete their long overdue retirement and the final Avenger class MCM vessels complete their on-going retirement.

 

Emphasizing the Navy’s leisurely MCM approach is the lack of numbers of MCM platforms.  There are currently only 8 Avenger MCM vessels (and all are scheduled for near term retirement), two dozen flyable MH-53E helos, and 6 deployable (I use that term loosely) LCS MCM ships although the Navy is retiring the Freedom variant so the LCS MCM responsibility may fall to the three deployable Independence variant MCM vessels.

 

As an example of the Navy’s leisurely approach to mine hunting, let’s consider the Seafox drone.  Seafox is a small underwater drone that is controlled from the host ships via a fiber optic cable.  The Navy has just issued a contract for maintenance support for the drone ASQ-232A Seafox Mine Neutralization System (for a video description, see ‘Seafox’).

 

Seafox Launching from its Cradle

 

Atlas North America LLC, Yorktown, Virginia, is awarded an $8,619,126 firm-fixed-priced, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity requirements contract for depot level support and maintenance for the Seafox Mine Neutralization System. This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $35,887,986.[1]

 

SeaFox encapsulates everything that is wrong with our current MCM approach.  The SeaFox operational sequence is:

 

• Detection of possible mines by the mine hunting host ship’s sonar which, by definition, puts the host ship in or close to the minefield.
• SeaFox is prepared, launched from the host ship, travels to the suspect mine’s location, acquires the suspect object, and the shipboard operator visually identifies the object as a mine.
• Seafox returns to the host ship and is recovered.
• A ‘Combat SeaFox’ is prep’ed, launched, travels to target, and reacquires the mine.
• Seafox is positioned and detonated
• Repeat

 

A minimal time estimate to destroy a single mine is on the order of 2 hrs … likely much more.

 

As excruciatingly demonstrated in the product video, the mine hunting process is:

 

• Far too long
• Far too complex (too many steps)
• Far too costly
• Still too risky to host vessel

 

This is the approach the Navy is wedded to.  Yes, they claim to be working on a sweep system for the LCS but has anyone seen an operational sweep system?  Worse, they’ve decided to retire half the LCS vessels, leaving only a few Independence variants to conduct the entire fleet’s mine clearance.

 

 

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[1]https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract/Article/3046664/

 

[2]The Navy has been scavenging parts from retired Japanese MH-53 helos in order to keep its own helos flying.

https://seapowermagazine.org/reclamation-of-ex-japanese-mh-53e-helicopter-parts-complete-for-u-s-navy/ 

XLUUV Status

As part of the Navy’s wholesale – and uninformed by experimentation – leap into unmanned technology, the Navy has contracted with Boeing to produce 5 Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUV).   The cost estimate and contract was for $379M (FY2016 dollars) for the five vehicles with delivery of the first vehicle to have taken place in Dec 2020.

 

XLUUV / Echo Voyager

We previously discussed the CONOPS aspects of this project (see, “Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) CONOPS”).

 

Shockingly Predictably, the project is hugely over budget [1, p.8] and long overdue.

 

 

XLUUV Cost Overrun
Contract	$379M
Current	$621M
Overrun	$242M

 

 

That’s a 64% overrun and the contract isn’t complete, yet.  The cost will increase further.

 

Apparently, the cost is even higher as the contractor’s portion of the overruns is not included.

 

This cost growth accounts for the government’s liability and does not include cost growth absorbed by the contractor.[1]

 

The Navy also added a smaller, simpler, test vehicle to the contract which, according to the Navy, accounts for $73M of the $242M overrun.

 

 

In addition to being hugely over budget, the project is woefully behind schedule.

 

The delivery of the first XLUUV is now expected to be over 3 years late. The contractor originally planned to deliver the first XLUUV in December 2020 and all five by the end of calendar year 2022.[1, p.8] [emphasis added]

 

Deliveries are now tentatively scheduled for 2024.  History assures us that will be further delayed.

 

Why did all this happen?  According to GAO,

 

The Navy did not require the contractor to demonstrate its readiness to fabricate and deliver the XLUUVs prior to beginning fabrication, as called for by leading acquisition practices.[1, p.10]

 

Illustrating just how far from production-ready the XLUUV was, the contractor has requested a staggering number of deviations from specification.

 

If shipbuilders discover that they cannot build a ship according to the plan in the ship’s specifications, they can request a deviation from the plan. According to the Navy, the contractor has submitted over 1,500 deviation requests since the critical design review in October 2018.[1, p.12] [emphasis added]

 

I guess that design review didn’t cover anything relevant, did it?

