Statistics Will Say Whatever You Want Them To Say

Here is a cost estimate for the war in Iran, as reported by Reuters and provided by the Pentagon.
 

The ​United States' war in Iran has cost $29 ‌billion so far, a senior Pentagon official said on Tuesday, an increase of $4 billion from an estimate provided ​late last month.[1]

I have serious doubts about that figure
 
How can there be any doubt or discrepancy, you ask?  Don’t you just add up the costs?  Well, it depends what you consider to be costs.  For example, it’s incredibly expensive to operate an aircraft carrier so the cost of operating one in this conflict must be significant, right?  Well, no.  That aircraft carrier was going to be operating whether it was involved in the Iran conflict or just on routine deployment.  Those costs would be the same.  Whether in a war or not, you still have to pay for the crew, food, expendables, escort ships, and so on.  That carrier costs nothing extra to operate in war versus peace. 
 
The only true costs of war are the direct, extra costs such as the additional munitions that would not otherwise have been expended.  Thus, the war cost of the carrier is only the extra munitions, fuel, and the like that would not have otherwise been used.  That’s a pretty small figure compared to $29B !
 
I can go through endless other examples but you get the idea.  The cost of the war is only the direct, extra cost.  We have to pay for all the personnel, aircraft, ships, fuel, food, etc. that we would have if there were no war.
 
So, what did the Pentagon include in their cost estimate?  Only the Pentagon knows and they aren’t saying.  As Reuters acknowledges,
 

It is unclear how the Pentagon arrived at the $29 billion figure.[1]

You can say anything you want with statistics by manipulating what you include and exclude.  Here’s a hint that the Pentagon’s estimate may include more than the direct costs.
 

Jules Hurst, ‌who ‌is performing the duties of the comptroller, told ‌lawmakers that the cost included updated repair and replacement ‌of equipment and operational costs.[1]

Repairs and replacement due to battle damage is a legitimate war cost but routine repairs and replacements that would have happened anyway, are not.  Similarly, operational costs are not a direct cost unless they are over and above routine costs.  Even munition expenditures cost zero.  Those munitions have already been paid for.  They cost nothing.  Their replacements will cost something but there has been near zero direct replacement of any of the expended munitions, as yet, since replacement takes months or years.  As Congress begins to allocate munitions replacement funding and the Pentagon begins placing production contracts, then the legitimate war costs will begin to accumulate.  And, yes, I understand including anticipated replacement costs in a war cost estimate.  That’s reasonable, if not accurate.
 
I’m certain – with no concrete evidence – that the Pentagon has loaded every cost they can think of into the cost estimate.  Why?  Because the Pentagon is not in the business of fighting wars;  they’re in the business of securing funding from Congress and a large war cost estimate is a great way to get Congress to provide additional funding.  It’s as simple as that. 
 
The Pentagon wants more money.  You don’t get more money by telling Congress the war is well within your existing budget.  You get money by lying exaggerating falsifying creative accounting to pressure Congress into giving you more money. 
 
Every cost estimate I’ve ever seen from the Pentagon has been highly, and artificially, skewed, up or down, to serve the purposes of an agenda.
 
What has this war cost?  I have no idea but I’m sure it’s not what the Pentagon says.
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Reuters website, “US war in Iran has cost $29 billion so far, Pentagon says”, Staff, 12-May-2026,
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-war-iran-has-cost-29-billion-pentagon-says-2026-05-12/

The Military is not a Business

ComNavOps continues to see examples of the military-as-as-business mindset and this is horribly wrong.  The military is not a business.  It’s not subject to business case studies.  Because it’s not a business, there are [many] times when it will be run inefficiently and that must be accepted.  For example, a business study of ship manning would point to the minimum number of sailors necessary to operate the ship.  Combat, however, demands excess crew for damage control, casualties, etc.  Inefficient but necessary.
 
It seems that the higher up the officer, the more likely they are to approach the military as a business case.  I guess this is because so many officers pursue degrees in business related studies.  By the time an officer gets to flag rank, they’re damn near accountants instead of professional warriors!
 
The military is a combat case, not a business case.  Understand it.  Accept it.  Embrace it.
 
Here’s yet another example.  This one is from a retired admiral, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, arguing for restructuring the submarine Navy as a service provider.
 
