Submarine Anti-Air Capability

The Navy is looking to develop an anti-air missile for use in submarines (and surface ships).
 

The U.S. Navy has shared details about its vision for a new family of modular surface-to-air missiles that is expected to include a version that will arm future variants of the Virginia class submarine.[1]

The War Zone website has an interesting article about this with a decent discussion of the weapon and some of the benefits and drawbacks.[1]  The weapon is presented as a modular miracle that can include hypersonic versions, various ranges, and various packaging options and will be capable of destroying everything that flies, from drones to hypersonic ballistic missiles.  Truly a miracle weapon … as all new weapons are.
 
Will this be a common sense, evolutionary development or enhancement of an existing, proven weapon?  No!  It will be revolutionary!
 

The United States Navy (USN) is seeking a new, modular interceptor to serve as the basis for the Naval Modular Missile (NMM) program, a next-generation initiative designed to revolutionize surface naval capabilities … [1]

How many weapon systems just over the last few years have promised to revolutionize naval warfare?  Dozens!
 
How many weapon systems have actually revolutionized naval warfare?  None!
 
And yet we keep making the claim.  Hmm …
 
But, let’s get back to the specifics on this particular system.
 
The article describes the potential use by submarines to shoot down ballistic missiles in the launch/boost stage, at any point in flight, or for terminal defense as well as for use in providing AAW protection for carriers and, of course, for shooting down local ASW helos and patrol planes. 
 
To be fair, the article does briefly mention a few potential issues with this and we can think of others.
 
A submarine operating tactically close enough to a surface group to provide anti-air protection is subject to the ages old problem of blue-on-blue friendly fire.  No surface ship is going to allow an unknown submarine to operate near it on the possibility that it might be friendly.  Submarines are a sink-on-sight target, no questions asked.  It is the responsibility of the submarine to not operate near any other friendly submarine or ship because of the inability to distinguish friend from foe.
 
Every subsurface to air missile cuts into the very limited missile inventory of the submarine and reduces its offensive capability which is, of course, the submarine’s entire reason for being.  A submarine’s need for subsurface to air (SSAM) capability would be extremely rare.  Let’s face it, if you’re a submarine captain and you find you need SSAM very often then you’re not doing your job correctly!
 
A submerged missile launch requires the submarine to come to a shallow depth – generally the opposite of what a submarine wants to do in combat.
 
A missile launch creates a great deal of noise, heat, and visual display.  In other words, it likely gives away the submarine’s position.
 
Most obviously, the major issue is targeting.  A submerged submarine has extremely limited air search capabilities so where is the targeting for all these wondrous anti-air scenarios coming from?  Even the local anti-air scenario presents difficulties in targeting.  You may be able to hear a helo and have a general direction but that’s not enough for an anti-air launch.  Surface ships with exact radar pictures have a hard time establishing exact targeting for SAMs and a submerged submarine has far less chance.  Simply launching a SSAM and hoping it can find a target somewhere in the hemisphere around the sub is a recipe for wasting missiles. 
 
As far as receiving targeting from a remote platform, it is challenging, at best, to send real time targeting data to a submerged submarine without unacceptable risk to the submarine.  This also ignores the practical question of what platform could survive long enough to produce targeting data deep inside enemy waters.
 
 
Discussion
 
The SSAM inventory on a submarine would be very small unless someone wanted to abandon the submarine’s primary mission and instead perform AAW.  Is a very small inventory, meaning a very small AAW contribution, worth risking the submarine and compromising its main role?  I think not.  This smacks of yet another example of the Navy’s misguided attempts to make every platform a single-handed war winner.  We have ships designed specifically for the AAW role.  Let them do their job and let submarines do theirs which is offensive operations.  Do we want to risk (due to friendly or unfriendly fire) a several billion dollar sub trying to shoot down a million dollar missile when there are surface ships (Aegis) designed and suited exactly for that task?
 
Some might say that a submarine could be the unseen, forward AAW “shooter” with targeting provided by some other platform in a scenario analogous to the unmanned USV “shooter” vessel being placed far in front of a surface group and cued by a Burke or patrol plane .  Of course, that ignores the problem of how to communicate real time targeting data to a far distant, submerged submarine (as well as the blue-on-blue issue).  As far as I know, that’s a practical impossibility.
 
That said, it might be worthwhile having a half dozen or so SSAMs for the local defense scenario (anti-ASW helo) if the targeting issue can be solved.
 
There’s a reason why there has not been wide spread adoption of this technology among world navies.
 