 

 

Conclusion

 

For an organization whose stock in trade is the acquisition of ships, this kind of horrendous budget and schedule performance on project after project is appalling.  The situation is all the worse when one considers how small and simple this vehicle is.  People need to be fired.

 

 

 

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[1]Government Accountability Office, “Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle”, Sep 2022, GAO-22-105974

Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) CONOPS

The Navy is embarking on a program to acquire dozens/hundreds of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) with [** warning: shocking news ahead! **] no concept of operations (CONOPS) to guide the design.  Okay, that was probably the least shocking news you could have read, right?  I mean, the Navy hasn’t developed a CONOPS for anything other than admiralty promotions in many decades so why would this be any different?  We’ve seen from the LCS program what happens when you commit to a full production program with no CONOPS and no prototype.  Way to learn a lesson, Navy.

 

Since the Navy won’t develop a CONOPS, let’s see what, if anything, we can come up with, along those lines, for a UUV.

 

The Navy is developing dozens of different UUV designs in many different sizes.  Most are just glorified torpedoes.  We’ll ignore those as the minor pieces of equipment that they are.  Instead, we’ll focus on the largest UUV, the extra large unmanned underwater vehicle (XLUUV, also called Orca).

 

… the Navy defines XLUUVs as UUVs with a diameter of more than 84 inches, meaning that XLUUVs are to be too large to be launched from a manned Navy submarine.  Consequently, XLUUVs instead will transported to a forward operating port and then launched from pier. The Department of the Navy’s March 16, 2021, unmanned campaign framework document states that the XLUUV will be designed “to accommodate a variety of large payloads….”  The Navy testified on March 18, 2021, that mines will be the initial payload for XLUUVs.  More specifically, the Navy wants to use XLUUVs to, among other things, covertly deploy the Hammerhead mine, a planned mine that would be tethered to the seabed and armed with an antisubmarine torpedo, broadly similar to the Navy’s Cold War-era CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo) mine.[1]

 

The XLUUV will be based on the Boeing Echo Voyager with some Navy-specific modifications.  That being the case, let’s take a look at the Echo Voyager.

 

Echo Voyager is roughly the size of a subway car—it is 51 feet long and has a rectangular cross section of 8.5 feet by 8.5 feet, a weight in the air of 50 tons, and a range of up to 6,500 nautical miles. It can accommodate a modular payload section up to 34 feet in length, increasing its length to as much as 85 feet. A 34-foot modular payload section provides about 2,000 cubic feet of internal payload volume; a shorter (14-foot) section provides about 900 cubic feet.[1]

 

Boeing Echo Voyager

Echo Voyager has a maximum speed of 7.8 kts [2] and uses a combination diesel-electric propulsion/power system.  On battery, the vessel has a range of 150 miles at 2.6 kts whereupon it must surface and recharge its batteries using its diesel generator. 

 

With a single fuel module in its payload bay, Boeing claims the range is 6,500 miles.[2]  I’ve found no information about the size of the fuel module.  The statement that fuel modules are stored in the payload bay is important because that means that the effective payload space is less than the stated specification of 2,000 cu.ft.

 

The vessel has an obstacle avoidance sonar and inertial guidance.

 

The maximum dive depth is 11,000 ft.[2]

 

In 2019, the Navy contracted with Boeing to produce four XLUUVs for $43M which is just under $11M apiece.[2]  The contract was later expanded to include a fifth vessel.  Funding will come from a Navy Research and Development account similar to the funding mechanism used for the first two LCS.[1]

 

The preceding description suggests certain operational characteristics that will influence the CONOPS and selection of appropriate missions.

 

 

CONOPS Characteristics

 

Speed – As noted, the vessel is very slow.  The maximum speed is 7.8 kts and, presumably, the economical cruising speed is much less.  Given the statement about the range on battery being 150 miles at 2.6 kts, this suggests that the cruising speed is 2-3 kts.  This has a major impact on operations.  For example, pier launch and lack of forward bases means that for Chinese theater operations the nearest launch point (disregarding Japan which is not a guaranteed base of combat operations), Guam, would be around 2100 miles from the South China Sea.  Even at the maximum speed of 7.8 kts, the transit time to the South China Sea would be around ten days and a more economical cruising speed of, say, 3 kts, would result in around a thirty day transition time.