Note:  The phrase ‘as a service’ refers to a business model where a product or service is offered on a subscription basis rather than being owned outright by the customer.
 
He points out, correctly but with zero understanding of the real issue, that the submarine fleet is overworked.
 

The U.S. submarine industrial base that builds and sustains our existing fleet is not keeping pace with operational demands. Combatant Commanders’ requests for submarine capability in theater go unfulfilled.[1]

He then sets out to offer a business solution instead of recognizing the real problem is the Combatant Commander’s incessant and unjustified requests for submarines when, in reality, the submarines need to be undergoing maintenance and intensive combat training not answering useless requests from the Combatant Commanders so that they can increase the public perception of the importance of their little fiefdom.
 
Trussler suggests a ‘service’ model for submarines.
 

The “as-a-service” model—already proven in air and space—could offer a solution by using conventionally powered submarines to improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet. The goal is not to replace nuclear-powered SSNs but to ensure they remain focused on their most critical missions while using diesel-electric submarines for two key roles:
 
Providing platforms for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of new undersea technologies. This would reduce the risk and cost of fielding new capabilities by thoroughly testing their performance and tactical applicability before pulling an SSN offline for months of installation, testing at sea, and removal.
 
Expanding training opportunities. U.S.-trained civilian crews operating conventionally powered submarines could act as adversary forces in exercises, helping undersea, surface, and air forces refine their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills. These platforms could also support personnel training and qualification pipelines, ensuring crews receive adequate at-sea experience before deploying on SSNs.[1]

And, of course, he makes the usual bogus claim that this will free up nuclear subs for more important tasks.
 

… by freeing SSNs for high-end missions.[1]

We’ve already debunked this mythical claim (see, “Free Up Ships for More Important Duties”).
 
He then goes on to make a cost comparison claim (without any reference or link and the claim is highly suspect).
 

According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates, operating a Virginia-class SSN costs approximately $1.6 million per operational day. In contrast, a conventionally powered diesel-electric submarine can operate at a significantly lower daily cost—approximately 40% less than an SSN.[1]

He also proposes operating these non-nuclear subs with civilian crews.
 

By offloading lower-risk missions to commercially operated submarines with Navy-trained civilian crews, uniformed personnel can stay focused on high-end warfighting while maintaining operational proficiency.[1]

 
Discussion
 
There are several questionable aspects to this entire concept of submarines as a service.
 
For starters, no references are provided for any of the claims made in the article which makes verification and understanding of the claims difficult or impossible.  As an example, the claimed operating cost for a Virginia class submarine of $1.6M per day seems unbelievable under any reasonable assumptions.  Nuclear subs have no daily fuel costs so that pretty much leaves the crew salaries as the major operating cost.  Salaries for a crew of 135 would be something on the order of $55,000 per day.  Food would be, what, several hundred dollars a day?  So, where does the rest of the $1.6M per day come from?  My guess would be that someone is piling occasional maintenance and overhaul/refit costs onto the operating cost and perhaps other not-really-operational costs like nuclear fuel/reactor disposal costs, base facility costs, etc.  Without an itemized breakdown, I have no idea but $1.6M seems ridiculous.  This is one of those cases where you can make the number anything you want by manipulating what you choose to include or exclude in the category of operating costs.
 
Another example of unsubstantiated claims is,
 

… improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet.[1]

There is absolutely no documentation or logic to support the idea that operating a few non-nuclear subs will increase fleet readiness, improve lethality, or increase SSN availability.  Logic would suggest there is no relationship, at all, between a few non-nuclear subs and the SSN fleet.
 
Civilian submarine crews are a suspect idea.  How do we handle secrecy and security with civilians?  We don’t even share our submarine technology with our military allies so it’s hard to imagine sharing it with a civilian crew regardless of how many non-disclosure agreements you make them sign.
 
How does the chain of command work with civilians?
 
The entire premise that non-nuclear subs would free up SSNs for more important tasks is completely bogus.  Aside from having previously demonstrated that there are no ‘more important’ tasks sitting around for lack of a sub, the harsh reality is that we have more than enough subs already.  Heck, we’ve got a dozen or more subs sitting idle, pierside, just waiting for their turn at maintenance.  As an example, the Los Angeles class submarine, USS Boise, has been waiting, idle, for over eight years for maintenance.  If we think we need more subs, the solution is to our idled fleet back in service.
 
