Upgraded Littoral Perrys

Once upon a time, the US Navy faced a choice about how to deal with the fake ‘littoral’ issue (see, “LittoralWarfare – Is There Such a Thing?”):  either upgrade/modify the Perry class frigates or build an entire new class of ships, the LCS.  One required new hulls.  The other required only upgrades of existing hulls.  Of course, the Navy being the Navy, unhesitatingly opted to build new LCS hulls, thereby ensuring their continued shipbuilding budget slice.  In order to eliminate the possibility of anyone suggesting that Perrys could be upgraded for a fraction of the cost of new construction, the Navy neutered the Perrys by removing weapons (2003 timeframe) and stating publicly that it was not possible to upgrade the Perrys to use the new SM-2 missiles that were then coming.  In addition, the Navy wound up giving away Perrys in order to irretrievably remove them from possible service.
 

The USN had decommissioned 25 "FFG-7 Short" ships via "bargain basement sales to allies or outright retirement, after an average of only 18 years of service".[1]

Of course, as is so often the case, the Navy was quickly proven wrong as the Australian navy proceeded to upgrade their Perrys (the Adelaide class) to use the SM-2 and, in fact, added an 8-cell VLS in the bow of the ship.
 
Not only did Australia upgrade their Perrys and continue to operate them but so did quite a few other countries.  Let’s take a look at some of the upgrades performed by other countries after the US Navy stated that upgrades were not affordable or technically feasible.
 
 
Australia
 
The Australian Perrys (Adelaide class) received an extensive upgrade in the mid-2000’s.  The program cost around A$1.46B to upgrade four Perrys (A$365M ea).  Following is a partial list of the upgrades.[2]
 

• Added 8-cell tactical length VLS in the bow for ESSM missiles
• Upgraded to use SM-2MR Standard missiles
• Switched to Eurotorp MU90 Impact torpedoes
• Upgraded fire control from Mk92 Mod 2 to Mod 12
• Replaced sonar with new Thompson (Thales) Spherion Medium Frequency Sonar
• Upgraded Phalanx CIWS to Block IB
• Added Link 16
• Upgraded computers
• Upgraded SPS-49 and SPS-55 radars
• Added Radamec 2500 EOTS long-range passive TV & infrared surveillance
• Added laser rangefinder.
• Added multi-sensor Radar Integrated Automatic Detect and Track System (RIADT) for improved target detection, tracking, and engagement, particularly against low altitude targets in cluttered ocean or near-shore environments
• Replaced SLQ-32 EW system with Elbit (EA-2118) and RAFAEL (C-Pearl)
• Added ALBATROS towed sonar
• Added two RAFAEL Mini-Typhoon 12.7mm remote weapon systems
• Added additional decoy launchers

 

Adelaide Class Frigate with 8-Cell VLS and SM-2

 
Taiwan
 

• Added 8x Hsiung Feng II/III SSM in two box launcher racks
• Added 2x Bofors 40 mm/L70 guns
• Added 2x Type 75 20 mm/75 guns

 
 
Spain
 

• Replaced Phalanx CIWS with Meroka 20 mm CIWS
• Replaced SLQ-32 with Nettunel Mk-3000 EW suite
• Added RAN-12L/RAN-30 air search radar for low horizon scanning

 
 
Pakistan
 

• overhaul of all four diesels
• replacement of sea valves and air conditioning
• new bridge and navigational suite
• composite dome over the overhauled AN/SQS-56 sonar array

 
 
Following are some other countries that have operated Perrys although I could not readily find lists of upgrades:
 
Poland
Turkey
Bahrain
Egypt
Philippines
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that the Navy lied when they stated that the Perrys could not be upgraded.  They simply wanted to ensure that no viable option remained that could derail the – even then – controversial LCS program.
 
Looking at the list of upgrades proves that we could have added racks of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, VLS cells, added more guns, and upgraded almost every weapon, sensor, and piece of equipment on the ship.  In short, we could have had a very powerful littoral combat ship worthy of the name that would have put the LCS to shame and all for a fraction of the cost of the LCS.  This is all the more disappointing when we note that many of the Perrys were retired after only 14 years or so of service.  We had serviceable ships, viable upgrades, acceptable costs, and we chose to scrap the entire Perry class and build the LCS … just a monumentally stupid decision.  And, of course, we are now early retiring the LCS which simply emphasizes and compounds the near-criminal stupidity of the Navy.
 