 

Payload – This is a small vessel with a correspondingly small usable payload.  Consider the Navy’s main postulated mission:  laying Hammerhead mines.  How many mines could fit in a 2000 cu.ft. payload space?  I can’t find any specs on the Hammerhead capsule size, however, there is a picture of the Hammerhead package so a reasonable estimate of the package size is possible.  Knowing the Mk54 torpedo size, we can visually estimate the overall package size.  Assuming the package is sized to fit a 21” torpedo tube, this gives us approximate dimensions of 21” x 21” x 19 ft, for a total of 58 cu.ft.  Simple arithmetic tells us that the maximum number of mines that could be carried in the 2000 cu.ft. payload space would be 34.  However, there needs to be room to move and secure the mines during loading.  It would be reasonable to assume that half the payload space would be dedicated to movement and securing the mines which would reduce the capacity to 17 mines.  Some sort of mine handling and ejection mechanism is required and that would further reduce the number of mines.  If the fuel module is also stored in the main payload section, the number of mines is even smaller.  A reasonable estimate would be a mine capacity of around 12.  See, ref [3] for an interesting discussion of this.

 

Hammerhead Mine Capsule

Range – On the face of it, the claimed range of 6,500 is excellent and suggests that not only can the vessel reach its operating area and return (4200 miles round trip from Guam to the South China Sea) but it will have enough excess range to effectively operate for an extended period within the operating area.  However, as noted, the submerged range is only 150 miles on a single battery charge.  Thus, in order to achieve the claimed range of 6,500 miles, the vessel will have to surface frequently … a very bad requirement for a submarine operating in enemy waters!

 

Communications – I’ve found no mention of communications in any description of the vessel which implies that once launched, the XLUUV will be largely autonomous.  Aside from being very dubious about the success of a truly autonomous vessel for any length of time, this suggests that the vessel’s usefulness in the surveillance role will be limited as that would require frequent and lengthy transmissions from the UUV back to its port - communications that would quickly pinpoint the vessel’s location for the enemy and given the UUV’s very slow speed, it would be quickly destroyed.

 

 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

 

In attempting to assemble a CONOPS, what do we have to work with?  We have a small vessel with a small payload (small on the scale of contributing to a war effort).  The vessel, itself, is very slow and unresponsive.  As with any submerged vessel, communications will be difficult once a mission is started. 

 

So, what does that suggest for a CONOPS?

 

It suggests that the only viable missions are those that are very slow developing and can afford to wait for very long periods of time and can be effective with very small payloads.

 

While various articles have postulated virtually every mission ever conceived in the history of warfare, there are only two viable missions that meet the criteria and constraints described above:

 

Mine Laying – An XLUUV can be effective as a mine layer but with a significant caveat: it is only useful and effective for a very small area.  Typically, mines are deployed in the thousands to tens of thousands for a single field.  The very small payload of the XLUUV precludes using it to lay a large field no matter how many XLUUVs we acquire.  That only leaves point mining of a very small area such as a channel or entrance to a harbor or a narrow passage between islands.  For example, one could imagine productively mining the entrance/exit to a Chinese naval port.

 

Surveillance – Given the combination of limited sensors, limited field of view, very slow speed (inability to follow a target), and communication issues, the only type of surveillance mission that would make sense is monitoring a very small, restricted area as described in the mine laying section.  In such a scenario, the XLUUV becomes, essentially, a static sensor and targets come to it (or not – that’s useful information, too).  The caution is that any important and restricted area will be heavily patrolled by the enemy.  Whether the craft is quiet enough to escape close scrutiny is unknown.  It will have to be extremely quiet since it will have no ability to fight back or maneuver to avoid detection.  Further, the extremely limited battery life that requires frequent surfacing to recharge is a major liability in this mission.  Without knowing exactly how stealthy the XLUUV can be (factoring in frequent surfacing for recharging), surveillance is a pretty iffy mission.

 

 

Rationale

 

Given the lack of worthwhile missions, why is the Navy so enthusiastic about building these UUVs?  What is their rationale?  Cheapness, compared to a real submarine, is obviously a major factor and if the XLUUV had even a fraction of a real sub’s capability, this might make sense … but it does not. 

 

Does the Navy really view these as a cheap replacement for real subs?  That would be hard to believe but we’re replacing Burkes with small, defenseless, unmanned surface vessels so … maybe.  Could they, in some twisted way, view them as a cheap, indirect replacement for surface ships in the overall force structure? 

 

Is it technology for its own sake? 