 
 
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[1]The War Zone website, “U.S. Navy Is Seeking A Submarine Launched Anti-Air Missile”, Joseph Trevithick, 31-Jul-2026,
https://www.twz.com/sea/u-s-navy-is-seeking-a-submarine-launched-anti-air-missile

Criminal Negligence – USS Boise

The Los Angeles class submarine, USS Boise (SSN-764), has been waiting pier side since 2015 for routine maintenance.  The Navy has now announced that a 2024, $1.2B maintenance contract has been terminated and the vessel will be retired.
 
Boise was commissioned 1992 and served around 22 yrs until being abandoned pier side by the Navy in 2015 where it has been rotting since.
 
A perfectly good, world class submarine abandoned by the Navy because they prioritized new hulls over maintenance of existing ones.
 
We’re in a pre-war arms race with China and the Navy does this?
 
I’m not a lawyer but this is unforgivable criminal negligence, dereliction of duty, and fraudulent management of the nation’s resources by a decade of Navy leadership.  Every CNO since 2015 should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed.  It’s depressing how many of my posts end with that sentence, isn’t it?

Bye Bye Boise

AUKUS Program

There has recently been speculation that the AUKUS submarine project may be cancelled.  The speculation is likely fueled by the fact that the current administration is reviewing the program, as it’s doing with all major defense programs.  At the moment, the project is not cancelled and, I suspect, is unlikely to be though it may well be altered.
 
Let’s take this opportunity to review and reassess the program.
 
To review, the program calls for Australia to receive eight nuclear powered submarines (SSN).  Construction would be in the UK and Australia although plans have varied with time so this is probably not locked in yet.  The first delivery would not be until at least 2040.  The US has committed to providing Australia with up to five Virginia class subs as interim replacements.
 
My take is that the deal makes no strategic or operational sense, whatsoever.  Here are a few issues:
 
Strategic Situation - A few more submarines in Australia won't appreciably change the strategic situation.  The US already has enough submarines to cover monitoring the E/S China Seas and trail any Chinese subs that enter the open ocean.  Of course, this assumes that the US can get their subs to sea instead of sitting for years pierside waiting for maintenance.
 
The delivery date of 2040 or beyond also renders any discussion of near to moderate term strategic relevance nearly moot.  If Australia could, magically, operate a fleet of SSNs today, that would potentially benefit the US as we grapple with our own (long recognized and yet ignored!) submarine shortfall.  Of course, that can’t happen and by 2040+, the US plans (hopes!) to have its submarine numbers on the upswing again which makes a few more AUKUS subs much less impactful. 
 
Support - I assume Australia will have a very difficult time maintaining and crewing the subs given their well documented difficulties with the Collins class submarines.  As of November of last year, only one of the six Collins class subs was operational.[1]  Manning and maintaining nuclear subs will be even more challenging.
 
Australia will also come to find out that establishing and maintaining a nuclear industry to support the subs will be costly beyond their imagining and prove highly unpopular with the citizenry.  Establishing a nuclear technology base will be much harder than simply sending a few officers to a US/UK training course.  Nuclear technology, technicians, scientists, and support staff are not conjured out of thin air.  It would take decades to establish.
 
As has happened in the US, the Australian government will likely pass comprehensive and onerous nuclear regulations that will create significant costs.
 

Collins Class Submarine - It will only get harder with SSNs

Nuclear Storage – Disposal and storage of spent nuclear materials and reactors is an issue.  Whether Australia would attempt to take that on or whether the US would do it is unknown.  Either way, someone will have to foot the costs.  Similarly, nuclear fuel storage is an issue as would be the handling and storage of contaminated nuclear equipment that needed to be changed out as part of maintenance.
 
Basing – One of the claimed major benefits for the US is basing in Australia with access to full nuclear submarine support capabilities.  Referring back to the support issue, it seems very unlikely that there will be any significant nuclear submarine support capability in any useful time frame.  Complicating matters is that basing for nuclear vessels has far more stringent security issues than for conventional ships.  Again, this is a significant added cost for Australia that I have not heard anyone discussing, yet.
 
 
 
Alternative
 
A better approach would be to assist Australia in building a significant SSK force for use in the China/Pacific region, something the US totally lacks. These submarines could be used to monitor and control shallow water chokepoints along the first island chain, a task better suited to smaller SSKs than the larger US SSNs.  That would actually be a strategic and operational benefit for the US and Australia and the support industry already exists in Australia. Crewing and maintenance remain ongoing challenges, of course.
 