 
_____________________________

 
[1]Wikipedia, “Adelaid-class frigate”, retrieved 12-Apr-2025
 
[2]Defense Industry Daily website, “Australia’s Hazard(ous) Frigate Upgrades: Done at Last”,
https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-hazardous-frigate-upgrade-04586/

FFG(X) Versus Perry

Everyone is excited about the Navy’s forthcoming FFG(X) (now Constellation class FFG-62).  The only problem is that it’s a bit of a step backwards in terms of firepower and combat effectiveness compared to the Perry class frigates.

 

What??!  No way.   …   Yes way. 

 

Let’s take a closer look.  Let’s compare the Perry class, before the Navy neutered them, to the Constellation class.  The significant differences and advantages are highlighted in green.

 

 

 

	Perry	Constellation
Length, ft	453	496
Displacement, tons	4200	6700
Speed, kts	29+	26+
Range, nm @ kts	4500 / 20	6000 / 16
Crew	176	140
Missiles	40(a)	32(b) + 8(c)
Gun	1x 76 mm	1x 57 mm
Close In AAW Weapons	1x CIWS	1x RAM
Torpedoes	2x triple Mk 32 = 6/24(d)	-
Helos	2x SH-60 Seahawk	1x MH-60 Seahawk + 1x MQ-8C Firescout
Sonar	SQS-56 hull mount + SQR-19 towed array	SQS-62 variable depth sonar + multi-function towed array

 

 

^(a)Mix of Standard, Harpoon

^(b)Mix of Standard, ESSM with quad-packing

^(c)Likely NSM in deck mounted quad racks

^(d)Perrys had up to 24 torpedoes including reloads

 

 

 

Perry Class Frigate

Speed - The Perry class may have a few knot advantage but it is likely not significant.

 

Range – Given that the two ranges are cited for different speeds, I suspect that the ranges are likely equivalent if compared at a common speed.

 

Crew – The Constellation’s smaller crew on a larger ship will be a detriment in combat when it comes to damage control, as graphically evidenced by the experience of the USS Stark.  Replacement of combat casualties will also be problematic for the Constellation class.

 

Missiles – The Perry has a larger missile magazine [40 vs. 32] although the Constellation compensates with bolt on anti-ship missiles (probably the Naval Strike Missile).  It is worth bearing in mind that the Perrys could have easily accommodated bolt on quad Harpoon launchers just as the Constellation will do, thus providing a greater missile capacity.  We’ve already examined VLS versus single arm launchers and determined that VLS offers no great advantage and, depending on circumstances, may be inferior in combat use (see, “VLS Versus Arm Launchers”).

 

The other noteworthy aspect is that in the AAW role, ESSM missiles can be quad-packed in the VLS which greatly increases the number of missiles.  Of course, quad-packing didn’t exist when the Perry was built.  Presumably, quad-packing would also be applied to a modern single arm launcher.  So, in a comparison of the Constellation to the original Perry, the missile number advantage would favor the Constellation.  Comparing the Constellation to a modern Perry, the missile numbers would likely be the same.

 

Gun – The Perry had larger and more effective gun.  Navy experience with the Mk110 57 mm gun has been disappointing, to say the least, with vibration/accuracy problems in the LCS, insufficient fire control sensors (optical only in the LCS), and elimination of the 57 mm from the Zumwalt design in favor of a smaller 30 mm gun.  The latter is particularly damning.

 

Close In – Close in weapons are equivalent and minimal.  Both classes should have a 2^nd close in system, at the minimum.

 

Torpedoes - For a supposed ASW vessel, the Constellation’s lack of on-board ASW torpedoes is surprising and disappointing.

 

Helos - For a supposed ASW vessel, the Constellation’s single helo is disappointing.  Whether the ship could operate a second helo is unknown.

 

Sonar - The absence of a hull mounted sonar on the Constellation is puzzling although that is offset, to some degree, by the VDS and towed array.  It should be noted, though, that the towed array imposes some limits on sonar functionality while the ship is maneuvering.  The ship can physically tow the array while maneuvering (to an unknown extent and an unknown maximum speed constraint) but the array is negatively impacted and needs time to straighten out and ‘settle’ after maneuvering before it can again provide useful sensor data.  The maneuvering and speed constraints imposed by the VDS, if any, are unknown.  The Perry hull mounted sonar, in contrast, is functional at all speeds and needs no time to ‘settle’ after maneuvering although flow noise is an issue, as with all sonars.

 

 

 

Note:  This should not have to be said but I know it will come up.  Yes, the Constellation, being decades newer, has newer, more capable electronics.  Duh.  This comparison looks at each ship relative to its time.  If the Perrys were built today, they’d have all the same electronics that the Constellation has. 