Another fallacy is that non-nuclear subs can be used to test equipment and develop tactics for nuclear subs.  They’re two different beasts.  They operate differently.  They have different noise levels, different speeds, different endurance, different dive depths, different sizes, different maneuverability, and so on.  Sure, if you want to test a new coffee maker, a non-nuclear sub is fine but if you want to test, say, a new sonar, you need the platform it will actually be installed on to get realistic and applicable results.  We already do far too much simulation testing and we’ve seen the flaws in that when we sent weapons to Ukraine and most failed or had significant flaws.
 
Having said all that, there’s nothing wrong with buying a foreign non-nuclear sub for adversary training but to embark on an entire new type of submarine because Combatant Commanders whine is stupidity on a plate.
 
We need to stop approaching the military as a business case and start viewing it as the often intentionally inefficient warfighting organization it is.
 
 

Reporting for Duty!

 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Submarines “As-a-Service” Will Get More Players on the Field Today”, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, 7-Jun-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/06/submarines-as-a-service-will-get-more-players-on-the-field-today/

Does the Navy Want the F-35C?

The Navy has never appeared to be very enthused about the F-35.  They’ve gone deep into fantasy land to rave about the wonders of the LCS, the Ford, the Zumwalt, and many other programs but the F-35 praise has been very muted.  The actual procurement numbers of F-35s has been minimal, to put it mildly. 
 
Now, however, with a war with China looming on the horizon (by the Navy’s own public statements), has the Navy’s enthusiasm for the F-35 increased?  Is the Navy requesting more F-35s, possible on a crash basis to prepare for the coming war?  Let’s check the 2025 defense spending bill.
 
Congress is in the process of finalizing the 2025 defense spending bill.  Currently, there are various versions of the bill floating around as the various groups put forth their own versions and attempt to reconcile the various versions.  The various actors and their budget versions are shown below.[1]

• President’s budget: $849.8 billion for the Defense Department
• House NDAA: $849.8 billion for the Defense Department
• House defense appropriations: Includes $833 billion in defense spending
• Senate Armed Services Committee: $878.4 billion for the Defense Department
• Senate Appropriations Committee: $852.2 billion defense spending

That’s interesting but let’s look, specifically, at the F-35 requests in the budget.

F-35
 
The President’s budget calls for 9 F-35C for the Navy, 4 F-35C for the Marine Corps, and 13 F-35B for the Marine Corps.  The other actors have similar numbers.
 
The Navy plans to buy 82 F-35C across the five year FYDP, split between the Navy and Marines.  That’s around 9 F-35Cs per year for the Navy, depending on the exact Navy-Marine split.
 
That doesn’t seem like a great deal of enthusiasm for the F-35 on the Navy’s part.
 
 
Notes
 
Here’s some related notes.
 
As you know, despite having 11 aircraft carriers, the Navy has only 9 air wings.  Two carriers have no air wing.  This is slightly understandable as one carrier is always in a mid-life refueling and overhaul.  In recent years, a second carrier has been hard down due to intensive maintenance due to deferred maintenance racked up during too many deployments for too many months.  This is not normal and is an emergency condition.
 
The real problem with this is that 9 air wings leaves us two short in the event of war when we would surge every carrier. 
 
The Navy is statutorily required to maintain 10 air wings.  Congress, as they so often do, neutered their own requirement by granting the Navy a waiver. 

The 2024 NDAA granted the Navy relief from the Title 10 requirement to stand up a 10th CVW by October 1, 2025 pending SECNAV submission of a report to congress analyzing potential approaches to the manning, operation, and deployment of a 10th CVW.[2]

Thus, Congress is complicit in the Navy’s air wing and aircraft shortfall.
 
The Navy, as they so often do, is dealing with this not by acquiring more aircraft and air wings but by playing an aircraft accounting game. 