 
 
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[1]The National Interest website, “Australia Has Only 1 Collins-Class Submarine ‘In Service’”, Peter Suciu, 4-Nov-2024,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/australia-has-only-1-collins-class-submarine-service-213563

Submarine Shortfall

You’re probably heard, recently, that the attack submarine (SSN) force is declining in numbers and is projected to reach a low of around 40 (versus the publicly stated, desired target of 60-70) over the next decade and naval observers and Congress are suddenly worried.  However, this is not a new development.  The shortfall was predicted at least two decades ago.  For example, the 2014 Navy 30-year shipbuilding plan noted that the SSN level would fall from the 2014 level of 55 to less than 50 in 2020 and ultimately down to a low of 42 in 2029 and would not recover to 50 subs until 2038 and would stay at that level through 2043. 
 
The looming shortfall was not only anticipated but embraced by the Navy in 2005. 

The Navy announced in late March 2005 that it planned to reduce its attack submarine fleet to 41 from its current level of 55.[1]

Thus, the SSN shortfall was not a surprise event.  In fact, it was long anticipated and intentionally inflicted.  The Navy actually planned the shortfall !
 
In fact, given that we just noted that 18 subs are sitting in extended idle status awaiting maintenance (see, “SSNMaintenance Backlog”), the predicted low point could be closer to 30 deployable subs!
 
How did this happen?  It’s not a trick question.  For the last couple of decades we’ve been retiring subs faster than we’re building them.  For example, the 2014 30-year shipbuilding plan called for 52 retirements versus 47 launches.  That’s a net decrease of 5 subs over that time period … hence, a decrease and a shortfall. 
 
Despite anticipating the shortfall decades ago, the Navy allowed a several year gap in submarine construction between the last Los Angeles and the first Virginia.  The last Los Angeles class submarine was launched in 1995.  The first Virginia class submarine was launched in 2003.  That’s an 8 year gap.  Yes, there were two Seawolf class subs mixed in there but it was an 8 year gap between major submarine classes.
 
Even when the Virginia class began production, construction was limited to 5 launches, less than one per year, from 2003-2008, inclusive. 
 
So, facing a known shortfall, the Navy’s response was to program in an 8 year gap in production and build less than one per year for the 6 years subsequent to the gap.  Clearly, the Navy was unconcerned about the looming shortfall.  Now, however, the Navy is attempting to deflect by placing the blame and responsibility on industry for somehow failing to have adequate production capacity.
 
And still the Navy is not serious about mitigating the shortfall.  For example, the current 5-year plan calls for 10 retirements which is two per year.  Compared to the build rate of 1.2 subs per year, it’s obvious why we have a worsening shortfall.
 
According to industry, US submarine production capacity is currently limited to a theoretical maximum of two subs per year, however, the actual production rate is barely more than one per year.  The entire Virginia class has, thus far, seen 25 launches in the 21 years from 2003-2023, inclusive.  That’s a sustained production rate of only 1.2 subs per year.
 
In comparison, the Los Angeles class saw 62 subs built in the 22 year period from 1974-1995, inclusive.  That’s a build rate of 2.8 subs per year, nearly three per year!  Now, we’re down to barely one per year.
 
The Navy talks publicly about building three subs per year but that’s clearly a fantasy that’s entirely disconnected from reality.
 
The Navy had two decades to address the shortfall and consciously chose not to address it.  They are only now attempting to address it because a panicking Congress is beginning to ask questions and, even so, the only real effort the Navy is making is to try to place blame on industry instead of themselves.  That’s not addressing the shortfall, that’s addressing the public relations.
 
 
Options
 
So, what could have been done over the preceding two decades and what can we currently do to mitigate the shortfall?
 
Retirements - The obvious, immediate, short term solution is to stop retiring subs.  We early retired a dozen Los Angeles class subs with less than 20 years service (see, “Los Angeles Class Overhauls and Retirements”)!  Many more have been retired with less than 30 years.  Even subs nearing the end of their scheduled service life can be retained in an idled status against the advent of war.
 
Operational Patterns – We could have, and still should, stop deploying subs on extended cruises.  Going to a home-port maintenance and training concept, as we’ve frequently discussed, would reduce the ‘dive cycles’ and full power nuclear use which depletes the nuclear fuel and would extend the life of the subs.
 
There is value in submarine missions that map out the underwater battlefield, determine water conditions (salinity, density, currents, thermoclines, etc.), monitor and collect intel on foreign submarines, monitor enemy ASW capabilities, etc. but they do not require full combat submarines.  A much reduced capability submarine could be built for the specific purpose of monitoring, as just described.  Non-combat SSKs would be a cheap and highly effective platform for the types of data collection just listed while the bulk of the SSNs remain in a home-port training/maintenance condition, preserving and extending their life spans.
 