Constellation Class Frigate

Summary

 

The Constellation is significantly larger than the Perry and yet is less combat capable especially in the ASW role which is a frigate’s main role.  The Constellation’s single helo, no ASW torpedoes, and lack of a hull mounted sonar will hamper ASW effectiveness.  Crew size and a markedly inferior gun further emphasize the decrease in combat capability although the quad-packing of ESSM missiles adds to the AAW capability.  Admittedly, the differences are not huge but the fact that a frigate which is decades newer represents a bit of a step backward is disappointing.  When cost is factored in, the Perry, at around $122M in the 1980 time frame ($385M inflation adjusted to FY20), is far cheaper than the Constellation which will likely be around $1B+ even in serial production.

 

A more expensive ship with less combat capability?  That seems in keeping with the Navy, today.

 

 

Perry vs. LCS

From the start of the LCS program, there has always been the spectre of the Perry FFG lurking over it.  Many have suggested that the Perrys should have been upgraded instead of building LCSs.  Others have suggested building new Perrys.  In any event, the Navy decided to get rid of the Perry class in a move highly reminiscent of the sinking of the Spruances to eliminate their potential competition with the Navy’s desired Aegis cruisers - remove the Perrys and there could be no potential alternative to the LCS.

Once in a while it’s fun to ponder what might have been.  Just for fun, let’s look at what a Perry path could have given us compared to what we got with the LCS.

For starters, here are a few physical characteristics.

                                    Perry                           LCS

Length                        450 ft                          378 ft

Displacement            4200 t                         3500 t

Speed                        30 kts                          35 kts

Range                        4500 nm @ 20 kts     1200 nm @ 20 kts *

Draft                           22 ft                            13 ft

* Estimated from DOT&E reported data

The key physical characteristics are the speed, range, and draft. 

An LCS would be somewhat faster.  Recall that the LCS speed has been steadily downgraded such that a practical max speed is now only a few to several kts faster than a Perry.  More importantly, neither the Navy nor any LCS supporter has yet come up with a tactical use for the LCS’ speed so in comparing the two vessels speed, this is essentially a non-issue.

The range advantage for the Perry is enormous.  Again, recall that the LCS range has been steadily downgraded from the design goal of 3500 nm @ 14 kts.  Add to this the conceptual requirement for the LCS to put into port every two weeks for maintenance as opposed to the Perry’s ability to stay at sea indefinitely and the range/endurance characteristic hugely favors the Perry.

Draft is another of those ambiguous characteristics that the Navy has been unable to come up with an actual use for.  Is there really any operational benefit to a 13 ft draft versus a 22 ft draft?  Is there something useful that an LCS can do in 13 ft of water that a Perry can’t do in 22 ft?  This is another non-issue.

Now, for purposes of this comparison, we’re going to assume that the Navy continued building Perrys.  Thus, we’re not going to compare the LCS with the old, defanged Perrys that the Navy neutered.  Instead, we’re going to compare the LCS with a modern version of the Perry.  By “modern”, I mean a Perry that had been reasonably upgraded with new technology as it became available but not with non-existent technology promises like the LCS.

Seaframe.  The vessel would have the same hull but with a modern, slanted superstructure for a degree of stealth.  That’s a reasonable construction modification.  The vessel would not be a super-stealth ship but would have an easily achievable and reasonable degree of stealth.  In essence, it would have an LCS-ish superstructure.

The entire hull and machinery spaces would be built with quieting in mind (much of it was!)  Acoustic isolation, vibration dampening, and materials selection would make the ship as quiet as possible.  Prairie/Masker technology was, and will be, applied.

The stern would be modified in some fashion to accommodate waterline (or nearly so) stern launched RHIBs along the lines of the LCS’ dry well deck.  This would provide a great deal of flexibility and ease of operation for boarding and inspection (VBSS) ops and the like.

Sensors.  The main radar would be the TRS-4D supplemented by optical sensors (EO/IR).  Sonars would include a hull mounted multi-frequency sonar, a dedicated mine finding sonar, multi-function towed array, and dipping sonar (VDS or aircraft type).  Laser sensors and target designators would round out the fit.

Armament.  The bow would accommodate a 76mm gun and an 8-cell VLS along the lines of the Australian upgrade.  Free standing Harpoon box launchers would hold 8 Harpoons.  A RAM launcher would provide short range AAW.  A pair of Mk38 Mod 2 25mm remote gun systems would provide close-in protection against surface craft.  A Hellfire launcher would provide short range anti-surface, anti-swarm capability.  Two sets of triple torpedo tubes would provide anti-submarine weaponry.  Odds are that an additional one or two 8-cell VLS could be accommodated but that would remain to be seen.