By 2025, the Navy will have solved its strike fighter shortfall in part by changing how it will field the F-35C Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter. Instead of two squadrons per air wing with 10 tails, the Navy will now field a single squadron with 14 tails, Rear Adm. Andrew Loiselle, director of the Air Warfare Division (OPNAV/N98), told the House Armed Services subcommittee on tactical air and land forces on Tuesday. testified it was reducing F-35C Lightning II Joint Strike Fight from two to one squadron per air wing.[3]

How reducing two 10-aircraft squadrons with 20 total aircraft to one squadron with 14 total aircraft alleviates the shortfall is an arithmetic miracle beyond understanding.  Nevertheless, it’s what the Navy is doing.  This further demonstrates the Navy’s lukewarm view of the value of the F-35.

 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “F-35s, frigates and FRA woes: Here are the issues facing Congress in upcoming FY25 budget process”, Valerie Insinna, 6-Sep-2024,
http://breakingdefense.com/2024/09/f-35s-frigates-and-fra-woes-here-are-the-issues-facing-congress-in-upcoming-fy25-budget-process/
 
[2]https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/117134/witnesses/HHRG-118-AS25-Wstate-GeringB-20240416.pdf
 
[3]USNI News website, “Navy Adjusts F-35C Squadron Size to End Fighter Shortfall by 2025”, John Grady, 14-Jul-2021,
https://news.usni.org/2021/07/14/navy-adjusts-f-35c-squadron-size-to-end-fighter-shortfall-by-2025

LCS Program Cost and Opportunity Cost

Austal (USA) just launched the final LCS, the USS Pierre (LCS 38).  Now would seem an especially appropriate time to assess the financial and opportunity cost of the program.  Did we get value for our taxpayer money (the program cost)?  Was there something else we could have better spent our taxpayer funds on (the opportunity cost)?  Let’s see.
 
A cursory review reveals that we acquired
 

16x Freedom class ships (5 retired)

 

19x Independence class ships (2 retired)

 

Total LCS Ships  = 35 (7 retired)

Total Active LCS Ships = 28

 
Note:  Depending on which plan you look at, the Navy intends to retire several more Freedom class vessels over the next few years.  Essentially, the entire Freedom class is being terminated as quickly as the Navy can.
 
What did this acquisition program cost? 
 
Ship
GAO reports R&D and acquisition costs = $20.5B [2]
Unit cost = $650M [2]
 
Module
GAO reports module R&D and acquisition costs = $7B[1]
Total modules = 40 [1]
Unit cost = $175M per module.[1]
 
Total Program Cost
Total cost module and ship = $27.5B
 
 
Discussion
 
Value – The LCS has almost no combat capability.  Hence, the value for the money is near zero.
 
Opportunity Cost – The opportunity cost = $27.5B.  What could we have done with $27.5B if we had not spent it on the LCS program?  Well, the alternative opportunities are nearly endless:  munitions, mines, a dedicated minesweeper, ASW destroyer/corvette, air wings, dry docks, etc.  At this point, it’s not even debatable that almost any alternative choice would have been a better use of the funds.  In other words, the opportunity cost-value far exceeded the actual cost-value.
 
Bear in mind that this is not a case of hindsight.  Almost everyone except the Navy pointed out massive problems with the program from day one:  concurrency, lack of CONOPS, a multitude of design issues, insufficient weight and stability margins, a badly flawed manning model, a badly flawed maintenance model, lack of armament, complete absence of modules, etc.  There was no hindsight involved or required.  The problems were painfully obvious and predictable.  In fact, the term ‘predictable’ implies a small degree of uncertainty.  Regarding the LCS problems, there was no uncertainty.  The problems were 100% certain to occur, as was pointed out by … well … everyone.
 
The LCS is the poster child for a program that should never have left the back-of-the-napkin stage.  It produced no value and a staggering $27.5B wasted opportunity cost.
 
  
 
_______________________________ 
[1]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2023, GAO-23-106059, p.149
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Apr 2018, GAO-18-360SP, p.92

2024 Weapons Procurement Increase

As we’re all well aware, the US military has been hemorrhaging weapons in the form of transfers to Ukraine.  Inventories for many weapons are critically low.  It should, therefore, be safe to conclude that next year’s (2024) weapons procurement quantities should be massively increased over 2023, right? 
 
On top of that, the Navy has publicly stated that China will invade Taiwan within the next couple of years so that is, obviously, going to trigger a massive increase in weapons procurement for 2024 as we gear up for a peer war, right.
 