Capacity – The Navy had two decades to promote and develop additional production capacity and, perhaps, an additional shipyard but opted not to.  Programming in an 8 year production gap followed by 6 years of one sub per year is the opposite of building production capacity.  Instead, the Navy allowed industry’s production capacity to decrease as shipyards adjusted to lower production demands and allowed skilled workers to retire without replacement.  As industry noted, 

The presidents of both shipyards [General Dynamics and Newport News] recently said they believed they could handle three SSNs a year but that they and their suppliers would only invest in the additional infrastructure, machinery and people if the Navy sent a clear demand signal and committed to higher shipbuilding rates for a long duration.[2]

The Navy’s haphazard production program does not give industry the confidence to increase production capacity.  You may recall the 29-boat Seawolf class that was truncated to just three?  Not exactly confidence-inspiring.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The incompetence and willful disregard by the Navy in addressing the shortfall has been nothing short of stunning and constitutes dereliction of duty by a succession of CNOs, each of whom should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed.
 
Finally, let’s close this out with an hysterical lie by the Navy.  Referring to production capacity, Rear Admiral David Goggins had this to say, 

He said the Navy would not build the ships if they couldn’t properly maintain them … [2]

That’s hilarious!  Hey, Admiral … I’ve got some bad news for you.  The Navy isn’t properly maintaining any of their ships!
 
 
 
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[1]https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/scn-sub.htm
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy Confident It Could Build 3 Virginia SSNs a Year, Though More Study Needed On Shipyard Capacity”, Megan Eckstein, 18-Nov-2020,
https://news.usni.org/2020/11/18/navy-confident-it-could-build-3-virginia-ssns-a-year-though-more-study-needed-on-shipyard-capacity#:~:text=The%20Navy%20has%20just%2050%20SSNs%20today%2C%20is,goal%20of%20as%20many%20as%2080%20by%202045.

SSN Maintenance Backlog

We just read about the USS Boise (SSN-764), which has been idled since Jan 2015 awaiting dry dock availability and is finally beginning its maintenance period.  The optimistic unrealistic hope is that Boise returns to service in late 2023 or sometime in 2024 which would be an 8-9 year period of idleness.  You would hope that this is some sort of sick April Fool’s joke but it isn’t.  This is the sad reality of our naval maintenance effort.
 
Was Boise just a bad luck, bad circumstances, fluke?  How is the rest of the SSN submarine fleet doing as regards maintenance?
 
According to a just released CRS report, 37% of the SSN fleet is currently idled in, or awaiting, depot maintenance, overhauls, and dry dock availability and are non-operational.[1]  That’s 18 of the 49 SSN subs in the fleet that are sitting idle, leaving just 31 operational SSNs in the US fleet.
 
China doesn’t need to worry about our submarine fleet … it’s sitting idle.
 
Sure, we couldn’t keep SSNs, arguably the most lethal component of our military, in service but we made sure we kept building LCS so that we could retire them as they completed construction and we made sure that we built all the Zumwalts and we pushed the Ford through despite having utterly unreliable catapults, traps, and weapon elevators.
 
New hulls … yes!
 
Maintenance … no.

Our Submarine Force?

 
 
 
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[1]Congressional Research Service, “Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O’Rourke, 6-Jul-2023, RL32418

US Submarine Losses in the Pacific

I generally avoid simply repeating information from other sources but I occasionally make an exception for truly amazing works.  One such is this link[1] to a brief summary of the numbers and causes of US submarine losses in WWII.  The Navy lost 52 submarines, almost all of them in the Pacific.  Amazingly, only one was lost in the open ocean of the central Pacific.  The rest were lost near land.

 

Below is a map showing the location of each loss.

 

Please follow the link and check out the site.  You’ll find it fascinating and informative.

 

 

Here’s a few open questions you might want to ponder or comment on:

 

• What does this suggest about future submarine actions against the Chinese?  
• What does this suggest about likely operating areas in future actions?
• What does this suggest about mid-ocean enemy submarine threats?
• What does this suggest about submarine support and basing requirements?
• What does this suggest about where our ASW resources should go in a war with China and how will we support and protect those resources?
• What does this suggest about the number of submarines we’ll need to prosecute a war relative to the number of submarines we have or are capable of building (2 per year)?