Aviation.  As now, the ship would have a hangar and flight deck capable of operating two Seahawk type helos versus the LCS which can only operate one.

In summary, the Perry would be a highly proficient ASW vessel with a long range surface strike capability and a reasonable AAW self-defense and near area defense along with anti-swarm defense.  This would have been a reasonable frigate with good endurance, range, and both blue water and littoral capability.  Had we built these, they would have nicely bridged the gap between the old Perrys and a new, clean sheet frigate design.  Best of all, it would be serving as we speak compared to the current LCS with no modules and barely a Coast Guard level of combat capability.

Ah, what might have been.

Missile Inbound

ComNavOps occasionally offers a recommendation on a book of naval interest.  Today’s offering is Missile Inbound by Jeffrey Levinson and Randy Edwards (1).  The book describes the Iraqi Exocet missile attack on the USS Stark in May 1987.  Stark was hit by two Exocet missiles, killing 37 crew, and nearly sank.

One of the enduring questions surrounding the incident is why the Stark failed to defend herself.  The ship and command element certainly had every reason to anticipate danger.  As the book notes, in the months prior to the attack, Iraqi aircraft flew around 340 missions, launched 90 or so Exocet missiles and hit around 40 ships.  The Iraqi pilots were not exactly known for their discriminating targeting skills.  Thus, the Stark had ample warning that they were sailing in dangerous waters.



USS Stark



The status of the various sensors and weapons is extensively discussed and documented as well as the mental mindset of the CIC crew. 

The damage control efforts by the crew bordered on miraculous and the events are told in great detail in the form of individual crew member’s stories.  As has been repeatedly stated in this blog, the number one attribute for successful damage control is adequate (meaning excessive) numbers of crew and the book’s descriptions drive that point home.  As noted,

“… the ship did not have enough men to support critical “reflash watches” until the first rescue-and-assistance teams from the Waddell and Conyngham came aboard at approximately 0400.  Consequently, previously extinguished fires would flare up again, creating an unbearable work burden for the crew and threatening the ship.  The crew were bone-weary from fighting the conflagration, and by early morning the intense 100-degree heat and humidity of the Persian Gulf were having a debilitating impact as well.  By midmorning the crew’s effectiveness was rapidly waning as a result of exhaustion.”

The legal aftermath and subsequent investigations are explored in depth and are every bit as fascinating as the attack and saving of the ship.  Rules of Engagement are described and the conflicting requirements of self-defense and politics are spelled out.

In summary, the book is a highly readable and entertaining (if such a word can be used to describe a tragedy) writing.  It paints a compelling picture of a ship operating in a war zone with a peacetime mentality.  The various lessons from the incident should serve as pointed reminders to us, today, as we sail into unfriendly ports (Cole), go eye to eye with China, and design ships that have neither the structural strength nor manning to fight and survive in combat.

I highly recommend this book especially to readers who wish to better understand the reality of combat, ship design, damage control, ROE/politics, and how all these factors relate to our current Navy.

(1) Missile Inbound, Jeffrey Levinson and Randy Edwards, Naval Institute Press, 1997, ISBN 1-55750-517-9

Poland Upgrades Perry

Oh, the poor nation of Poland.  Those fools are about to invest $34M into upgrades on the Perry class frigate, the ex-USS Clark.  Don’t they know that the Perrys are completely obsolete and quite likely to spontaneously sink at any moment?  Don’t they know that they’re totally incapable of being upgraded?  We know that because the Navy told us that as part of the justification for the LCS.  I bet Poland wishes they had an LCS instead of an FFG with nothing more than up to 40 Standard missiles for AAW defense backed by Phalanx, Harpoon anti-surface missiles, 76 mm gun, anti-submarine torpedoes, Kaman Super SeaSprite ASW helos, and a hangar for two helos, among other capabilities.  Pity poor Poland, unable to afford a mighty war machine like the LCS.  

As reported by Defense News website, Poland has contracted with the US for a $34M upgrade to extend the operational capability of the Perry FFG until 2025.  The vessel’s combat, radio, reconnaissance, sensor, computer, and propulsion systems will be updated.

(1) Defense News, Jaroslaw Adamowski, 4-Nov-2013,  http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131104/DEFREG01/311040013/Poland-US-Sign-34M-Frigate-Modernization-Deal

Why No Frigates?

A reader on the previous post posed the seemingly simple question,

Why isn’t the Navy building frigates? 