I’m guessing we’re going to be seeing many thousands of additional missiles budgeted for 2024, right?
 
Let’s see just how big the procurement increases are for some common weapons.  The table below shows the 2023 and 2024 procurement quantities.[1]
 

 
So, with a peer war looming and depleted inventories due to Ukraine, the Navy is ordering 218 fewer weapons than last year.  Do I really need to add any more commentary to this post?
 
__________________________

 
[1]“Highlights of the Department of the Navy, FY 2024 Budget”, p.2-9

Hypersonic Missile Target Set

The Navy (and US military, in general) has latched on to hypersonic weapons and, as is typical of the Navy, with absolutely no supporting evidence or testing that demonstrates that hypersonic weapons will be effective enough to justify their cost and other negative impacts.  We touched on this in a previous post (see, “Conventional Hypersonic Prompt Strike Missile”).

  

Speaking of cost,

 

Based on internal Defense Department estimates on the number of weapons planned, that amounts to about $106 million per missile for the Army and $89.6 million for the Navy.[1]

 

One time use missiles that cost a hundred million dollars!  How can that possibly be justified?

 

Here’s a cost for integrating – not producing! – hypersonic missile components:

 

Lockheed Martin won $347 million to integrate at least eight of those glide bodies with guidance systems, rocket boosters, protective canisters, and so on, arming a battery of four Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) launchers.[2] [ed. = $43M each]

 

The 2021 GAO Annual Weapons Assessment report cites a program cost of $3.96B ($FY21) for a quantity of 11 missiles ($360M each) without specifying what’s included in the cost.

 

While there are no reliable unit cost figures for hypersonic weapons, yet, it is clear that they’re going to be very expensive.  The first reference, citing a cost of $90M per missile for the Navy, is the most authoritative estimate that I’ve been able to find.

 

Now, with that kind of staggering cost in mind, how do we justify hypersonic weapons?

 

Well, one way would be if the destructive effects were several levels beyond devastating - a near nuclear bomb level of destructive power from a single weapon.  However, the destructive effects are nowhere near that level.  They will either depend on kinetic energy alone or use a conventional warhead which limits the size of the explosive power to conventional levels although that would be added to whatever kinetic effects there are.

 

As we’ve repeatedly demonstrated via calculations, kinetic energy, alone, is rarely sufficient to produce a useful destructive force.  Kinetic energy is also a tricky phenomenon to effectively harness.  For example, the bullet through paper analogy that I’ve often cited renders kinetic energy unusable.  Even when a physically substantial target is hit, the kinetic energy is likely to be gradually released (on a relative time scale) as opposed to the instantaneous release from a conventional explosive.  The gradual release ‘dilutes’ the destructive effect of the kinetic energy release/conversion.

 

Here’s an illustrative example of the kinetic energy effects of a hypersonic weapon.  The data is all speculative as there are no publicly available specifications, that I’m aware of.

 

Mass of common glide body = 900 kg

Velocity = Mach 5 = 3800 mph = 1699 m/s

 

     k.e. = 0.5 * mass * (velocity)squared

     k.e. = 0.5 * 900 * (3800)squared

     k.e. = 1,299,000,000 J

 

By comparison, a kg of TNT releases 4,184,000 J.  Thus, the hypersonic weapon is equivalent to 310 kg of TNT (683 lb).  A Tomahawk missile has a 1000 lb conventional warhead so a hypersonic weapon would be equivalent to less than 1 Tomahawk missile.  That’s substantial, to be sure, but it’s nothing approaching near nuclear bomb type of destruction.

 

Of course, if the warhead is heavier or lighter or the speed is greater or lesser, that would change the calculation.

 

The point is that while a weapon that is equivalent to one Tomahawk missiles is potent, it does not justify a hundred million dollar price tag when that hundred million dollars could buy 50 Tomahawk missiles.