 

 

 

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[1]http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/SubLosses/SS_losses-Intro.html

Submarines and ASW in the China War

The US military recognizes that the geography of the Pacific region dictates that a war with China will be a naval and air war.  What’s more, an astute - or just semi-literate – naval analyst will recognize that the war will be, substantially, a submarine war.  Of course, US Navy admirals do not qualify even for the semi-literate classification so who knows whether they recognize this or not?  Regardless, the rest of us recognize the primacy of the submarine in this conflict.  With that understanding, let’s take a closer look at  submarine warfare and its counter, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), in a war with China.

 

 

Numbers

 

The obvious starting point is numbers and both sides have submarines – something the US Navy seems to forget/ignore so let’s check each side’s respective submarine numbers.

 

China

 

China has around 64 submarines of all types with the majority being SSKs.  Excluding the SSBNs, the total is 56.  Obviously, it is very difficult to know exact numbers and there is some uncertainty about the active/inactive status of some vessels.  Acknowledging that, the numbers break down as follows:

 

 

Type	Class	Qty.
SSN	Han class (may be inactive/reserve)	3
SSN	Shang I class (Type-093)	2
SSN	Shang II class (Type-093A)	4
SSBN	Jin class (Type-094)	8
SSK	Ming class (Type-035)	4
SSK	Song class (Type-039)	13
SSK	Yuan class (Type-039A/B)	18
SSK	Kilo class (Project 877/Project 636/Project 636M)	12
	Total	64

 

 

In addition, China maintains many older SSKs in reserve status and these could play a pivotal role in a sustained war after both sides lose many of the front line submarines.

 

United States

 

The US currently has 68 active submarines that break down as follows:

 

SSBN 14

SSGN 4

SSN 50

 

Of course, unless we enter a nuclear war with China, the 14 SSBN are of no combat use which leaves us with 54 combat submarines compared to China’s 56. 

 

In addition, the US is still on the long anticipated downward trend which is projected by the Navy’s latest 30 year plan to bottom out at a low of 46 SSN in 2028 and will not reached a sustained 50+ level again until 2034.  This also assumes no additional early retirements – not a bet I’d care to take.

 

So, at the moment, the US and China have equal numbers of submarines with China being mostly an SSK force and the US being exclusively nuclear. 

 

 

SSK

 

United States naval observers keep clamoring for SSKs because they are so quiet and effective.  Turning it around, that must mean that Chinese SSKs are a major threat to us. 

 

Given the geography of the East and South China Seas, where combat can be reasonably anticipated to take place, China’s conventional submarines have significant advantages related to acoustics and stealth.  The traditional disadvantages of SSKs – range, endurance, low speed, etc. don’t really apply when operating so close to home ports.  Therefore, China, with a fleet of 47 SSKs enjoys a potentially significant tactical advantage, being able to saturate chokepoints and operating areas with extremely quiet, nearly undetectable submarines that suffer few of the SSK disadvantages.

 

Should the Chinese submarines attempt to venture out from the first island chain, the advantage would flip to the US with its nuclear subs.

Chinese Yuan Class SSK 

 

 

SOSUS

 

China has established a network of SOSUS-like listening arrays throughout the first island chain.[1, 2]  US submarines will have a difficult time penetrating the first island chain and operating undetected. 

 

On a related note, China has acknowledged having listening stations monitoring undersea activity around Guam.

 

The Chinese government has revealed the existence of two underwater sensors situated between the United States island of Guam and the South China Sea. …

 

The state-run Chinese Academy of Sciences only disclosed the pair of acoustic sensors earlier in January 2018, but had been operating them since 2016, according to a report from the South China Morning Post. One of them is in the Challenger Deep, located at the southern end of the Marianas Trench and the deepest known point on earth, and the other is situated further west near the island of Yap, part of the Federated States of Micronesia. Both reportedly can pick up acoustic signatures more than 620 miles away, putting them within range of Guam and the major strategic U.S. naval base at Apra Harbor.[3]

 

Similarly, the US and Japan have reportedly established a network of listening arrays throughout the first island chain and extending into the Indian Ocean.[4]  Chinese subs will have a difficult time operating undetected.

 

Since both sides operate listening arrays, this would seem to favor neither side.  However, the extreme quiet of the SSKs might seem to offer an advantage to China.

 

 

ASW

 

The US has much greater experience and institutional knowledge about ASW although the Navy seems intent on squandering that advantage by refusing to produce combat-effective ASW assets.  For example, the P-3 Orion was not suited to operating in contested areas and replacing it with the nearly identical P-8 Poseidon was foolish.  The LCS-ASW variant has been officially abandoned, leaving the Navy with no dedicated ASW surface vessel.  The Burkes, while ASW-capable, in theory, are woefully deficient in training and are far too expensive to risk playing tag with Chinese SSKs.