 

Is it sheer, unmitigated stupidity?

 

A handful for the limited mine laying mission is reasonable but any more than that cannot be justified and yet the Navy seems committed to a large production run and making these a significant portion of the future fleet structure.  It’s baffling.

 

 

Conclusion

 

It is very difficult to postulate a worthwhile concept of operations other than the very limited mine laying mission described above, although that single mission does have some value.  That does not, however, seem to justify the acquisition of more than a handful of XLUUVs – certainly not the large program the Navy seems to want to pursue.

 

Acquisition of this XLUUV will require a supply/support logistics train, administration, operators, specialized equipment, specialized maintenance, etc.  Does the limited scope of useful missions justify all this?  I’m doubtful.

 

This seems to be yet another case of the Navy jumping on the unmanned technology bandwagon for no demonstrable good reason;  technology for the sake of technology.

 

This also continues the trend of minimizing the value of raw firepower in combat, as the XLUUV offers no significant firepower.

 

At best, this is a niche mission/craft with a significant cost in terms of acquisition and support.

 

 

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[1]Congressional Research Service, “Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress”, 19-Jan-2022

 

[2]https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26513/boeing-is-building-the-navy-big-orca-submarine-drones-to-hunt-and-lay-mines-and-more#:~:text=Boeing%20experimental%20Echo%20Voyager.%20The%20diesel-electric%20Echo%20Voyager,and%20use%20its%20air-breathing%20diesel%20generator%20to%20recharge.

 

[3]Strikepod Systems website, 1-Jun-2021,

https://www.strikepod.com/xluuv-offensive-mining/#:~:text=Little%20is%20known%20of%20the%20CDM%2C%20but%20it,very%20shallow%20water%2C%20or%20possibly%20the%20surf%20zone.

A Vision of Unmanned Combat

ComNavOps has railed against unmanned vehicles, at least as the Navy envisions them, but is there an unmanned future that might make sense?  I do actually see a future for unmanned combat but not the way the Navy is going about it.  Let’s do a fictional exploration of the unmanned future done the right way.

 

By the way, here’s a couple of previous posts on the subject:

Piece It Together

Drone Wars

 

Here’s a story describing a different approach to unmanned combat.  As always, and especially so in this case, this is not an attempt at presenting a realistic combat simulation.  It is just a presentation of concepts in a more entertaining story form.

 

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The enemy island base had become an intolerable thorn in the Navy’s side.  The base’s surveillance UAVs were ranging far and wide and restricting what the Navy could accomplish.  The effective surveillance had enabled the enemy to employ their own anti-ship missiles to hold the Navy at a distant arm’s length.  Cruise missile attacks against the base had proven fruitless as the enemy AAW laser emplacements, railguns, and miniature hypersonic Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) had simply blotted the attacking cruise missiles from the sky and the few missiles that had gotten through had been insufficient to make an appreciable dent in the base’s operations due to the facilities having been built into underground, reinforced structures or above ground, hardened shelters. 

 

It was time for some up close and personal attention.  The Navy was going to conduct an amphibious assault against the base but it would be in a form unimaginable to the sailors and Marines who had conducted the long series of amphibious assaults in the Pacific of WWII.  As a former Marine Commandant had once said, the Marines were out of the frontal assault business but that didn’t mean that an assault couldn’t be done.

 

As the invasion fleet began its approach – ‘approach’ being a relative term for a fleet still a thousand miles away! - to the island, the opening moves began.

 

The fleet’s UAV carriers began launching unmanned combat aircraft (UCAV) to seek out and destroy the enemy’s long range manned and unmanned aircraft.  These UCAVs were not the ‘Terminators’ of popular conception that could go to toe-to-toe with manned fighters – not even close!  Instead, the UCAVs had a simple search and destroy function that was successful due to numbers rather than individual capability.  In fact, the UCAVs weren’t much more than aerial missiles that, themselves, carried two missiles, each.  The UCAVs were designated areas to search and instructed to destroy anything they found.  The first wave consisted of almost 200 UCAVs.  This was massing at the local level.

 

Of course, the enemy had their own UCAVs and the attrition rates on both sides were stunning, the more so when unmanned aircraft met manned.  The manned aircraft generally made short work of the UCAVs but the overwhelming numbers of unmanned aircraft ensured that they could still accomplish their mission. 