 

We’ve discussed in previous posts that kinetic weapons (no explosive warhead) depend on the transfer/conversion of their kinetic energy into thermal energy and resulting shock/pressure effects.  In order for this to happen, the kinetic projectile must encounter sufficient resistance to quickly and efficiently transfer/convert the kinetic energy.  This is the bullet/paper problem: a bullet (lots of kinetic energy) fired at a piece of paper, will do very little damage, leaving only a bullet size hole as it passes through the paper and the paper will emerge virtually undamaged because the paper offers insufficient resistance to transfer/convert any of the bullet’s kinetic energy to the paper target.  Similarly, a hypersonic kinetic projectile that encounters a soft target like a ship will likely pass through, causing relatively little damage.  Conversely, a substantial, solid target such as a concrete bunker, fortification, or hardened aircraft shelter will offer sufficient resistance to facilitate the energy conversion and the target will be destroyed.

 

Closely related to this resistance problem is that a hypersonic missile will release/convert its kinetic energy slowly as opposed to a conventional explosive, such as a Tomahawk missile, which releases its energy instantaneously.  When you see videos of rail gun projectiles impacting targets, the targets are, invariably, steel blocks multiple feet in thickness and the projectile produces an impressive fireworks display.  However, how many real world targets consist of steel blocks a few feet thick?  A hypersonic body impacting a real world target, such as a building, is likely going to penetrate straight through the target, releasing/converting only a portion of its energy.  The remainder will be released/converted in the ground as the body continues to penetrate until it stops.  In fact, the body might well pass straight through the building, leaving only a small hole, and bury itself in the ground (the bullet through paper analogy).  What effect that underground release/conversion of energy would have on the above ground structure/target is unknown.  I’m not aware that anyone has done any realistic testing of hypersonic weapon destructive effects.  We desperately need realistic testing before we continue down the staggeringly expensive hypersonic weapons path.  It’s going to be very difficult to justify a hundred million dollar, one time use weapon.

 

A final consideration about target sets is that the hypersonic missile inventory will likely be quite small.

 

The [Pentagon] internal assessment, made available to Bloomberg News, shows an expected total of … 240 missiles for the Navy.[1]

 

Thus, we have to not only take into account the cost of a hypersonic missile but also the inventory level.  With very few missiles, we can’t waste them against anything but extremely high value targets.  We also can’t waste them against heavily defended targets.

 

Moving on, we’ve noted that hypersonics have a fairly limited target set.  With no guidance package, they can only be used against fixed targets.  In order to effectively release/convert their kinetic energy, the target has to be physically substantial.  Even a ship is likely to see a hypersonic weapon pass straight through (this phenomenon was seen often in WWII when large caliber, armor piercing shells would pass straight through a smaller target ship, causing very little damage.

 

What does all of the preceding tell us about the hypersonic weapon target set?  It tells us that valid targets must be: 

• Fixed targets since hypersonic weapons don’t have guidance packages
• Extremely high value targets to justify the cost
• Physically hard targets to trigger an effective degree of energy release/conversion
• Less defended so as not to waste expensive missiles

This excludes: 

• Area bombardment / suppression fire
• Mobile targets
• Physically soft targets such as trucks, tanks, artillery, aircraft, most buildings
• Heavily defended targets

Now, let’s consider how many real world targets fall into the valid target set?  The answer is … not many.  Examples might be a very large headquarters building, hardened aircraft hangars, underground bunkers, nuclear missile silos, and Chinese submarine pens built into mountains.  Even within this set, some of the potential targets are questionable.  For example, is it really cost-effective to destroy a hardened aircraft hangar with a hundred million dollar missile as opposed to a couple of Tomahawks?

 

The harsh reality is that the vast majority of targets are not valid hypersonic weapon targets.  These would include trucks, tanks, artillery, people, ships, aircraft, radars, and almost every worthwhile target one might find on a battlefield. 

 

Thus, hypersonics would seem to be more a one-shot, sniper type weapon for use against very high value, very constrained targets rather than a general warfare weapon.

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]Bloomberg website, “Hypersonic Sticker Shock: U.S. Weapons May Run $106 Million Each”, Anthony Capaccio, 12-Nov-2021,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-12/hypersonic-sticker-shock-u-s-weapons-may-run-106-million-each

 

[2]Breaking Defense website, “Hypersonics: Army Awards $699M To Build First Missiles For A Combat Unit”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 30-Aug-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/08/hypersonics-army-awards-699m-to-build-first-missiles-for-a-combat-unit/

FY22 Weapon System Costs

For informational purposes, following are some Gross Weapon System costs taken from the Navy budget documents[1,2] for FY2022.