 

To compensate, the US needs to focus its submarine force o on ASW, dropping strike, ISR, special ops, and any other non-ASW mission.  This singular focus is necessary to produce maximum competency and thereby negate China’s SSK advantages.  New submarine designs and construction with this singular focus would have the effect of making subs cheaper (no VLS) and, therefore, more numerous.  It also makes them smaller and quieter.  All else being equal, smaller is harder to detect than larger.  VLS serves no purpose for the submarine’s main mission of ASW or even its secondary mission of anti-surface warfare.  If we want land attack subs then we should build dedicated SSGNs.

 

The US desperately needs to begin realistic, intensive ASW training using actual SSKs as enemy surrogates.  Some time ago we leased the services of an SSK for such training but we ended that practice and no longer have dedicated training against SSKs, as far as I know. 

 

Where is our Top Gun for submarines where dedicated enemy sub simulators and surrogates operated by exquisitely trained instructors specializing in enemy tactics teach submariners how the enemy will fight and how to defeat them?  We don’t have such training.  The Navy has made noises about establishing such an organization but has, thus far, failed to provide actual SSKs and dedicated OPFOR crews to man them.  Without that, any minor training efforts are just paper exercises.

 

Closely related to ASW training is the practice of anti-ASW, meaning the evasion and escape from, and defeat of, enemy ASW forces?  To the best of my knowledge we do not practice that at all.

 

 

Confined Waters

 

Confined, often shallower waters present unique characteristics when compared to the open ocean, deep sea waters that US submarines are used to operating in.  Salinity, density, thermoclines, depth, conductivity, acoustic propagation, etc. are all different inside the East and South China Seas.  This confers a familiarity that gives Chinese submarines a ‘home field’ advantage.  Are we actively and aggressively collecting data on the physical characteristics of the waters inside the first island chain?  I would hope so but I’m not aware of any sustained program along those lines.

 

The differing physical characteristics dictate different submarine tactics than those used in open ocean scenarios.  Are we practicing confined water (E/S China Sea) submarine tactics?  Again, I would hope so but there are no programs that I’m aware of.  While there may well be physical characteristics data collection that I’m not aware of, it is far less likely that there are tactics programs that I’m unaware of.  I know for a certainty that there is no equivalent to Top Gun.

 

 

 

Summary

 

Both sides have equal numbers of submarines with China leaning heavily towards SSKs while the US favors nuclear subs.  Both sides have listening arrays which possibly confers a slight advantage to the Chinese SSKs.

 

One would hope that we are diligently working on locating Chinese SOSUS arrays and have lans to destroy them at the outset of war.  Finding and planning/training for the Chinese SOSUS destruction would be a worthy mission for SEALS instead of being a land combat force in the Middle East.

 

Neither side possesses useful, tactically relevant ASW forces.  P-8s cannot survive in the anticipated operating area.  US surface forces are nearly inoperable as regards ASW.  When war comes we will not risk Burkes conducting ASW and, indeed, would be foolish to do so.  Burkes are nearly non-functional due to lack of training.  The LCS has been eliminated as an ASW asset. 

 

On the other hand, China is completely without submarine or ASW experience and likely has little acoustic data on US submarines.

 

The winner of the submarine/ASW fight will win the war and the winner will be the side that trains the hardest and most realistically.  While I have no knowledge about Chinese submarine warfare training, I can say that the US is not training hard, is not training productively, and is not training realistically.  That doesn’t bode well for us.

 

We just don’t seem to be serious about war.

 

__________________________________

 

[1]Forbes website, “China Builds Surveillance Network In South China Sea”, H. I. Sutton, 5-Aug-2020,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/08/05/china-builds-surveillance-network-in-international-waters-of-south-china-sea/?sh=68ef686d74f3

 

[2]http://www.hisutton.com/Cn_Underwater_Great_Wall.html

 

[3]Drive website, “China Reveals It Has Two Underwater Listening Devices Within Range of Guam”, Joseph Trevithick, 30-Jun-2019,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/17903/china-reveals-it-has-two-underwater-listening-devices-within-range-of-guam

 

[4]https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/fish-hook-sea-bed-sosus-network.448398/

Submarine Readiness

As of this writing, the US Navy has 50 attack subs and is firmly on the downward trend which has been anticipated for decades.  With an imminent war with China looming (according to Navy statements), one would assume we’re taking good care of our subs and cranking out their maintenance availabilities with great haste.