 

The first wave of UCAVs fought to a standstill but succeeded in depleting the enemy’s manned aircraft weapons and forcing them to return to base to refuel and rearm.  While that was happening, the fleet’s UAV carriers launched a second wave of 200 UCAVs which, thanks to the greatly reduced enemy manned aircraft threat, was able to largely eliminate the enemy’s airborne sensor platforms which allowed the fleet to continue its approach to the island with only a greatly reduced anti-ship missile threat to deal with.

 

As the UCAV battle progressed, the UAV carriers also launched a wave of nearly a hundred unmanned sensor monitors.  These were UAVs that were modified to fly to a designated location and then ‘crash’ into the sea whereupon they would float and act as passive monitors.  Being passive and with not much more than horizon sensing range, they were not some kind of super-sensor that could find all enemy targets in the region.  Instead, they functioned more by providing a sense of where the enemy was not rather than where they were.  Of course, occasionally, they were able to definitively detect enemy units but that was almost a side benefit.  Thus, the invasion fleet was able to establish a reasonable picture of enemy locations and activity.

 

Despite the reduced anti-ship missile threat, enough got through the fleet’s defenses that a few ships were sunk and several damaged to the point that they had to individually retire and make their way back to base.  Still, a sufficiently intact fleet arrived at the actual assault point.

 

At this point, the UAV carriers launched a wave of sonar equipped underwater unmanned scout vehicles (SUUV) to scout the approaches to the landing site.  The SUUVs quickly identified shoals of enemy mobile mines slowly converging on the fleet, drawn to it by their passive sonar.  These mobile mines were, essentially, torpedoes optimized for long range, slow speed approaches, hugging the bottom of the ocean floor.  Their intent was to reach a point under a ship and then initiate a near-vertical terminal sprint into the underside of the target ship.

 

The UAV carriers had a counter for the mobile mines which were smaller, faster underwater ‘fighter’ UUVs (FUUV) that would search for the mobile mines and fire very small torpedoes which mimicked the function of an aircraft’s air-to-air missiles.  The FUUVs engaged in underwater ‘strafing’ attacks against the mobile mines and were able to largely destroy the threat.  Again, not all could be stopped and several more ships were damaged and two more sunk.

 

As the FUUVs were being recovered back aboard the UAV carriers, those same carriers began simultaneously launching the first assault wave of crawlers.  The crawlers were an amphibious, mobile vehicle that traveled on spherical, tracked rollers that granted tremendous maneuverability and the ability to traverse broken ground and obstacles on land or under the sea.  With the mine threat eliminated, the crawlers were able to complete their slow approach to the beach whereupon they began emerging from the waves and started to move inland.

 

The crawlers were programmed with simple destination and targeting instructions and were free to choose their own paths to the enemy base.  While they were easy enough to kill individually, their numbers and small size ensured that many would survive to reach the target base.  This was massing on a local basis and it was effective.  Once at the base, the crawlers performed simple optical and IR scans to locate suitable, pre-defined target types, approached those targets, and detonated themselves.  Of course, the enemy had their own unmanned, ground combat vehicles that roamed the battlefield and tried to intercept the crawlers.  However, the degree of intelligence and capability of the sensors that could be fit into small unmanned ground combat vehicles was limited and while many crawlers were intercepted and destroyed, the massed crawler numbers were sufficient to ensure that enough got through to the target. 

 

The crawler’s main targets were the SAM radars, launchers, and reloads and they were sufficiently successful that the fleet could begin launching cruise missiles and aircraft for more precise strikes with larger weapons.

 

At this point, there would be a great deal of hard fighting still to come but the assault was a success.  The enemy’s defenses had been breached and follow on forces could complete the mission.

 

 

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Here’s a description of some of the unmanned vehicles mentioned in the story.

 

Crawlers – These are small, heavily armored, mobile explosives.  They are spherically tracked which gives them great maneuverability and the ability to traverse broken terrain and obstacles.  They are equipped with various short range sensors and rudimentary find and destroy ‘intelligence’.  They seek out a designated target, move up to it, and explode.  The heavy armor makes them hard to kill.  They can crawl along the sea floor and on land equally well.  They are employed by the thousands.  Each has an explosive equivalent to an 8” shell which, with propulsion gear and sensors, gives a total weight of around 500 lbs.

 

Waves of these crawl up out of the sea and inexorably move to the designated targets and explode.

 

Lest you think this is a ridiculous, scifi, fantasy concoction, note that we already almost have this in the form of two separate, existing vehicles:

 

Ground robots – For example, the QuinetiQ Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System (MAARS) 

 

MAARS

 

Mobile mines – For example, the US Navy Mk67 Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM)

 

All that is needed is to marry the two concepts.