 

 

Ship Program[1]	Unit Cost
Columbia SSBN	$15.0B
Ford CVN	$12.8B
Virginia SSN	$3.5B
Burke DDG	$2.4B
Constellation FFG	$1.1B
John Lewis T-AO (Oiler)	$0.7B

 

 

Of course, the ship costs are only partial costs.  For example, the Ford cost is simply the Congressional cost cap number.  Billions of dollars more have been racked up on the Ford trying to complete elevators, fix EMALS and AAG, making warranty repairs on items that were delivered damaged (main turbine generators, for example), and completion of construction items that were deferred when the Ford hit its cap limit.  Those funds are coming from unknown sources and account lines.  The Ford’s true cost is somewhere in the $15B+ range.

 

 

Weapon Program[2]	Unit Cost	Qty
Tomahawk	$2.07M	60
AMRAAM a	$1.7M	122
Standard (type unspecified)	$4.8M	125
JASSM	$1.5M	25
LRASM	$3.4M	48
NSM	$1.7M	34
Mk48 Torpedo	$2.7M	58
Sidewinder	$485,000	178
Small Diameter Bomb II	$227,000	180
RAM	$930,000	100
Joint Air to Ground Missile	$303,000	164
Hellfire	$63,000	120

 

^a from 2021; none procured in 2022

 

 

One concerning aspect is the very small procurement quantities of many of the weapon system programs.  For example, when the war with China comes, we’ll need thousands of anti-ship missiles, right?  We’re procuring 34 of the small Naval Strike Missiles per year and 48 of the larger, mainstay LRASM missiles.  Can we increase our procurement from a few dozen per year to the thousands per year that we’ll need?  It seems unlikely.  We could, conceivably, double (triple???) production but that would still leave us thousands short of what we’d need.  If a factory is producing at a rate of dozens per year, they’re not going to have the capacity to suddenly increase production by a factor of 50x or so.  What are we going to do to achieve that kind of instantaneous production capacity increase?  What’s our plan?  We don’t have a plan, as far as I know.  I’ve never heard any discussion of industrial production plans for wartime.

 

Anyway … this summary is just intended to give us a quick, concise list of some costs to help inform our weapon system discussions.  Hope this helps!

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Justification Book Volume 1 of 1, Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, May 2021,

https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/SCN_Book.pdf

 

[2]Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates Volume 1 of 1, Weapons Procurment, Navy, May 2021,

https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/WPN_Book.pdf

Unspecified Ship Construction Costs

Well, since we couldn't indulge in humor, let's try the grim reality of budgets …

As we’ve often documented, the Navy is brilliant at one thing and that is obscuring true ship construction costs with practices such as:

 

• Incomplete delivery
• Phased delivery
• Government Furnished Equipment
• Post-delivery outfitting
• R&D funds for construction
• Warranty costs
• Post-commissioning ‘refits’ that are used to complete initial construction

 

The problem for naval observers is that it’s very hard to pin down the magnitude and type of these costs and even harder to figure out which specific ships the costs are assigned to.  Here’s an example from the FY23 President’s Budget highlights document:

 

Cost-to-Complete funding for prior year shipbuilding $1.3B across all programs.[1]

 

That’s $1.3B (that’s billion !) of unspecified costs added to the construction costs of unspecified ships.  That’s for just this coming year.  Given that we’re reduced to building around five significant ships per year (not counting tugs, salvage ships, patrol boats, etc.), that works out to around $260M per ship in additional costs that should be included in construction cost totals but aren’t.  It makes oversight difficult, doesn’t it?

 

 

[1]Department of the Navy, FY 2023 President’s Budget, p.8

Duplication and Budget Grabs

The Marines believe that the Navy abandoned them at Guadalcanal so they developed their own air force in a massive duplication of effort and overlap of responsibilities.

 

Today, the Army believes that the Air Force is not providing intelligence (ISR) quickly enough for the Army’s Long Range Precision Fires program and so they’re looking to develop their own ISR effort in a massive duplication of effort and overlap of responsibilities.