 

The fleet attack submarine breakdown, by class, is : 

• Seawolf 3
• Los Angeles  26
• Virginia  21

So, how is the maintenance doing?

 

“We’re really struggling to get submarines out on time. Over the last ten years, 20 to 30 percent [came] out on time,” said Vice Adm. Bill Galinis … [1]

 

That means 70% to 80% of maintenance availabilities ran over schedule.  That’s not good.

 

As of Thursday, 18 submarines were in some type of maintenance, PEO Submarines Rear Adm. Jonathan Rucker said … [1]

 

With only 50 attack submarines in the fleet, that’s 36% of the fleet in maintenance.

 

What’s causing the problem?

 

The earliest Virginia-class boats are among the hardest submarines to repair on time.[1]

 

“We’ve seen a significant growth in the amount of man days required in submarine availabilities, particularly in the Virginia class,” [Vice Adm. Bill] Galinis said.[1]

 

According to the Government Accountable Office, “Virginia class submarines have returned to operations almost nine months later than expected, on average; Los Angeles class submarines have taken four and a half months longer than scheduled, on average, to return to the fleet.[1]

 

What’s the problem with the Virginia class.  After all, they’re the newest submarines we have so they should have the least maintenance problems, right?

 

The Virginias were designed to operate closer to shore and with components that met rigorous NAVSEA standards for submarine safety, but were not as durable as some of the older components on the Los Angeles-class boats.[1]

 

“Where we were in the beginning of the Virginia class, we had a charge early on to build a design and build a submarine for an affordable cost to make sure we got the numbers we needed.”[1]

 

So, by their own admission, the Navy ‘cheaped out’ on Virginia class subs and now they’re suffering extended maintenance issues and, apparently, poorer quality components.  That’s what happens when you design to a business case instead of a combat case.

 

And now, let’s listen to the Navy rationalize away the problem:

 

“If you throw a rudder over on the Titanic, it takes a while for the ship to turn,” Rucker told USNI News.  “It’s going to take a little bit of time, just because there’s a lag and getting the resources or changing behavior or ensuring that we plan better for what we’re going to do.”[1]

 

The maintenance delays have been on-going for a decade, at least, admiral.  How much more time do you need to ‘throw the rudder over’?

 

 

 

________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “NAVSEA: Navy ‘Struggling’ to Get Attack Subs Out of Repairs on Time as Demand Increases”, Sam LaGrone, 21-Sep-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/09/21/navsea-navy-struggling-to-get-attack-subs-out-of-repairs-on-time-as-demand-increases

USS Connecticut, SSN-22, Collision and Repair Timeline

It has been 9 months since USS Connecticut, SSN-22, suffered an underwater collision with a sea mount in the South China Sea.  Let’s review the timetable with an eye towards what this tells us about our potential wartime battle damage repair capability and capacity.

 

 

2-Oct-2021        Collision with sea mount in South China Sea

8-Oct-2021        Arrived Guam for temporary repairs

4-Nov-2021       CO, XO, COB reported relieved

18-Nov-2021      Leaves Guam for temporary repair sea trial

12-Dec-2021      Arrives San Diego after surface transit from Guam

15-Dec-2021      Left San Diego, CA

20-Dec-2021      Arrived Puget Sound for thorough damage assessment

21-Dec-2021      Arrived Bremerton, WA for repairs

?-Feb-2023        Scheduled start of permanent repairs

 

The damage is expected to be repaired during a scheduled Extended Docking Selected Restricted Availability starting in February 2023.[2]

 

If – and that’s a very big ‘if’ – the repairs start on time in Feb 2023, it will have been 16 months since the collision.  That’s a pretty poor repair response for peacetime and would be atrocious during war. 

 

Here is what little we know about the extent of the damage.  Based on photos – because the Navy isn’t saying anything – the bow was sheared off (or removed as part of temporary repairs) and the sonar dome is gone, presumably resting at the bottom of the South China Sea.[2]  Reports suggest that the rudder is damaged, as well.

 

What will that cost to repair?  Here is a hint at the magnitude of the eventual repair bill.

 

Buried deep in the National Defense Authorization Act, two lines—crafted to prevent easy searching—authorize the Navy to receive an initial tranche of $50 million in repair funds—$10 million for a “spare Seawolf class bow dome” (page 1815) and $40 million for “USS Connecticut emergent repairs” (page 1850).[1]

 

That’s $50M just for the beginning of the repair bill, largely intended to cover long lead items.  A reasonable guess would put the final repair bill in the $300M-$400M range.