 

 

Monitors – These are UAVs that would fly to a designated location and then ‘crash’ into the sea whereupon they would convert to a floating ‘raft’ of sorts with passive optical, communication, and IR sensors as well as a small onboard solar power generator.  The sensors, being located very low on the water, had only a horizon range sensing capability although the comm sensors could often detect signals originating much farther away thanks to signal ducting in the atmosphere.  The value of the monitors was the ability to develop a picture of where the enemy was not more so than where they were.  Precursors of this already exist in the form of sonobuoys and Chinese floating sensor platforms.  All that is needed is to scale the concept to the appropriate size.

 

Floating Sensor Platform

FUUV – These are unmanned underwater vehicles that are the equivalent of UCAVs.  Equipped with passive and short range active sonar, FUAVs use a simple seek and destroy control program and are armed with two micro-torpedoes which are the functional equivalent of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.  A precursor of this already exists in the form of Archerfish, Barracuda, and others.

 

Archerfish

SUUV – These are unmanned underwater scout vehicles.  Equipped with passive and short range active sonar, their function is just what the name implies: to scout for enemy underwater assets.  These essentially already exist in the form of Knifefish and others.

 

Knifefish

Summation

 

This is not in any way meant to be a realistic, balanced combat simulation.  It is simply a more entertaining way of illustrating some unmanned concepts.  So, what are the key takeaways from this?

 

 

Numbers.  The common theme throughout the story is large numbers of unmanned assets.  Lots and lots of numbers.  By the hundreds and several times that.  It is important to recognize that one of the key characteristics of unmanned assets is – or should be – cheapness which translates to numbers.  Individual assets are not supremely capable and are, in fact, only marginally capable.  It is in the aggregate that they become capable.  Numbers.  Lots and lots of numbers.

 

Artificial Intelligence - Unmanned assets, lacking Terminator level artificial intelligence, need to be employed in very large swarms to be effective which, again, takes us back to affordability.  One of the key aspects of the story’s vision of unmanned assets is that not only are the individual assets not very ‘intelligent’, they are downright simplistic.  This means that they are not suited for low end, peacetime operations that would require careful discrimination between combatants and non-combatants.  Instead, they are intended only for high end combat where anything they see that meets a basic set of criteria becomes a legitimate target.  This keeps the programming simple, cheap, reliable, and far less prone to deception by an enemy.

 

Carriers - It is obvious that launching, controlling, collating data, and recovery of the required number of unmanned assets requires a dedicated carrier capable of handling both aerial and underwater unmanned vehicles.

 

 

It is clear from this story that ComNavOps’ vision of a potential viable future for unmanned assets is radically different from the Navy’s.  This vision is focused on utilizing unmanned assets for combat scenarios rather than the ridiculously optimistic scenarios that the Navy is assuming.  Further, this vision of unmanned assets focuses on the characteristics and strengths of unmanned assets (cost, simplicity, numbers, and risk tolerance) rather than trying to create gold-plated unmanned systems that are unaffordable and unachievable. 

 

There is a future for unmanned assets but it’s not the Navy’s vision.

Atlas Mine Countermeasures System

The Navy’s efforts to develop an effective mine countermeasure (MCM) module for the LCS have been problem plagued, to say the least, and a dismal failure to put it more accurately. 

Just for some comparative perspective, let’s take a look at another MCM system, this one from Atlas Elektronik which is developing a system to equip the new Belgian-Dutch vessels that are planned.  The two countries are teaming up to build replacement MCM ships and frigates.  Belgium is in charge of MCM vessel procurement and the Netherlands is responsible for the frigate. (1)  The new ships will replace the existing Tripartite class minehunters and the command and support ship BNS Godetia.

Atlas MCM System

Following the current trend towards ‘families of capabilities’ and ‘systems of systems’, the Atlas system components include:

Atlas Remote Capability Integrated Mission System (ARCIMS) Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) – The USV is 33 ft long, weighs 13,200 lbs, and has a payload capacity of 6,600 lbs.  It can accommodate a power module and magnetic, acoustic, and electric sweeps.  The boat’s max speed is 40 kts but the towing speed is only 8 kts. (2)  While perfectly adequate for non-time critical mine clearance during peacetime, this is woefully inadequate for combat mine clearance.