I’d like to take a shot a answering that.  The simple answer is that with the Navy firmly committed to the LCS, building frigates now would be an embarrassment and an admission of failure.  No way the Navy will consider new frigates, at this point.  I don’t think that even needs to be discussed further.

However, I think the reader is really asking why didn’t the Navy opt to build frigates back before the LCS program was irreversibly entrenched?  There must have been a point in time when the LCS was just a drawing and the Navy could have gone either way.  What made them choose the LCS over the frigate? 

Before I go any further, let me say that aside from a few conversations with people connected with the Navy but not in any significantly relevant position to answer the question, I have no inside information as to what the Navy’s thinking was.  In other words, this post is just speculation.

Further, I’m largely opposed to the LCS and highly critical of the way the program has been executed.  That said, I’m going to attempt to answer the question as objectively as I can.

On with the answer …

Let’s go back in time to around the late 1990s or so when the LCS was still just a concept.  The Perry class FFGs were in the final third of their lifespan, budgets were beginning to feel the pinch of fiscal reality, shipbuilding costs were escalating out of control, and people were questioning the Navy’s mission since the Cold War was over and China was not yet taken seriously as a naval competitor.



Why No Frigates?



The Navy was very concerned about their share of the defense budget.  With no readily recognizable naval enemy on the horizon, the Navy was deathly afraid that their slice of the defense budget pie would shrink.  Studies and papers were commissioned to attempt to spell out and “sell” the role and importance of the Navy.  Unfortunately, the Navy failed to convey a convincing rationale for continued huge expenditures on new ships.  It looked as if the fleet was going to shrink.  What to do?

The Navy’s solution was to put forth a new enemy.  Of course, there was no actual, specific enemy but that didn’t matter.  Lacking an actual enemy, the Navy came up with “LITTORAL” – a vague place that the non-specific enemy would reside and create all kinds of havoc.  Thus, the Navy reasoned, they could sell Congress on more ships if they pushed the idea of a magical LITTORAL combat ship that could do things that no other ship could do.  We’ve already debunked that idea in previous posts but at that time it was a simple public relations exercise to push the LCS as the savior that would do battle with the littoral monster.  Thus, the LCS was born rather than a frigate which Congress might reject, citing all the existing Perrys and the cheapness of upgrades relative to new construction.

Further, I think the Navy convinced themselves that the LCS was going to be the new age frigate.  Indeed, on paper (or Powerpoint, as the case may be!) the LCS was going to be an effective MCM, ASW, ASuW platform able to transform from one role to the next in a matter of hours.  Of course, none of those paper technologies and capabilities panned out and now we have neither a frigate nor the envisioned LCS.

The insightful reader will note the zeal with which the Navy went about retiring and giving away Perry FFGs once the decision was made to go the LCS path.  Skeptics among us might suspect that that was done to pre-empt the possibility of Congress or critics suggesting that the Perrys be upgraded.  You may recall the way the entire Spruance class was Sinkex’ed to eliminate possible competition with the Aegis program.

So, there’s your answer as to why we aren’t building frigates.  The failure of the LCS is so blatantly obvious, at this point, that one can’t help but wonder where the Admiral Harvey of the LCS is.  Where’s the Admiral who will stand up and say that the Emperor LCS has no clothes and that a basic frigate would better serve the Navy and the Nation?

LSD Class Life Extensions

Well, here’s a bit of good news.  As reported by the Defense Industry Daily website (1), the Navy is performing mid-life extensions on the LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships and, in fact, has been doing so for several years.  These ships were commissioned between 1985-1998 and, with the extension, will serve until 2038.  Two ships per year are being upgraded with all modernizations scheduled to be completed by 2014.



LSD Class Upgrade - A Good Idea !



Costs for the upgrade appear to be quite reasonable by shipbuilding standards.  For example, USS Oak Hill (LSD-51) will be upgraded under a $115M contract.



The Navy should be doing far more upgrades instead of constantly wanting scrap perfectly usable ships to build ever more expensive new ones.  The Perry FFG class is a prime example.  The Navy made the conscious decision to forego maintenance and life extensions under the assumption that the LCS would be available to take over.  Of course, as it turned out, the LCS is not available in the anticipated numbers and has no capabilities.  Had the Navy extended the FFGs they would have capable ships for anti-piracy and Mid East merchant escort and patrol while buying time for the LCS program to get past its teething problems.

Let’s be fair and congratulate the Navy on a wise decision to extend the LSDs.

(1) Defense Industry Daily, http://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2012/06/ship-construction-and-naval-armor.html, 1-Aug-2012