 

As a comparison, here is the cost and timing for a similar repair on the Los Angeles class submarine, USS San Francisco:

 

In 2005, the USS San Francisco, a Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine, also struck an underwater mountain, a crash that killed a sailor and injured 97 others. It took 3 1/2 years in Puget Sound to install a sonar dome from the decommissioned USS Honolulu onto the boat, in maintenance that in total cost $134 million.[3]

 

USS San Francisco

The USS McCain required 2 yrs and 2 months to complete repairs.  The USS Fitzgerald required 3 yrs to return to active duty and repair costs were reported as $327M[4].

 

We’re looking at a 2025-2026 time frame to return to active service.  That’s four or five years to effect repairs and that’s only if the repairs start on time which I strongly doubt will happen. 

 

This incident and the Navy’s near state of paralysis regarding the repairs tells us what we need to know about our ability to deal with wartime battle damage … we have no abililty!

 

Damage repair, whether due to combat or accidents, is critical for the maintenance of a strong fleet.  Our repair capacity is almost non-existent, repair timelines are terrible, and costs are enormous.  Our repair response is atrocious.  We have no ability to ‘surge’ a repair. 

 

‘Surge’ a repair?  Yes!  If you recall, the USS Yorktown, CV-5, was badly damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea.  Repair estimates were for 90 days.  In a massive repair surge, Yorktown was repaired in 3 days and sailed to participate in the Battle of Midway.  The repair surge involved 1400 men and required rolling blackouts in Hawaii to supply the required power for the repair effort.

 

Connecticut’s repair surge is going to require something on the order of 4-5+ years.

 

Yikes!

 

We are not ready for war.

 

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Forbes website, “Congress Authorizes Millions For Repairs Of USS Connecticut”, Craig Hooper, 20-Dec-2021,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/12/20/congress-authorizes-millions-for-uss-connecticut-ssn-22-repairs/?sh=24e12022656c

 

[2]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Comments On USS Connecticut Submarine”, Peter Ong, 5-Jul-2022,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/07/u-s-navy-comments-on-uss-connecticut-submarine/

 

[3]Yahoo News website, “USS Connecticut, damaged in crash with underwater mountain, arrives in Bremerton”, Josh Farley, 21-Dec-2021,

https://www.yahoo.com/news/uss-connecticut-damaged-crash-underwater-220043902.html

 

[4]USNI News website, “USS Fitzgerald Leaves Mississippi Drydock After More Than a Year of Repairs”, Sam LaGrone, 16-Apr-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/04/16/uss-fitzgerald-leaves-mississippi-drydock-after-more-than-a-year-of-repairs

 

Hurry Up and Wait

You may have heard the USS Boise (SSN-764, Los Angeles class), which has been sitting idle since 2015 and has long since lost its dive certification, is finally, maybe, scheduled to begin maintenance later this year … maybe … history suggests more delays will occur.(2)

USS Boise - Abandoned and Forgotten

Several other subs have been waiting multiple years and have lost their dive certifications.

 

In fact, the idle time accumulated by submarines waiting for maintenance is stunning.  Here’s what a GAO study found:

 

Last year, the Government Accountability Office found that in total, between 2008 and 2018, attack boats waiting to go into maintenance had sat idle for 10,363 days. (1)

 

A quick calculation shows us that 10,363 days is 28.4 years of idle wait time for maintenance.  That’s a lot of submarine idleness … and the Navy wants more ships and a bigger fleet?  That is mismanagement on a nearly criminal scale and should at least be grounds for recalling several retired CNOs to active duty for the purpose of instituting courts martial for gross negligence.

 

So, not only is there a shortage of numbers of submarines but the Russian US Navy can’t keep the ones they do have operational.   We quite literally have submarines sitting pier side, rotting.

 

Congress should cut all new construction ship funding until the Navy demonstrates that it can properly maintain the ships it has. 

 

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

(1)Defense News website, “With the Navy’s submarine maintenance woes, there may yet be hope”, David B. Larter, 7-May-2019,

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/navy-league/2019/05/08/among-the-navys-submarine-maintenance-woes-there-may-yet-be-hope/

 

(2)Navy Times website, “The Navy’s saddest fast-attack sub will finally get the tender loving maintenance it needs”, Geoff Ziezulewicz, 29-Apr-2021,

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2021/04/29/the-navys-saddest-fast-attack-sub-will-finally-get-the-tender-loving-maintenance-it-needs/