Atlas USV

SeaCat Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) – The AUV is a small, torpedo shaped unmanned, underwater vehicle that weighs around 150 lbs and has a payload capacity of around 60 lbs.  It is equipped with a dual frequency side scan sonar and has a max speed of 6 kts. (3)  It can operate autonomously or via remote control using a 1000 m fiber optic cable.  Optional payloads include a multibeam echosounder, imaging sonar, sub-bottom profiler, conductivity/temperature/pressure (CTD), or a camera.

Seacat UUV

Towed Synthetic Aperture Sonar – The sunspecified sonar is towed by the AUV and provides mine detection and classification capability.  Again, the max speed is 6 kts.

Mine-sweeping – Sweeping is provided by the ARCIMS USV and includes magnetic, acoustic, and electric sweeps.

Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTOL) – I have no idea what effective use this would provide.

Mine Avoidance Sonar – This is a hull-mounted sonar for the MCM host ship.

The Belgian Navy will spend 1.1 billion euros on the entire MCM project which envisions a range of unmanned systems including unmanned surface, aerial and underwater vehicles alongside towed sonars and mine identification and neutralization ROVs.

Does all of this sound familiar?  This is, more or less, what the US Navy has been trying to develop for the MCM version of the LCS.

What assessment can we make of the system and how does it compare to the LCS MCM module?

Speed.  As we noted, the speed of the components is very slow (6-8 kts) and is suited only for non- combat scenarios.  For rapid combat clearance operations the system is entirely unsuited.  The same is true for the LCS whose components have an effective clearance rate of 2 mines per hour, at best.  In both cases, the slow speed can be compensated for by sheer numbers of additional units but the numbers required would be staggering and far beyond any imaginable acquisition program.  Further, such numbers would require a degree of asset co-ordination that is also unimaginable.

Transit Time.  The low speeds of the various components mean that the transit time to and from the mothership, which stands well off from the suspected minefield, will be quite lengthy thereby contributing to an extremely slow overall clearance rate.  Again, the same applies to the LCS module components.

It is clear that the high tech, individual component approach to mine clearance is inherently slow and combat ineffective which leads one to wonder why it is even being pursued.  In fact, one could make a reasonable case that the ‘why’ is related to either the fixation by modern militaries on automation and unmanned for its own sake or the desire of commercial companies to offer products which enhance their corporate profits but do little for the customer’s combat capabilities coupled with the Navy's inability to recognize that and specify products that would actually be effective.

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(1)navaltoday.com website, “Atlas pitches MCM toolbox for new Belgian, Dutch minehunters”, 1-Feb-2019,

https://navaltoday.com/2019/02/01/atlas-pitches-mcm-toolbox-for-new-belgian-dutch-minehunters/

(2)Naval Technology website,

https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/atlas-remote-combined-influence-minesweeping-system-arcims/

(3)Geo-matching website,

https://geo-matching.com/auvs-autonomous-underwater-vehicles/seacat

UAV Bounty Hunters

Hey, that appeasement policy towards China is working real well, isn’t it?  In exchange for not seriously contesting any of their illegal actions in the South China Sea they’ve now decided to begin seizing our drones.  USNI News website reports that the Chinese seized a US unmanned underwater glider (Littoral Battlespace Sensing Glider - LBSG) in international waters while it was being recovered by a US ship operating 50 miles northwest of Subic Bay, Philippines (1).  The US has filed protests and requested that the Chinese return the drone but if the Chinese didn’t return our EP-3 until long after they had stripped it of all interesting technology, they’re certainly not going to return a drone.

History teaches us, with unfailing certainty, that appeasement encourages aggression.  Appeasement, however, is not the subject of this post.  I just wanted to throw yet another failure in the face of the Chinese apologists and appeasers among you.

Back to the post …

This incident is the beginning of what will become a trend of unfriendly nations seizing or destroying our unmanned vehicles in international airspace and waters.  Why?  Why not?  We’re not going to respond.  If we wouldn’t respond to the seizure of two manned riverine boats by Iran, we’re certainly not going to respond to the seizure of unmanned vehicles.  Our enemies know this so they won’t hesitate to seize the opportunity to deal the US a black eye, trumpet their success to their people, and garner some free technology.

During the Cold War, aircraft were shot at and down from time to time.  If countries were willing to do that then let’s face it, no one is going to bat an eye at capturing or destroying unmanned vehicles.  We’re going to see an open season on unmanned vehicles.

Russia is watching this incident carefully.  If we don’t respond forcefully, and we won’t, Russia will be sure to seize or destroy a UAV.  In fact, we may see UAV “hunting” become a routine occurrence. 