 

… Army leaders, which for decades have complained that they [do] not receive the battlefield-ready ISR it needs in a timely manner from either the Air Force or the Intelligence Community (IC), are now seeking to develop their own ISR satellite payloads that they can task for themselves. (1)

 

Key … to the Army’s overarching plan for high-speed future warfare, is the ability for taskable, over-the-horizon sensors that provide the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to enable targeting of the service’s developing arsenal of very long-range weapons, or in Army-speak, long-range precision fires. (1)

 

The Army is developing their own long range precision missile strike capability (out to 1000 km) which is the Air Force’s responsibility and will result in a massive duplication of effort and overlap of responsibilities.

 

The Marines, fearing budgetary irrelevance, have scrapped their main mission and equipment and are morphing into a small unit, light infantry, missile-shooting, coastwatcher organization and are demanding their own long range anti-ship missiles, private amphibious/logistics fleet, and some type of anti-submarine warfare capability in a massive duplication of effort and overlap of responsibilities with the Navy.

 

The Army has a massive navy of their own with Besson class landing ships (LSV – Logistics Support Vessels – 300 ft, 4000 tons), LCM landing vessels, and a myriad of other logistics ships, barges, and other support ships.  The Army operates around 90 large ships and hundreds of watercraft.

 

 

As we dig down, we find that the scope and scale of duplication between the services is breathtaking and, equally astounding, is increasing.  The end result is we’re slowly but surely developing four services that are complete duplicates of each other.  

• We have four air forces.
• We have three navies.
• We have four long range missile strike forces.
• We have four ground combat forces (Army, Marines, Navy SEALs/EOD/medical, Air Force Special Warfare).
• We have four cyber forces.
• We have four ISR forces.

 

This is unwise, inefficient, and unsustainable.  Each service is spending precious budget dollars duplicating the other service’s capabilities while their own core responsibilities suffer.  For example, the Marines have no significant mobile, armored, anti-air capability and yet they’re spending their money on anti-ship and ASW.  The Army lacks mobile, armored artillery vehicles and yet they’re spending their money on duplicating the Air Force’s deep strike.  And so on.

 

We desperately need a central, controlling authority to put a stop to this massively wasteful duplication of effort.  We have several levels of such authority (President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs) but none seem willing to do their jobs and just say no to the various services.

 

Everyone is trying to fight everyone else’s battle for no good reason other than budget grabbing.  For example, the Marines were in a panic about being rendered irrelevant by the China/Pacific scenario and have been frantically encroaching on the Navy’s mission in order to remain budget-relevant.

 

This must stop.  We need someone in higher authority to put a stop to this.  It’s costing us untold sums of money to duplicate capabilities.

 

 

 

______________________________________

 

(1)Breaking Defense website, “Project Convergence 2021 Kicks Off; Showcases 110 New Technologies”, Theresa Hitchens, 12-Oct-2021

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/10/project-convergence-2021-kicks-off-showcases-110-new-technologies/

What’s Wrong With This Picture?

The Navy has repeatedly tried to early retire the entire Ticonderoga Aegis cruiser class because the Navy claims the ships are too old and too expensive to maintain and operate.

 

The Navy has tried at least twice to early retire Nimitz class carriers because the Navy says that they are too expensive to maintain.

 

The Navy early retired the Tarawa class because they claimed they were too expensive to maintain and operate.

 

 

That’s a lot of highly capable, combat-worthy ships that the Navy has gotten rid of or tried to get rid of due to claimed maintenance and operating costs.

 

 

In contrast, and disturbingly,

 

The Navy has issued multiple awards cumulatively worth up to $2.76 billion to maintain its East Coast-based Littoral Combat Ships, according to a Friday Defense Department contract announcement. (1)

 

So, the cruisers, carriers, and amphibious ship’s maintenance costs are too expensive to justify keeping them in the fleet but the LCS, with no credible combat capability, is worth nearly $3B to keep active?

 

What’s wrong with this picture? 

 

 

 

 

 

Note:  And that’s just the east coast LCS.  The west coast will, presumably, need an equal amount of money for maintenance.

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

(1)USNI News website, “Navy Issues Multiple Contracts Worth Up to $2.76B for East Coast Littoral Combat Ship Maintenance”, Mallory Shelbourne, 13-Aug-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/08/13/navy-issues-multiple-contracts-worth-up-to-2-76b-for-east-coast-littoral-combat-ship-maintenance