I’ve stated repeatedly that unmanned vehicles will have only a limited role in combat, being too easy to find and destroy, and it appears that they will have a limited role in peace as well.  The LBSG was a relatively unsophisticated drone.  Will we risk our most sophisticated unmanned vehicles near enemy waters and airspace knowing that they are subject to routine seizure?  I doubt it.  We’d be idiots if we did.

Does anyone think the Chinese will hesitate to sink or seize that nifty new DARPA ACTUV (Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel) that’s supposed to follow enemy subs around?

Thanks to our passive, appeasing policies, I see a future of unfriendly state-sponsored UAV bounty hunters!

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(1)USNI News website, “Updated: Chinese Seize U.S. Navy Unmanned Vehicle”, Sam LaGrone, 16-Dec-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/12/16/breaking-chinese-seize-u-s-navy-unmanned-vehicle

Asymmetric Advantage

The general media has gone to great lengths to point out, correctly, that many of our potential enemies have or are pursuing asymmetric advantages.  Mines, small boat suicide attacks, small boat swarms, fast attack missile boats, intermediate range ballistic missiles, small and quiet non-nuclear subs, and so forth.  What isn’t discussed is the fact that the US possesses, or could develop, asymmetric advantages of our own. 

Our two biggest conventional advantages are technology and money (current budget problems notwithstanding!).  These can be leveraged into asymmetric advantages.  What kinds of asymmetric advantages?  Well, this is where the imagination can go wild.  For the sake of brevity, I’d like to nominate one particular area that few other countries or non-state actors can match and that would provide disproportionate advantages for us.



Underwater Glider UUV



In real estate it’s location, location, location.  In war it’s recon, recon, recon.  Where’s the enemy and what are they doing?  If you know that, the battle gets a whole lot easier.  Call it intel or surveillance or recon or whatever, the ability to monitor the enemy is a priceless advantage.  Of course, the Navy already has many systems for collecting intel:  submarines, satellites, electronic signal intercepts, and so on.  To a greater or lesser extent those systems all collect information from a distance or, in the case of subs, put themselves at risk to get up close.  Why not develop systems that can get extremely close and have little risk of detection?  Well, in fact, the Navy is working on just such systems in the form of unmanned vehicles, both aerial and subsurface.



Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are solidly into their development curve and offer well known and powerful surveillance capabilities as demonstrated over today’s battlefields.  They do have a few disadvantages or limitations such as being fairly detectable, if one wishes to look for them, they have relatively limited range and endurance, and they are susceptible to control signal disruption.  These issues are undoubtedly being addressed.

Let’s look a bit further at Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs).  By comparison to UAVs, UUVs are in their infancy.  The Navy and industry are currently developing a variety of UUVs and there is no point attempting to describe specific systems.  Conceptually, UUVs offer the potential to retain many of the advantages of UAVs while avoiding some of the limitations.

UUVs, by their very nature as underwater vehicles, are extremely difficult to detect.  Consider how hard it is to detect a full size submarine and how much harder it must be to detect something a fraction of that size.  Once deployed in their operating area, UUVs can provide very close range surveillance of ships, mines, subs, harbors, coastlines, water conditions, geography, etc. with little risk.

Various technologies are being explored which may allow UUVs to operate almost indefinitely, thereby overcoming one of the limitations of UAVs.  Solar power, wave regeneration, thermal recharge, ionic recharge, etc. are all methods that offer the possibility of extremely long endurance.  Consider the advantages inherent in a UUV that can loiter for days or months, undetected, and providing continuous monitoring of an area.



Undetectable and Long Endurance



As the imagination expands a bit, the possible uses for UUVs are almost limitless.  Imagine being able to attach small shaped charges to an enemy ship in its own harbor, or being able to have a small UUV attach itself like a limpet to a ship or submarine to provide continuous tracking, or, with some lead time, mapping out a minefield.  The possibilities are endless!

Of course, there are associated problems.  Underwater communications is challenging.  It does no good to collect information if it can’t be transmitted.  Remote underwater control is even more difficult, bordering on impossible over any significant distance.  UUVs would largely have to operate autonomously.  Still, as with UAVs, these problems can be solved over time.

UUVs offer a potential asymmetric advantage that is extremely powerful and well worth continued intense development.  Few other countries and no non-state groups can either utilize or counter this technology.  The Navy would do well to commit significant resources to developing this potential advantage.